dc.contributor.advisor | Mjølsnes, Stig Frode | nb_NO |
dc.contributor.advisor | Gligoroski, Danilo | nb_NO |
dc.contributor.author | Glendrange, Magnus | nb_NO |
dc.contributor.author | Hove, Kristian | nb_NO |
dc.contributor.author | Hvideberg, Espen | nb_NO |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-12-19T14:13:52Z | |
dc.date.available | 2014-12-19T14:13:52Z | |
dc.date.created | 2010-10-07 | nb_NO |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | nb_NO |
dc.identifier | 355716 | nb_NO |
dc.identifier | ntnudaim:5478 | nb_NO |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/262321 | |
dc.description.abstract | We have participated in the creation of almost two terabytes of tables aimed at cracking A5/1, the most common ciphering algorithm used in GSM. Given 114-bit of known plaintext, we are able to recover the session key with a hit rate of 19%. The tables are expected to be unique as they provide the best coverage yet known to the authors, and they are the first step in a real-world passive attack against GSM. An initial investigation and analysis into the air interface of GSM were performed, from both a theoretical and practical point of view. These examinations would be essential in order to utilize the generated tables in a practical attack.Additionally, a rogue GSM network was built and deployed without enabling ciphering and frequency hopping. This active attack was purely based on open-source software and hardware, implying that real GSM networks could be spoofed with resources available to the general public. | nb_NO |
dc.language | eng | nb_NO |
dc.publisher | Institutt for telematikk | nb_NO |
dc.subject | ntnudaim:5478 | no_NO |
dc.subject | SIE7 kommunikasjonsteknologi | no_NO |
dc.subject | Nett og tjenester | no_NO |
dc.subject | Telematikk | no_NO |
dc.title | Decoding GSM | nb_NO |
dc.type | Master thesis | nb_NO |
dc.source.pagenumber | 213 | nb_NO |
dc.contributor.department | Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet, Fakultet for informasjonsteknologi, matematikk og elektroteknikk, Institutt for telematikk | nb_NO |