Loan-to-Value Regulations on Mortgages and the Use and Refinancing of Unsecured
Peer reviewed, Journal article
Published version
Date
2022Metadata
Show full item recordCollections
Original version
https://doi.org/10.1080/08965803.2022.2109654Abstract
We study how loan-to-value (LTV) regulations on mortgages can change the use of unsecured debt and mortgage refinancing behaviors for households at or near the regulatory limits imposed. This study focuses on the differences in unsecured debt market participation between Norway and Sweden, where LTV regulations are in effect, and Denmark and earlier studies, where no LTV limits are imposed. We analyze the unsecured debt loan market using data from a repeated household survey from 2019 and 2021 with 4,010 and 3,023 respondents, respectively. We also explore mortgage lending and unsecured debt using a unique micro data set covering 7,385 Norwegian households. Our analysis shows that unsecured debt increases with LTV level but that households’ refinancing behaviors explain the lower increase in unsecured household debt at or near the regulatory limit for LTV on mortgages. We further demonstrate that an increasing number of households cannot refinance unsecured debt with mortgage debt. This lack of ability can lead to a rapid increase in the number of financially vulnerable households. We are the first to demonstrate that changes in different debt sources and refinancing patterns can increase the number of financially vulnerable households when LTV regulations are imposed solely on mortgage debt.