Verifiable Mix-Nets and Distributed Decryption for Voting from Lattice-Based Assumptions
Journal article, Peer reviewed
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Date
2023Metadata
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Original version
Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security. 2023, 1467-1481. 10.1145/3576915.3616683Abstract
Cryptographic voting protocols have recently seen much interest from practitioners due to their (planned) use in countries such as Estonia, Switzerland, France, and Australia. Practical protocols usually rely on tested designs such as the mixing-and-decryption paradigm. There, multiple servers verifiably shuffle encrypted ballots, which are then decrypted in a distributed manner. While several efficient protocols implementing this paradigm exist from discrete log-type assumptions, the situation is less clear for post-quantum alternatives such as lattices. This is because the design ideas of the discrete log-based voting protocols do not carry over easily to the lattice setting, due to specific problems such as noise growth and approximate relations.
This work proposes a new verifiable secret shuffle for BGV ciphertexts and a compatible verifiable distributed decryption protocol. The shuffle is based on an extension of a shuffle of commitments to known values which is combined with an amortized proof of correct re-randomization. The verifiable distributed decryption protocol uses noise drowning, proving the correctness of decryption steps in zero-knowledge. Both primitives are then used to instantiate the mixing-and-decryption electronic voting paradigm from lattice-based assumptions.
We give concrete parameters for our system, estimate the size of each component and provide implementations of all important sub-protocols. Our experiments show that the shuffle and decryption protocol is suitable for use in real-world e-voting schemes.