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dc.contributor.authorde Kock, Bor
dc.contributor.authorGjøsteen, Kristian
dc.contributor.authorVeroni, Mattia
dc.date.accessioned2022-09-14T12:42:55Z
dc.date.available2022-09-14T12:42:55Z
dc.date.created2021-08-16T13:35:02Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.identifier.citationLecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS). 2021, 12804 451-479.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0302-9743
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/3017855
dc.description.abstractWe exploit the Diffie-Hellman-like structure of CSIDH to build a quantum-resistant authenticated key-exchange algorithm. Our security proof has optimal tightness, which means that the protocol is efficient even when instantiated with theoretically-sound security parameters. Compared to previous isogeny-based authenticated key-exchange protocols, our scheme is extremely simple, its security relies only on the underlying CSIDH-problem and it has optimal communication complexity for CSIDH-based protocols. Our security proof relies heavily on the re-randomizability of CSIDH-like problems and carries on in the ROM.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherSpringer, Chamen_US
dc.titlePractical Isogeny-Based Key-Exchange with Optimal Tightnessen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.typePeer revieweden_US
dc.description.versionacceptedVersionen_US
dc.rights.holder© 2021 Springer Nature Switzerland AGen_US
dc.source.pagenumber451-479en_US
dc.source.volume12804en_US
dc.source.journalLecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/978-3-030-81652-0
dc.identifier.cristin1926318
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextpostprint
cristin.qualitycode1


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