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dc.contributor.authorBjarghov, Sigurd
dc.contributor.authorAskeland, Magnus
dc.contributor.authorBacke, Stian
dc.date.accessioned2021-02-23T13:54:05Z
dc.date.available2021-02-23T13:54:05Z
dc.date.created2020-10-19T17:18:45Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.identifier.isbn978-1-7281-6919-4
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/2729893
dc.description.abstractLocal peer-to-peer (P2P) markets are envisioned as a promising market design to integrate the increasing number of agents in the distribution grid. To incentivize grid-friendly consumption profiles, we suggest a subscribed capacity tariff where end-users pay for a capacity level with a high excess energy term. The P2P market functions as a capacity market where end-users buy capacity from other agents when needed. We demonstrate the concept by formulating the local P2P market equilibrium problem as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP). Analysis of a neighborhood case study shows that both aggregated peak load and agent costs decreases.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)en_US
dc.relation.ispartof2020 17th International Conference on the European Energy Market - EEM
dc.relation.urihttps://doi.org/10.1109/EEM49802.2020.9221966
dc.titlePeer-to-peer trading under subscribed capacity tariffs - an equilibrium approachen_US
dc.typeChapteren_US
dc.description.versionacceptedVersionen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/EEM49802.2020.9221966
dc.identifier.cristin1840652
dc.relation.projectNorges forskningsråd: 257660en_US
dc.relation.projectNorges forskningsråd: 257626en_US
dc.description.localcode© 2020 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.en_US
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextpostprint
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