Comparison of Cost Allocation Strategies among Prosumers and Consumers in a Cooperative Game

Abstract

As the higher penetration of distributed generation (DG) and electrical energy storage (EES) is emerging, end-users are taking a more active role in the power grid. With an increased amount of DG and EES available, opportunities for cooperation in the operation of power exchange arises. In cooperative game theory, for all players in a game cooperate under joint benefits. Preliminary studies show such cooperation among prosumers and consumers provides reduced annual electricity cost compared to independent operation. Focusing on cost allocation among end-users equipped with rooftop PV and batteries, we want to evaluate two solution concepts from game theory; the nucleolus and the Shapley value. By changing parameters that increase the value of the battery system in terms of reduced cost, this paper aims to examine whether the deviation between the cost allocations proposed by the methods increases as the value of the battery system is changed. The simulated case is based on data from private residences in Norway. Results from our case show that both nucleolus and Shapley provide stable cost allocations under minor deviations. However, results also imply that the deviation between the methods increases with an increased battery system value.