dc.contributor.author | Knowles, Jonathan | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-05-09T10:38:49Z | |
dc.date.available | 2018-05-09T10:38:49Z | |
dc.date.created | 2014-01-16T14:16:01Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2013 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. 2013, XXI 199-201. | nb_NO |
dc.identifier.issn | 1022-3398 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2497749 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper is about the relationship between anti-sceptical arguments that reflect on the (alleged) possibility that we might be a brain in a vat, and different conceptions of perceptual experience. I argue that while the former fail in their remit as anti-sceptical, their significance should instead be understood in terms of a conception of experience on which sceptical issues do not arise. | nb_NO |
dc.language.iso | eng | nb_NO |
dc.publisher | Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society | nb_NO |
dc.title | On envatment, experience and epistemology | nb_NO |
dc.type | Journal article | nb_NO |
dc.type | Peer reviewed | nb_NO |
dc.description.version | acceptedVersion | nb_NO |
dc.source.pagenumber | 199-201 | nb_NO |
dc.source.volume | XXI | nb_NO |
dc.source.journal | Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society | nb_NO |
dc.identifier.cristin | 1091936 | |
dc.relation.project | Norges forskningsråd: 217425 | nb_NO |
dc.description.localcode | This article will not be available due to copyright restrictions (c) 2013 by Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society | nb_NO |
cristin.unitcode | 194,62,70,0 | |
cristin.unitname | Institutt for filosofi og religionsvitenskap | |
cristin.ispublished | true | |
cristin.fulltext | postprint | |
cristin.qualitycode | 1 | |