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dc.contributor.authorKnowles, Jonathan
dc.date.accessioned2018-05-09T10:38:49Z
dc.date.available2018-05-09T10:38:49Z
dc.date.created2014-01-16T14:16:01Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.citationContributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. 2013, XXI 199-201.nb_NO
dc.identifier.issn1022-3398
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2497749
dc.description.abstractThis paper is about the relationship between anti-sceptical arguments that reflect on the (alleged) possibility that we might be a brain in a vat, and different conceptions of perceptual experience. I argue that while the former fail in their remit as anti-sceptical, their significance should instead be understood in terms of a conception of experience on which sceptical issues do not arise.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Societynb_NO
dc.titleOn envatment, experience and epistemologynb_NO
dc.typeJournal articlenb_NO
dc.typePeer reviewednb_NO
dc.description.versionacceptedVersionnb_NO
dc.source.pagenumber199-201nb_NO
dc.source.volumeXXInb_NO
dc.source.journalContributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Societynb_NO
dc.identifier.cristin1091936
dc.relation.projectNorges forskningsråd: 217425nb_NO
dc.description.localcodeThis article will not be available due to copyright restrictions (c) 2013 by Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Societynb_NO
cristin.unitcode194,62,70,0
cristin.unitnameInstitutt for filosofi og religionsvitenskap
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextpostprint
cristin.qualitycode1


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