dc.contributor.author | Armknecht, Frederik | |
dc.contributor.author | Boyd, Colin Alexander | |
dc.contributor.author | Davies, Gareth Thomas | |
dc.contributor.author | Gjøsteen, Kristian | |
dc.contributor.author | Toorani, Mohsen | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-03-06T12:11:53Z | |
dc.date.available | 2018-03-06T12:11:53Z | |
dc.date.created | 2018-01-19T11:16:29Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2017 | |
dc.identifier.isbn | 978-1-4503-4944-4 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2488888 | |
dc.description.abstract | Deduplication removes redundant copies of files or data blocks stored on the cloud. Clientside deduplication, where the client only uploads the file upon the request of the server, provides major storage and bandwidth savings, but introduces a number of security concerns. Harnik et al. (2010) showed how cross-user client-side deduplication inherently gives the adversary access to a (noisy) side-channel that may divulge whether or not a particular file is stored on the server, leading to leakage of user information. We provide formal definitions for deduplication strategies and their security in terms of adversarial advantage. Using these definitions, we provide a criterion for designing good strategies and then prove a bound characterizing the necessary trade-off between security and efficiency. | nb_NO |
dc.language.iso | eng | nb_NO |
dc.publisher | Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) | nb_NO |
dc.relation.ispartof | Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security | |
dc.title | Side channels in deduplication: trade-offs between leakage and efficiency | nb_NO |
dc.type | Chapter | nb_NO |
dc.description.version | acceptedVersion | nb_NO |
dc.source.pagenumber | 266-274 | nb_NO |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1145/3052973.3053019 | |
dc.identifier.cristin | 1547315 | |
dc.relation.project | Norges forskningsråd: 248166 | nb_NO |
dc.description.localcode | © ACM, 2017. This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here by permission of ACM for your personal use. Not for redistribution. The definitive version was published in ACM Transactions of Computing Education, https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=3052973.3053019 | nb_NO |
cristin.unitcode | 194,63,30,0 | |
cristin.unitcode | 194,63,15,0 | |
cristin.unitname | Institutt for informasjonssikkerhet og kommunikasjonsteknologi | |
cristin.unitname | Institutt for matematiske fag | |
cristin.ispublished | true | |
cristin.fulltext | postprint | |
cristin.qualitycode | 1 | |