| dc.contributor.author | Molnar, Peter | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2017-10-03T07:18:03Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2017-10-03T07:18:03Z | |
| dc.date.created | 2013-11-26T12:25:50Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2013 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Economics Bulletin. 2013, 33 (3), 1840-1846. | nb_NO |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1545-2921 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2457883 | |
| dc.description.abstract | We study multiunit uniform price auctions where the seller is allowed to decrease the quantity supplied in order to maximize his profit. We show that he never chooses to do so in equilibrium. However, the existence of this option eliminates such equilibria where objects for sale are sold for too low a price. Our model explains the size of underpricing in Treasury auctions and provides guidance for the design of uniform price auctions. | nb_NO |
| dc.language.iso | eng | nb_NO |
| dc.publisher | Economics Bulletin | nb_NO |
| dc.title | Uniform price auctions with profit maximizing seller | nb_NO |
| dc.type | Journal article | nb_NO |
| dc.type | Peer reviewed | nb_NO |
| dc.description.version | publishedVersion | nb_NO |
| dc.source.pagenumber | 1840-1846 | nb_NO |
| dc.source.volume | 33 | nb_NO |
| dc.source.journal | Economics Bulletin | nb_NO |
| dc.source.issue | 3 | nb_NO |
| dc.identifier.cristin | 1069404 | |
| dc.relation.project | Norges forskningsråd: 199908 | nb_NO |
| dc.description.localcode | © 2013 The Authors. This is an article published by Economics Bulletin. | nb_NO |
| cristin.unitcode | 194,60,25,0 | |
| cristin.unitname | Institutt for industriell økonomi og teknologiledelse | |
| cristin.ispublished | true | |
| cristin.fulltext | postprint | |
| cristin.qualitycode | 1 | |
