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dc.contributor.authorNes, Sven Anders
dc.date.accessioned2024-02-08T14:23:03Z
dc.date.available2024-02-08T14:23:03Z
dc.date.created2024-01-02T12:12:45Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.identifier.citationErkenntnis: An International Journal of Scientific Philosophy. 2023, .en_US
dc.identifier.issn0165-0106
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/3116434
dc.description.abstractEmotions, like actions, this paper argues, are typically embodied processes that are responsive to reasons, where these reasons connect closely with the agent’s desires, intentions, or projects. If so, why are emotions, nevertheless, typically passive in a sense in which actions are not; specifically, why are emotions not cases of doing something intentionally? This paper seeks to prepare the ground for answering to this question by showing that it cannot be answered within a widely influential framework in the philosophy of action that has been dubbed the Standard Conception of Action, shared by such diverse theorists as G.E.M. Anscombe, Donald Davidson, Jennifer Hornsby, Michael Smith. and Michael Thompson. The Standard Conception approaches agency via the notion of someone’s doing something intentionally, and links the latter notion closely to that of doing something for a reason, so as to imply ‘Anscombe’s Thesis’ that, if someone is doing something for a reason, they are doing it intentionally. The paper shows how emotions, as reason-responsive embodied processes, counterexemplify this claim. Qua processes, they can aptly be described in the progressive, as cases of trembling with fear, exploding with anger, etc. They are a kind of ‘doing’ something, for a reason, yet not intentionally.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.rightsNavngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.no*
dc.titleWhy are Actions but not Emotions Done Intentionally, if both are Reason-Responsive Embodied Processes?en_US
dc.title.alternativeWhy are Actions but not Emotions Done Intentionally, if both are Reason-Responsive Embodied Processes?en_US
dc.typePeer revieweden_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.description.versionpublishedVersionen_US
dc.source.pagenumber0en_US
dc.source.journalErkenntnis: An International Journal of Scientific Philosophyen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10670-023-00756-6
dc.identifier.cristin2218837
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextoriginal
cristin.qualitycode2


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Navngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Navngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal