What Self in Self-Organisation? Engaging Varela’s Epistemology for the Co-Embodied Self

Abstract

bodily and joint co-embodied processes so that the self is already and constitutively social. I focus on an early article by Francisco Varela, “Not one, not two”, to argue that his non- dualistic epistemology entails a paradigm shift towards a fundamentally co-embodied, and thus social view of self. Varela argued that the mind-body duality could be resolved by understanding the mind as embodied. Both Varela and Thompson have later elaborated on this and suggested an enactive, essentially embodied view of the self in terms of self-organized, organismic autonomy. I will argue that the enactive view of the self remains ambiguous with regards to the role of social interactions: are they constitutive for the minimal self-organization of the self or do they only play a shaping, secondary factor? I rely on Varela’s epistemology in “Not one, not two” to support my argument that the minimal self-organizational network that is the human self entails both individual