| dc.description.abstract | Denne tolkningen har hatt som mål å vurdere Staten med et hermeneutisk blikk, i stor grad basert på Gadamers grunnprinsipper. Det har i så måte ikke vært et mål å avklare, en gang for alle, hvordan den tallteoretiske påvirkningen gjør seg gjeldende i Staten eller hvorvidt Sokrates evner å vise, en gang for alle, at dikaiosyne er godt i og for seg selv. Oppgaven har hatt som hovedmål å sannsynliggjøre at dialogen sentrerer om begrepet dikaiosyne og hvordan dette skal begripeliggjøres, som har gjort seg gjeldende i to hypoteser: H1: Det er Thrasymachos feiloppfatninger om begrepet dikaiosyne som utgjør hans dialektiske rolle, ikke hans påståtte ‘natrurettsideologier’. Og H2: Sokrates utvikler et allerede eksisterende begrepsinnhold når han viser at dikaiosyne frembringer harmoni og samklang i borgerens og statens sjel. Dette begrepsinnholdet har mange kommentatorer oversett, da grunnet en diakron endring, slik denne oppgaven har tolket det. Til sist, begrepet dikaiosyne utvikles forbi det som kan sies å være et etablert datidig begrepsinnhold ved å benytte seg av datidens moderne vitenskap, tallteorien. Sokrates forsøker, særlig, å forsvare hvordan Statsoverhodets avgjørelser, som ofte går på bekostning av den individuelle borger, allikevel tjener denne individuelle borgeren, ved å trekke på tallteori. | |
| dc.description.abstract | This reading of Plato’s seminal dialogue The Republic aims to view it through a hermeneutical lens, based upon Hans-Georg Gadamer’s mode of interpretation as outlined in his magnum opus Truth and Method. In that sense, it is not the primary objective of this master’s thesis to ascertain, once and for all, how number theory has influenced the overall argument of The Republic or whether or not Socrates is able to prove, once and for all, that dikaiosyne (‘justice’, gr.) is good in and by itself. Rather, this thesis primarily aims to actualize the notion that the springing question in the dialogue is the concept of dikaiosyne and whether or not this concept is to be understood as a virtue. This thesis takes the form of two interrelated hypotheses: 1. The way in which Thrasymachus is mistaken about dikaiosyne is the reason for his instructive role in the dialogue, not his purported “natural right doctrine”, as some commentators propose. 2. Socrates expounds on an already existing conceptual understanding (or “usage”) of the term in displaying how dikaiosyne engenders harmony and unison in the state’s and in the citizen’s soul. That the ancient Greek conceptual understanding and usage of the term dikaiosyne greatly diverges from the present-day conceptual understanding and usage of ‘justice’ is lost on a number on key commentators in the secondary literature. This is, in large part, due to the diachronic change which the term has been subject to in the space of the nearly two and a half millennia that separate them and the text itself. Or, so I argue. Finally, the concept of dikaiosyne is expounded on in the dialogue past what can reasonably be said to have been existing conceptional understanding at the time, in large part by fusing the general notions of individual and political souls (and their interconnection) with what was viewed as the ‘modern science’ of the time, namely number theory. Socrates attempts, in particular, to open up the possibility that the Head-of-state’s decisions (“philosopher king”), some of which naturally go against the interest of particular citizens, still yield the individual citizen a greater kind of profit unachievable without said Head-of-state. Socrates achieves this by drawing on, similarly, number theory. Or, so I argue. | |