dc.contributor.author | Sommervoll, Dag Einar | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-09-22T11:25:34Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-09-22T11:25:34Z | |
dc.date.created | 2020-08-19T12:44:40Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Housing Economics. 2020, 49 1-10. | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 1051-1377 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/11250/2780299 | |
dc.description.abstract | The lion’s share of Norwegian homes changes hands through closely monitored and regulated auctions. Some housing market experts advocate the supremacy of a jump bid, a significant bid increase to discourage fellow bidders, and thereby acquire the dwelling at a lower price compared to bidding strategy with moderate bid increases. We find no evidence for the efficacy of this jump bid strategy. Jump bidders, if successful, pay a positive jump premium. This also applies to the case where the jump is not the final bid and the jump bidder win at a later stage. In this case, the jump bid premium is around 1 to 2%. However, a jump bid is a credible signal of “serious intentions”. Jump bidders tend to win auction more often even in cases, where the jump bid is matched, and the auction continues. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | eng | en_US |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | en_US |
dc.relation.uri | https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1051137720300498?via%3Dihub | |
dc.title | Jump bids in real estate auctions | en_US |
dc.type | Peer reviewed | en_US |
dc.type | Journal article | en_US |
dc.description.version | publishedVersion | en_US |
dc.rights.holder | This version of the article will not be available due to copyright restrictions by Elsevier | en_US |
dc.source.pagenumber | 1-10 | en_US |
dc.source.volume | 49 | en_US |
dc.source.journal | Journal of Housing Economics | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jhe.2020.101713 | |
dc.identifier.cristin | 1824026 | |
cristin.ispublished | true | |
cristin.fulltext | original | |
cristin.qualitycode | 1 | |