| dc.description.abstract | The Norwegian Animal Welfare Act (AWA) intends to promote respect for animals (AWA, 2009, §1), and it states that animals have intrinsic value independent of their instrumental value for humans (AWA, 2009, §3). Despite this explicit statement and intention, Norwegian animal husbandry involves numerous generally accepted practices, such as maceration of male chicks and salmon farming, that appear to be contrary to an everyday understanding of the concept’s “respect” and “intrinsic value”. This raises some questions: Can we substantiate that there is a morally impermissible gap between law and practice? If so, how? And which moral considerations are reasonable to link to these concepts given the act’s application of them?
This thesis aims to analyze the ethical concepts of “respect” and “intrinsic value” and es-tablish a well-founded moral basis for a discussion on which moral considerations that needs to be taken seriously if these concepts are to be understood as having any practical value.
This is done in light of the Kantian theories of the contemporary philosophers Stephen Darwall, Onora O’Neill, Allen Wood, Jens Saugstad and Christine Korsgaard, as well as the legislative preparatory works of the Act.
On this basis it is possible to give two main Kantian interpretations of the Act’s use of these concepts, of which only one is consistent with the conceptual understanding inherent in the legislative preparatory works. However, regardless of which interpretation you choose, these animal husbandry practices cannot be justified. These practices are symptomatic of a failure to treat animals as individuals deserving of considerate treatment in their own right.
This thesis concludes with some reflections on the considerations that arguably must be at the basis of a policy that takes the word of the law seriously. | |
