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dc.contributor.authorAcemoglu, Daron
dc.contributor.authorRobinson, James A.
dc.contributor.authorTorvik, Ragnar
dc.date.accessioned2021-02-23T12:56:56Z
dc.date.available2021-02-23T12:56:56Z
dc.date.created2021-02-03T09:30:46Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.identifier.citationJournal of comparative economics. 2020, 48 749-778.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0147-5967
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/2729832
dc.description.abstractWe provide a potential explanation, based on the “political agenda effect”, for the absence of, and unwillingness to create, centralized power in the hands of a national state. State centralization induces citizens of different backgrounds, interests, regions or ethnicities to coordinate their demands in the direction of more general-interest public goods, and away from parochial transfers. This political agenda effect raises the effectiveness of citizen demands and induces them to increase their investments in conflict capacity. In the absence of state centralization, citizens do not necessarily band together because of another force, the escalation effect, which refers to the fact that elites from different regions will join forces in response to the citizens doing so. Such escalation might hurt the citizen groups that have already solved their collective action problem (though it will benefit others). Anticipating the interplay of the political agenda and escalation effects, under some parameter configurations, political elites strategically opt for a non-centralized state. We show how the model generates non-monotonic comparative statics in response to the increase in the value or effectiveness of public goods (so that centralized states and public good provision may be absent precisely when they are more beneficial for society). We also suggest how the formation of a social democratic party may sometimes induce state centralization (by removing the commitment value of a non-centralized state), and how elites may sometimes prefer partial state centralization.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.rightsNavngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.no*
dc.titleThe political agenda effect and state centralizationen_US
dc.typePeer revieweden_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.description.versionpublishedVersionen_US
dc.source.pagenumber749-778en_US
dc.source.volume48en_US
dc.source.journalJournal of comparative economicsen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jce.2020.03.004
dc.identifier.cristin1886176
dc.description.localcode© 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).en_US
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextoriginal
cristin.qualitycode1


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