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dc.contributor.authorJaksland, Rasmus
dc.date.accessioned2021-01-11T10:03:21Z
dc.date.available2021-01-11T10:03:21Z
dc.date.created2021-01-06T10:40:55Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.identifier.citationEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Science. 2020, 10 .en_US
dc.identifier.issn1879-4912
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/2722317
dc.description.abstractIn her paper “Neo-positivist metaphysics” (Philosophical Studies, 160(1), 53–78, 2012), Alyssa Ney promises a naturalized metaphysics that is acceptable even by positivists’ – and specifically Carnap’s – standards. This neo-positivist metaphysics takes its outset in the findings of our best science and relies on them to inform a metaphysics that can avoid the dependence on linguistic frameworks that is inherent to Carnapian deflationism. Neo-positivist metaphysics attempts to sidestep these problems by inheriting its semantic credentials directly from science itself. This paper argues that such attempts are unsuccessful since science contains no resources with which to answer Carnap’s challenge either, and a science-based metaphysics is therefore just as vulnerable to Carnapian deflationism as traditional metaphysics. Consequently, neo-positivist metaphysics does not provide the promised metaphysics that can avoid Carnapian deflationism. While this conclusion focuses on Ney’s neo-positivist metaphysics, its scope includes any attempt to avoid Carnapian deflationism by a naturalized metaphysics that relies on strict deference to the findings of science. Substantial metaphysics – naturalized or not – is impossible unless or until Carnapian deflationism is refuted, and the resources for such a refutation cannot be found in naturalized metaphysics.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.rightsNavngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.no*
dc.titleOld problems for neo-positivist naturalized metaphysicsen_US
dc.typePeer revieweden_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.description.versionpublishedVersionen_US
dc.source.pagenumber19en_US
dc.source.volume10en_US
dc.source.journalEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Scienceen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s13194-020-00282-0
dc.identifier.cristin1866138
dc.description.localcode(C) The Author(s) 2020. Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0en_US
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextoriginal
cristin.qualitycode2


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