dc.contributor.advisor | Belsom, Einar | nb_NO |
dc.contributor.author | Birkeland, Mariell Kversøy | nb_NO |
dc.contributor.author | Eriksen, Ane Eidem | nb_NO |
dc.contributor.author | Ueland, Ellen | nb_NO |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-12-19T14:27:31Z | |
dc.date.available | 2014-12-19T14:27:31Z | |
dc.date.created | 2012-01-06 | nb_NO |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | nb_NO |
dc.identifier | 473555 | nb_NO |
dc.identifier | ntnudaim:6168 | nb_NO |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/265858 | |
dc.description.abstract | Through a dynamic panel data analysis of a sample of Nordic firms we investigate how executives stock and option incentives influence the choice of capital structure. In addition, we look at how equity ownership by a large external shareholder influences the incentives effect on capital structure. Our results show that options have a negative effect on debt level, while stock holdings influence is more diffuse. We also see that only options have both a statistical and economical significant impact on leverage, and therefore operate as a stronger incentive than stocks. No significant dependency is found between the size of the largest external shareholder and the incentives effect on capital structure. Still, we see a weak trend indicating that the effect of equity based incentives is stronger when firms largest shareholders are institutional. | nb_NO |
dc.language | eng | nb_NO |
dc.publisher | Institutt for industriell økonomi og teknologiledelse | nb_NO |
dc.subject | ntnudaim:6168 | no_NO |
dc.subject | MTIØT Industriell økonomi og teknologiledelse | no_NO |
dc.subject | | no_NO |
dc.title | Executive Incentives and Capital Structure | nb_NO |
dc.type | Master thesis | nb_NO |
dc.source.pagenumber | 29 | nb_NO |
dc.contributor.department | Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet, Fakultet for samfunnsvitenskap og teknologiledelse, Institutt for industriell økonomi og teknologiledelse | nb_NO |