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dc.contributor.authorFrantz, Christopher
dc.contributor.authorGhorbani, Amineh
dc.date.accessioned2020-01-29T11:47:51Z
dc.date.available2020-01-29T11:47:51Z
dc.date.created2020-01-14T13:17:02Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-030-30298-6
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2638578
dc.description.abstractInequality is considered one of the drivers for the emergence of collective action, but conventional wisdom suggests that it is equality among the stakeholders that helps sustain it. Nonetheless, more controversial findings in the collective action literature suggest that inequality can in fact be beneficial for the sustainability of collective action beyond its emergence. In this research, we use simulation to gain more insights into the relationship between inequality and collective action. We simulate an abstract common-pool resource system to model collective action and consider different types of inequality (e.g., wealth, social influence) to study its correlation with the sustainability of the system in terms of resource well-being, wealth levels and distribution. Preliminary results suggest that equality promotes sustained collective action, but also highlight that factors such as social influence and individual behavioural characteristics may be more decisive in determining the overall well-being.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherSpringer Verlagnb_NO
dc.relation.ispartofSocial Simulation for a Digital Society
dc.titleInequality: Driver or Inhibitor of Collective Action?nb_NO
dc.typeChapternb_NO
dc.description.versionacceptedVersionnb_NO
dc.source.pagenumber77-89nb_NO
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/978-3-030-30298-6_7
dc.identifier.cristin1772381
dc.description.localcodeThis is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article. Locked until 19.11.2020 due to copyright restrictions. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30298-6_7nb_NO
cristin.unitcode194,63,10,0
cristin.unitnameInstitutt for datateknologi og informatikk
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextpostprint
cristin.qualitycode1


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