Event corruption: a game theoretic approach

Abstract

This article applies economics of doping theory (game theory) to corruption. Similarities, and significant differences between the two topics are identified. As a consequence of such differences, the corruptive action - the bribe - is introduced as a decision variable for the players. Nash equilibria of the "corruption game" are structurally similar to the doping-situation - e.g. "everybody is corrupt". However, the size of the bribe becomes, as a consequence of a significant revision of the basic models, "as high as possible"; indicating that the event corruption case should be at least as hard to handle as the doping problem and with possibly even more drastic adverse effects. Although the article focuses on corruption in sports and events, the results are also relevant for other types of corruptive action. Corruption in sports is a problem threatening the existence of professional sports. Methods for better understanding, which we present in this article, are hence of vital importance for the professional sports business. Keywords: game theory, economics of doping, economics of corruption, bribe equilibrium.