dc.contributor.author | Yang, Zheng | |
dc.contributor.author | Lai, Junyu | |
dc.contributor.author | Li, Guoyuan | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-02-05T13:43:54Z | |
dc.date.available | 2018-02-05T13:43:54Z | |
dc.date.created | 2017-09-29T15:17:33Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2017 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1751-8717 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2482729 | |
dc.description.abstract | In Public-Key Cryptography (PKC) 2015, Bergsma et al. introduced an interesting one-round key exchange protocol (which will be referred to as BJS scheme) with strong security in particular for perfect forward secrecy (PFS). In this study, the authors unveil a PFS attack against the BJS scheme. This would simply invalidate its security proof. An improvement is proposed to fix the problem of the BJS scheme with minimum changes. | nb_NO |
dc.language.iso | eng | nb_NO |
dc.publisher | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) | nb_NO |
dc.title | Cryptanalysis of a generic one-round key exchange protocol with strong security | nb_NO |
dc.type | Journal article | nb_NO |
dc.description.version | submittedVersion | nb_NO |
dc.source.journal | IET Information Security | nb_NO |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1049/iet-ifs.2017.0055 | |
dc.identifier.cristin | 1500575 | |
dc.description.localcode | © 2018 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works. | nb_NO |
cristin.unitcode | 194,64,93,0 | |
cristin.unitname | Institutt for havromsoperasjoner og byggteknikk | |
cristin.ispublished | true | |
cristin.fulltext | preprint | |
cristin.qualitycode | 1 | |