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dc.contributor.authorYang, Zheng
dc.contributor.authorLai, Junyu
dc.contributor.authorLi, Guoyuan
dc.date.accessioned2018-02-05T13:43:54Z
dc.date.available2018-02-05T13:43:54Z
dc.date.created2017-09-29T15:17:33Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.issn1751-8717
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2482729
dc.description.abstractIn Public-Key Cryptography (PKC) 2015, Bergsma et al. introduced an interesting one-round key exchange protocol (which will be referred to as BJS scheme) with strong security in particular for perfect forward secrecy (PFS). In this study, the authors unveil a PFS attack against the BJS scheme. This would simply invalidate its security proof. An improvement is proposed to fix the problem of the BJS scheme with minimum changes.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)nb_NO
dc.titleCryptanalysis of a generic one-round key exchange protocol with strong securitynb_NO
dc.typeJournal articlenb_NO
dc.description.versionsubmittedVersionnb_NO
dc.source.journalIET Information Securitynb_NO
dc.identifier.doi10.1049/iet-ifs.2017.0055
dc.identifier.cristin1500575
dc.description.localcode© 2018 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.nb_NO
cristin.unitcode194,64,93,0
cristin.unitnameInstitutt for havromsoperasjoner og byggteknikk
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextpreprint
cristin.qualitycode1


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