dc.contributor.author | Haukioja, Jussi | |
dc.contributor.author | Cohnitz, Daniel | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-10-18T06:55:20Z | |
dc.date.available | 2017-10-18T06:55:20Z | |
dc.date.created | 2013-01-17T12:32:19Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2013 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 2013, 91 (3), 475-500. | nb_NO |
dc.identifier.issn | 0004-8402 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2460655 | |
dc.description.abstract | We distinguish and discuss two different accounts of the subject matter of theories of reference, meta-externalism and meta-internalism. We argue that a form of the meta-internalist view, “moderate meta-internalism”, is the most plausible account of the subject matter of theories of reference. In the second part of the paper we explain how this account also helps to answer the questions of what kind of concept reference is, and what role intuitions have in the study of the reference relation. | nb_NO |
dc.language.iso | eng | nb_NO |
dc.publisher | Taylor & Francis | nb_NO |
dc.title | Meta-Externalism vs Meta-Internalism in The Study of Reference | nb_NO |
dc.type | Journal article | nb_NO |
dc.description.version | submittedVersion | nb_NO |
dc.source.pagenumber | 475-500 | nb_NO |
dc.source.volume | 91 | nb_NO |
dc.source.journal | Australasian Journal of Philosophy | nb_NO |
dc.source.issue | 3 | nb_NO |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1080/00048402.2012.717534 | |
dc.identifier.cristin | 990992 | |
dc.relation.project | Norges forskningsråd: 212841 | nb_NO |
dc.description.localcode | This is an Original Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Australasian Journal of Philosophy on 28 Aug 2012, available at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00048402.2012.717534 | nb_NO |
cristin.unitcode | 194,62,70,0 | |
cristin.unitname | Institutt for filosofi og religionsvitenskap | |
cristin.ispublished | true | |
cristin.fulltext | postprint | |
cristin.qualitycode | 2 | |