Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorDuan, Shuwen
dc.contributor.authorMjølsnes, Stig Frode
dc.contributor.authorTsay, Joe-Kai
dc.date.accessioned2013-11-19T23:17:20Z
dc.date.accessioned2016-06-08T07:44:21Z
dc.date.available2013-11-19T23:17:20Z
dc.date.available2016-06-08T07:44:21Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.citationNorsk Informasjonssikkerhetskonferanse (NISK) 2013;2(1):88-99nb_NO
dc.identifier.issn1893-6563
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2391806
dc.description.abstractWe present a security analysis of the widely-deployed Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA) authentication protocol, where we find that the TETRA authentication protocol suffers from flaws that allow an attacker to defeat basic authentication properties that are normally required in secure operations. In order to launch an attack, an adversary only needs to control the radio link communication ( e.g., by impersonating as a base station). This attack can be used to reduce the users' availability of the network access, which may cause serious consequences in an emergency scenario: a targeted mobile station may falsely show that it is connected to the network while, in fact, the mobile station is unable to receive network communications. Based on this analysis, we propose a strengthened authentication protocol for the TETRA system, and formally verify security properties for our protocol proposal using the automated tool Scyther.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherTapirnb_NO
dc.titleSecurity Analysis of the Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA) Authentication Protocolnb_NO
dc.typeConference objectnb_NO
dc.typeJournal articlenb_NO
dc.typePeer reviewednb_NO
dc.date.updated2013-11-19T23:17:20Z
dc.source.pagenumber88-99nb_NO
dc.source.volume2nb_NO
dc.source.journalNorsk Informasjonssikkerhetskonferanse (NISK)nb_NO
dc.source.issue1nb_NO
dc.identifier.cristin1067276
dc.description.localcodeAuthor postprintnb_NO


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record