| dc.description.abstract | This thesis is an attempt to understand what kind of force that lies in the use of practical
reason. I wish to show how practical reason can be used to discuss and establish moral norms that have universal validity by elucidating the discourse-theoretical approach to reason and action that one finds in the philosophy of Jürgen Habermas. The justification for the universal force of practical reason is based on a transformed transcendental philosophy that seeks to make explicit the presuppositions for rational discourse and what Habermas calls «Communicative action». Habermas is able to explicate a moral point of view that takes into account the interest of all participants by reconstructing practical reason and its presuppositions that rational agents must commit to by engaging in discourse. I will show that this is internally connected to the performative attitude that agents engaged in speech take towards each other. At the same time, Habermas' theory lacks the force to motivate a person that does not acknowledge that the moral point of view should have any authority in choosing how to act, even though one could acknowledge that the moral usage of practical reason is possible. This is due to the fact that Habermas' justification of the moral point of view is an epistemic one and not an ethical one. I will show how Habermas opens the gap between the epistemic justification for the rational force of the moral point of view on the one hand, and the ethical question «why should I be moral?» on the other. The final part of this thesis will show that even though Habermas lacks the arguments to motivate a person to choose a moral life, he can show how a good self-understanding has to include moral actions to some degree. | nb_NO |
