| dc.description.abstract | Why do some states opt for increased control over their natural resources? What makes state leaders change petroleum policy, and what makes state ownership and control over petroleum a viable option for some, but not others? This thesis uses an established typology of petroleum ownership and control in order to look at variations over time. The period of study is 1960-2010, with a focus on petroleum-exporting states, and I use a longitudinal data set on the evolution of ownership models to pinpoint determinants to both what causes the variation, and what makes the states' models change over time. To make inferences, I employ both multinomial and regular logistic regression with random effects. The empirical evidence presented in the thesis shows that: 1) Oil price shocks makes it more likely for states to transition towards a model of state ownership; and that 2) these transitions are more likely to take place in "waves", when a similar
transition has happened in other countries previously. However, assumptions regarding the effect of regime types and democracy, based on previous studies on related subjects, are refuted. Altogether, the findings are consistent but not very robust: The results may be biased because of problems with rare-event data and lack of variation in the outcome variable. However, the implications from the empirical results mostly fit with the existing scholarship on the subject of petroleum policy as well as ownership and control. | nb_NO |
