Making or breaking the cycle of corruption: Exploring the impact of transitional justice on corruption in postconflict countries

Abstract

Does the implementation of transitional justice (TJ) mechanisms such as trials, truth commissions, and institutional reforms reduce corruption by enhancing accountability, building trust, and creating a culture of deterrence? Although prior work has studied whether economic crimes should be included in TJ agendas, TJ’s potential to address corruption has been mostly overlooked. On the one hand, theory suggests that TJ could reduce corruption; yet, on the other, it indicates that TJ mechanisms are not effective enough at solving deep-rooted corruption. Testing these opposing arguments using data from 106 postconflict countries that experienced conflict between 1946 and 2006, I find that the implementation of TJ and corruption are not statistically associated. However, when I further investigate this relationship with only “well-implemented” TJ mechanisms, purges are found to be negatively associated with political corruption and amnesties are positively associated with regime corruption.