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dc.contributor.authorCohnitz, Daniel
dc.contributor.authorHaukioja, Jussi
dc.date.accessioned2021-04-19T07:18:45Z
dc.date.available2021-04-19T07:18:45Z
dc.date.created2021-01-12T17:12:23Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.identifier.isbn9780367629724
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/2738228
dc.description.abstractOur intuitions about reference are often seen to be a crucial source of evidence for theories of reference. This chapter contrasts two views about the relationship between individual competence and facts about reference. The meta-externalist view, the two may be quite independent; on the meta-internalist view, by contrast, facts about reference are determined by individual psychological facts. The chapter explores how, from a meta-externalist point of view, the relationship between intuitions and reference would look. Both internalism/externalism distinctions can be illustrated in terms of what is or is not possible about internal duplicates. Meta-externalism denies that the (narrow) psychological states of a speaker determine which theory of reference is true of the expressions used by that speaker: external factors also play a role in determining this. The chapter looks at some candidates for what these external factors could be and discusses in what way intuitions still might play a role in investigating which theory of reference is correct.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherRoutledge
dc.relation.ispartofThe Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Reference
dc.titleReference and Intuitions
dc.typeChapter
dc.description.versionacceptedVersion
dc.source.pagenumber551-559
dc.identifier.doi10.4324/9781003111894
dc.identifier.cristin1870116
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextpreprint
cristin.qualitycode2


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