dc.contributor.author | Jaksland, Rasmus | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-01-11T10:09:25Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-01-11T10:09:25Z | |
dc.date.created | 2021-01-06T10:43:42Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Philosophia. 2020, . | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 0048-3893 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/11250/2722320 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper examines our pre-theoretic conception of non-supernaturalism; the thesis that all that exists is natural. It is argued that we intuitively take this thesis to be a substantive, non-dogmatic, empirically justified, not merely contingent truth. However, devicing an interpretation of non-supernaturalism that captures all aspects of this intuition is difficult. Indeed, it is found that this intuition conflates the strong inferential scope of a metaphysical claim with the modest justificatory requirements of an empirical matter of fact. As such, non-supernaturalism, in its pre-theoretic form, contains an internal tension that must be navigated whenever the thesis features in systematic thinking. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | eng | en_US |
dc.publisher | Springer | en_US |
dc.rights | Navngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal | * |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.no | * |
dc.title | Non-supernaturalism: Linguistic Convention, Metaphysical Claim, or Empirical Matter of Fact? | en_US |
dc.type | Peer reviewed | en_US |
dc.type | Journal article | en_US |
dc.description.version | publishedVersion | en_US |
dc.source.pagenumber | 16 | en_US |
dc.source.journal | Philosophia | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s11406-020-00251-0 | |
dc.identifier.cristin | 1866142 | |
dc.description.localcode | (C) The Author(s) 2020. Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 | en_US |
cristin.ispublished | true | |
cristin.fulltext | original | |
cristin.qualitycode | 1 | |