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dc.contributor.authorCarlsen, Fredriknb_NO
dc.date.accessioned2014-12-19T14:31:36Z
dc.date.available2014-12-19T14:31:36Z
dc.date.created2007-01-18nb_NO
dc.date.issued2006nb_NO
dc.identifier121793nb_NO
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/267034
dc.description.abstractThe paper presents a rational political business cycle model where voters are imperfectly informed about both incumbent competence and incumbent preferences. The model predicts that election cycles on real variables are observed mainly when the incumbent is right-wing and unpopular. The model is put to test on a data set comprising 56 elections in eight OECD countries. Opinion poll series have been collected for each election campaign to compute estimates of the government's reelection chances. The results are broadly consistent with the theoretical model: there is evidence of abnormal pre-election decreases in unemployment and increases in output when right parties hold office and re-election prospects are poor but otherwise not.nb_NO
dc.languageengnb_NO
dc.publisherNorges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet, Fakultet for samfunnsvitenskap og teknologiledelse, Institutt for samfunnsøkonominb_NO
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Paper Series, 1503-299X; 2006:15nb_NO
dc.subjectElection cycles; Asymmetric information; Government popularityen_GB
dc.titleElection cycles, party ideology and incumbent popularity: Theory and evidence for OECD economies.nb_NO
dc.typeResearch reportnb_NO
dc.contributor.departmentNorges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet, Fakultet for samfunnsvitenskap og teknologiledelse, Institutt for samfunnsøkonominb_NO


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