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dc.contributor.authorKnowles, Jonathan
dc.date.accessioned2020-01-30T08:21:13Z
dc.date.available2020-01-30T08:21:13Z
dc.date.created2020-01-08T14:35:25Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.identifier.isbn9780198803461
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2638744
dc.description.abstractRelationalism, also called ‘the Relational View’, is a theory of perceptual experience which sees at least a central core of such experience as consisting in a non-representational relation between subjects and features of their environment—a relation that is also seen as at least analogous to Russellian acquaintance. In addition to phenomenological support, relationalism is according to one of its major proponents John Campbell needed to solve what he calls ‘Berkeley’s puzzle’: how it can be that we can gain a conception of objects as mind-independent from sensory experience. I examine Campbell’s arguments for this claim and suggest they fail to convince insofar as it is unclear that experience is necessary to acquire a conception of mind-independent objects. I close by showing how phenomenological externalism can do justice to our conflicting intuitions regarding Berkeley’s puzzle.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherOxford University Press (OUP)nb_NO
dc.relation.ispartofAcquaintance. New Essays
dc.titleRelationalism, Berkeley's Puzzle and Phenomenological Externalismnb_NO
dc.typeChapternb_NO
dc.description.versionacceptedVersionnb_NO
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/oso/9780198803461.003.0008
dc.identifier.cristin1768703
dc.description.localcodeLocked until 31.12.2021 due to copyright restrictions. This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of a chapther accepted for publication in [Acquaintance. New Essays] following peer review. The version of record is available online at: 10.1093/oso/9780198803461.003.0008nb_NO
cristin.unitcode194,62,70,0
cristin.unitnameInstitutt for filosofi og religionsvitenskap
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextpostprint
cristin.qualitycode2


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