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dc.contributor.authorOlsson, Nils
dc.contributor.authorNyström, Johan
dc.contributor.authorPyddoke, Roger
dc.date.accessioned2019-12-16T14:32:27Z
dc.date.available2019-12-16T14:32:27Z
dc.date.created2019-08-28T10:17:22Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.identifier.citationCase Studies on Transport Policy. 2019, 7 (4), 837-848.nb_NO
dc.identifier.issn2213-624X
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2633467
dc.description.abstractThe two Nordic countries Norway and Sweden have launched governance regimes for the early phases of transport infrastructure investments after experiencing frequent cost overruns and low cost-benefit ratios. This study seeks to find out if these governance regimes have reduced the escalation of costs from early estimates to finalized projects and influenced the choice of projects away from those with lower benefit to cost ratios. We have compared governance regimes for major transport infrastructure investments in the two countries and examined the development and content of quality assurance activities, the involvement of internal and external parties, their duties and responsibilities, their stage gate models, and how decisions are made. The findings are that both countries have introduced formalizations of their governance regimes that mandate project reviews during the planning process and quality assurance, both of which have increased early cost estimates. One difference was that in Norway, the Ministry of Finance manages the quality assurance scheme and imposes external quality assurance requirements, while Sweden has no corresponding ministerial oversight. Therefore, on the one hand, the process is more strictly formalized in Norway, but on the other hand, cost-benefit ratios appear to have more weight in Sweden. Furthermore, although both countries have done several ex post evaluations, neither country has introduced a formalized ex post evaluation process allowing for systematic examination of the causes of cost overruns and low benefit to cost ratios. Even so, politicians may manoeuvre projects with lower benefit to cost ratios around the governance systems in both countries. Finally, some projects in both countries still have experienced significant cost escalations despite these processes.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherElseviernb_NO
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internasjonal*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.no*
dc.titleGovernance regimes for large transport infrastructure investment projects: Comparative analysis of Norway and Swedennb_NO
dc.typeJournal articlenb_NO
dc.typePeer reviewednb_NO
dc.description.versionacceptedVersionnb_NO
dc.source.pagenumber837-848nb_NO
dc.source.volume7nb_NO
dc.source.journalCase Studies on Transport Policynb_NO
dc.source.issue4nb_NO
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.cstp.2019.07.011
dc.identifier.cristin1719408
dc.description.localcode© 2019. This is the authors’ accepted and refereed manuscript to the article. Locked until 23.7.2021 due to copyright restrictions. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/nb_NO
cristin.unitcode194,64,92,0
cristin.unitnameInstitutt for maskinteknikk og produksjon
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextpreprint
cristin.qualitycode1


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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internasjonal
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