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dc.contributor.authorWyller, Truls Egil
dc.date.accessioned2019-12-05T08:53:58Z
dc.date.available2019-12-05T08:53:58Z
dc.date.created2019-09-05T15:07:26Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.identifier.citationKant-Studien. 2019, 110 (3), 498-511.nb_NO
dc.identifier.issn0022-8877
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2631867
dc.description.abstractI defend what I take to be a genuinely Kantian view on temporal extension: time is not an object but a human horizon of concrete particulars. As such, time depends on the existence of embodied human subjects. It does not, however, depend on those subjects determined as spatial objects. Starting with a realist notion of “apperception” as applied to indexical space (1), I proceed with the need for external criteria of temporal duration (2). In accordance with Kant’s Second Analogy of Experience, these criteria are found in concepts and laws of motion and change (3). I then see what follows from this for a reasonable notion of transcendental idealism (4). Finally, in support of my Kantian conclusions, I argue for the transcendentally subjective nature of particular temporal extension (5).nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherDe Gryuternb_NO
dc.titleKant on Temporal Extension: Embodied, Indexical Idealismnb_NO
dc.typeJournal articlenb_NO
dc.typePeer reviewednb_NO
dc.description.versionpublishedVersionnb_NO
dc.source.pagenumber498-511nb_NO
dc.source.volume110nb_NO
dc.source.journalKant-Studiennb_NO
dc.source.issue3nb_NO
dc.identifier.doi10.1515/kant-2019-3008
dc.identifier.cristin1721968
dc.description.localcode© 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston. Locked until 5.9.2020 due to copyright restrictions.nb_NO
cristin.unitcode194,62,70,0
cristin.unitnameInstitutt for filosofi og religionsvitenskap
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextpostprint
cristin.qualitycode2


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