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dc.contributor.authorLöschenbrand, Markus
dc.contributor.authorKorpås, Magnus
dc.contributor.authorFodstad, Marte
dc.date.accessioned2019-03-13T13:06:54Z
dc.date.available2019-03-13T13:06:54Z
dc.date.created2018-10-03T11:30:12Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifier.isbn978-1-5386-1488-4
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2589873
dc.description.abstractTraditionally, electricity markets have been designed with the intention of disabling producer side market power or prohibiting exercising it. Nonetheless it can be assumed that players participating in pool markets and aiming to maximize their individual benefits might depart from the optimum in terms of total system welfare. To recognize and analyze such behavior, system operators have a wide range of methods available. In the here presented paper, one of those methods - deriving a supply function equilibrium - is used and nested in a traditional discontinuous Nash game. The result is a case study that shows that marginal cost bidding thermal producers have an incentive to collaborate on scheduling in order to cause similar effects to tacit collusionnb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)nb_NO
dc.relation.ispartof2018 15th International Conference on the European Energy Market - EEM
dc.titleMarket Power in Hydro-Thermal Systems with Marginal Cost Biddingnb_NO
dc.title.alternativeMarket Power in Hydro-Thermal Systems with Marginal Cost Biddingnb_NO
dc.typeChapternb_NO
dc.description.versionacceptedVersionnb_NO
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/EEM.2018.8469984
dc.identifier.cristin1617524
dc.relation.projectNorges forskningsråd: 243964nb_NO
dc.description.localcode© 2018 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.nb_NO
cristin.unitcode194,63,20,0
cristin.unitnameInstitutt for elkraftteknikk
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextpostprint
cristin.qualitycode1


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