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dc.contributor.authorMyskja, Bjørn Kåre
dc.contributor.authorMagelssen, Morten
dc.date.accessioned2019-01-29T11:43:03Z
dc.date.available2019-01-29T11:43:03Z
dc.date.created2018-10-19T14:10:29Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifier.citationBMC Medical Ethics. 2018, 19 .nb_NO
dc.identifier.issn1472-6939
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2582794
dc.description.abstractBackground In the debate on conscientious objection in healthcare, proponents of conscience rights often point to the imperative to protect the health professional’s moral integrity. Their opponents hold that the moral integrity argument alone can at most justify accommodation of conscientious objectors as a “moral courtesy”, as the argument is insufficient to establish a general moral right to accommodation, let alone a legal right. Main text This text draws on political philosophy in order to argue for a legal right to accommodation. The moral integrity arguments should be supplemented by the requirement to protect minority rights in liberal democracies. Citizens have a right to live in accordance with their fundamental moral convictions, and a right to equal access to employment. However, this right should not be unconditional, as that would unduly infringe on the rights of other citizens. The right must be limited to cases where the moral basis is more fundamental in a sense that all reasonable citizens in a liberal democracy should accept, such as the constitutive role of the inviolability of human life in liberal democracies. Conclusion There should be a legal, yet circumscribed, right to accommodation for conscientious objectors refusing to provide healthcare services that they reasonably consider to involve the intentional killing of a human being.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherBMC (part of Springer Nature)nb_NO
dc.rightsNavngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.no*
dc.titleConscientious objection to intentional killing: an argument for tolerationnb_NO
dc.title.alternativeConscientious objection to intentional killing: an argument for tolerationnb_NO
dc.typeJournal articlenb_NO
dc.typePeer reviewednb_NO
dc.description.versionpublishedVersionnb_NO
dc.source.pagenumber9nb_NO
dc.source.volume19nb_NO
dc.source.journalBMC Medical Ethicsnb_NO
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1186/s12910-018-0323-0
dc.identifier.cristin1621757
dc.description.localcode© The Author(s). 2018 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)nb_NO
cristin.unitcode194,62,70,0
cristin.unitnameInstitutt for filosofi og religionsvitenskap
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextoriginal
cristin.qualitycode1


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