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dc.contributor.authorHelgesen, Per Ivar
dc.contributor.authorTomasgard, Asgeir
dc.date.accessioned2018-06-01T06:16:06Z
dc.date.available2018-06-01T06:16:06Z
dc.date.created2018-05-28T14:58:40Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifier.citationEnergy Economics. 2018, 70 270-288.nb_NO
dc.identifier.issn0140-9883
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2499978
dc.description.abstractWe investigate the economic impacts of introducing tradable green certificates to promote electricity produced from renewable energy sources. We formulate a mixed complementarity, multi-region, partial equilibrium model, clearing both the electricity and green certificate markets under the assumption of Nash-Cournot market competition. We introduce a mixed complementarity formulation of the tradable green certificate policy scheme. The main contribution of this paper is to combine a public support scheme for electricity production with a power market model in which strategic generators compete and exercise market power in a capacitated transmission network with spatial energy exchange. Any policy instrument interfering with the free market solution in a partial equilibrium model will reduce social welfare as a result of deadweight losses from the policy. These welfare losses may be substantial. We show that losses from tradable green certificates influence different market actors depending on the market conditions, but existing firms are likely to bear most of these losses. In markets with Cournot competition, where producers act strategically, green certificates help to increase market competition if new firms are able to enter the market. Existing firms will not be motivated to compete with new generation capacity. The consumer surplus from introducing tradable green certificates under Cournot competition may increase, despite the deadweight losses the policy incurs.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherElseviernb_NO
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internasjonal*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.no*
dc.titleAn equilibrium market power model for power markets and tradable green certificates, including Kirchhoff's Laws and Nash-Cournot competitionnb_NO
dc.typeJournal articlenb_NO
dc.typePeer reviewednb_NO
dc.description.versionpublishedVersionnb_NO
dc.source.pagenumber270-288nb_NO
dc.source.volume70nb_NO
dc.source.journalEnergy Economicsnb_NO
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.eneco.2018.01.013
dc.identifier.cristin1587185
dc.relation.projectNorges forskningsråd: 216513nb_NO
dc.description.localcode© 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).nb_NO
cristin.unitcode194,60,25,0
cristin.unitnameInstitutt for industriell økonomi og teknologiledelse
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextoriginal
cristin.qualitycode1


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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internasjonal
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