| dc.description.abstract | During the last 15-20 years, Putnam's model-theoretic argument has no longer been a hot and fashionable topic in philosophy. It has, however, secured its place as one of three central arguments in analytic philosophy where referential indeterminacy figures in a central role, the other two being Quine's argument for referential inscrutability (see Chapter 16, THE INDETERMINACY OF TRANSLATION), and Kripke's Wittgenstein's skeptical paradox about rules (see Chapter 15, RULE-FOLLOWING, OBJECTIVITY AND MEANING). Nonetheless, interest in features particular to the model-theoretic argument, its proper interpretation, and its role in Putnam's argumentation as well as in anti-realist arguments in general, has by no means disappeared. A number of articles putting forward interesting new suggestions in these regards have come out, as well as two books (Taylor 2006; Button 2013) that build centrally on Putnam's argument, or argumentation directly inspired by it. | nb_NO |
