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dc.contributor.authorMitrovic, Branko
dc.date.accessioned2018-01-23T11:33:17Z
dc.date.available2018-01-23T11:33:17Z
dc.date.created2016-12-14T13:59:47Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.citationPhilosophy of the social sciences. 2017, 47 (1), 28-43.nb_NO
dc.identifier.issn0048-3931
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2479029
dc.description.abstractIn recent decades, a number of authors have relied on the multiple realizability argument to reject methodological individualism. In this article, I argue that this strategy results in serious difficulties and makes it impossible to identify social entities and phenomena.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherSAGE Publicationsnb_NO
dc.titleIs multiple realizability a valid argument against methodological individualism?nb_NO
dc.typeJournal articlenb_NO
dc.typePeer reviewednb_NO
dc.description.versionacceptedVersionnb_NO
dc.source.pagenumber28-43nb_NO
dc.source.volume47nb_NO
dc.source.journalPhilosophy of the social sciencesnb_NO
dc.source.issue1nb_NO
dc.identifier.doi10.1177/0048393116643591
dc.identifier.cristin1412748
dc.description.localcode© 2016. This is the authors' accepted and refereed manuscript to the article. The final authenticated version is available online at: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0048393116643591nb_NO
cristin.unitcode194,61,55,0
cristin.unitnameInstitutt for arkitektur og teknologi
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextpostprint
cristin.qualitycode2


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