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dc.contributor.authorHofmann, Bjørn
dc.date.accessioned2018-01-15T14:16:05Z
dc.date.available2018-01-15T14:16:05Z
dc.date.created2017-11-12T14:08:29Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.citationBMC Medical Ethics. 2017, 18 (56), 1-11.nb_NO
dc.identifier.issn1472-6939
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2477614
dc.description.abstractBackground New technologies facilitate the enhancement of a wide range of human dispositions, capacities, or abilities. While it is argued that we need to set limits to human enhancement, it is unclear where we should find resources to set such limits. Discussion Traditional routes for setting limits, such as referring to nature, the therapy-enhancement distinction, and the health-disease distinction, turn out to have some shortcomings. However, upon closer scrutiny the concept of enhancement is based on vague conceptions of what is to be enhanced. Explaining why it is better to become older, stronger, and more intelligent presupposes a clear conception of goodness, which is seldom provided. In particular, the qualitative better is frequently confused with the quantitative more. We may therefore not need “external” measures for setting its limits – they are available in the concept of enhancement itself. Summary While there may be shortcomings in traditional sources of limit setting to human enhancement, such as nature, therapy, and disease, such approaches may not be necessary. The specification-of-betterment problem inherent in the conception of human enhancement itself provides means to restrict its unwarranted proliferation. We only need to demand clear, sustainable, obtainable goals for enhancement that are based on evidence, and not on lofty speculations, hypes, analogies, or weak associations. Human enhancements that specify what will become better, and provide adequate evidence, are good and should be pursued. Others should not be accepted.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherBioMed Centralnb_NO
dc.rightsNavngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.no*
dc.titleLimits to human enhancement: Nature, disease, therapy or betterment?nb_NO
dc.typeJournal articlenb_NO
dc.typePeer reviewednb_NO
dc.description.versionpublishedVersionnb_NO
dc.source.pagenumber1-11nb_NO
dc.source.volume18nb_NO
dc.source.journalBMC Medical Ethicsnb_NO
dc.source.issue56nb_NO
dc.identifier.doi10.1186/s12910-017-0215-8
dc.identifier.cristin1513251
dc.description.localcode© The Author(s). 2017 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.nb_NO
cristin.unitcode194,65,70,0
cristin.unitnameInstitutt for helsevitenskap Gjøvik
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextpreprint
cristin.fulltextoriginal
cristin.qualitycode1


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