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dc.contributor.authorKnowles, Jonathan
dc.date.accessioned2017-11-29T12:48:04Z
dc.date.available2017-11-29T12:48:04Z
dc.date.created2017-01-04T12:08:13Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.citationSynthese. 2016, 1-17.nb_NO
dc.identifier.issn0039-7857
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2468535
dc.description.abstractIn recent work Huw Price has defended what he calls a global expressivist approach to understanding language (and/or thought) and its relation to the physical world. Global expressivism rejects a representationalist picture of the language-world relation and thereby, by intention at least, also a certain metaphysical conception of what are commonly known as placement problems: how entities of the everyday, common sense world like mental states, meanings, moral values, modalities and so on fit into the natural world. Global expressivism upholds a commitment to substantive enquiry into the naturalistic basis of thought about the world, but pursues this in a pragmatist or non-representationalist ’key’ (as Price often puts it), thereby rendering—as it sees things—traditional metaphysical questions otiose. I am in broad sympathy with many of Price’s arguments and ideas. However, I believe the specific sub-variety of non-representationalism he develops actually fails to secure the anti-metaphysical results he seeks. My arguments have their starting point in the Carnap-Quine debate. Given Price’s view of this, which I endorse, I think it can be made clear that Quine’s view, or something very close to it, presents us with a coherent example of a non-representationalist metaphysical placement project. Though one might reasonably doubt the rationality of or motivation for such a view, Price’s own strongly naturalistic assumptions, as these are evinced in his so-called ’subject’ naturalism, make that move dialectically unavailable to him. I end with a brief sketch of an alternative non-representationalist and anti-metaphysical position.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherSpringer Verlagnb_NO
dc.titleGlobal expressivism and the flight from metaphysicsnb_NO
dc.typeJournal articlenb_NO
dc.typePeer reviewednb_NO
dc.description.versionacceptedVersionnb_NO
dc.source.pagenumber1-17nb_NO
dc.source.journalSynthesenb_NO
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11229-016-1166-1
dc.identifier.cristin1420685
dc.relation.projectNorges forskningsråd: 217425nb_NO
dc.description.localcodeThis is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Synthese. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1166-1nb_NO
cristin.unitcode194,62,70,0
cristin.unitnameInstitutt for filosofi og religionsvitenskap
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextpostprint
cristin.qualitycode2


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