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dc.contributor.authorHaukioja, Jussi
dc.contributor.authorCohnitz, Daniel
dc.date.accessioned2017-10-18T06:55:20Z
dc.date.available2017-10-18T06:55:20Z
dc.date.created2013-01-17T12:32:19Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.citationAustralasian Journal of Philosophy. 2013, 91 (3), 475-500.nb_NO
dc.identifier.issn0004-8402
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2460655
dc.description.abstractWe distinguish and discuss two different accounts of the subject matter of theories of reference, meta-externalism and meta-internalism. We argue that a form of the meta-internalist view, “moderate meta-internalism”, is the most plausible account of the subject matter of theories of reference. In the second part of the paper we explain how this account also helps to answer the questions of what kind of concept reference is, and what role intuitions have in the study of the reference relation.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherTaylor & Francisnb_NO
dc.titleMeta-Externalism vs Meta-Internalism in The Study of Referencenb_NO
dc.typeJournal articlenb_NO
dc.description.versionsubmittedVersionnb_NO
dc.source.pagenumber475-500nb_NO
dc.source.volume91nb_NO
dc.source.journalAustralasian Journal of Philosophynb_NO
dc.source.issue3nb_NO
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/00048402.2012.717534
dc.identifier.cristin990992
dc.relation.projectNorges forskningsråd: 212841nb_NO
dc.description.localcodeThis is an Original Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Australasian Journal of Philosophy on 28 Aug 2012, available at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00048402.2012.717534nb_NO
cristin.unitcode194,62,70,0
cristin.unitnameInstitutt for filosofi og religionsvitenskap
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextpostprint
cristin.qualitycode2


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