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dc.contributor.authorGalteland, Herman
dc.contributor.authorMjølsnes, Stig Frode
dc.contributor.authorOlimid, Ruxandra-Florentina
dc.date.accessioned2017-08-18T07:18:46Z
dc.date.available2017-08-18T07:18:46Z
dc.date.created2017-08-14T09:51:53Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.citationLecture Notes in Computer Science. 2017, 463-473.nb_NO
dc.identifier.issn0302-9743
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2451080
dc.description.abstractThe cMix scheme was proposed by Chaum et al. in 2016 as the first practical set of cryptographic protocols that offer sender-recipient unlinkability at scale. The claim was that the cMix is secure unless all nodes collude. We argue that their assertion does not hold for the basic description of cMix, and we sustain our statement by two different types of attacks: a tagging attack and an insider attack. For each one, we discuss the settings that make the attack feasible, and then possible countermeasures. By this, we highlight the necessity of implementing additional commitments or mechanisms that have only been mentioned as additional features.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherSpringer Verlagnb_NO
dc.titleAttacks on the Basic cMix Design: On the Necessity of Commitments and Randomized Partial Checkingnb_NO
dc.typeJournal articlenb_NO
dc.typePeer reviewednb_NO
dc.description.versionacceptedVersionnb_NO
dc.source.pagenumber463-473nb_NO
dc.source.journalLecture Notes in Computer Sciencenb_NO
dc.identifier.doi978-3-319-61273-7_22
dc.identifier.cristin1486000
dc.description.localcode© Springer International Publishing AG 2017. The final publication is available at Springer via https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-61273-7_22nb_NO
cristin.unitcode194,63,15,0
cristin.unitcode194,63,30,0
cristin.unitnameInstitutt for matematiske fag
cristin.unitnameInstitutt for telematikk
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextoriginal
cristin.qualitycode1


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