| dc.contributor.author | Lydersen, Lars | nb_NO |
| dc.contributor.author | Skaar, Johannes | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2014-12-19T13:46:44Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2015-12-22T11:45:23Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2014-12-19T13:46:44Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2015-12-22T11:45:23Z | |
| dc.date.created | 2011-10-02 | nb_NO |
| dc.date.issued | 2010 | nb_NO |
| dc.identifier | 445069 | nb_NO |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1533-7146 | nb_NO |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2370275 | |
| dc.description.abstract | We consider the security of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol for Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), in the presence of bit and basis dependent detector flaws. We suggest a powerful attack that can be used in systems with detector efficiency mismatch, even if the detector assignments are chosen randomly by Bob. A security proof is provided, valid for any basis dependent, possibly lossy, linear optical imperfections in the channel/receiver/detectors. The proof does not assume the so-called squashing detector model. | nb_NO |
| dc.language | eng | nb_NO |
| dc.publisher | Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet, Fakultet for informasjonsteknologi, matematikk og elektroteknikk, Institutt for elektronikk og telekommunikasjon | nb_NO |
| dc.title | Security of quantum key distribution with bit and basis dependent detector flaws | nb_NO |
| dc.type | Journal article | nb_NO |
| dc.type | Peer reviewed | |
| dc.source.pagenumber | 60-76 | nb_NO |
| dc.source.volume | 10 | nb_NO |
| dc.source.journal | Quantum information & computation | nb_NO |
| dc.contributor.department | Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet, Fakultet for informasjonsteknologi, matematikk og elektroteknikk, Institutt for elektronikk og telekommunikasjon | nb_NO |
