• Clearing the Shadows: Recovering Lost Performance for Invisible Speculative Execution through HW/SW Co-Design 

      Tran, Kim-anh; Sakalis, Christos; Själander, Magnus; Ros, Alberto; Kaxiras, Stefanos; Jimborean, Alexandra (Chapter, 2020)
      Out-of-order processors heavily rely on speculation to achieve high performance, allowing instructions to bypass other slower instructions in order to fully utilize the processor's resources. Speculatively executed ...
    • Do Not Predict – Recompute! How Value Recomputation Can Truly Boost the Performance of Invisible Speculation 

      Sakalis, Christos; Chowdhury, Zamshed; Wadle, Shayne; Akturk, Ismail; Ros, Alberto; Själander, Magnus; Kaxiras, Stefanos; Karpuzcu, Ulya (Chapter, 2021)
      Recent architectural approaches that address speculative side-channel attacks aim to prevent software from exposing the microarchitectural state changes of transient execution. The Delay-on-Miss technique is one such ...
    • Efficient invisible speculative execution through selective delay and value prediction 

      Sakalis, Christos; Kaxiras, Stefanos; Ros, Alberto; Jimborean, Alexandra; Själander, Magnus (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2019)
      Speculative execution, the base on which modern high-performance general-purpose CPUs are built on, has recently been shown to enable a slew of security attacks. All these attacks are centered around a common set of ...
    • Ghost loads: what is the cost of invisible speculation? 

      Sakalis, Christos; Alipour, Mehdi; Ros, Alberto; Jimborean, Alexandra; Kaxiras, Stefanos; Själander, Magnus (Chapter, 2019)
      Speculative execution is necessary for achieving high performance on modern general-purpose CPUs but, starting with Spectre and Meltdown, it has also been proven to cause severe security flaws. In case of a misspeculation, ...
    • Understanding Selective Delay as a Method for Efficient Secure Speculative Execution 

      Sakalis, Christos; Kaxiras, Stefanos; Ros, Alberto; Jimborean, Alexandra; Själander, Magnus (Peer reviewed; Journal article, 2020)
      Since the introduction of Meltdown and Spectre, the research community has been tirelessly working on speculative side-channel attacks and on how to shield computer systems from them. To ensure that a system is protected ...