

David Soltveit

# Ethnocentrism Unveiled

A Quantitative Analysis of the Radical European  
Parties and Their Voters

Master's thesis in European Studies

Supervisor: Anna Brigevidh

May 2024



David Soltveit

# **Ethnocentrism Unveiled**

A Quantitative Analysis of the Radical European  
Parties and Their Voters

Master's thesis in European Studies  
Supervisor: Anna Brigevid  
May 2024

Norwegian University of Science and Technology  
Faculty of Humanities  
Department of Historical and Classical Studies



Norwegian University of  
Science and Technology



# Abstract

Ethnocentrism is a crucial issue among European party politics today, yet its presence is not understood to its full extent. This master thesis examines the concept's core values and nuances to differentiate it from other closely associated concepts. Furthermore, the thesis maps out the presence of ethnocentrism in Europe by investigating both the European radical left and radical right. To do so, it employs multiple datasets and applies a quantitative analysis to investigate both the radical voters and the radical parties. In addition, the thesis divides Europe into two regions, Western Europe and Central/Eastern Europe, along with their respective parties and voters. Doing so allows the thesis to further detail the landscape of European ethnocentrism as it investigates the differences across the European regions and the parties within them. In addition, the thesis gains insight into multiple aspects of the radical parties and their voters, confirming and challenging the established literature on the topic.

The findings of the thesis exhibit ethnocentrism to vary between the radical voters and their parties, with only the voters creating an overlap between themselves. This variation between voter and party is the most evident in the case among the radical left parties, as the thesis finds the radical right to be a more unified party family than the left. The thesis makes it apparent that the Western radical left parties are cohesive in regard to one another, while the Central/Eastern ones are not. Hence, the Western parties of the left consistently lack this specific type of representation in respect of their voters. Furthermore, the thesis finds there to be stark differences between Western and Central/Eastern Europe amongst voters. The central difference is how the latter, in general, is more opposed to ethnocentrism as well as its associated concepts.

# Sammendrag

Etnosentrisme er et alvorlig problem i europeisk partipolitikk i dagens politiskelandskap, men tilstedeværelsen av dette konseptet er underforstått. Denne masteroppgaven utforsker dette konseptet i forhold til kjerneverdier og nyansene som skiller det fra assosierte og tett knyttete konsepter. Dessuten kartlegger oppgaven tilstedeværelsen av etnosentrisme i Europa ved å undersøke om enten de europeiske radikale venstre- og høyre partiene eller deres velgere bidrar til en overlapp. For å gjennomføre dette benytter oppgaven to ulike datasett og anvender en metode i form av kvantitativ analyse. I tillegg deler oppgaven Europa i to regioner i form av West Europa og Sentral/Øst Europa, i lag med deres respektive partier og velgere. Dette tillater oppgaven å tydeligere utdype det Europeiske landskapet i form av etnosentrisme ettersom den både kan forske på forskjellene mellom og innad i regionene, i tillegg til partiene og velgerne deres. Oppgaven oppnår også større innsikt over flere aspekter som assosieres med de radikale partiene, som bekrefter og utfordrer den etablerte litteraturen.

Funnene til oppgaven demonstrerer at etnosentrisme varierer fra de radikale partiene til velgerne deres, ettersom bare de sistnevnte skaper en overlap mellom hverandre. Denne variasjonen mellom velgere og partier er tydeligst i tilfellet av de radikale venstre partiene, ettersom oppgaven finner at de radikale høyre partiene er en mer samlet partifamilie. Oppgaven gjør det tydelig at de radikale venstre partiene i vest er samlet i forhold til hverandre, mens den andre regionen viser ikke denne samlingen. På dette grunnlaget ender venstersiden uten representativt grunnlag for alle aspekter til sine velgere. Til slutt finner oppgaven store forskjeller mellom de to regionene i Europa mellom velgere. Den sentrale forskjellen er hvordan den sistnevnte viser større støtte for generell etnosentrisme og de assosierte verdiene.

# Acknowledgements

Completing my thesis would not have been possible without the invaluable guidance of my supervisor, Professor Anna Brigevich. Her academic feedback and insights have been instrumental to my studies. I am deeply grateful for the positivity, support, and patience she has extended to me throughout this writing process.

I am also grateful to my friends for their positivity and support throughout my five years of study in Trondheim. Thank you for all the invitations, rounds of board games, frisbee golf, late nights, and laughs. Thank you to my parents and sister for helping me get to this point. A special thanks goes to Annikken and Aslak, who have studied by my side for five years, ensuring that I take sufficient breaks and do not study too hard. Lastly, I want to express my appreciation to my girlfriend for her constant support, which has made my days easier.

David Soltveit

Trondheim, 15<sup>th</sup> of May 2024





# Table of Contents

List of Figures .....	xi
List of Tables.....	xi
List of Abbreviations (or Symbols) .....	xi
1 Introduction .....	1
1.1 Topic .....	1
1.2 Research Questions .....	3
1.3 Methodology .....	5
1.4 Structure of the thesis .....	6
2 Literature Review .....	7
2.1 Characteristics of Radical Parties .....	7
2.1.1 RPs in Europe .....	11
2.2 Ethnocentrism .....	13
2.2.1 Facets of Ethnocentrism.....	14
2.3 Confounding Ideologies.....	15
2.3.1 Nativism .....	15
2.3.2 Ethnic Nationalism .....	16
2.3.3 Racism .....	18
2.4 Hypotheses .....	18
3 Method .....	20
3.1 Datasets and Variables .....	20
3.1.1 The European Social Survey .....	20
3.1.2 The Chapel Hill Expert Survey .....	21
3.1.3 Dependent variables .....	23
3.1.4 Independent variables.....	24
3.2 Multilevel Logistical regression Model .....	27
4 Empirical Analysis .....	29
4.1 Party Positions using CHES Data .....	29
4.2 Radical Voter Analyses.....	34
4.2.1 Radical Voters and Ethnocentrism .....	34
4.2.2 RLVs versus RRVs .....	36
4.2.3 Radical Voters in the West and in the CEE States .....	38
4.3 Analyses .....	41
5 Discussion.....	43
5.1 European Ethnocentrism .....	43
6 Conclusion .....	46

6.1	Summary .....	46
6.2	Review and Future Research .....	46
7	References .....	48
	Appendices .....	52

## List of Figures

Figure 2.3.1: Relationship between Ethnocentrism and nativism .....	16
Figure 2.3.2: Nationalism's relationship with other ideologies.....	17
Figure 3.1: Visual representation of the regression models .....	28

## List of Tables

Table 3.1: Division of Europe in the regression analysis.....	21
Table 3.2: Parties of the thesis.....	23
Table 4.1.1: Western Political Positions of RLPs .....	32
Table 4.1.2: CEE Political Positions of RLPs .....	32
Table 4.1.3: Western Political Positions of RRP.....	33
Table 4.1.4: CEE Political Positions of RRP.....	34
Table 4.2.1: Ethnocentrism across radical and non-radical voters by region .....	35
Table 4.3.1: Combined East and West RVs.....	37
Table 4.3.2: RPVs in the West and the CEE.....	39

## List of Abbreviations (or Symbols)

CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CHES	Chapel Hill Expert Survey
DV	Dependent variable
ESS	European Social Survey
EU	European Union
ICC	Intraclass Correlation Coefficient
IV	Independent variable
MLM	Multilevel Model
NRP	Non-radical party
NRV	Non-radical voters
OR	Odds Ratio
PCF	Principal Component Factor
RLP	Radical left party
RLV	Radical left voters
RP	Radical party
RRP	Radical right party
RRV	Radical right voters
RV	Radical voters

# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Topic

"The situation in Ukraine today is completely different because it involves a forced change of identity. And the most despicable thing is that the Russians in Ukraine are being forced not only to deny their roots, generations of their ancestors but also to believe that Russia is their enemy. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the path of forced assimilation, the formation of an ethnically pure Ukrainian state, aggressive towards Russia, is comparable in its consequences to the use of weapons of mass destruction against us. As a result of such a harsh and artificial division of Russians and Ukrainians, the Russian people in all may decrease by hundreds of thousands or even millions."  
– Vladimir Putin (2021)

This excerpt from Vladimir Putin's article on the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians was written eight months before the start of the Russian Invasion. In this excerpt and the rest of the article, he is significantly focused on the ethnic Russians living in Ukraine (Putin, 2021). Describing how their assimilation is comparable to weapons of mass destruction speaks volumes of just how important the matter of ethnicity is. Although the following war may have started for a multitude of reasons, the matter of ethnicity rests heavier than most might realize over Europe. The distinct political views on ethnic groups and the superiority of one's group are attributed to the ideology of ethnocentrism. Although fewer people share President Putin's worldview, especially on the matter of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, many divisions across the world revolve around the matter of ethnicity. Ethnocentrism, or the belief that one's ethnic group is superior, is a much more relevant political attitude in contemporary Europe than previously assumed, as evidenced by the aftermath of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Putin's war on Ukraine highlights that ethnocentric rhetoric still resonates with parts of the European electorate, even those that are outside of Russia. The Russia-Ukraine War has created an influx of Ukrainian refugees, especially into neighboring EU member states, such as Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. These countries and the EU have ironically garnered criticism for their outpouring of public and political support for the refugees, as activist groups point out that there is a double standard in how these refugees are treated in comparison to those that have come from the Middle East and Africa during the 2015 migrant crisis (Reilly & Flynn, 2022). In response to this criticism, receiving countries have argued that Ukrainian refugees are much more capable of assimilating into their host states, given their ethnic backgrounds. For example, Bulgarian Prime Minister Kiril Petkov said of the Ukrainians: "These are refugees we are used to...These people are Europeans...These people are intelligent, educated...This is not the refugee wave we have been used to, people we were not sure about their identity, people with unclear pasts, who could have been even terrorists," (Brito, 2022). Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, a staunch opponent of immigration to Europe, has expressed similar sentiments (Coakley, 2022).

The Ukrainian refugee crisis demonstrates that ethnicity is still a binding force in Europe today, and ethnocentrism continues to inform political decision-making in EU Member States. As such, it merits closer examination. However, ethnocentrism is a highly complex concept, as its boundaries are not as clear-cut as with many other social science concepts. Instead, this concept gets muddled with terms such as nativism and racism, as well as issues surrounding immigration, which are closely related to ethnocentrism but

conceptually and causally distinct from it. This is what the thesis will address. It does so by examining the extent of ethnocentrism across radical right and left parties in the EU, as well as among their voters.

An ethnocentric mindset is naturally more aligned with anti-liberal ideals, as the core values of liberalism are tolerance, pluralism, and freedom, which very much encompass multiculturalism and a diversity of ethnicities (Heywood, 2017, p. 33). Hence, the thesis will investigate the parties furthest away from the center, namely the radical parties on both the left and the right. The rise of radical parties (RPs) in Europe has been well documented over the last twenty years. Especially the radical right parties (RRPs) have gained a lot of traction during the migration crisis and the economic crisis. Simultaneously, increasing criticism towards the European Union (EU) has become a factor of support for both party families, as the topic of identity has become highly salient and politicized in both the national parliaments as well as the European one. The crises have become nexus events for Europe as the RPs have seized a stable political platform in many countries. This goes for both the RRPs as well as the radical left parties (RLPs), as both have seen stable growth.

There are a number of gaps in the literature on RRPs and RLPs that this thesis aims to address. First, it is reasonable to assume that RRPs and their supporters will exhibit more ethnocentrism than mainstream parties and voters. After all, RRPs are more likely to endorse anti-pluralism, authoritarian values, and anti-immigration policies (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Hence, a number of studies document that radical right voters are xenophobic and nationalistic (Golder, 2016; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Rydgren, 2008). And yet, explorations of whether these voters are also ethnocentric have traditionally been ignored, as nativism, racism, and xenophobia are considered adequate proxies for ethnocentrism. As I show in the theoretical discussion below, it is vital to keep these terms distinct.

Second, the literature on RPs typically paints RLPs as the polar opposite of RRPs. Whereas RRPs are nativist, illiberal, and nationalistic, RLPs are frequently described as internationalist, cosmopolitan, and open to immigration (Brigevich, 2020). However, several studies argue that RLPs have more in common with RRPs than we give them credit for. RLPs and their voters are also nationalistic and wish to curtail immigration because it hurts the native workers, who are the critical electorates of RLPs (Halikiopoulou et al, 2012; Rooduijn & Burgoon, 2018). Furthermore, both RRPs and RLPs are Eurosceptic and populist (Fagerholm, 2018). Hence, this thesis explores the degree to which radical right and radical left parties and voters similarly align on ethnocentrism. It might seem unlikely that RLPs and their voters will exhibit ethnocentrism, even if they are opposed to immigration. Instead, they are more likely to oppose immigration for economic reasons. However, this supposition overlooks that RLPs in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) behave more like RRPs in the West. As Rovny (2014) points out, the communist legacy in CEE has created RLPs that are frequently intolerant of both immigration and ethnic minorities. Thus, the third gap this thesis aims to fill is in charting out the similarities and differences between the parties and voters in Western Europe and CEE states.

In short, ethnocentrism is far from a new topic. This is a concept that historically predates both the terms of racism and nationalism and their uses. It has been used to drive war, conquest, and conflict which is still present in Europe today (Bizumic & Duckitt, 2012). The Russian Invasion of 2022 can be explained as partially ethnocentric, although there are many other factors as well. Furthermore, the reaction to Putin's invasion is also illustrative of the similarities between RRPs and RLPs and their supporters. A recent study by Ivaldi

(2023) of the French response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine found both the radical right and radical left in France have been more supportive of Putin's actions than the mainstream. Hence, we must not assume that RLPs are the mirror image of RRP in all regards. In fact, we may find more similarities within these two-party families than the literature assumes, especially regarding ethnocentrism.

The thesis believes the RPs are more similar than they are given credit for and expects ethnocentrism to be an undiscovered "bridge" that connects the two and can explain why voters can change between the radical parts of the left-right axis. Further, it believes ethnocentrism's presence to be more evident than it seems.

## 1.2 Research Questions

The formerly mentioned aim of the thesis is to gain an understanding and subsequently map out ethnocentrism's presence in Europe. Gaining a proper understanding of the concept ethnocentrism is crucial for two reasons: Firstly, the concept is often misused in the literature as many define the ideology through the ways it is expressed rather than through its defining ideals, which the thesis will thoroughly explain (Bizumic & Duckitt, 2012). Secondly, the concept is often miscast with similar but not equal concepts like nationalism, immigration, and nativism, which, although overlapping, are distinct terms. Furthermore, there are justified flaws in the definition used for the concept, specifically in terms of what constitutes an ethnic group, which the thesis will detail.

### **(1) How does ethnocentrism fit into the landscape of European parties and voters?**

This is an expansive research question, which still leaves a lot to be determined. Thus, three sub-research questions are incorporated to further limit and resolve the wide range of the study. Exploring the potential ethnocentric values among Europeans is far more interesting when the context surrounding it is similarly examined. The secondary questions will aim to provide this context by precisely locating its presence. By controlling for regional differences and party families, we will have a stronger foundation to be able to properly explain the complexity of the concept and what it might correlate with.

The thesis explores how radical right parties (RRPs) and radical left parties (RLPs) incorporate ethnocentric policy positions into their platforms and the degree to which their voters similarly express ethnocentric attitudes. The mainstream literature on European parties by Mudde (2007) argues that RRP are nativist and xenophobic; as such, they are the most likely to invoke ethnocentric language. RLPs, on the other hand, have a reputation for being more cosmopolitan and supportive of multiculturalism. However, several studies demonstrate that this reputation may not be as clear-cut as we suppose. For example, Halikiakoupolou et al. (2012) argue that some RLPs are equally likely as RRP to use nationalistic rhetoric in their party programs, although their motivation in doing so is predicated on a more inclusive vision of Europe. Furthermore, research on CEE highlights that one of the significant cleavages dividing non-Western states on the issue of ethnic minorities' rights (Rovny, 2014). Studies show that RLPs in the CEE are prone to ethnocentric and authoritarian rhetoric, given their post-communist legacy. These developments showcase that more research is needed on the policy positions of RLPs. Hence, the main research question is complemented by three sub-questions.

### **(a) Does an ethnocentric overlap exist between the radical left and the radical right, both at the party and the voter level?**

The first of these sub-questions will specifically address a potential overlap among radical parties in relation to ethnocentrism. This question will support the primary research question by examining the radical parties and their association with the ideology. The question pertains to whether ethnocentrism could be cast explicitly as a more prominent attitude for the RPs and their voters. The literature outlines a set of other characteristics that usually, but not always, are a mainstay in these parties, which are Euroscepticism, Nationalism, Populism, and Anti-elitism (Bolet, 2022; Burgoon, 2012; De Vries & Edwards, 2009; Halikiopoulou et al, 2012; Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, 2007). This theory of overlap between the edges of the political axis is formerly known as the horseshoe theory (Heywood, 2017, p. 16). An overlap in this respect will be examined as a strong presence of ethnocentrism compared to the mainstream parties. There are alternative fallouts we do not expect to uncover, such as the RP and their voters not being ethnocentric or the mainstream parties exhibiting ethnocentrism. By extending this to the perspective of Liberalism, which finds itself the furthest away from the edges of the political axis. We know these parties are inversely less associated with this topic due to their strong sense of tolerance and freedom (Heywood, 2017, p. 33). This could be a possible false positive the thesis could uncover by the liberal parties showcasing a low amount of ethnocentrism to the degree that the RPs seem ethnocentric in comparison. However, as the exclusion of ethnic groups is commonplace by some RRP, which may become breaches of human rights, these are values more often associated with the RRP rather than the RLP (Halmai, 2020). Although this frequently is the case, the literature highlights multiple reasons why this might be the case among the RLPs as well, specifically due to the divide among the RLPs in Europe, as well as the proposed mirroring party systems between CEE and Western Europe (March & Mudde, 2005; Rovny, 2014). Following this, the subsequent secondary research question concerns itself with ethnocentrism across space and explicitly how it pertains to the relationship between the CEE and the West of Europe. Hence, the second sub-question (1b) accordingly asks:

**(b) How do ethnocentric attitudes vary across Western European and the CEE states?**

The second sub-research question changes scope from investigating RPs to examining differences in Europe across space. This question will build upon the knowledge from the previous question, which will indeed be answered in tandem due to the quantitative analysis covering both aspects simultaneously. This approach simultaneously adds another layer to the overall enhancement of information on the topic that the thesis researches. The two questions stretch across two dimensions, which will be further elaborated upon by the third sub-research question, which asks as follows:

**(c) What other political characteristics, values, or attitudes correlate with ethnocentrism?**

The final question further expands upon the area of research as it provides the main research question with a different avenue of insight. The thesis examines RP connection, geography, and, lastly, corresponding attitudes. Not only will this relate to the overlapping values but also to the values specifically related to either the left or the right on matters such as identity, immigration, culture, social issues, and economy. These, of course, are policies pertaining strictly to either the radical left or right in a traditional sense. Analyzing such values is particularly useful as it provides further insight into ethnocentrism and which values it may or may not correlate with. Further, this will provide an even stronger

foundation of which parties and/or voters are most likely to adopt or have ethnocentric values.

### 1.3 Methodology

The methodology of the thesis is employed to accomplish three things: First, it will use the scholarly literature to define ethnocentrism. Secondly, the thesis examines the RLPs and RRP and how they position themselves on a set of political issues relating to ethnocentrism and their nature. Thirdly, the thesis performs a multilevel logistic analysis of the radical left voters (RLV) and the radical right voters (RRV) in terms of their attitudes towards ethnocentrism, along with other factors conditioning votes for RPs. The thesis employs a division of both Europe and the RPs, dividing the parties into four groups: 1) RRP in the West, 2) RLP in the West, 3) RRP in CEE, and 4) RLP in the CEE. This categorizing is crucial in regard to examining the voters due to the ability to investigate the specific attitudes of each group.

To elaborate upon the first aim. By using the literature on the topic of ethnocentrism, the thesis has opted to utilize the definition of Bizumic and Duckitt (2012) as a foundation. The use of this definition, which will be further analyzed in detail, has the primary target of delineating the concept from similar concepts such as nativism, immigration, racism, and nationalism. This will be of assistance to the rest of the thesis in many regards, such as operationalizing ethnocentrism specifically rather than confusing it with associated concepts. Furthermore, this will assist the eventual discussion by providing clarity, conceptual rigor, and depth to the term. The chosen definition concerns ethnocentrism with the three aspects of Group self-centeredness, outgroup negativity, and ingroup positivity, with the two latter ones being expressions of the former. These central pillars, in terms of the definition, function as great aspects to be able to measure and operationalize ethnocentrism in terms of the quantitative analysis.

The second aim of thoroughly examining the RPs' political stances is accomplished using datasets provided by the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES). The datasets in question will give the thesis an overview of larger political patterns in the RPs of Europe at a fixed point in time on issues such as ethnocentrism, related issues pertaining to this topic, and common topics of the RPs. In addition, this method will provide the ability to investigate the parties on an individual basis, helping to establish what messages the parties are sending to their voters. Furthermore, it will give the possibility of comparing them within their own group to discover parties deviating from the others. Most importantly, the thesis will be able to compare the four groups of parties against one another. This analysis allows us to uncover similarities and differences among the party families across the Western and CEE countries, in addition to the same examination across party families within the same regions.

Mapping out the presence of ethnocentrism in Europe is a rather large task which the thesis has chosen to solve by the use of a quantitative method. To gain such vast knowledge across both CEE and Western Europe, the paper will utilize another dataset pertaining to voter attitudes from 2019 in the form of ESS10. Moreover, the thesis will utilize a multilevel logistical regression analysis to extract useful information from this dataset. Due to the rather large task, the thesis will not be able to answer specifically on a country level in which voters inhabit ethnocentric attitudes. However, it will be able to account for the amount of variance and explanatory power among the different radical voters in Europe. Due to the method of separating voters into four groups, the thesis will examine the European level and separate Europe into CEE and West. Additionally, the thesis will



separate the voters into three groups: The RLV, NRV, and RRV. The results of the logistical regression models will examine the extent to which voters are indeed as ethnocentric as their parties of choice.

## 1.4 Structure of the thesis

The thesis is structured into six chapters. The second chapter will cover the existing literature on the main topics: Radical parties, their characteristics, and ethnocentrism. The chapter will outline what a "radical" party is in this context, as well as explain in detail the common characteristics of RPs on both sides of the left- right axis. Furthermore, the chapter will present the chosen definition of ethnocentrism, including the six facets, and compare the concept to other concepts similarly used, with the aim of distinguishing it from the other. Additionally, the chapter examines the potential overlap in the characteristics of the RPs and ethnocentrism and introduces the hypotheses. The third chapter will go into detail on the method and how the thesis implements its quantitative analyses. It will explain the choice of variables and how the two different datasets – the CHES and the ESS - are to be understood. The chapter will also provide info about the countries within the datasets and the parties examined. Lastly, it will explain how a logistical regression is conducted and interpreted. Chapter four begins with an analysis of the party positions of the RRVs and RLVs under investigation, focusing on variables related to in-group/out-group dynamics, including support for ethnic minority rights. Then, presenting the mean scores of RRV and RLV on the measures of ethnocentrism helps compare the voters to the parties. Finally, the chapter concludes with a quantitative analysis of RRVs and RLVs to gauge the extent of their ethnocentrism. Chapter five discusses the analyses conducted and finds that ethnocentrism has a consistent presence among the RVs. The thesis finds that it is a concept that creates an overlap between the two ends of the left- and right axis. However, the concept cannot be described equally in terms of its presence among RPs across Europe. The thesis also finds ethnocentrism to be significantly associated with opposition to immigration and, to some extent, nationalism, TAN, and Euroscepticism. Chapter six recaps the main findings and reviews what the thesis has attempted, what it has succeeded at, as well as suggesting future research on the topics of interest. The main findings reiterated in the conclusion states that there is an ethnocentric overlap among RRVs, in addition to the CEE countries being overall significantly more ethnocentric than the Western European countries. Further, the thesis finds there is no overlap among the RPs, which leads to the finding of a disconnect between RLVs and RRVs.

## 2 Literature Review

This chapter provides a two-fold assessment by first presenting RPs and then going on to examine ethnocentrism. These topics, with seemingly little relevance to each other, are evaluated in the same chapter as the thesis wishes to examine if ethnocentrism could be a characteristic linking the left and the right-RPs and their voters. Thus, assimilating a precise overview of the RPs in Europe and their characteristics will be of great assistance when defining and discussing ethnocentrism. Further, it will be a necessity when choosing variables, picking out RPs for the analysis, and explaining the eventual findings of the regression analyses. Moreover, this chapter will present a definition of ethnocentrism by Bizumic and Duckitt (2012) to understand what this concept encompasses and does not, which will merit further discussion. Lastly, the chapter will reflect on the characteristics that link the RPs together, along with the additional elements of ethnocentrism. The aim is to examine if there are elements central to ethnocentrism that are similarly central to the RPs. Additionally, this examination is extended to encompass other specific attitudes closely associated with ethnocentrism. The chapter concludes by presenting the hypotheses that were conducted to answer the research questions. The chapter finds ethnocentrism to be its own concept distinct from all others yet experiences great overlap with associated concepts. Furthermore, it establishes ethnocentrism as not being a central part of the existing overlaps among the RPs, yet its associated terms are.

### 2.1 Characteristics of Radical Parties

The thesis has its focus on the extreme ends of the political spectrum, indicating that it is of use to examine other articles on the topic to understand their composition, what makes them different, and what characterizes them. Studies that examine the radical left or right often place them in opposition as they are placed on opposite sides of the left- right-axis. However, the thesis is just as, if not more, preoccupied with the ones that compare them to each other, which there are multiple studies on. While the right has been well-defined in the last decade to be heavily immigration-focused through their embrace of anti-immigration and xenophobic rhetoric, the left, on the other side, has become a lot more ambiguous, which the paper will return to. However, they have traditionally been concerned with the egalitarian interests of the working class against the interests of the elite (Bolet, 2022; March, 2011, p. 37). There has similarly been done much research on what may align the two ends of the left- right-axis, as there are elements that often make them seem similar. The literature on this topic is far from conclusive. Nevertheless, the efforts of examining the two sides have yielded some results that this paper will utilize. The common traits found that the RPs share Anti-Semitism, euroscepticism, nationalism, and populism as characteristics. Often with a common cause of representing the "virtuous and unified population" against corrupt political establishments (Bolet, 2022; Burgoon, 2012; De Vries & Edwards, 2009; Halikiopoulou et al, 2012; Mudde, 2007). These characteristics will be further examined as they are central to the thesis both in regards to gaining insight into RPs in general and also regarding choosing variables, viewing their results in context, and eventually discussing them. The next subsection defines and differentiates radical right and radical left parties more precisely, while this present subsection focuses on their similarities.

This thesis will continue to utilize the “radical” term as its shorthand term for the parties in question. Some refer to them as “the far”- or the “extreme” left or right, however as stated by Luke March (2011), “extreme” often brings with it some baggage in the form of expectation that the parties in question operate outside the law in an undemocratic manner, especially after 9/11. Thus, the thesis operationalizes the German legal tradition that has made attempts to distinguish extremism from radicalism. It treats the “radikalismus” -term as a radical critique of the status quo, or the constitutional order in different terms, without anti-democratic intention or meaning to it (March, 2011, p. 10). In the same tradition, the “extremismus” -term is the token of being open to prohibition, anti-democratic, anti-constitutional, as well as anti-liberal (March, 2011, p. 10). In Europe, both on the left as well as the right, there are parties that could be considered extreme. Not in the sense of constructing terror attacks but rather through the sense of exhibiting anti-democratic and anti-liberal attitudes and characteristics. Fidesz in Hungary would be a typical example, with their leader Viktor Orban openly describing their party’s attempt to produce an illiberal constitution for the country (Halmai, 2020). Nevertheless, the fundamental aspect to consider is that all extreme parties are, by extension, radical; however, not all radical parties are extreme. Evidently, this justifies and clarifies the utilization of the radical term as being of greater use to the thesis than any other.

### *Euroscepticism*

We begin with the first common characteristic of RPs and their voters: Euroscepticism, which is the opposition to European Integration. De Vries and Edwards’ (2009) paper showcases how the decrease in public support for the EU has been a trait that has been uncorrelated with mainstream parties in member countries. RRP have further echoed Euroscepticism to voters by adding a layer of defense for national sovereignty and identity. RLPs, on the other side, have coupled the opposition towards the EU with resistance specifically to the neoliberal character of the EU. In other words, Euroscepticism boils down to economy (on the radical left) and identity (on the radical right) (De Vries & Edwards, 2009). This argument is further supported by Hooghe and Marks (2005), who elaborate upon this by arguing that there is an additional mainline of explanation on top of the explanation of identity and economy. They preface that claiming consensus would be hyperbolic as there is no consensus on why a person supports or opposes the EU. However, their first reason for Euroscepticism is the argument of economy, and specifically the EU’s impact on your economic costs and benefits (Hooghe & Marks, 2005). Their second reason is down to a person’s group membership, suggesting that identity and belonging to a national identity rather than a European one constrains the EU. Their third explanation argues political cues dictate public opinion (Hooghe & Marks, 2005).

These papers, although written almost two decades ago, still hold up impeccably well as The EU has been through two major crises on these exact topics: The Economic Crisis and The Migrant Crisis. These events have, in turn, led to increasing politicization of both the EU and the topics of economy and immigration, especially by the RPs who oppose the EU and try to highlight these issues. Consequently, the mentioned crisis’ impact was found to have no effect on the EU-stance of NRPs, as well as making the RPs even more Eurosceptic (Rohrschneider & Whitefield, 2015). The final reason for voter Euroscepticism identified by Hooghe and Marks (2005) ties naturally into this as well, as parties cue their voters to oppose the EU, which has been easier due to the crises. There are further layers to RPs being Eurosceptic as ideology such as nationalism ties into a fundamental skepticism towards the EU. Nationalism will be covered further in its own part. Further, radical left and right ideologies lend themselves even more to Euroscepticism due to their preoccupation with the economy on the left and identity on the right. As established by the

papers are the reasons for opposition, showcasing how it is the RPs on both sides that have become the common oppositional parties to the EU and how they are the benefits of the crises. While economy and identity are common expressions of Euroscepticism that evidently pair well with the orientations of the RPs, there are authors who take different approaches.

Daphne Bolet (2022) believes that voters turn to the RPs for necessity more than political inclination. This is another way the RPs on both sides reconcile as they are both “shelters” for the voters who feel forgotten by the mainstream. She presents what she claims is the under-studied psychological factor of status anxiety and further establishes that people’s social status compared to their parents is central to becoming a radical voter. Having a lower social status, as opposed to having an equal or higher, is significant for voters to specifically turn to the radical left (Bolet, 2022). This group is mainly comprised of highly educated people living in cities who originate from poor parts of society. She further highlights that voters being sheltered by the radical right are usually older, self-employed men residing in rural areas (Bolet, 2022; Hobolt, 2016). Evidently the rise of globalism plays a large role in the rise of the RPs and the presented characteristics.

The consequences of inequality are substantial as they have the potential to draw out insecurities and deprivation felt in the broad population, which in turn becomes the scapegoating of out-groups. Furthermore, an unchecked income equality may lead to a sharp decrease in support of global engagement, leading to broader criticism of parties’ positions on internationalism, EU cooperation, and a lack of trade protectionism (Burgoon, 2012). These are all aspects that connect to Bizumic and Duckitt’s (2012) definition of ethnocentrism, which the paper will cover in the next sub-chapter. These attitudes reflect not only in voters but in the political parties as well (Burgoon, 2012). Playing off these aspects, many of the voters who turn to the radical parties experience an increasing fear of status decline, which is characterized by the perceived change from the once dominant white working class. Groups with low income in a country with rising levels of unemployment and social inequality will eventually be pushed to turn against the mainstream parties, especially the mainstream left, which in many countries are the champions of inequality (Bolet, 2022). They will “flee” to the radical left, which is also concerned with these issues. On the other side, the blame will be put on the emerging ethnic groups in society who come in to replace the previously dominant group (Bolet, 2022).

Sara Hobolt (2016) details the effect of globalization through Brexit, how it has brought support for RPs, and what groups reside there. It is important to note that the United Kingdom is an outlier in terms of its historical opposition to the EU; however, as emphasized by the paper, similar divisions across Europe are becoming increasingly prominent due to globalization. The main factors in the Brexit referendum were the concerns about immigration along with loss of a clear national identity. The main group that this side appealed to was the “losers of globalization,” namely voters with low levels of education and people in more vulnerable positions in the labor market (Hobolt, 2016). The “winners,” on the other side, are young, highly educated professionals who were heavily in the Remain camp. The division is also evident in terms of geography, where urban residents living in more multicultural cities were more prone to vote Remain (Hobolt, 2016). On the contrary, the rural residents of the English countryside were Leave. Further, this was a country splitting within the United Kingdom as England and Wales had a majority of Leave while Scotland and Northern Island were pro-Remain (Hobolt, 2016).

### *Nationalism*

Nationalism is believed to be a “thin” or “sticky” ideology that takes on many different shapes. This indicates that this ideology can change depending on the context, specifically what other ideology it is connected with (Halikiopoulou et al, 2012). After conducting extensive research on the topic of RPs with the intent to understand what is connecting them, Halikiopoulou et al. (2012) find that nationalism is one of the overarching factors that connects RLPs and RRP. They acknowledge left- and right-nationalism to be two different kinds of nationalism, as it is a “sticky” ideology, but believe that both types have the same core: Preservation of unity, autonomy, and identity. These principles are believed to be the core of all the shapes nationalism can take. However, this paper further states that when coupled with RPs, nationalism specifically takes the form of Euroscepticism, supporting the previous paper (Halikiopoulou et al, 2012). This is due to their quantitative case study on the parties in France and Greece, which finds that: 1. Mainstream parties are neither eurosceptic nor nationalist, 2. RP’s are consistently both (Halikiopoulou et al, 2012). This concept of thin ideology and the definition of “preservation of the core” will be central to the paper as it overlaps greatly with both ethnocentrism and nativism. Other authors like Andrew Heywood (2017, p.168) add to this definition of nationalism as the belief in the nation, an organic community, self-determination, and culturalism. He explains that even nationalists argue over what they define as a nation as some view this as the country they live in, and some connect it to a people from a region, which is a nuance the paper will return to. The other aspects are neatly encompassed by the previously mentioned definition (Halikiopoulou et al, 2012). This overlapping aspect is highly relevant to the thesis as it is what ethnocentrism is believed to be and will be discussed further after the thesis has presented ethnocentrism.

### *Anti-elitism and Populism*

Another thin ideology that has encapsulated the RP’s for decades now is populism. Cas Mudde (2004) defines this as:

*“An ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.”*  
– Cas Mudde, 2004.

The most useful way of analyzing this definition is to start with what it opposes, which is elitism and pluralism. Elitism is described as the exact opposite of populism, as it expresses the views of the immoral elite instead of the virtuous masses. Pluralism, on the other side, rejects both elitism and populism as it pictures society as a collection of groups and individuals with different wants and needs (Mudde, 2004). The problem with this definition is the vagueness of “the people”, as it has been argued that this is just a rhetorical tool that is not referring to anyone. Mudde (2004) acknowledges this criticism and explains that the people of the populists are an imagined community in the exact same way as nationalists (Mudde, 2004). Lastly, he points to the populist rhetoric of being “the champion of the people” as common across the left- right-axis and this being a product of the time we live in, which will eventually change (Mudde, 2004). This notion of “the people” and imagined communities is the most interesting aspect to highlight in terms of ethnocentrism in the next subchapter, as people’s perceptions of groups are so central to this concept. This extends the thoughts of Bolet (2022) as, in many cases, “the people” refers to the people who feel forgotten, seeking refuge in the RPs, which ties back into Hooghe and Marks’s (2005) third reason for cueing. When some people turn to these RPs due to their low status, anxiety, or other reasons, they are easily cued to be opposed to EU integration.

These attitudes are evidently often found in the same kind of voters and the same kind of parties. However, this is not necessarily the case in all of Europe.

### 2.1.1 RPs in Europe

As previously mentioned, the RRP's have been well documented in the last decade compared to the RLP's; however, much of the literature assumes all party compositions to be similar throughout Europe. This is not as clear-cut of a case as it seems (Rovny, 2014). Even if all the previously displayed characteristics are linked in some way, and they are all expressed in the far ends of the political axis, the literature does display some theoretical challenges the paper needs to address, followingly many aspects are far from unanimous. In accordance it is in place to swiftly identify what the thesis "expects" the RRP's and RLP's to be in both the CEE and the West.

I begin by defining what a RRP is. The Western party systems characteristically have RRP's that are highly concerned with their cultural unit in regard to the nation and the political unit in regard to the state. This combination of the two adds up to a previously mentioned concept called nativism, which is expressed through the security of their nation and immigration (Mudde, 2007; Rooduijn et al, 2017). They are increasingly xenophobic to non-native elements such as persons and ideas and believe them to be a danger to their ideal of the homogenous nation-state (Rooduijn et al, 2017). Hobolt (2016) mentioned the composition of RRP's in terms of most voters belonging to a lower socio-economic position than the mainstream. To slightly elaborate, these voters tend to have lower incomes, be less educated, have a greater likelihood of being unemployed, and come from lower social classes. With globalism and the migrant crisis enhancing salience on the issues the RRP already had "ownership" to, it is evident why they rose to a more prominent position (Rooduijn et al, 2017). In regard to the already discussed use of the terms "radical" versus "extreme", the general basis for this group to be reckoned as the latter is strong. Due to their encompassing ideal of democracy being only for a certain group, their own national and cultural one. In fact, the CHES family grouping, which the thesis will return to, was originally based on Hix and Lord's (1997) definition of party family. In their sectoring of party families, they used the labels of "Radical Left" and "Extreme Right" due to the nature of the parties. In the CEE, the parties are not as united as in the West. Jan Rovny (2014) describes the CEE as mirroring the West while (Pytlas, 2018) argue that the parties are just like their Western peers, if not more extreme. Some parties in the CEE countries are described to be downright racist and anti-semitic, as well as having a greater influence on the mainstream on normalizing such attitudes. Other sources, however, claim that it is the RLP that claims ownership of these issues, with the RRP's being preoccupied with redistribution and fiscal policies (Rovny, 2014).

Secondly, I will define what an RLP is. This party family, as previously alluded to, is far more ambiguous than their counterparts and needs a broader presentation. The thesis will conduct this to both give a stronger foundation for the discussion as well as provide a generalization of the paper. What makes the RLP's radical, rather than oppositional, is that they traditionally have rejected the values, practices, and the general underlying socio-economic structures that contemporary capitalism has put in place (March, 2011, p. 8). Depending on the party, this can vary from the outright opposition of private property to milder rejection of consumerism and neo-liberalism. Secondly, advocating for alternative structures to contain power and economy that involve major redistribution of resources from the already existing elites to the lower groups of society (March, 2011, pp. 8-9). Finally, RLP's are internationalists both in terms of solidarity of common causes and

cooperation across borders. This is a result of their belief that regional and national socio-political issues are caused by larger global structures (March, 2011, p. 9). On the other hand, the difference from their neighbors on the center-left is that they generally try to act within the confines of capitalism rather than break down capitalism itself.

The Western European left alone can be categorized into many different subgroups depending on the definition. Luke March (2011) highlights this as his definition divides them into four groups: communists, democratic socialists, populist socialists, and social populists. These categories are dynamic and overlapping, with all RLPs becoming more populist and nationalistic to gain the blue-collar voters appeal (March, 2011, p. 19). Additionally, there is the distinction between the "new" and the "old" left, which will be most pertinent for the thesis. This divide comes about due to the end of the USSR as a trend of new left parties being more oriented towards "new social movements" like environment, peace, women's rights, and solidarity of the third world (March & Mudde, 2005). No matter how many categories are created, the main disparity between RLPs is the new focus on other social movements compared to mainly the economic and anti-elitist orientation of the old communist RLPs. This matters for the thesis as the different parties may or may not have different views on the variables, especially ethnocentrism. If these "new" RLPs are supposed to be internationalists with major support toward third-world solidarity, then how could they still be ethnocentric, as these are opposing values. Furthermore, these aspects of social issues, such as gay rights, have been somewhat contradicted to be specific to the RLPs, and the RLPs have also become great supporters of such causes. This is due to the phenomenon aptly named "The Gay Right" in the scholarly literature (Lancaster, 2019; Magni & Reynolds, 2023). The origin of this phenomenon seems to be two-fold: First, there is a cynical reason behind this as many parties and elites on the right have tried to be ahead of their voters, anticipating a shift in attitudes (Magni & Reynolds, 2023). Additionally, this has meant that they are able to brand themselves as inclusive. Secondly, a lot of parties have become more secular than before and strongly adopted same-sex family policies into their already strong focus on family values (Magni & Reynolds, 2023). Furthermore, Magni and Reynolds (2023) provide an overview of the parties that are opposed to gay rights and supportive of gay rights. Several of the Western RLPs featured in the dataset are named on the supportive side (Magni & Reynolds, 2023). Comparing them with "old" RLPs will allow us to examine these distinctions between the two.

The greater issue in the divide between CEE and Western party composition merits its own presentation. Halikiopoulou et al. (2012) chose to research on France and Greece in their article, however there might be a large variance depending on what country is the applied case. Especially when using the West European countries compared to the countries that were previously under communist rule, which is described as "mirror images" from each other. Explaining the party composition patterns in this part of Europe is very different as Communist federalism has created institutional connections between specific ethnic groups and political parties (Rovny, 2014). It is demonstrated by Jan Rovny (2014) that countries who has a main ethnic minority originating from the center of a communist federation will have leftist parties that support minorities. However, if the main minority were to be from another place, the left would turn out to be anti-immigrant by utilizing ethnic nationalism and chauvinism. Thereby, ethnic issues are the forming of political systems in the post-communist countries as the right consistently becomes a reflection of their left counterparts. Simply: If the left is ethno-nationalistic, then the right will not be, but if the left is not, then the right will be (Rovny, 2014). These ethnicity issues are, in this regard, heavily correlated with sociocultural preferences. Support for ethnic minorities leans

toward social liberalism, while the other side leans toward social conservatism (Rovny, 2014).

With this variance of Europe in mind, there will be a need to separate CEE and Western Europe. When attempting something such as this, there is a risk of running into the same issue as the EU, namely, deciding where Europe ends. Furthermore, dividing the continent is still more problematic as many of the countries in the former communist bloc consider themselves central European (March, 2011, p. 8). Throughout the thesis, however, the simple term already in use, Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) will be a short-hand term for Countries that were part of the Big Bang EU enlargement in 2004. The rest of the countries will be referred to as West(ern) Europe, which will, by all purpose and design, include Greece, which is further East than most of Europe. These countries and their parties will be detailed in later chapters, along with their positions and limitations regarding the countries the thesis can use.

## 2.2 Ethnocentrism

As presented in the introduction, ethnocentrism is the central component of this thesis. Aiming to provide nuanced documentation of the concept and challenge the established definition. This is all in an attempt to gain a better understanding of the concept and apply it to European politics. Bizumic and Duckitt (2012) present an overview of ethnocentrism. Their article explains that the concept has become highly prominent, especially in political psychology. Further, they highlight how there was a lack of a common definition of the concept for ethnocentrism to be properly utilized, previous through this paper. By researching the literature, both historical and recent, on ethnocentrism of different authors, they find what they believe to be the three main underlying factors of ethnocentrism:

*"(a) group self-centeredness (i.e., giving strong importance to one's group), (b) outgroup negativity (i.e., hostility and contempt towards other groups), and (c) mere ingroup positivity (i.e., positive evaluation of one's own group)."*- Bizumic and Duckitt, 2012.

They utilize these three criteria and exhibit how ethnocentrism could, but does not necessarily have to, reside in all of them simultaneously. They end with their own reconceptualization of the concept of ethnocentrism which is:

*"a strong sense of ethnic group self-centeredness, which involves intergroup expressions of ethnic group preference, superiority, purity, and exploitativeness, and intragroup expressions of ethnic group cohesion and devotion."* - Bizumic and Duckitt, 2012.

This definition builds on the previously uncovered factors of ethnocentrism; however, the authors emphasize that it is to some degree separate from them. The main theme of ethnocentrism is putting one's own ethnic group above others. They clarify that there is no explicit need for outgroup negativity or ingroup positivity; these are rather expressions of ethnocentrism than its core (Bizumic & Duckitt, 2012). This definition is brief, adequate, and informative, with the only real point of discussion being the term "ethnic group", as it might be vague to many in its definition. The authors acknowledge this themselves and extend a discussion on the topic. They realize that culture is a core part of ethnocentrism, and after debating elements of different culture definitions, they stick to a definition of culture that reads "a relatively organized system of shared meanings" (Smith & Bond, 1999). Further, they extend this definition to encompass their own definition of ethnic group, which is:



"the real-world groups that their members perceive as having a unique "system of shared meanings" (e.g., distinct customs, mores, norms, language, or dialect), the perception of common historical past and future, and usually belief in a common origin." - Bizumic & Duckitt, 2012.

The authors argue that when breaking down the concept ethnocentrism it results in ethnos and center, which is why ethnicity is the main component of ethnocentrism. Therefore, this concept cannot be used to describe groups divided by culture. The next part of the thesis should be about where the divisions of culture lie. Is there a separation between Norwegian and Swedish culture, or would this fall under Scandinavian culture? Further, does this divide lend itself to all people in or out of that culture? If so, why or why not? There are a lot of identity studies done on these topics. However, this seems like a tangent to what the thesis wants to accomplish, which is why it leaves this for future research.

### 2.2.1 Facets of Ethnocentrism

These expressions are important for selecting variables and will be necessary for the impending discussion. Hence, the thesis will elaborate upon them.

#### *Preference*

Preference is the inclination to prefer one's own ethnic group. This includes both the larger scale of member's group over other groups along with the individual level of group members over outgroup members (Bizumic & Duckitt, 2012). This is not a like-for-like term for seeing one's own group as superior or advocating ethnic purity; however, associates greatly with other radical expressions (Bizumic & Duckitt, 2012).

#### *Superiority*

This facet appears to be the most widespread as it can be linked to multiple dimensions such as morality, spirituality, sociability, military might, economy, history, development, and so forth. Most ethnic groups have traditionally, at some point, believed themselves to be superior in some way, usually in the form that they were some form of "chosen people" (Bizumic & Duckitt, 2012). Bizumic and Duckitt (2012), define this facet as the belief of an ethnic group to be superior to another in a certain dimension.

#### *Purity*

Ethnic purity is a facet that is remarkably close to outgroup negativity. However, it is argued that they are not the same, as it is possible to show outgroup negativity without practicing the belief that one's ethnic group should be ethnically homogenous (Bizumic & Duckitt, 2012). Further, it is possible to reject outgroups for lack of common experience and/or goals rather than outright dislike. This facet involves a desire to maintain one's ethnicity from being mixed with outgroups, thereby staying "pure" (Bizumic & Duckitt, 2012). The self-importance of the group is expressed through a wish of the group to associate purely with themselves while keeping outgroup members at a distance, possibly even shunning them (Bizumic & Duckitt, 2012).

#### *Exploitativeness*

It is a facet of ethnocentrism that relates to furthering the group's interest at any cost. This facet critically displays how the interests of the group are more important than considerations of other groups, as no consideration should be shown towards them, making it acceptable to exploit, enslave, rob, and kill outgroups (Bizumic & Duckitt, 2012). This facet has radical tendencies; however, it does not necessarily need to involve negative elements like purity. Exploitativeness can be attached to indifference towards outgroups,

although this seems to be an exception to the expression as this facet is heavily linked to outgroup negativity (Bizumic & Duckitt, 2012).

#### *Group Cohesion*

The penultimate facet involves the mindset of the group's needs over the individual. This should be promoted through high levels of cooperation, integration, and unity within the group (Bizumic & Duckitt, 2012). Many definitions do not include this facet when defining ethnocentrism; however, Bizumic and Duckitt (2012) have chosen to incorporate it into their expressions. They elaborate that this facet does not primarily need conflict to be promoted, but when a group feel threatened or engage in a conflict cohesion is naturally increased.

#### *Devotion*

The final facet of ethnocentrism, according to this definition, is an unconditional and strong attachment, dedication, and loyalty to the group. This should be expressed through blind support and uncritical support for the actions of the group, with a willingness to sacrifice oneself for their ethnic group (Bizumic & Duckitt, 2012).

## 2.3 Confounding Ideologies

As this thesis aims to examine both ethnocentrism, the RPs, and what connects them, it is necessary to further distinguish them from each other and determine how they are connected. This sub-chapter will explain the closely related topics to ethnocentrism, such as nativism, ethnic nationalism, and racism. It will clarify how ethnocentrism differs from these ideologies, how they are similar, and why they are often used interchangeably. Lastly, the sub-chapter will assist the future choice of hypothesis by showcasing how these subjects may tie together with euroscepticism and each other.


### 2.3.1 Nativism

A concept closely connected to ethnocentrism is nativism. Some refer to this as ethnic nationalism, which is increasingly confusing. These two terms are often used with the same intention, which is why the paper will thoroughly clarify the differences and overlaps between them. Nativism is an ideology with the belief that the state should be solely inhabited by members of the group native to the country. Furthermore, nonnative people, cultures, religions, and ideas are a fundamental threat to the homogenous nation-state (Schwörer, 2021). The two concepts, as mentioned, are very similar and thus are easily entwined. A nativist may display the elements presented in Bizumic and Duckitt's (2012) definition of an immigrant of a different ethnicity. This creates an overlap between the two concepts, which is common, leading to these misuses of the different definitions. This overlap between nativism and ethnocentrism has been previously discussed by other authors without labeling it in this manner. What differentiates them is their intentions. An ethnocentric will be anti-immigration because of the immigrant's ethnicity. A nativist, on the other side, will be anti-immigration no matter the race of the immigrant; they would rather oppose the nationality of the immigrant. It is equally possible that both ethnocentrism and nativism are expressed through, for example, the economy, where they both could believe ethnic immigration to negatively impact the country economically. The real essence that separates the two is the focus on ethnic and national groups. A nativist will only consider people of both the same ethnicity and nationality to be in the same group. While an ethnocentric on the other side, will expand, or reduce, their view of who is part of their group only to include those of the same ethnicity as they are not as preoccupied with nationality as nativists. Thus, the thesis believes that nativism can be viewed as a

sub-category of ethnocentrism, which can sometimes be used about the same case. However, their broader views will differ.

For instance, in Figure 1 below, person A is a nativist, and B is an ethnocentric; they are both ethnically white Norwegians. Regarding an immigrant from Sudan, they have the same exact thoughts in the form of ingroup positivity and outgroup negativity. In terms of an immigrant from Sweden, however, they differ. The nativist, although not as negative as the previous immigrant due to some shared culture, religion, and traditional skin color, would still be critical due to the Swede being from a different nation. The ethnocentric, on the other side, would not have any issues due to the person stemming from the same ethnicity. By this logic, ethnocentrism's ideal, in the confines of Europe, is to be a white, Christian Europe. However, nativists who view their group more narrowly might only look toward their own country or region within Europe, implying that some kinds of cooperation, like free movement, might be inconceivable. This is a reason why both nativism, as well as ethnocentrism view ethnic groups very narrowly to be opposed to the EU. Furthermore, the aspect of sovereignty is also more compatible with this notion of the nation.

Figure 2.3.1. Relationship between Ethnocentrism and nativism.




### 2.3.2 Ethnic Nationalism

The thesis believes it is important to stress the relationship between nationalism and ethnocentrism. As both concepts have been described through core values, ideals, and the mindset of nationalism, the relationships described by Halikiopoulou et al. (2012) are directly comparable to multiple of the expressions Bizumic and Duckitt (2012) names ethnocentric. Sheppard et al. (2023) recognize this and utilize the same framework of Bizumic and Duckitt (2012) to explain nationalism differently. Considering this framework, nationalism can be seen as a strong sense of national group self-centeredness, just like ethnocentrism, with the same intragroup and intergroup expressions. The historical explanation for this is that the modern world system of the nations grew out of core ethnic groups in their own ways, creating them (Sheppard, Bizumic, & Iino, 2023). However, there are distinctions between the two concepts. Nationalism will be concerned with national legal, political, and economic systems and assumes an accord between a political entity and a national one. Ethnocentrism, on the other side, does not take any of these into accord (Sheppard, Bizumic, & Iino, 2023).

There is one last nuance, however, as the paper by Halikiopoulou et al. (2012) is, as mentioned, using some of the ethnocentric expressions to evolve into their version of radical and eurosceptic nationalism. What is peculiar is how they point out this as an expression on both the right and the left of the axis. This leads the thesis to believe further that quantitative analyses will yield results of ethnocentrism as well as nationalism on both sides. Further, ethnocentrism and euroscepticism may have a relationship previously uncovered. Lastly, the previous points about "sticky/thin" ideology are highly relevant for this comparison. Nationalism can be attached to many ideologies ranging from liberalism to facism as well as from ethnocentrism to nativism. According to Andrew Heywood (2017, p. 176), nationalism adds the belief that the nation-state is the way of order to whatever elements the ideology previously is composed of. This is how all the confusing terms of liberal nationalism, conservative nationalism, expansionist nationalism, as well as civic and ethnic nationalism that are relevant to the thesis (Heywood, 2017, pp. 176-177). Add to the fact that some nationalism places ethnic groups in the center of their ideology, and seemingly, ethnic nationalism is highly similar to ethnocentrism. Some would argue that it could be apt to view nationalism as a sub-category of ethnocentrism due to their large similarities. However, nationalism is too versatile of an ideology. Claiming all nationalism is ethnocentrism is simply wrong as they are separate concepts, and claiming all nationalism is partly ethnocentrism is also wrong as ethnocentrism has qualities to it separate from nationalism. Utilizing names like "ethnic nationalism" or other sub-categories of nationalism could be useful for some purposes. However by using similar terms about ethnocentrism leads to confounding and inaccurate research. According to Shepard et al. (2023), the thesis should view the two as distinct concepts. Figure 2 below illustrates the relationship between ethnocentrism, nativism, and nationalism.

Figure 2.3.2. Nationalism's relationship with other ideologies.



### 2.3.3 Racism

Further, the paper would like to compare ethnocentrism to the concept of racism. This is a concept that is closely related to this definition of ethnocentrism. Racism is a focus specifically on someone's race, which Bizumic and Duckitt (2012) also claim is part of their definition yet is a distinct culture. Both of these concepts contain central ideas about the three previously presented pillars of (a) group self-centeredness, (b) outgroup negativity, and (c) mere ingroup positivity. Racism could be argued to be a sub-category of ethnocentrism. However, this thesis chooses to pursue a different classification of the relationship (Bizumic & Duckitt, 2012). The key distinction, which is almost written in fine print, of racism is its inherent belief that certain moral and psychological traits relate to biological racial traits like skin color, facial features, etc (Bizumic & Duckitt, 2012). This is not a factor of ethnocentrism, although the thesis argues that this belief could be an overlap between the two. To further exemplify this discussion, Racism believes that a certain race will have a set of morals and a way of thinking from birth. Even if a person of a certain race grew up by themselves in the jungle or a completely different environment with only people of a different race than their own, racism believes that they would have the same morals and mindset as a different person growing up in its own racial group. Ethnocentrism does not view races this way, as it is more of a view between races, not on biological factors. However, as mentioned, due to their common view of outgroup negativity, especially the belief that other ethnic groups than one's own are inferior, these mindsets often go hand in hand.

## 2.4 Hypotheses

Based on the above discussions of RPs and ethnocentrism, I derived five hypotheses that will be tested in the analysis below.

The first hypothesis addresses the first sub-question (1a). This hypothesis taps into the aspect of the overlap between the radical left and right as it expects ethnocentrism to be the mainstay among these voters compared to their mainstream counterparts. By peering into ethnocentrism from this perspective, the paper may be able to confirm or deny which parts of the European electorate emphasize the importance of ethnicity. In terms of RVs, this is a topic as most of the literature clearly points towards the RPs being ethnically negatively oriented. The RLP, on the other side, should by many accounts be positive towards immigration and other ethnicities due to their aspect of social justice (March, 2011, p. 10). Although they are known as internationalists for their solidarity, the paper has pointed out the opposite through sources such as Halikiopoulou et al. (2012), who find the mentality of the left to "protect the core". This mentality is completely aligned with some of the expressions in the presented definition of ethnocentrism. Thus, it is not particularly far-fetched to believe that ethnocentrism might also be an aspect found in both RLPs and RPs and their voters. Hence, the first hypothesis expects the following:

H1: Radical voters generally will be more ethnocentric than their mainstream counterparts.

Continuing along the lines of the RPs, the next set of hypotheses is related to the reaffirming of their characteristics: nationalism and Euroscepticism. As previously described, the expectation is that the RPs are going to be nationalistic and Eurosceptic compared to their counterparts in the mainstream NRPs. These hypotheses are closely connected to the third sub-research question (1c), as it will examine other factors that condition voting for a radical party. Furthermore, the thesis has previously pointed out that

nationalism is a staple for RPs, and that it is a thin ideology that can manifest or “latch on” to other ideologies. This might be the case for nationalism and ethnocentrism, which makes the two useful to examine together.

H2: RP voters will be more nationalistic than mainstream voters.

H3: RP voters will be more Eurosceptic than mainstream voters.

Fourthly, the paper has gone into detail about the Western party systems, while the countries of CEE are much more unknown. Many of the authors of the previously presented papers might assume that the party systems are equal throughout Europe. However, this thesis has highlighted Jan Rovny’s (2014) paper that examines how CEE states display a counter to the Western party systems. The different party compositions are, according to the paper, “mirror images of each other”. However, he also presents that some CEE countries are similar to the West. This might result in a conflict in the outcome of the thesis’ regression, and examining the countries in CEE on an individual level might be a solution for future research. Nevertheless, the thesis follows up on this research and assumes that the CEE and the West will have opposing results. However, the thesis firmly believes that the characteristics identified in RPs will be consistent in all RPs, as well as the aspect of ethnocentrism. This hypothesis relates to the second sub-question (1B), as it explores the attitudes of radical voters and how similar they are across space.

H4: RPs in Western European and CEE countries will differ on the factors conditioning their vote for RP, with the exception of ethnocentrism.

In addition, the thesis specifically highlights the social issue of attitudes towards gay rights. Although this is not directly the topic of the thesis, it wishes to examine the relationship ethnocentrism might have with homophobia. This stems from ethnocentric expressions, which display a separation from people being different. Although ethnocentrism is ethnically centric, it is impossible to “be ethnocentric” towards someone’s sexual orientation. However, there might be a common xenophobic mindset surrounding more easily being displayed by ethnocentrism, which is similarly shown towards people of different sexual orientations.

H5: RP voters will be more likely to exhibit negativity towards gay rights.

## 3 Method

This chapter of the thesis will cover the dataset, the variables, the countries, and the values of the quantitative regression analysis. Moreover, it will detail how the regression analysis has been constructed, how it works and consequently how the paper reached its findings. The chapter will also explain the hypotheses chosen, the reason for them and what their success will achieve. The individual-level data comes from the European Social Survey (ESS) round 10. This is complemented by data on parties from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) 2019. For a country to be included in the analysis, it must be present in both the ESS and the CHES.

### 3.1 Datasets and Variables

#### 3.1.1 The European Social Survey

The first of the chosen datasets for the thesis is the European Social Survey (ESS) Round 10, from 2020. This cross-national survey is academically driven and has been continually conducted since 2001 and published in "rounds" every other year. These surveys measure a representative population sample in over thirty nations through beliefs, attitudes, and patterns of behavior (European Social Survey, n.d.). This sheer number of European countries, as well as its specific attention to attitudes in regard to politics, is the main reason to opt for this dataset in the case of the thesis. Further, as the survey focuses on the voters rather than parties, it gives us a broader understanding and nuance of voters' attitudes compared to party manifestos, which only capture the party's official position on certain political issues. It is important to mention that this specific survey was conducted during the timeframe of 2019 to 2020. This indicates that some results might have been impacted by the Covid-19 pandemic. Although an important acknowledgment, we should not put too much emphasis on this when interpreting the results. Rightly, Europe is rarely "quiet," as previous rounds would have been even further impacted by the migrant crisis and further back the economic crisis. Suggesting that there will always be something impacting how voters answer such a survey.

For the logistical regression analysis, the thesis will utilize the following countries from the dataset: Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, and Slovakia. Some of the remaining countries of the survey were incoherent in their questions and thus lacked certain variables central to the thesis. This resulted in the thesis dropping eight of the countries, indicating fourteen are left in the survey. The list of countries dropped are the following: Belgium, Iceland, the United Kingdom, Ireland, North-Macedonia (known as Macedonia in the ESS), Switzerland, Montenegro, and Croatia. In addition, some countries have multiple rounds of the same question, in which the thesis consistently chose the question identified as the first one.

As previously mentioned, the divide between CEE and the West is crucial to the thesis, and selected countries provide an even split of countries in both parts of Europe. These have been divided accordingly in Table 3.1. Although the paper has emphasized the EU, it has chosen to keep Norway in the selection. Even if it is not an EU-member state, it is the only Scandinavian country that has proven to have somewhat different political parties on the radical left. Furthermore, it is hardly an irrelevant country in the EU context, given it is still

an EEA member, one of the EU's largest trade partners, and geographically closer than many other countries to the "core" of the EU (Regjeringen, 2012). This spread of countries allows the thesis to examine differences within the EU member states, which is exactly what the thesis will do, even if the data is preoccupied with the individual level.

*Table 3.1 Division of Europe in the regression analysis.*

<b>Western Europe</b>	<b>CEE</b>
Finland	Bulgaria
France	Czechia
Greece	Estonia
Italy	Hungary
Netherlands	Lithuania
Norway	Slovenia
Portugal	Slovakia

### 3.1.2 The Chapel Hill Expert Survey

The second of the chosen datasets for the thesis is the CHES from 2019. Similarly to the ESS, this is an academically driven, cross-national survey that has been conducted multiple times since 1999 (Chapel Hill Expert Survey, n.d.). These surveys are conducted by experts and have an emphasis on political parties rather than voters. The 2019 survey spans 32 countries, with a total of 277 different political parties (Chapel Hill Expert Survey, n.d.). This survey asks experts of national-level party systems to evaluate how parties position themselves on integration, economics, immigration, social issues, European integration, as well as other issues. This survey is naturally adjusted to make parties comparable to each other across national lines. The CHES obviously allows the thesis to compare the parties in different countries to each other. As this is on a standardized scoring system with a set of questions specified to display values making the survey impeccable for a thesis such as this one. These CHES party positions serve as cues to party supporters, who use these positions to inform their opinions about these issues (Hooghe and Marks 2005). The party positions will be utilized in the first step of the analysis below to map out how ethnocentric and nationalistic RRP and RLPs are in the West as compared to the CEE and to get a better understanding of the kinds of messaging radical party supporters receive from their party of choice on a host of political issues.

The countries utilized in the CHES will be the same as those in the ESS. By examining both datasets, the thesis will get an even greater grasp than through the ESS alone. Further, by researching parties specifically, the paper will gain an understanding of how these topics are being consciously used as a political tool by the parties. Pytlas (2018) describes the CEE RRP as more successful in making their policies and attitudes more common than their radical peers. This will undoubtedly be revealed among the CHES data if it is the case. Unfortunately, this is not something the thesis will be able to discern through the RVs, which may hamper further investigation between party and voter.

The standardization of party positions is the most important use of the CHES. At the same time, a key advantage of the CHES is that it codes parties as belonging to various party families. Specifically, it categorizes parties into RRP, RLP, or one of nine other categories. All of the other categories are what the thesis has referred to as non-radical parties (NRPs) or mainstream parties. By identifying RRP and RLP via the CHES dataset and transferring



the information to the ESS dataset, the thesis can pick out the voters who vote for radical parties. The voters were subsequently placed into three groups and compared to each other, which the thesis will return to explain in further detail. Table 3.2 lists the RRP and RLPs in the analysis.

By utilizing the same countries in the CHES 2019 dataset as in the ESS 10 2019, the thesis can account for twenty-nine RPs. The parties are specified in Table 3.2, which showcases the West and CEE divisions of the parties. Although both regions of Europe have seven countries, the West has nineteen RPs of display, while the CEE has ten. The variance between the two regions is due to all Western countries having at least one RP, with three of the countries having more than two RPs. In the CEE, both Estonia and Lithuania have no RPs, while the only country having more than two separate parties is Hungary. Although there are more parties than accounted for in the thesis, both in regards to the ESS and the CHES, the thesis could only account for the parties present in both datasets. Furthermore, the datasets provide some overlapping data as the CHES has accounted for coalitions like the CDU in Portugal, which previously consisted of two separate parties. The ESS, on the other side, has made both the former parties, as well as the coalition party being a stand-alone option. This disconnect between the two datasets made for challenging data and the omission of certain parties from the datasets. Further, there is a stark division between the two regions regarding their radical division. The West experienced a divide of ten RLPs and nine RRPs, while the CEE oppositely experienced a split of only two RLPs and eight RRPs. Despite the West having nearly double the number of RPs, the sheer number of voters is much closer, with the West only having approximately 1.5 times as many voters as the CEE. Both sides have great contributors, including Syriza of Greece and Fidesz-KDNP of Hungary. Although the main reason to have NRVs from all countries is to get a true grasp of the European regional attitude or stance on topics. Yet, due to skews from such countries as Estonia, Lithuania, Greece, and Hungary, there was further incentive to keep all possible voters as they function as a balance to each other.

Table 3.2: Parties of the thesis.

<b>West</b>				<b>CEE</b>			
<b>Country</b>	Party	Family	Voters	<b>Country</b>	Party	Family	Voters
<b>Finland</b>	VAS	RL	86	<b>Bulgaria</b>	Ataka	RR	7
	PS	RR	133		Volya	RR	14
<b>France</b>	PCF	RL	16	<b>Czechia</b>	KSCM	RL	95
	RN	RR	107		SPD	RR	88
	FI	RL	44	<b>Estonia</b>			
	DLF	RR	12				
<b>Greece</b>	Syriza	RL	480	<b>Hungary</b>	Fidesz- KDNP	RR	567
	KKE	RL	127		Jobbik	RR	130
	XA	RR	31		MM	RL	52
	EL	RR	53	<b>Lithuania</b>			
	MR25	RL	45				
<b>Italy</b>	LN	RR	155	<b>Slovakia</b>	LSNS	RR	42
					Sme Rodina	RR	95
<b>Netherlands</b>	SP	RL	4	<b>Slovenia</b>	SNS	RR	15
	PVV	RR	73				
	FvD	RR	38				
<b>Norway</b>	FrP	RR	89				
	RV	RL	36				
<b>Portugal</b>	CDU	RL	47				
	BE	RL	55				
Total:	Total:	Split:	Total:	Total:	Total:	Split:	Total:
7	19	10-9	1 631	7	10	2-8	1 104

Source: CHES 2019; ESS10

### 3.1.3 Dependent variables

Because the analysis operationalizes vote choice as a dichotomous or dummy variable, logistic (logit) regression will be used in the analysis. I explain the model choice in greater detail below. The dependent variable (DV) in this analysis is whether the ESS respondent voted for a RRP or a RLP, as opposed to all other parties. As the paper is researching both the radical left and the radical right voter, and not just one of them, it needs two dependent variables. The dependent variables read: (1) Did the voter vote for a RLP or not, and (2) did the voter vote for a RRP or not? In both variables, the radical voters have the value of one, while the non-radical voters, plus the other radical group, have the value of zero.

To expand upon the origins of these variables, the data in the ESS was utilized according to the results of the CHES (2019) survey. Based on the CHES's definition of which parties

counted as radical, the thesis isolated the voters of these parties in the ESS to group them together with voters from other countries that voted for RPs of the same family. This left the thesis with three groups: RRVs, the RLVs, and the NRVs. Thereafter, the thesis conducted coding that separated the countries into CEE states and Western Europe according to whether the country was part of the 2004 EU enlargement or not, with Norway being placed in the latter block.

### 3.1.4 Independent variables

The key independent variable (IV) of interest is ethnocentrism. The goal of the logit analysis is to ascertain whether radical right and radical left voters are more likely to exhibit higher levels of ethnocentrism. The previously presented literature outlines six main expressions of ethnocentrism. The thesis originally attempted to isolate all six expressions of the concept in the ESS survey when considering relevant variables. However, due to these displaying great overlap with nationalism, amongst other factors, the thesis reverted to choosing variables as close to the definition by Bizumic and Duckitt (2012) as possible. Hence, two survey questions were chosen to operationalize ethnocentrism. These survey questions queried respondents how many or how few immigrants should be allowed to come and live in one's country. The first question asked respondents about immigrants that are "of a different race/ethnic group from the majority", while the second asked about immigrants of "the same race/ethnic group as the majority." The analysis below labels these variables "Different Ethnic Group" and "Same Ethnic Group", respectively. These variables have four values ranging from complete support (i.e., allow many to come and live here) to complete opposition (allow none). The scales of the variables have been recoded to make the interpretations more intuitive, where allow none = 1 and allow many = 4. In other words, higher values on the Different Ethnic Grp variable indicate less ethnocentrism, while higher values on the Same Ethnic Grp variable indicate more ethnocentrism.

The former variable has an obvious inclusion/exclusion of out-groups dimension. However, the implications of the Different Ethnic Grp variable may be twofold. On the one hand, the respondent may simply be opposed to all immigration, regardless of the race or ethnic group in question. On the other, the respondent may actually be ethnocentric. Hence, the second variable determines whether the respondent is more favorable to one's own ethnic group. When applied together, these variables allow us to capture ethnocentrism more accurately while disentangling it from general attitudes toward immigration. Moreover, any differences in them will signify a difference in position on ethnicity specifically, given that the crucial difference between them is the aspect of ethnicity. Thus, the thesis regards these variables to accurately express ethnocentrism. I anticipate that radical voters will be more likely to accept immigrants from their own ethnic group and less likely to accept immigrants from other ethnic groups (H1).

Additionally, to complement the two ethnocentrism variables, I include a survey item that asks respondents "How emotionally attached are you to Europe". According to its definition, ethnocentrism is about the high regard of one's ingroup, which this variable captures by the broad term of "Europe". This variable is not perfect, as it might correlate the concept of Europe and the EU too closely. Similarly, some would not consider all of Europe as its ingroup, as the "ethnic groups" are inherently difficult to discern in a continent as multicultural as Europe. However, the essence of the question asks about Europe, which to ethnocentric voters may be regarded as the white Christian Europe. Displaying a strong attachment to this concept may potentially be an expression of ethnocentrism. If so, we should see radical voters express a greater attachment to Europe. Of course, we may see

the opposite effect. European identity is typically construed as a more inclusive and cosmopolitan identity (Citrin & Sides, 2004). As such, it might be the case that greater attachment to Europe indicates less ethnocentrism. If this is the case, then radical voters may exhibit lower attachment to Europe. The Europe Attachment variable is on an 11-point scale, with greater values indicating more attachment.

I now turn to the other IVs in the model. Euroscepticism is the next concept to be operationalized in the model. Ideally, the thesis would include variables that encompass the feelings of opposition toward aspects of European integration, cooperation, or the EU in general. The variable questioning "European Union: European unification could go further or has gone too far" is the embodiment of this concept. As predicted in H3, radical voters are more likely to be Eurosceptic. The variable is on an 11-point scale, with high values indicating more support of EU integration.

In the case of nationalism, the thesis will operationalize it using the question: "How emotionally attached are you to [country]". This question asks about the equivalent of what the Europe variable is, but on a national level. It directly addresses the connection of nationality, which, as established by Sheppard et al. (2023), is a separate ideology that works in the same framework as ethnocentrism. This variable will enable the thesis to tap into nationalism or, potentially, nativism. Every single country in this survey has been asked this question on the same scale of one to ten. High values indicate attachment to their country, and low values indicate less support. We should see that radical voters are more nationalistic than mainstream voters (H2).

The next aspect to operationalize is the party-specific, ideological elements, such as attitudes toward immigration, social justice, and redistribution. We start with variables that should pertain specifically to RRPs, for whom strong opposition to immigration is the central cue of the parties to the voters. There are multiple reasons to oppose immigration for the supporters of these parties; Hobolt (2016) shows how many of the voters of the radical right have shifted due to globalization. Immigrants are accused by RRPs of crossing borders and "taking" jobs from the traditional working-class dominated by white, older, less educated men. For many belonging to this group, this is a question of identity, while others are more concerned with the economic issues immigration seemingly brings upon them. Hence, the paper will operationalize immigration attitudes by looking at three questions. The first asks respondents whether they think immigration is bad/good for the economy; the second asks whether immigrants undermine/enrich the cultural life of the country; and the third asks whether it is generally bad/good for the country. The three immigration variables have an intuitive range of values from zero to ten, where high values indicate more positive values toward immigration.

These three immigration-based variables were at first considered to be incorporated into an index to pick up on opposition to immigration firmly. However, after deliberation, the thesis concluded that picking up on the different aspects of immigration is more interesting in terms of RPs. Further, a Principal Component Factor (PCF) analysis has been conducted to investigate if it is indeed beneficial to keep all three separately. The analysis found all of these variables to measure distinct attitudes among the voters. Further, the same analysis included the two ethnocentric variables as they also relate to immigration. However, all five variables displayed values suggesting that the variables should be entered into the model separately. I anticipate anti-immigration attitudes will be a strong predictor of voting for a RRP, especially when that opposition is rooted in cultural anxiety. We may

also find that RLP voters are more hostile to immigration for economic reasons, although not cultural ones.

Next, we have two attitudes that are strongly linked to supporting RLPs. The first attitude pertains to fiscal monetization, which, as March (2011) showcased, is the true linchpin of the RLPs. To operationalize support for greater redistribution of incomes, I use the question: "Government should reduce differences in income levels". Such a question does not only pertain perfectly to the RLPs, but RLPs have particularly strong opposition towards fiscal policies, such as FRP in Norway (Fremskrittspartiet, n.d). Similarly to other questions, the variable is recoded to be intuitive regarding high values indicating more support for redistribution. As such, radical left voters should score particularly high on this question. The last of the IVs taps into support for social justice policies, which, as displayed previously, is a natural source of contention among the RLPs. The "new left", as mentioned, are the parties with ownership on such matters, while the "old left" has not adopted this progressive thought process. Which makes the aspect highly interesting in terms of the research questions. The variable chosen to operationalize this aspect is the support for gay rights, specifically asking: "Gays and lesbians should be free to live life as they wish". Similarly to the previous variable, it is recoded due to its being counterintuitive in terms of interpretations. Higher values indicate greater support for gay rights. I anticipate that individuals who vote for a RP will be less likely to support gay rights (H5). Both variables are constructed on a five-point scale.

The final variables added to the regression are the set of control variables: gender, age, and education. These questions from the ESS10 naturally provide the respondent's gender, age, and level of education in years. Similar to the dependent variables, the gender variable has been dummy-coded with the value zero equal to "male" and the value one equal to "female". Both the age and education variables are continuous, with the former ranging from the age of fifteen to ninety. The latter variable must be utilized carefully due to the values ranging from zero to fifty-five, with several values missing in between. This is due to the sample size in the dataset not having representatives for every year. This is not an issue in the thesis case as this variable does not pertain further than being a control. Further, most respondents cluster between seven and twenty-one years of education, leaving few individual cases to skew the variable. However, in other cases where this variable might be the center of attention, it must be caustically used. Controlling variables is necessary for the thesis as they should not be reported like the other independent variables. They should always be explained and justified as valid variables to further build knowledge upon; however, their results should not be analyzed and interpreted with the same level of relevance (Hûnermund & Louw, 2023). Such variables still have a purpose, which is controlling for variance among the other independent variables by isolating other interfering effects on the dependent variable (Hûnermund & Louw, 2023). Appendix 2 through tables A.2.1 and A.2.2 reports the descriptive statistics for all the variables.

It is prudent to acknowledge some methodological limitations regarding the two data sources. As the thesis is using the ESS Round 10, it is dictated that not all European countries can be used, and not all aspects can be researched upon. This is due to the limitation of the questions in the dataset, the lack of evenly distributed questions throughout the countries in the survey, and lastly, the overlap in utilized countries with the CHES. This results in the topics of populism and anti-elitism not being able to be measured in any meaningful way, as the ESS has no questions that would be possible to interpret either of these categories. The aspect of anti-elitism variable is an unfortunate

loss; however, due to populism being a sticky ideology with much literature on the topic, it is not the most necessary topic for the thesis to contribute to.

## 3.2 Multilevel Logistical regression Model

The thesis will utilize a logistical regression, often referred to as a logit regression. These types of regressions are mainly used because of the dependent variable being dichotomous. As this is the case in this analysis makes this form of regression the most optimal choice. It is difficult to argue for the utility of linear regression, as the thesis would have run a greater risk of not fulfilling the technical requirements of a regression, as the regression curve might not be linear and the residual might not be satisfactory (Skog, 2021, p. 353). The downside of using a logistic regression as opposed to a linear regression is, first and foremost, that a linear regression can measure the effects of the independent variable on the dependent variable in absolute terms. A linear regression will have the same effect regardless of the values interpreted, whether it is the values from three to four or twenty to twenty-one (Skog, 2021, pp. 362-363). The logit is more challenging to interpret; however, by utilizing the "Odds ratios" (OR), the thesis will be able to draw useful interpretations. By utilizing OR, the regression measures the relative effect. To elaborate, this method displays how much more likely something is to be than something else (Skog, 2021, p. 363). Odd ratios take on values between -1 and 1, with higher, positive values indicating that the likelihood of an outcome is more likely. Negative values indicate that the outcome is less likely for the group under investigation. Take, for example, one of the models that examines the likelihood that a respondent will vote for an RRP in Western Europe. For any given independent variable, the OR-value will tell us whether radical right voters (as a group) are more or less likely to hold that political attitude when compared to the other group, which comprises nonradical and radical left voters.

This particular regression is strictly divided into four, as it researches four different groups of individuals. The first division is between the radical parties and the mainstream. The regression is dummy-coded to compare the RRP voters with the value one and the rest with the value zero. This will indicate how much more likely a radical right voter is to belong to a different group or have a different value on the independent variable. Likewise, the next part of the regression has the RLP voters with a value of one and the rest of the voters with a value of zero. This will allow the thesis to compare the two types of RPs separate from one another and read their results with as little interference as possible. In turn, this allows comparisons of their results against each other and towards the center. Furthermore, the regression is divided twice, in addition to getting pure readings on the RLP- and RRP voters. The regression divides the voters into respondents from CEE states and the West. This leaves the thesis with four regression models, which will give it the possibility to isolate not just the RLP and RRP in Europe but also isolate the RLP and RRP in the different parts of Europe. This gives further room for interpretation and comparisons allowing the paper to go into detail as well as investigate the broader trends.

Figure 3.1: Visual representation of the regression models.

		Origin Country	
		West	CEE
RP Identity	RLP	Radical Left Voters in the West	Radical Left Voters in the CEE
	RRP	Radical Right Voters in the West	Radical Right Voters in the CEE

In addition to a logistical modeling, the analyses presented here are also multilevel models (MLMs). A MLM provides the intercept of the model the ability to vary by taking each country-level group into account (Robson & Pevalin, 2016, p. 22) To elaborate upon this, this kind of model applies different levels of analysis, making it possible to distinguish between the individual (micro) and country (macro) levels of the data (Robson & Pevalin, 2016, p. 6). This improvement upon a regular logit model is imperative, as it gives the thesis the ability to further explain how an individual’s level predictors vary and subsequently impact the dependent variable in the separate contexts (Robson & Pevalin, 2016, p. 7). The respondents in the ESS data are motivated by individual attitudes, but they also reside in different countries that have their own complexities and, more importantly, their own party systems. The multilevel model makes it possible to control for country context without including country dummies in the regression.

In order to opt for MLM, the thesis ran statistical tests in the form of the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) to understand how much of the variance of the dependent variables is attributed to differences between the country levels (Ringdal, 2018; Robson & Pevalin, 2016). The values of the ICC test range from zero to one, with the former indicating perfect interdependence of the second level. This suggests that the variables on a country level give no power to variation of the individual-level variable (Sommet & Morselli, 2017). ICC values of one suggest the opposite, being the country-level variables variation exhibiting perfect interdependence, indicating that it is the between country levels causing variance (Sommet & Morselli, 2017). These tests of the thesis all displayed larger variances between the country levels, meriting the usage of multi-level models. Had this not been the case, the thesis would have reverted to using a regular logistic model.

## 4 Empirical Analysis

The analysis proceeds in three steps. In the first part, we take a closer look at the RRP and RLPs under investigation. Using CHES data, I map out the party positions of the RRP and RLPs on a variety of variables relating to ethnocentrism, as well as variables relating to the traditional platforms of these parties (e.g., immigration for RRP and economics for RLP). This mapping of party positions allows us to gauge the extent to which the parties in this study conform to the expectations in the literature. It also shows us the type of cues that the parties send to their voters, which we assume will inform the voters' decisions to vote for these parties. In the second part, we turn to an examination of ethnocentric attitudes of the different types of radical voters, both in the West and in the CEE. Specifically, I evaluate the average (mean) scores of radical right, radical left, and non-radical voters on the two ethnocentrism variables. The goal here is to assess the degree of ethnocentrism among the three types of voters. This information will be useful for unpacking the results of the multilevel model introduced in the third and final part of the analysis. In the third part, I present the regression results in two steps. The first set of models looks at radical right (Model 1) and radical left (Model 2) voters across Europe, writ large. The second set of models divides the sample into Western states and CEE states. Hence, four models will be presented: radical left voters in the West (Model 3), radical left voters in the CEE (Model 4), radical right voters in the West (Model 5), and radical right voters in the CEE (Model 6).

### 4.1 Party Positions using CHES Data

How well do the parties under investigation here conform to the ideological expectations in the literature? And how do these parties position themselves on ethnocentrism and related concepts? The CHES dataset contains a multitude of party position variables. For the purpose of this analysis, I focus on seven variables. First, I include the party's position on immigration, as this is the most important issue for RRP. Higher values indicate more support for open borders and less restrictive immigration. Second, I include the party's position on economic redistribution – the most important issue for traditional RLP. Higher values of the variable denote more opposition to redistribution and greater preference for laissez-faire economics. Given that I anticipate that some of the RLPs in this analysis are more like "new left" parties that prioritize social justice and freedom of lifestyles, I include the variable GALTAN, which captures the party's position on social and cultural issues (Hooghe & Marks, 2017). GAL stands for Green/Alternative/Libertarian and represents the socially liberal or left-wing end of the political spectrum. Conversely, TAN stands for Traditional/Authoritarian/Nationalist and represents the socially conservative end of the political spectrum (Hooghe & Marks, 2017). Higher values on the GALTAN variable indicate more socially conservative, right-wing values, such as opposition to gay rights. I expect that the radical right and radical left party families will differ significantly on these signature positions.

Next, I examine two party positions where the literature predicts an overlap between RRP and RLP: nationalism and Euroscepticism. The nationalism variable captures whether the party promotes nationalist conceptions of society (higher values) versus cosmopolitan



conceptions of society (lower values). Euroscepticism is measured by the variable EU position, where higher values indicate more support for European integration.

Finally, to tap into ethnocentrism, I rely on two CHES variables. The first of these is the party's position on ethnic minority rights, where higher values indicate greater opposition to more rights for ethnic minorities. The second variable is multiculturalism, which measures the party's position on how immigrants and asylum seekers should be handled. Lower values of the variable indicate that the party is more in favor of multiculturalism, while higher values indicate a preference for assimilation. The two variables are the two closest to resembling the aspects of ethnocentrism that we previously presented by Bizumic and Duckitt (2012), which expressed a group self-centeredness by either outgroup negativity or ingroup positivity. These variables tap directly through the facets of exploitativeness, preference, and superiority. Opposition to the rights of ethnic minorities is the belief that the interests of one's ethnic group are more important compared to those of outgroups. This, in turn, is also preference by favoring the ingroup to a strong degree by being actively against them to have equal rights to their own group. Lastly, it is a way of keeping the ingroup superior through legal, social, and developmental dimensions. This is furthered in the aspect of multiculturalism; however, this concept is, in turn, about tolerance and acceptance of other cultures, which, as established, is a central component of ethnocentrism. Furthermore, forcing assimilation is stripping away culture, adhering to the facet of purity by rejecting the mixing with outgroups. As we have established that nativism is a central part of the RRP ideology, we expect them to strongly adhere to ethnocentrism as well. In CEE, we expect there to be more consistency than in the West, although we still expect strong ethnocentrism in most parties. The RLPs should, in general, differ on a party basis, with the old left parties present to show as much ethnocentrism as the RRP. The new left parties, on the other side, are expected to show some ethnocentrism, although not as strong as the RRP.

All of the variables are on an 11-point scale, with the exception of the EU position variable, which is on a 7-point scale. Alongside the party positions on these issues, I also include each issue's salience for the party. The salience of an issue is how important that issue is for the party in question. For example, we anticipate that immigration will be a highly salient issue for RRP, while redistribution will be highly salient for RLP. It will be particularly interesting to note how salient ethnic minority rights are for the parties in question. The salience variables are on an 11-point scale, with higher values indicating greater salience. Table 4.1 reports the CHES issue position and salience scores for the RRP and RLP in this analysis.

The following analysis covers and overviews raw data in the form of the political positions of the formerly presented RPs. These data are separated into four groups, illustrated in Appendix 1. The groups are the same four as the regression, dividing them into RLPs (1) in the West, (2) in the CEE, and RRP (3) in the West, and (4) in the CEE. These data rank the parties on a set of values or stances on the topics. All values are ranked on an eleven-point scale except for "EU position" which is a seven-point scale. Further, these scales vary in terms of their interpretation. "EU position" exhibits high values, indicating stronger support for the EU. The "Galtan" scale shows low values equal Gal and high values equal Tan. The scale of "Redistribution" displays high values as opposition. In regard to the "Immigration Policy" scale, high values favor restrictive policies, while low favor more liberal policies. "Multiculturalism" has low values favoring cosmopolitanism, while higher favors assimilation. "Ethnic minorities" have high-ranking values that oppose the rights of ethnic minorities. Lastly, high values in the "Nationalism" stance favor nationalism.

Further, all values except for "Ethnic Minorities" and "Nationalism", have a "Salience" value as well. The salient values project how much importance or attention the given political party place on the topic in question. These values are all intuitive in the sense that higher values indicate more salience on the topic. Note that the dataset did not add any "Salience" values for the parties in Norway. By utilizing these values, the thesis will gain a more realistic view of how RPs in Europe in the sense of how they actually act separately from the literature.

The thesis will examine these stances, investigating patterns and deviations from within their groups and compared to other groups. The thesis will compare the parties on an interregional level – comparing the RLPs and the RRP in the CEE and West to each other. Similarly, it will compare them on an intrafamily level – comparing the RRP in the CEE with the RRP in the West and continuing the procedure with the RLPs. To be able to measure these values as much as possible, the thesis will categorize the values into five "brackets" or "tiers". These will be separated into the following: 0-2, 2.01-4.5, 4.51-5.5, 5.51-8, and 8.01-10. These are simply thresholds made to help the thesis be able to categorically decide if a party has strong or moderate opinions on a matter. On the salient stances, it is as clear to categorize the values from 8.1 and above as "Strong opinions on the matter" and those below two as "Do not care for the matter". All opinions in between are far from insignificant as the values between these upper and lower limits and the midpoint of five are still indications of the parties stance on the topics. The non-salient ones are a bit more nuanced due to some measuring opposition and support towards a topic, while others are measuring distinct topics in opposition. These will be adequately examined in their own turn. The exception to the rule of these brackets is the value of EU Position, which is on a seven-point scale and cannot be measured in the same way as the rest.

I begin with analyzing the Western political positions of RLPs, which are showcased in Table 4.1.1, which is the largest group of parties. As a group, these parties are rather divided in terms of Euroscepticism. The group had a wide range of results, with four of the six of them placing themselves above the midway score of 3.5. The rest are, to a degree, in opposition. The more interesting value, however, is "EU Salience", which shows how much attention they bring to this topic, which displays average values across the parties. This indicates that they do not particularly stress themselves on the matter of the EU. However, they do not stray away from it either. The Galtan aspect shows that almost all these parties are straight liberals, as only two parties are above the halfway point of five. The salience on these matters is too somewhat between being important and not important, with no party exhibiting either very high or very low values. Redistribution, however, is a matter of great importance to all of these parties exhibiting both low salience, high salience, and high support, which is to be expected from this group. Immigrational salience, on the other hand, displays that none of the parties belong in the groups of the highest attention being given. There are four parties placing this in the second-highest bracket, between 5.51 and 8, with the rest belonging to the two brackets below. Further, all but one of the parties have their primary stance in the two lowest tiers, which indicates more liberal policies, as opposed to the restricting ones. Similarly, none of these parties place salience on multiculturalism in either the lowest or highest brackets, with all but one belonging to the third and fourth tier. Multiculturalism itself is consistently shown to be on the side of cosmopolitanism for all but one party, which is similarly to be expected due to the literature previously dividing the old and new left. Ethnic minorities lack the salient dimension. However, the value of this topic is seemingly correlating with multiculturalism as all but one party belongs to the two lowest groups supportive of ethnic minorities rights. The

Dutch party SP is consistently the different party among these two values, along with immigration and the next variable. Nationalism witnesses all parties gain slightly higher values than ethnic minorities, with SP being the sole party on the side of “projecting nationalism”. These values confirm the parties’ stances being in line with the literature’s new left, with SP seemingly differing slightly from its peers. These are interesting aspects that can be used to make other comparisons.

*Table 4.1.1: Western Political Positions of RLPs*

<b>Values</b>	VAS	PCF	FI	Syriza	KKE	MR25	SP	RV	CDU	BE
<b>EU Position</b>	5.07	3	2.87	5	1.11	4.62	2.83	1.2	2.37	3.75
<b>- Saliency</b>	4.64	4.62	6.87	6.66	6.22	7.62	5.58		5.25	5.5
<b>Galtan</b>	1.50	3.75	3.12	2.44	6.62	0.66	4.30	1.4	5.12	1.75
<b>- Saliency</b>	7.78	3.57	4.75	7.55	3.25	7.14	4.08		5.85	7.28
<b>Redistribution</b>	1.07	0.5	0.62	1.33	0.11	1	0.75	0.30	0.85	1.42
<b>- Saliency</b>	8.57	8.87	8.87	6.77	7.66	7.42	9.25		8.85	9
<b>Immigration</b>	2.21	3.25	4	2.11	2.66	0.66	5.25	1.66	2.37	1.5
<b>- Saliency</b>	6.21	2.87	4.50	7.55	4.50	7.66	4.81		4.75	6
<b>Multiculturalism</b>	2.57	3.57	3.85	1.77	3.71	0.83	5.58		1.83	1.83
<b>- Saliency</b>	6.71	3.83	5.16	6.55	3.87	7.33	5		5.14	5.85
<b>Ethnic Minorities</b>	2.28	2.14	2.25	1.50	2.14	0.80	4.58	1.85	2	0.71
<b>Nationalism</b>	2.35	2.85	2.87	1.77	5.12	1.57	6.25	3	5.50	2.16

Source: CHES 2019.

The next group, RLPS in the CEE, is significantly smaller as Table 4.1.2 only has two parties being evaluated. These two parties are seemingly diametrically opposed to Galtan, while they are three brackets apart on all matters except for Redistribution. The subject of EU Position also has significantly opposed stances as MM is strongly pro-EU, with KSCM being slightly opposed. In terms of saliency, they do not vary with more than one bracket on matters other than the EU Position, and the only other topic with saliency in the highest bracket is redistribution by the KSCM. MM is seemingly a part of the New Left aligning strongly with the Western RLPs on all matters except the EU Position. KSCM, on the other hand, is a lot closer to the Old Left, which will be interesting when compared to the RRP.

*Table 4.1.2: CEE Political Positions of RLPs*

<b>Values</b>	KSCM	MM
<b>EU Position</b>	2.73	6.50
<b>- Saliency</b>	5	9.39
<b>Galtan</b>	8.07	1.60
<b>- Saliency</b>	6.69	7.61
<b>Redistribution</b>	1.38	4.35
<b>- Saliency</b>	8.52	5.57
<b>Immigration</b>	8.96	3.15
<b>- Saliency</b>	6.74	4.92
<b>Multiculturalism</b>	8.84	3.18
<b>- Saliency</b>	5.44	4.61
<b>Ethnic Minorities</b>	7.15	1.89
<b>Nationalism</b>	7.96	2.14

Source: CHES 2019.

The Western RRP stances in Table 4.1.3 are similar to the RLP and are close to the outlined literature, with these parties showing only some exceptions. The party stances on all the topics are consistently in the highest brackets of the given topic except for Redistribution. In terms of EU Position, all parties display strong opposition except for FrP, who are closer to the center, although still showing opposition. This party, along with PVV, are the only two not in the highest brackets of Galtan, suggesting the parties all are a lot more conservative. Immigration, Multiculturalism, Ethnic minorities, and Nationalism all show unanimous values in the 8.1-10 bracket, indicating Restrictive immigration policies, support of assimilation, opposition to the rights of ethnic minorities, and active projection of nationalism. As mentioned, Redistribution shows conflicting results as the parties vary between the second lowest bracket and the second highest, with only one at the highest bracket. This indicates some parties prefer strong redistribution, while some want less. However, this topic crucially displays the weakest average level of salience. On the contrary, Immigration has the highest average across the parties, all in the highest bracket. Throughout the other salient values, there is a relatively high average. The outliers are not many. However, the Greek parties XA and EL, especially the former, have slightly lower salience on the topics.

Table 4.1.3: Western Political Positions of RRP

Values	PS	RN	DLF	XA	EL	LN	PVV	FvD	FrP
<b>EU Position</b>	1.64	1.38	1.43	1.22	2.13	1.68	1.31	1.08	3.10
<b>- Salience</b>	6.86	8.63	8.43	4.13	4.38	8.37	7.08	7.5	
<b>Galtan</b>	8.79	8.13	8.29	10	9.38	9.21	7.23	8.33	6.80
<b>- Salience</b>	8.21	7.63	7.60	9.13	8.25	7.39	5.92	7.25	
<b>Redistribution</b>	5.29	4	6.40	2.75	3.57	7.36	5.83	8.70	6.40
<b>- Salience</b>	5.14	5.38	4.60	3.75	3.86	5.06	4.18	3.32	
<b>Immigration</b>	9.79	9.88	9.33	9.5	9.88	9.95	9.92	9.92	9.70
<b>- Salience</b>	9.79	9.88	9	9.25	9.88	9.95	9.91	9.82	
<b>Multiculturalism</b>	9.79	10	9.60	9.71	10	9.82	9.91	9.91	
<b>- Salience</b>	8.64	9.5	8.5	6.5	7.43	8.41	10	9.82	
<b>Ethnic Minorities</b>	9	9.88	9.40	9.58	10	8	9.75	9.75	9.33
<b>Nationalism</b>	9.07	9.63	9.40	9.625	10	9.12	9.83	9.83	8.80

Source: CHES 2019.

Lastly, in Table 4.1.4, the CEE RRP are highly similar to their Western peers. The largest differential is their stances in EU Position as this group has a somewhat accommodating attitude, with four of the parties exhibit a lack of opposition. Regarding redistribution, all parties vary around the third bracket on average, like the West, although strictly in terms of numbers, there are some parties that are close to the lowest bracket, which is notable. Further, they rank high in terms of Galtan, Immigration, Multiculturalism, Ethnic Minorities, and Nationalism. The parties are also similar to the West in terms of salience. However, the outlier is Volya from Bulgaria, who shows low levels of all salient values. The party is distinct from the others and could almost fit into the limited group of CEE RLPs as it shares similarities, especially in terms of stances with the KSCM.

Table 4.1.4: CEE Political Positions of RRP

Values	Ataka	Volya	SPD	Fidesz-KDNP	Jobbik	LSNS	Sme Rodina	SNS
<b>EU Position</b>	2.20	3.50	1.48	3.06	3.78	1.31	3.13	2.66
<b>- Saliency</b>	4.40	3.93	7.33	8.13	6.26	5.75	4.28	3.13
<b>Galtan</b>	9.62	8.53	9.37	9.19	8.06	9.81	8.43	8.46
<b>- Saliency</b>	8.29	4.71	8.26	9.57	8.35	9.56	7.81	7.66
<b>Redistribution</b>	3.19	5.18	4.13	5	4.64	2.26	2.85	6.83
<b>- Saliency</b>	6.56	4.93	5.08	6.64	6.28	6.06	6.37	5.71
<b>Immigration</b>	9.76	8.06	9.85	9.93	9.13	10	9.18	9.60
<b>- Saliency</b>	9.05	5.82	9.61	10	7.78	9.87	8.33	9.46
<b>Multiculturalism</b>	9.65	7.94	9.88	8.35	8.35	9.92	9.16	9.5
<b>- Saliency</b>	7.39	4.27	8.42	7.92	7.15	7.07	6.46	8.14
<b>Ethnic Minorities</b>	9.70	7.5	9.74	8	7.69	9.87	7.46	8.93
<b>Nationalism</b>	9.55	7.94	9.74	9.80	9.19	10	8.37	9.26

Source: CHES 2019.

In terms of similarities between the two Western RP groups, there are not many in terms of the stances on issues. The only one that shows somewhat similar values is the aspect of the EU Position, where both groups have oppositional stances, although the left is a lot more opposed. In terms of saliency, there are also a few similarities. This group of parties, however, does find more similarities with the KSCM of the previously covered group, which is in line with the literature covering the overlap between the RL and RR. The two RR groups are fairly similar, with the CEE being a bit less Eurosceptic and even more varied in terms of redistribution. The RLPs share a limited amount of similarities. The KSCM differs greatly in aspects other than redistribution and EU Position, while MM is distinctly different in these specific aspects. In regard to how ethnocentric these parties are, the thesis clarified that it would operationalize the values of “Ethnic Minorities” and “Multiculturalism” as its measures of the concept. After this examination, the thesis finds the first group of parties to be not particularly ethnocentric. Both two values are generally low, with the former mentioned being the lowest. Furthermore, neither of the parties really takes any ownership of multiculturalism, exhibiting low saliency on the matter. Only SP, which was the exception, displayed any values not in the two lowest two brackets. The second group of parties with only two parties is a lot more challenging. The former categorization of MM being closely aligned with the new left and KSCM with the old left is the best description, as the latter displays a clear ethnocentric position. Due to such a small sample size, it is difficult to decisively call the second group ethnocentric. However, it does seem to follow a distinction of belonging, which type of left party is in question. Both groups of the RRP are, as expected, highly ethnocentric. They consistently score high across the metrics, and the West, in particular, scores high even on Multicultural Saliency, while the CEE scores slightly lower.

## 4.2 Radical Voter Analyses

### 4.2.1 Radical Voters and Ethnocentrism

I now turn to the final step in the analysis: multilevel logit modeling. First, I spend some time describing the most important variables within their own regions and party groups. These findings are crucial for the thesis in its assessment of ethnocentrism in regard to the RVs. We have established in the analysis above that all kinds of RRP are consistently

ethnocentric, while RLPs are not consistent in terms of ethnocentrism. Now, we turn to their voters. Table 4.2 below shows the degree of ethnocentrism across radical left, non-radical, and radical right voters, divided by region. Ethnocentrism is operationalized using the two ESS questions about immigrants from different ethnic groups and immigrants from the same ethnic group coming to live in the respondent’s country. Recall that we anticipate that both the radical left voter (RLV) and the radical right voter (RRV) will be more ethnocentric than the non-radical voter (NRV).

Table 4.2.1: Ethnocentrism across radical and non-radical voters by region

Variables	Party Family	Number of Respondents	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
<b>Western Europe</b>						
Different Ethnic Group	RLV	994	2.412	0.955	1	4
	NRV	5 669	2.708	0.862	1	4
	RRV	697	2.251	0.838	1	4
Same Ethnic Group	RLV	989	2.987	0.738	1	4
	NRV	5 664	3.027	0.804	1	4
	RRV	692	2.678	0.802	1	4
<b>CEE States</b>						
Different Ethnic Group	RLV	143	1.643	0.754	1	4
	NRV	5 487	2.323	0.902	1	4
	RRV	928	1.740	0.735	1	4
Same Ethnic Group	RLV	146	2.021	0.883	1	4
	NRV	5 495	2.800	0.909	1	4
	RRV	934	2.273	0.895	1	4

Source: ESS 10, Elaborated upon in Appendix 2.

I turn first to Western Europe. In regard to immigrants from other ethnic groups, it is clear that RRVs are the most ethnocentric, with a mean of 2.251. However, as anticipated, RLVs are more ethnocentric (2.412) than the non-radical voters (2.708). Hence, in Western Europe, we have reason to support H1. This is further supported by the other variable regarding immigrants from the same ethnic group; a similar pattern emerges, where non-radical voters are more supportive of immigration than the RVs. Although the RRV are close to the NRVs values. What is notable, however, is that for all groups, the preference is for immigrants who are from the same ethnic group. There are two ways of interpreting this: All groups display ingroup preference, which suggests that the concept could be omnipresent among voters. On the other hand, by calculating the difference in value between the first and second variables, the RLV is the group with the greatest differentiation in value (0.575). The RRV similarly has a greater difference (0.427) than the NRV, who saw the least change in their values (0.319). This suggests that the change in ethnicity makes the greatest difference to the RLV, giving merit to this group of voters who do not adhere to the aspect of social justice across all topics.

Now, I examine the CEE states. Here, the results vary somewhat from the ones above. While it is true that non-radical voters are the least ethnocentric, they are lower than even

the RRV in the West. The position of RRVs and RLVs is flipped compared to the West in terms of the most opposition. RLVs in CEE states are the most ethnocentric, as evidenced by their mean of 1.643. In fact, RLVs in this region are the most ethnocentric of all respondents, although the RRVs are not far behind them, with a mean of 1.740. When it comes to immigrants from the same ethnic group, once again, RLVs are the most opposed to immigration (2.021), followed by the RRVs (2.273). This does suggest that there is a stronger opposition to immigration and ethnicity than in the West. However, by adding context to the other migrational variables, highlighted in Appendix 2, there are similar values among the RRV in the West and the CEE, once again indicating that the aspect in question is related to ethnicity rather than immigration. This is due to the politicization of ethnicity used within multiple CEE countries specifically linked to the communist regimes. The regime had different meanings depending on the country, and the use of different types of ethnic policies was seen as a tool used against the suppressed native ethnicity in the country (Rovny, 2014). For instance, ethnic policies in the Soviet Union were seen as a means for achieving Russian national goals, as opposed to, say, Bulgarian goals. Similarly, Serbia viewed communism in Yugoslav as a way of incorporating the Serbian nation into a larger political entity (Rovny, 2014). Hence ethnicity holds a completely different tone in the CEE compared to the West as is immediately met with skepticism.

#### 4.2.2 RLVs versus RRVs

While we see in the analysis above that radical voters are, on average, more ethnocentric, in that they oppose immigrants from other ethnic groups entering their country, we want to make sure that our results are statistically significant. We also want to control for a host of other factors, such as nationalism, immigration attitudes, and Euroscepticism when investigating the factors that lead one to vote for a RRP or a RLP.

In this section, I present Models 1 and 2. Here, I do not distinguish between the West and the CEE states. Rather, I am interested in what patterns emerge across Europe as a whole. Table 4.3 presents the results of the multilevel logit models for RLVs (Model 1) and RRVs (Model 2). These models both have over twelve-thousand observations, being far above the threshold of a large-N study. They naturally have the same amount of voters due to the same group being subject to the same country as there is no divide in region yet. Furthermore, the standard error is particularly small across the variables in both models. Lastly, the  $sd(cons)$  display the degree of variance on a country-level in a model. Both models have a very high degree of variance between the countries, which was to be expected as we are placing the voters of the West and CEE together. Model 1 exhibit higher variance between their countries than the RRV does.

Table 4.3.1: Combined East and West RVs.

Variables	RLV (Model 1)	RRV (Model 2)
	OR Std. err	OR Std. err
<i>Diff. Ethnic Group</i>	1.368*** (0.093)	0.726*** (0.046)
<i>Same Ethnic Group</i>	0.793*** (0.046)	1.103 (0.060)
<i>Immigration: Economy</i>	1.006 (0.027)	0.946** (0.021)
<i>Immigration: Country</i>	1.079** (0.030)	0.938** (0.023)
<i>Immigration: Culture</i>	1.074** (0.030)	0.927*** (0.020)
<i>Redistribution</i>	1.548*** (0.072)	0.922* (0.033)
<i>Nationalism</i>	0.938** (0.023)	1.047* (0.022)
<i>Euroscepticism</i>	0.880*** (0.016)	0.911*** (0.014)
<i>Attachment to Europe</i>	0.924*** (0.018)	0.937*** (0.015)
<i>Gay Rights</i>	1.290*** (0.056)	0.958 (0.033)
<i>Age</i>	0.997 (0.003)	0.990*** (0.002)
<i>Education</i>	0.994 (0.010)	0.961*** (0.010)
<i>Gender</i>	0.972 (0.074)	0.771*** (0.054)
<i>Constant</i>	0.001*** (0.001)	0.800 (0.743)
<i>Sd(cons)</i>	3.698 (1.057)	3.038 (0.785)
<i>Obs</i>	12 439	12 439

P-value levels: \*=<0.05, \*\*=<0.01, \*\*\*=<0.001

I begin with interpreting the results of the RLV (Model 1). The first two variables have already been examined in regard to their mean values and compared between the three groups of voters. This time, the RLVs as a unit are being measured directly up against the rest of the voters. This time, the variable showcasing attitudes towards different ethnicities results in an OR-value higher than one, suggesting that the highlighted group, the RLV, is more positive towards other ethnicities. Secondly, the variable operationalizing opposition to the same ethnicity continues to display that the RLVs are more opposed than the rest. This is due to their value being below zero. In logistical regressions, the number one is representative of the reference group, which in this case is all voters that are not the RLV. Both of these are significant at the highest level, being the third. This indicates that the OR-values can be generalized in regard to the greater population. The variable concerning immigration in regard to the economy is not of significant p-values, which signifies that the values between the two groups of the DV are too similar. In turn, it indicates that the OR-value cannot be generalized; hence, it will not be further interpreted. This goes for the additional insignificant variables for this model and all other models. In the case of this model, the insignificant variables are age, education, and gender. This suggests the RLV group is on a generally equal level in terms of their age, education and in terms of gender balance when compared to the rest of the voters. The other two immigrational variables,



measuring general immigration and immigration in regard to culture, are significant at the second level. These have very similar OR-values, indicating slightly more support towards the two aspects than the other voters. Followingly, redistribution is significant at the third level, exhibiting OR-values above one, suggesting stronger support than the reference group on the concept. Nationalism, on the other side, although significant at the second level, has an OR-value lower than one, signifying a lesser degree of nationalism from the RLV across Europe. The variable of Euroscepticism displays a p-value at the third level and, like the previous variable, OR-value is lower than one. This, however, is more aligned with the literature as it indicates the RLVs are more Eurosceptic. Penultimately, attachment to Europe is followingly identical in terms of p-values, with slightly higher OR-values, while still below one, implying stronger opposition to Europe. Lastly, attitudes towards gay rights are met with stronger support amongst these voters as the OR-value is above one and the p-value passes the threshold at the third level.

Secondly, I interpret the results of Model 2, accounting for the RRV. In this model, the two variables operationalizing ethnocentrism display the former, different ethnicity, to be significant at the third level, with the latter being insignificant. The OR-value of the former is below one, as expected, indicating ethnocentrism amongst this group. The degree of insignificance from the latter suggests similar levels of opposition towards the same ethnicity. The three immigration variables are all significant. Immigration regarding culture is significant at the third level, with the others at the second. All three have similar OR-values below one, suggesting greater opposition than other voters. Followingly, the variable covering redistribution also shows stronger opposition with its OR-value and p-value at the first level. Nationalism is, in this case, present as the RRVs have an OR-above one, with a p-value at the first level. Euroscepticism and attachment to Europe are identical to Model 1 in the sense of the p-value level and results of the OR-value. Gay rights are the only insignificant variable other than the aforementioned same ethnicity variable. The three control variables are all significant, with OR-values below zero. This exhibits a younger voting group, with less education and gender balance favoring men.

In conclusion, this model is meant to interpret the larger trends of Europe rather than the region-based nuances. The two models, combining the parties of the West and CEE, find that there is a great difference between the RLV and RRV in terms of ethnocentrism, as RLVs are more supportive while the RRVs are more opposed to their reference groups. Regarding their ingroups, the RLV has flipped their opinions, with Model 2 not exhibiting any deviation from the mainstream. Further, I find that in the aspects regarding immigration and redistribution, the two groups have consistently opposed views, as the left is positive while the right is negative. The only exception is the economic basis for immigration, which was insignificant. Following that, I find that nationalism also has the voters divided in opposition to each other, but the right now is more supportive, and the left is opposed. Euroscepticism and attachment to Europe is found to be opposed in both models. Lastly, I find that attitudes on gay rights are supported in Model 1, while Model 2 exhibits no difference.

#### 4.2.3 Radical Voters in the West and in the CEE States

Finally, in this section, I conclude the analysis by examining the differences between the RLV and RRV in both the West and the CEE states. Table 4.3.2 shows the results of Models 3 – 6. These models measure the same variables as the previous two. However, they add the crucial distinction of separating the CEE from the West, granting us the ability to further analyze the differences across Europe and within party families. The number of observations is naturally fewer than models 1 and 2 due to them being divided. The

sd(cons) values remain high, especially in the two models accounting for the CEE (4 and 6). This signifies that all four groups experience great variance between the country levels, with the CEE experience more than the West. There is nothing further to report on the standard error other than in models 4 and 6 sd(cons), which appears to be high.

Table 4.3.2: RLVs in the West and the CEE

Variables	RLP		RRP	
	West (Model 3)	East (Model 4)	West (Model 5)	East (Model 6)
	OR Std. err	OR Std. err	OR Std. err	OR Std. err
<i>Diff. Ethnic Group</i>	1.412*** (0.105)	1.178 (0.216)	0.709*** (.0616)	0.753** (0.071)
<i>Same Ethnic Group</i>	0.822** (0.052)	0.705* (0.109)	1.049 (0.080)	1.127 (0.087)
<i>Immigration: Economy</i>	1.013 (0.030)	0.965 (0.056)	0.917** (0.027)	0.976 (0.032)
<i>Immigration: Country</i>	1.089** (0.033)	1.064 (0.075)	0.910** (0.025)	0.975 (0.037)
<i>Immigration: Culture</i>	1.087** (0.033)	1.009 (0.068)	0.876*** (0.030)	0.996 (0.034)
<i>Redistribution</i>	1.496*** (0.078)	1.749*** (0.192)	1.011 (0.048)	0.876* (0.051)
<i>Nationalism</i>	0.908*** (0.025)	1.078 (0.065)	1.020 (0.048)	1.070* (0.033)
<i>Euroscepticism</i>	0.886*** (0.018)	0.908* (0.038)	0.908*** (0.020)	0.922*** (0.020)
<i>Attachment to Europe</i>	0.919*** (0.020)	0.924 (0.039)	0.924*** (0.021)	0.975 (0.023)
<i>Gay Rights</i>	1.356*** (0.068)	1.067 (0.097)	1.006 (0.054)	0.890* (0.041)
<i>Age</i>	0.996 (0.003)	1.002 (0.007)	0.985*** (0.003)	0.998 (0.003)
<i>Education</i>	0.989 (0.010)	0.998 (0.032)	0.962** (0.012)	0.972 (0.016)
<i>Gender</i>	0.992 (0.082)	0.879 (0.175)	0.719*** (0.066)	0.844 (0.091)
<i>Cons</i>	0.006*** (0.006)	0.001*** (0.001)	5.914* (4.710)	0.021* (0.086)
<i>Sd(cons)</i>	2.139 (0.706)	4.713 (2.648)	1.691 (0.586)	4.192 (1.648)
<i>Obs</i>	6 669	5 770	6 669	5 770

P-value levels: \*=<0.05, \*\*=<0.01, \*\*\*=<0.001.

I begin interpreting the results of model 3, which showcases the RLVs in the West. This model is highly similar to model 1 as all variables have remained equal in terms of significance. The only change is the variable describing attitudes toward the same ethnic group, which changed from the second level (in Model 1) to the third level (in Model 3). Separate from this, the only changes are in the specific values of the OR. None of these value changes, however, are drastic enough to yield different interpretations. As previously mentioned, it is possible to calculate the OR-values in terms of relative change. However, this is not really of interest to the thesis as it will not be useful terms of comparison.

I continue by describing the results of model 4, which covers the RLVs in the CEE. This group of voters is the most inconclusive, as most of the operationalized values have become insignificant, aligning their attitudes with their reference group. To elaborate, six of the thirteen variables have different p-values in the form of insignificant values compared to model 1. Most importantly, the matter of ethnicity is distinguishable to the

Western RLVs as their attitudes align with their reference group. The other insignificant variables are all three immigrational variables, nationalism, attachment to Europe and attitudes towards gay rights, as well as the control variables. Of the significant variables, the operationalized value of attitude towards the same ethnicity exhibits stronger opposition than the reference group. Both the redistribution and Euroscepticism variables retain their overall results through OR- and p-value compared with model 1. The former slightly adjusts its OR-value by being even more supportive of the p-value at the third level. Euroscepticism, too, has a slightly higher OR-value than model 1, while still remaining more opposition than those not being RLVs. The variables have changed to the first level in terms of p-value.

Thirdly, I examine the results of model 5, which describes the Western RRV. This group of voters is similar to model 2, which examines the broader lines among RRVs, signifying that this model also aligns with the literature. First, the results display that the variables pertaining to the same ethnicity, redistribution, nationalism, and gay rights are all insignificant. This suggests that these voters are as supportive of governmental redistribution as the reference group and as supportive in regard to gay rights. Crucially, they are not more nationalistic than the average voter, which was the case when combined with the CEE in model 2. Most important, however, is the aspect of ethnicity, which suggests this group shares common attitudes on immigration of the same ethnicity. When compared with the variable operationalizing different ethnicities, the model aligns with model 2 by including a p-value at the third level and an OR-value lower than zero. Progressing onto the immigration variables which all display OR-values below zero, as well significant levels at second level or better. The remaining two variables, Euroscepticism and attachment to Europe, exhibit similar results as in Model 2. Both variables keep their p-values at the third level, with OR-values beneath zero signifying greater Euroscepticism than the other group, as well as a stronger opposition to Europe. All the control variables keep their interpretations from model 2, meaning this group is younger, less educated, and has a gender balance of more males than females.

Finally, I explore the results of the RRV in the CEE, model 6. Similar to the RLV of the CEE, these groups experience a great deal of difference in results when compared to their combined model (model 2). The aspect of ethnicity remains consistent as both attitudes towards other ethnicities remain statistically significant at the third level, with an OR-value below zero. The variable describing the same ethnicity remains insignificant. This suggests the group is more ethnocentric than the rest of the voters. The model also displays significant p-values among the redistribution, Euroscepticism, gay, and nationalism variables. The first three all have OR-values lower than zero, indicating opposition to redistribution, the EU, and gay rights. The results of nationalism, on the experience different results on the matters of immigration other side, continue to display an OR-value above one, indicating the group supports nationalism more than the rest. Further, all other variables are immigration regarding the economy, general immigration, immigration regarding culture, attachment to Europe, and the three control variables. This indicates that this group has attitudes on these topics similar to those of the rest of the voters.

To conclude, models 3-6 find both sets of Western voters to keep most of the attitudes from previous models. The most notable change is nationalism no longer being a significant factor among the RRV as it was in model 2. Both models describing RVs of the CEE, on the other side, exhibit different results, as the RLV is different on the matters of redistribution, Euroscepticism and opposition of the same types of ethnicities. The RRV exhibits the most notable changes in immigrational attitudes as all have become insignificant.

### 4.3 Analyses

The upcoming sub-chapter will utilize the results of the models describing the RPs to decide if the formerly presented hypotheses will be kept or rejected. The hypotheses are strictly relating to the voters rather than the parties, which will be elaborated upon in the discussion.

I begin by discussing H1: Radical voters, in general, will be more ethnocentric than their mainstream counterparts. It is evident that ethnicity is a factor amongst RPs, as the descriptive data in Table 4.2.1 depicts. They reveal that the voters in the CEE are generally more negative to the aspect of ethnicity than the West. Crucially, the RRV is the most opposed in the West, while the CEE finds the RLV to be the most negative. However, the voters of the RPs are the ones exhibiting (1) the most general opposition towards ethnicity, as well as (2) the most change in attitude when compared to the variable accounting for the same ethnicity. Regarding models 1-6, as the groups in question, either the RLVs or RRVs, are being compared to all voters, including the NRVs, is not focused. The variable operationalizing ingroup positivity; attachment to Europe, did not particularly work out as the results see it being more closely related to the Euroscepticism variable than the ethnocentric ones. Hence, the variable will largely be ignored in the discussion. This means that the results will not be as clear-cut as they would have had we compared the RLV/RRV strictly to the NRV. This suggests that although not all variables in models 3-6 seem to support the RLV to be ethnocentric, the hypothesis is kept due to the descriptive statistics. H1 is kept.

H2: RPs will be more nationalistic than the NRVs. Across the four models (3-6), only models 3 and 6 display significant values, with the former showing less nationalism and the latter more. This is further supported by the descriptive data in Appendix 2, highlighting the descriptive data between voting groups. In regard to the Western countries, the RRV do not have nationalistic attitudes, scoring lower than the NRVs. This situation is the same in the CEE just in terms of support as RLVs are similarly more nationalistic than the NRV, yet not enough to merit any significant findings. In conclusion, there are no consistent nationalistic attitudes among the RPs. Hence, H2 is rejected.

I continue with the hypothesis regarding Euroscepticism, H3: RPs will be more Eurosceptic than the NRV. Euroscepticism is the hypothesis with the most conclusive results. Across all six models the thesis finds stronger opposition to the aspect of EU integration compared to the NRV. This is backed by the descriptive data of Appendix 2 as all radical parties exhibit lower values than the NRV. Evidently H3 is kept.

Detailing the results for H4: RP voters in Western European and CEE countries will differ on the factors conditioning their vote for the RPs, with the exception of ethnocentrism. To answer this hypothesis, we have to steer away from the regression models, as answering this hypothesis requires us to investigate the direct values of the voters. Explaining the exact values or degree of difference is not a quality of logistical regressions. Thus, we turn to Appendix 2 and the descriptive statistics. By comparing the RLV and the RRV to their peers in different regions, it is evident that immigration is a more general point of contention in the CEE, as the NRV consistently has more opposing attitudes than the Western parties. In the West the RRV are consistently the most negative, with the RLV also being more opposed than the NRV. This dynamic, similar to ethnocentrism, is flipped in the CEE. Here, the RLV is the most opposed, with the RRV following and still scoring lower than the Western RRV. Redistribution, however, is quite similar between the CEE and the West. Although the radical CEE voters are more in favor of this aspect, the West doesn't

have the same pattern, with the RRV being more opposed. All groups, including the NRV, are close in raw values by hovering around four on the ten-point scale. In terms of attitudes on gay rights, there is a slight difference between the CEE and the West. The former experienced the RRV as being more opposed to the matter, while the two others are similar. In the West, the values are generally higher across all groups, with no real difference between them. Lastly, attachment to Europe is completely opposite in the regions. The Western composition has both groups of RVs being much more negative to the European aspect. The CEE, on the other hand, has both radical parties being more supportive of the RRVs, especially exhibiting support for this.

The final hypothesis is H5: RP voters will be more likely to exhibit negativity towards gay rights. Finally, the topic of the non-inclusive mindset, which in this case is related to gay attitudes. As explained in the previous hypothesis, the most notable result of this variable is the stark difference between the East and the West. The groups were all quite similar within their own regions, with only the RRV in the CEE exhibiting a notable difference in values. Hence, this is seemingly more of a region-based issue than a characteristic of RPs or ethnocentrism. Hence the hypothesis is rejected.

## 5 Discussion

The thesis has outlined the foundation of the literature, presented and rejected hypotheses, examined the European RPs and lastly interpreted the results of the logistic regression. The next step will be to analyze the conducted research and present its findings. The thesis once again showcases the research question it has attempted to answer:

- (1) **How does ethnocentrism fit into the landscape of European parties and voters?**
  - (a) **Does an ethnocentric overlap exist between the radical left and the radical right, both at the party and the voter level?**
  - (b) **How do ethnocentric attitudes vary across the Western European and the CEE states?**
  - (c) **What other political characteristics, values, or attitudes correlate with ethnocentrism?**

I begin by discussing the sub-research question, which was created to support the overarching main research question before I move on to discuss the main research in its entirety.

### 5.1 European Ethnocentrism

The first of the sub-questions is two-part as it questions the overlap both among the parties and the voters. By answering this question, I will simultaneously touch upon the second sub-research question, which will still be covered separately. I begin by presenting the potential overlap among parties. The previous analysis investigating party positions found that the RRP are consistently ethnocentric both in Western Europe and CEE. In addition to taking a radical stance, the parties simultaneously pursue this type of policy as the thesis finds them to politicize ethnocentric values. Furthermore, this finding is extended to the RLP KSCM in the CEE group. This party does not have particularly high salience on the matter; however, it has values that rival the RRP. As established, this party represents the old left, which suggests this sub-group of RLPs might contribute to an ethnocentric overlap amongst parties. Ideally, the datasets should have overlapped more so that more RLPs in the CEE could have been examined. This is completely separate from the sub-group of new left parties, which both the remaining RLP in the CEE, as well as all Western RLPs, can be classified as. These RLPs are consistently not ethnocentric in terms of their stances, nor are they found to politicize policies related to ethnocentrism. In conclusion, I find the extent of the ethnocentric overlap among parties to be limited to all RRP and RLPs of the old left.

Secondly, I present the voter aspect of the first sub-research question. By specifically addressing the attitudes towards ethnocentrism among RPVs, we can address the potential for an ethnocentric overlap among RPVs. This question is, by design, linked to the first hypothesis that was asked: H1: Radical voters, in general, will be more ethnocentric than their mainstream counterparts. This hypothesis was kept due to all RPVs exhibiting stronger opposition towards ethnic groups than their mainstream counterparts, meaning the thesis does find an overlap in ethnocentrism. This overlap includes the RLVs in both European regions, with the CEE RLVs exhibiting more opposition to this topic than any

other group. This examination further uncovers greater differences between the two regions, as well as the dissonance between voters and parties. To elaborate, there is a stark difference in the general attitudes towards ethnocentrism in the regions as the CEE scores themselves significantly lower than the Western voters. This takes us over to the party aspect, as the RPs are still placed exceedingly high amongst both RRP blocks. Furthermore, this illustrates a disconnect between Western RLPs and RLVs as there is an ethnocentric opposition amongst the voters, which is simply not reciprocated by the parties. To decisively answer the sub-research question, I find there to be a greater ethnocentric overlap.

I continue to answer the second sub-research question, which, as mentioned, has already been elaborated upon due to H1 highlighting ethnocentrism in the two regions of Europe. The findings already uncovered the display of ethnocentric attitudes to be stronger in the CEE countries than in the West among the RV. Furthermore, the regression models 3 to 6 highlight how country variation is greater in the CEE than in the West. This indicates that the voters in the CEE are very different from each other. Further research should be dedicated on a country basis with regard to ethnocentrism in the countries. In regard to the parties, the variation is small in the RRP; however, the RLPs have vast variation. This variation has been found to be a result of which sub-group the RLP belongs to. As this old- and new West is the deciding factor, it would be false to claim that geography is the deciding factor. To decisively answer the sub-question: Ethnocentric attitudes vary greatly across Europe on a voter level, not on a party level.

Interestingly enough, there were greater findings in regard to the second secondary research question. In both cases, among the RLP voters, there was a stronger opposition towards the same ethnicity. The West exhibits direct opposition despite their positive view of other ethnicities. The East similarly shows opposition while being as supportive towards other ethnicities as their central voters. This is further intriguing due to the light the thesis has painted them in "as being internationalists and champions of social justice," yet they specifically oppose certain ethnicities. The thesis speculates that this is an effect of multiple countries in the Eastern European part of the analysis having strained relationships with their neighbors. Another possibility may be that this is an effect of the RLP voters being preoccupied with their working class, which displays opposition towards workers from other countries in Europe entering and taking their jobs. However, if this were the case, then this would probably have been recognized in another variable related to immigration.

The third and final of the secondary research questions investigated the relationship of ethnocentrism with other attitudes to understand potential correlation. This research question is supported by the review of the literature, as well as H2, H3, and H5. After reviewing the literature, I find great associations and overlaps between ethnocentrism and nativism, immigration, and nationalism. This is supported by the party examinations where the values of the variables operationalizing ethnocentrism consistently correlated with nationalism and immigration, in addition to the TAN-side in the GALTAN variable. Immigration is further supported in the regression models to correlate with ethnocentrism: General immigration and immigration bad for the country's culture correlate with ethnocentrism as these variables show consistent results in terms of p-values and OR-values among all groups except the RRV in the CEE. However, the hypotheses of the quantitative models have some conflicting data. Starting with H2, which was rejected by the thesis, suggesting there is no correlation between nationalism and the RPs, which by extension is the case with ethnocentrism as well. Following that, H3 was kept as all RPs show Euroscepticism; this indicates that there could be a correlation with ethnocentrism.

This, however, is not the case among the RPs, as the EU position is variable, and the values operationalized as ethnocentrism change independently of each other. The thesis has found there to be a disconnect between the voters and parties, which means that this link can neither be confirmed nor denied. This correlation should merit its own research in another paper. Lastly, H5 covered the relationship between attitudes toward gay rights and the RPs, which was rejected by the thesis. This suggests there is no correlation here, either. To decisively answer the research question: Opposition to immigration and hard immigration policy correlates with ethnocentrism both in terms of parties and voters. Parties adhering to ethnocentrism followingly adhere to nationalism and GALTAN; however, this does not reflect amongst the voters.

Now that I have answered three sub-questions, there is enough support to firmly answer the main research question: How does ethnocentrism fit into the landscape of European parties and voters? Ethnocentrism is seemingly commonplace among the right and left RVs in both Western and CEE, a characteristic that creates an overlap between the two far sides. The concept cannot be described equally for RPs across Europe. Although ethnocentric values have been found to be a mainstay in RRs, it is consistently opposed among the new left parties in Europe associated with social issues. There are RPs in Europe that share the RRs position on ethnocentrism, which is regarded as the old left – composed of parties close to the previous communist regime of CEE. These found in, but not exclusive to, CEE Europe, as none of the Western parties subscribe to this. Lastly, ethnocentrism is greatly associated with opposition to immigration and, to some extent, nationalism, TAN, and Euroscepticism.



# 6 Conclusion

## 6.1 Summary

This thesis has been a detailed examination of ethnocentrism in the context of European party politics. The introduction of the thesis presented the main- and sub-research questions and introduced the main topics. Furthermore, it has researched the RPs and the RVs in great depth in terms of their values, attitudes, and association with other concepts. The first task of the thesis was to define its area of research in the form of ethnocentrism and RPs. To do so, it elaborated on the overlapping aspects between the RLPs and RRP that are already identified in the literature, including Euroscepticism, nationalism, populism, and anti-elitism. Establishing a separate definition of ethnocentrism separate from closely associated concepts such as immigration, nativism, nationalism, and racism. The next step of the thesis was to outline what an RP is in this thesis. It defined the significance of the radical term opposed to the notion of extreme parties, as well as how Europe is divided in the thesis. Moreover, the thesis defined the aspects that pertain to RRP and RLP individually. The thesis expanded on the RLPs and their categorization into the old and the new left, which would be crucial in terms of the findings.

The second part of the thesis explained the methods applied and the data used. In this part, the thesis created hypotheses relevant to the research questions and presented the datasets. The thesis elaborated upon its use of a quantitative method and logit model, as well as how it would use data on party positions. The subsequent part was the analysis of both the parties and voters. This led to the discussions that attempted to answer the research questions, which resulted in the main findings, which state as follows: There is an ethnocentric overlap among RPs, in addition to the CEE countries being overall significantly more ethnocentric than the Western European countries. Further, the thesis finds there is no overlap among the RPs, which leads to the finding of a disconnect between RLPs and RLVs. There are large differences between the two European regions in relation to ethnocentrism. Lastly, ethnocentrism correlates with multiple of the associated concepts, yet also these experienced variation between parties and voters.

## 6.2 Review and Future Research

In this final sub-chapter, I reflect on what the thesis has uncovered, how it has uncovered it, the challenges, improvements, and future research on the topic. Beginning with the findings, it is evident that I was able to answer the research questions posed in a sufficient manner. The research questions themselves were fitting as they all covered different aspects related to ethnocentrism. This made it possible to gain a greater understanding of this concept. I believe this thesis has been successful in highlighting ethnocentrism's core, as well as its distinctions from similar concepts. Moreover, I believe the thesis has been thorough in its definitions, and I was able to elaborate in-depth on RPs of different natures and showcase their most important aspects. The thesis has been successful in operationalizing the definition chosen for ethnocentrism. The main aspect of this definition was group self-centeredness, which has many expressions. I believe these were tapped into expertly through the party positions found in the CHES database.

The MLM and quantitative methods, on the other hand, experienced greater challenges. I also believe this part of the thesis to be a success as a mix of logit regression and nuance to the variables in question gave meaningful results for the RV. Nevertheless, I believe the MLMs could have been run more optimally. By modifying the DVs to strictly be a measure between a set of RVs and the NRVs, rather than the current format of having RVs among both groups in the variable. This would have made for better MLMs, as the results would have been a direct comparison between the voting groups. The attachment to Europe variable was not a success, however, as it seemingly was closer to other aspects, such as euroscepticism and nationalism, than ethnocentrism. The other variables, on the other hand, although coupled with immigration, I believe were utilized in a way that has given meaningful findings. Yet these are not without criticism either, as their usefulness was highly complicated. Additionally, the countries investigated in the thesis are more than sufficient enough to have conducted the robust research of the thesis. Yet, by expanding on the list of countries, we would have been able to gain a lot more insight into the implications of the research. This especially extends to the RLPs and RLVs of both European regions, as it would have opened for the discovery of potentially ethnocentric RLPs in the West. Additionally, it would provide greater depth to the underrepresented RLPs of the CEE countries, which could have provided further findings for the thesis. Yet due to the complicated process of combining the two datasets, and the unfortune of not having more countries overlap between the two, the thesis became limited in this regard.

I believe this thesis opens up a lot of research opportunities in European party politics and furthers specific research on ethnocentrism in the region. When these parties were investigated, the CEE parties displayed greater variance between country levels than the Western countries. Exploring ethnocentrism on country levels across Europe is certainly a venue of research open for exploration. Understanding if all countries in the CEE are as ethnically oriented as what the thesis finds, in addition to investigating which countries do not have parties representing ethnocentrism. Further, a continued examination of the relationships between ethnocentrism and the concepts associated, as well as the concepts this thesis found to be somewhat related, would be interesting prospects.

## 7 References

- Bizumic, B., & Duckitt, J. (2012, 12). What Is and Is Not Ethnocentrism? A Conceptual Analysis and Political Implications. *Political Psychology(Vol.33)(6)*, pp. 887-909.
- Bolet, D. (2022, 05 03). The janus-faced nature of radical voting: Subjective social decline at the roots of radical right and radical left support. *Party Politics(Vol.29)(3)*, pp. 475-488.
- Brigevich, A. (2020). Cueing the radical voter: The impact of economic, immigration and integration cues on public fear of the EU. *Party Politics (Vol.26)(6)*, pp. 744-759.
- Brito, R. (2022, 02 22). *Europe welcomes Ukrainian refugees — others, less so*. Retrieved from AP News: <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-refugees-diversity-230b0cc790820b9bf8883f918fc8e313>
- Burgoon, B. (2012, 12 21). Inequality and anti-globalization backlash by political parties. *European Union Politics(Vol.14)(3)*, pp. 408-435.
- Chapel Hill Expert Survey. (n.d.). *Chapel Hill Expert Survey*. Retrieved from Chapel Hill Expert Survey: <https://www.chesdata.eu/>
- Citrin, J., & Sides, J. (2004). More than nationals: how identity choice matters in the New Europe. In R. Herrman, M. Brewer, & T. Risse, *Transnational identities: Becoming European in the EU* (pp. 161–185). Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Coakley, A. (2022, 05 03). *Hungary's Orban defends response to Ukraine war refugees*. Retrieved from Al Jazeera: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/3/hungarys-orban-defends-response-to-ukraine-war-refugees>
- De Vries, C. E., & Edwards, E. E. (2009, 01 01). Taking Europe To Its Extremes: Extremist Parties and Public Euroscepticism. *Party Politics(Vol.15)(1)*, pp. 5-28.
- European Social Survey. (n.d.). *About the European Social Survey*. Retrieved from European Social Survey: <https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/about-ess>
- Fagerholm, A. (2018). The radical right and the radical left in contemporary Europe: Two min-max definitions. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies (Vol.26)(4)*, pp. 411-424.
- Fremskrittspartiet. (n.d). *Om FrP*. Retrieved from Frp: <https://www.frp.no/om-frp>
- Golder, M. (2016). Far Right Parties in Europe. *Annual Review of Political Science (Vol.19)(1)*, pp. 477–497.
- Halikiopoulou et al, D. (2012). The paradox of nationalism: The common denominator of radical. *European Journal of Political Research*, pp. 504-539.
- Halmai, G. (2020). Rights Revolution and Counter-Revolution: Democratic Backsliding and Human Rights in Hungary. *Law & Ethics of Human Rights(14)(1)*, pp. 97-123.
- Heywood, A. (2017). Political ideologies and why they matter. In A. Heywood, *Political ideologies; An introduction* (pp. 1-23). London: palgrave.

- Hix, S., & Lord, C. (1997). *Political Parties in the European Union*. New York: St.Martin's Press.
- Hobolt, S. B. (2016). The Brexit vote: a divided nation, a divided continent. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 1259-1277.
- Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2005, 12). Calculation, Community and Cues: Public Opinion on European Integration. *European Union Politics(Vol.6)(4)*.
- Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2017). Cleavage theory meets Europe's crises: Lipset, Rokkan, and the transnational cleavage. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 109-135.
- Hünemann, P., & Louw, B. (2023, 12 25). On the Nuisance of Control Variables in Causal Regression Analysis. *Organizational Research Methods (Vol.0)(0)*.
- Ivaldi, G. (2023). The impact of the Russia-Ukraine War on radical right-wing Populism in France. *European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS)*, pp. 141-154.
- Ivarsflaten, E. (2008). What Unites Right-Wing Populists in Western Europe? Re-Examining Grievance Mobilization Models in Seven Successful Cases. *Comparative Political Studies (Vol.41)(1)*, pp. 3-23.
- Lancaster, C. M. (2019, 09 2). Not So Radical After All: Ideological Diversity Among Radical Right Supporters and Its Implications. *Political Studies(Vol.68)(3)*, pp. 600-616.
- Magni, G., & Reynolds, A. (2023, 01). Why Europe's Right Embraces Gay Rights. *Journal of Democracy(Vol.34)(1)*, pp. 50-64.
- March, L. (2011). *Radical Left Parties In Europe*. New York: Routledge.
- March, L., & Mudde, C. (2005, 03). What's Left of the Radical Left? The European Radical Left After 1989: Decline and Mutation. *Comparative European Politics*, pp. 23-49.
- Mudde, C. (2004, 09 27). *The Populist Zeitgeist*. Retrieved from Wiley Online Library: <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x>
- Mudde, C. (2007). *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). *Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and authoritarian populism*. Cambridge University Press.
- Putin, V. (2021, 07 12). *Article by Vladimir Putin "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians"*. Retrieved from Kremlin.ru: <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181>
- Pytlas, B. (2018, 08 31). Radical right politics in East and West: Distinctive yet equivalent. *Sociology Compass (Vol.12)(11)*, pp. 33-58.
- Regjeringen. (2012, 2). *NOU 2012: 2*. Regjeringen. Retrieved from Regjeringen.no: <https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/nou-2012-2/id669368/?ch=4>
- Reilly, R., & Flynn, M. (2022). *The Ukraine Crisis Double Standards: Has Europe's Response to Refugees Changed?* Geneva: Global Detention Project.
- Ringdal, K. (2018). *Enhet og Mangfold*. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget.

- Robson, K., & Pevalin, D. (2016). *Multilevel Modeling in Plain Language*. London: SAGE.
- Rohrschneider, R., & Whitefield, S. (2015, 10 26). Responding to growing European Union-skepticism? The stances of political parties toward European integration in Western and Eastern Europe following the financial crisis. *European Union Politics*(vol.17)(1), pp. 138-161.
- Rooduijn et al, M. (2017, 1107 11). Radical distinction: Support for radical left and radical right parties in Europe. *European Union Politics (Vol.18)(4)*, pp. 536-559.
- Rooduijn, M., & Burgoon, B. (2018). The paradox of well-being: do unfavorable socioeconomic and sociocultural contexts deepen or dampen radical left and right voting among the less well-off?(Vol.51)(13),. *Comparative Political Studies*, pp. 1720-1753.
- Rovny, J. (2014, 10). Communism, Federalism, and Ethnic Minorities: Explaining. *World Politics*(Vol.66)(4), pp. 669-708.
- Rydgren, J. (2008). Immigration Sceptics, Xenophobes or Racists? Radical Right-Wing Voting in six West European Countries. *European Journal of Political Research (Vol.47)(6)*, pp. 737-765.
- Schwörer, J. (2021, 03 10). Less Populist in Power? Online Communication of Populist Parties in Coalition Governments. *Government and opposition*, pp. 467-489.
- Sheppard, H., Bizumic, B., & Iino, N. (2023, 06). A reconceptualization of nationalism: Intragroup and intergroup nationalism in ethnic majority and minority groups. *Current Research in Ecological and Social Psychology*(Vol.4), pp. 100-126.
- Skog, O.-J. (2021). *Å forklare sosiale fenomener*. Oslo: Akademisk Gyldendal.
- Smith, P. B., & Bond, M. H. (1999). *Social psychology: Across cultures*. Allyn & Bacon.
- Sommet, N., & Morselli, D. (2017). Keep Calm and Learn Multilevel Logistic Modeling: A Simplified Three-Step Procedure Using Stata, R, Mplus, and SPSS. *International Review of Social Psychology*(Vol.30)(1), pp. 203-218.



# Appendices

**Appendix 1: Full names of political parties**

**Appendix 2: Description of voter data**

## Appendix 1: Full overview of political parties

Table A.1.1: Western European RPs

Country	Acronym	Full name	Family	Voters
<i>Finland</i>	VAS	The Left Alliance	RL	86
	PS	The Finns Party	RR	133
<i>France</i>	PCF	French Communist Party	RL	16
	RN	National Rally	RR	107
	FI	Unbowed France	RL	44
	DLF	France Arise	RR	12
<i>Greece</i>	Syriza	Coalition of the Radical Left	RL	480
	KKE	Communist Party of Greece	RL	127
	XA	Popular Association – Golden Dawn	RR	31
	EL	Greek Solution	RR	53
	MR25	European Realistic Disobedience Front [MeRa25]	RL	45
<i>Italy</i>	LN	Northern League	RR	155
<i>Netherlands</i>	SP	Socialist Party	RL	4
	PVV	Party for Freedom	RR	73
	FvD	Forum for Democracy	RR	38
<i>Norway</i>	FrP	Progress Party	RR	89
	RV	Red Party	RL	36
<i>Portugal</i>	CDU	Democratic Unitarian Coalition	RL	47
	BE	Left Bloc	RL	55
<i>Total: 7</i>		Total: 19	Split: 10-9	Total: 1 631

Source: CHES 2019



Table A.1.2: CEE European RPs

Country	Acronym	Full name	Family	Voters
<b>Bulgaria</b>	Ataka	Attack	RR	7
	Volya	Will	RR	14
<b>Czechia</b>	KSCM	Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia	RL	95
	SPD	Freedom and Direct Democracy Tomio Okamura	RR	88
<b>Estonia</b>				
<b>Hungary</b>	Fidesz-KDNP	Hungarian Civic Union	RR	567
	Jobbik	Movement for a Better Hungary	RR	130
	MM	Momentum Movement	RL	52
<b>Lithuania</b>				
<b>Slovakia</b>	LSNS	People's Party – Our Slovakia	RR	42
	Sme Rodina	Sme Rodina – Boris Kollár	RR	95
<b>Slovenia</b>	SNS	Slovenian National Party	RR	15
<i>Total: 7</i>		Total: 10	Split: 2-8	Total: 1 104

Source: CHES 2019

## Appendix 2: Description of voter data

### A.2.1: Western Voter Distribution

Variable	Party Family	Number of Respondents	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Different ethnic group	RLV	994	2.412	0.955	1	4
	NRV	5 669	2.708	0.862	1	4
	RRP	697	2.251	0.838	1	4
Same ethnic group	RLV	989	2.987	0.738	1	4
	NRV	5 664	3.027	0.804	1	4
	RRP	692	2.678	0.802	1	4
Attachement to Europe	RLV	991	5.523	2.264	0	10
	NRV	5 719	6.471	2.085	0	10
	RRP	703	5.451	2.500	0	10
Immigration good or bad for economy	RLV	980	5.254	2.429	0	10
	NRV	5 659	5.776	2.234	0	10
	RRP	702	4.136	2.216	0	10
Immigration good or bad for country	RLV	982	5.241	2.246	0	10
	NRV	5 648	5.502	2.117	0	10
	RRP	701	3.991	2.283	0	10
Immigration good or bad for culture	RLV	987	5.564	2.615	0	10
	NRV	5 666	6.146	2.399	0	10
	RRP	697	4.436	2.544	0	10
Redistribution	RLV	994	4.343	0.864	1	5
	NRV	5 726	3.947	0.929	1	5
	RRP	700	3.833	1.084	1	5
Attachment to [Country]	RLV	997	8.467	1.692	0	10
	NRV	5 746	8.475	1.616	0	10
	RRP	702	8.359	1.798	0	10
EU unification	RLV	943	4.972	2.315	0	10
	NRV	5 488	5.654	2.272	0	10
	RRP	685	4.083	2.518	0	10
Gay rights	RLV	989	4.233	0.982	1	5
	NRV	5 698	4.279	0.941	1	5
	RRP	700	4.183	1.022	1	5
Age	RLV	986	50.848	16.049	19	90
	NRV	5 736	54.451	16.896	17	90
	RRP	704	52.793	16.636	18	90

Education	RLV	993	3.207	4.426	3	40
	NRV	5 714	13.727	4.752	0	50
	RRP	700	13.086	3.920	2	40
Gender	RLV	998	1.522	0.500	1	2
	NRV	5 758	1.510	0.500	1	2
	RRP	706	1.431	0.496	1	2

Source: ESS10.


#### A.2.2: CEE Voter Distribution

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Party Family</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>
Different ethnic group	RLV	143	1.643	0.754	1	4
	NRV	5 487	2.323	0.902	1	4
	RRP	928	1.740	0.735	1	4
Same ethnic group	RLV	146	2.021	0.883	1	4
	NRV	5 495	2.800	0.909	1	4
	RRP	934	2.273	0.895	1	4
Attachement to Europe	RLV	144	6.333	2.809	0	10
	NRV	5 514	6.188	2.647	0	10
	RRP	937	7.196	2.532	0	10
Immigration good or bad for economy	RLV	144	3.486	2.403	0	10
	NRV	5 426	4.936	2.663	0	10
	RRP	922	3.586	2.339	0	10
Immigration good or bad for country	RLV	145	3.290	2.315	0	10
	NRV	5 403	4.606	2.397	0	10
	RRP	925	3.780	2.127	0	10
Immigration good or bad for culture	RLV	145	3.297	2.481	0	10
	NRV	5 433	4.811	2.596	0	10
	RRP	927	3.868	2.389	0	10
Redistribution	RLV	140	4.043	1.031	1	5
	NRV	5 510	3.848	1.059	1	5
	RRP	942	4.086	0.876	1	5
Attachment to [Country]	RLV	147	8.408	1.915	0	10
	NRV	5 537	8.352	1.987	0	10
	RRP	941	8.549	1.774	0	10
EU unification	RLV	943	4.972	2.315	0	10
	NRV	5 488	5.654	2.272	0	10
	RRP	685	4.083	2.518	0	10

Gay rights	RLV	140	3.421	1.163	1	5
	NRV	5 439	3.460	1.151	1	5
	RRP	916	3.137	1.235	1	5
Age	RLV	147	57.245	17.157	20	82
	NRV	5 528	54.382	16.683	16	90
	RRP	943	53.995	16.137	19	90
Education	RLV	134	12.888	2.479	8	25
	NRV	938	12.409	3.436	0	40
	RRP	938	12.409	3.436	2	40
Gender	RLV	147	1.531	0.501	1	2
	NRV	5 561	1.563	0.496	1	2
	RRP	946	1.598	0.491	1	2

---

Source: ESS10.



 **NTNU**

Norwegian University of  
Science and Technology