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Securitising Migration

Unpacking the Threat Narrative in EU Responses to 'Climate Migration to the North'

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Master's thesis in Globalisation and Sustainable Development
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Summary

This dissertation employs discourse analysis to investigate the presence of a narrative of 'climate migration to the North as a future threat' in three European Union (EU) documents on migration and climate and discusses its implications for migration governance. The corpus consists of a European Agenda on Migration (2015), a New Pact on Migration and Asylum (2020), and a New Outlook on the Climate and Security Nexus (2023).

The method involves a qualitative discourse analysis of the three EU documents. Positioned within critical realism, the analysis examines the language, narratives, and policies portrayed in these documents. The coding process is inductive, allowing emergent themes to guide the analysis. The thematic categories applied cover the topics of Climate Change as a Root Cause of Migration, Perceptions of Crises and Threats, Narratives of Climate Migration, and Policy Implications of Climate Migration.

The findings reveal a growing securitisation of climate framing within the EU in a migration context. The dissertation explores how this perpetuation of alarmist narratives that conflate migration with security concerns hinder constructive policy responses. By unpacking the concept of 'climate migration' in the corpus, the disparity between policy responses and empirical evidence regarding this phenomenon is highlighted.

Keywords: discourse, climate migration, migration governance, European Union, securitisation.

Samandrag

Denne avhandlinga nyttar diskursanalyse for å undersøkje om eit narrativ om "klimamigrasjon til nord som ein framtidig trussel" er til stades i tre dokument om migrasjon og klima frå den Europeiske Union (EU), og diskuterer implikasjonane dette har for migrasjonsstyring. Korpuset består av a European Agenda on Migration (2015), a New Pact on Migration and Asylum (2020) og a New Outlook on the Climate and Security Nexus (2023).

Metoden inneber ein kvalitativ diskursanalyse av dei tre EU-dokumenta. Med utgangspunkt i kritisk realisme undersøkjer analysen språket, narrativa og politikken som blir skildra i desse dokumenta. Kodingsprosessen er induktiv, slik at forekommande tema rettleier analysen. Dei tematiske kategoriane, som blir brukte, dekkjer temaa klimaendringar som ei grunnleggjande årsak til migrasjon, oppfatningar av kriser og truslar, forteljingar om klimamigrasjon og politiske konsekvensar av klimamigrasjon.

Funna viser ein aukande sikkerhetisering av klimaproblematikken i EU i ein migrasjonssamanheng. Avhandlinga utforskar korleis denne vidareføringa av alarmistiske narrativ, som blandar saman migrasjon og tryggingsproblem, hindrar konstruktive politiske tiltak. Ved å pakke ut omgrepet "klimamigrasjon" i korpuset, synleggjerast misforholdet mellom politiske tiltak og empiriske bevis for dette fenomenet.

Nøkkelord: diskurs, klimamigrasjon, migrasjonsforvaltning, Den europeiske unionen, sikkerhetisering (BM).

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In writing this dissertation, I am reminded of the importance of advocating for human rights in the context of migration. My parents' support has been the cornerstone of my commitment to working for social justice and the well-being of migrants. I recall the countless conversations around the dinner table from my childhood forming the basis for all my political fascinations and interests. For facilitating a lifetime of curiosity, thank you.

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While acknowledging all the people who have been there for me throughout this process, I would love to direct a thanks to the cities of Trondheim, Helsinki, and York. These cities have given me the most valuable friendships and lessons of my life. They have been the backdrop of every word written, exam delivered, and hug given.

With this said, I hereby declare that this dissertation titled "Securitising Migration: Unpacking the Threat Narrative in EU Responses to 'Climate Migration to the North'" is my own work. The research was conducted in the spring semester of the academic year 2024 under the supervision of Associate Professor Hilde Refstie and Research Fellow and PhD Candidate Bruno C. Gabellini from the department of Geography, at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), in Trondheim, Norway.

Any errors that remain are my sole responsibility.

Marie Solgard
Trondheim, May 2024

List of Abbreviations

CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CRRF	Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
EU	European Union
GCM	Global Compact for Migrants
GCR	Global Compact on Refugees
IOM	International Organization for Migration
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

List of Condensed Titles

Agenda	Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A European Agenda on Migration
New Pact	Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on a New Pact on Migration and Asylum
New Outlook	Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: A New Outlook on the Climate and Security Nexus: Addressing the Impact of Climate Change and Environmental Degradation on Peace, Security, and Defence

List of Figures

Reference Style: APA 7th

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

In recent years, many countries in Europe, North America and Oceania have witnessed a rise in support of anti-immigrant parties and populist nationalism (Thorleifsson, 2019; Aalberg et al., 2011). This shift has manifested in increasing xenophobia and restrictive policies targeted at migrants, particularly those who are low-skilled and are migrating from the Global South[1] (Creppell, 2011). Bartoszewicz et al. (2022) attribute this partly to racist anxieties about the prospect of changing population compositions despite 'racialised migrants'[2] not being established in these areas. In conjunction, securitisation narratives prevalent in populist politics have been increasingly evoked (Bartoszewicz, 2021). Despite overall stable migration figures, managing rising South-North migration has become a priority in both national and international policy discussions (Lanati & Thiele, 2018), and finding solutions for migration, particularly refugees, has become a global matter of contention (Esses et al., 2017).

The narrative of 'migration to the North as a possible future threat' is frequently discussed in the media (Innes, 2010; Kovář, 2020; Watson & Riffe, 2013). One part of this narrative is the fear of that increased disasters, conflicts and poverty due to climate change in the Global South will lead to a "flood" of migrants into Europe and other parts of the Global North (Arcimaviciene & Baglama, 2018; De Haas, 2024; Drüeke et al., 2021; Kolmannskog, 2008; Musolff, 2011). Populist anti-immigrants are not the only ones evoking this narrative. It can also be found within foreign aid and intervention strategies to justify spending development and humanitarian resources overseas (Clemens & Postel, 2018; Huysmans, 2006; Lazaridis, 2011). While the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) work on global policy guidance, regional bodies such as the European Union adopt rules and policies to manage migration flows within its borders. Thus, examining how narratives on climate-induced migration are framed in European Union (EU) documents supporting policymaking is fundamental for understanding migration governance.

This dissertation investigates whether the EU uses the popular narrative of 'climate migration to the North as a future threat' to justify forms of foreign aid and political intervention. The EU has been a focal point in discussions about migration globally due to its multilateral political commitments. Studying their adoption of a narrative of a climate migration threat is imperative for several reasons; it can assist in improving our understanding of how media and public discourse contribute to policy discussions and implementation, provide insights into future migration policies in the EU, and enhance our comprehension of the decision-making processes within the EU. The EU is a large multilateral, regional body and agenda-setter. The migration policies of the EU are aimed at Member States, but they directly affect people's lives globally. Therefore, it is essential to discuss what narratives drive EU response and policies and what implications such narratives have for broader migration governance. In this dissertation, strategic documents in the EU are analysed, thereby contributing to a discussion on the implications of mobilising threat narratives in the EU.

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[1] The term 'Global South' has been subject to extensive debate regarding its relevance and appropriateness, much like other dichotomies in global discourse (Prys-Hansen, 2023; Patrick & Huggins, 2023). While lacking a singular definition, it is applied in this dissertation to align with European discourse, representing a transnational political subject. Despite its generalisation, it serves to evoke colonial histories, shared challenges, and economic disparities.

[2] "The term racialised migrants encompasses diverse migrant groups, such as recently arrived, asylum seekers and refugees, that share the common experience of being systemically assigned a racialised status" (Reynolds et al., 2024, p. 167).

1.1 Problem Statement

This dissertation investigates EU narratives on climate-induced migration in the discursive context of securitisation of migration by analysing three central EU documents on migration and climate. It explores how the documents use popular narratives of 'mass migration' to 'the Global North' from 'the South' due to climate change to justify specific forms of foreign aid and political interventions. By examining the justification, or a lack thereof, for foreign aid and political interventions with reference to this narrative, the dissertation sheds light on the broader implications it has for migration governance.

1.2 Research Questions

Utilising document analysis, the following question is answered:
> **Research question 1:** Does the narrative of 'climate migration to the North as a future threat' serve as a justification for specific forms of foreign aid and political intervention in strategic EU documents?

Utilising the results from this question and the secondary literature and research on the topic, the dissertation continues with an exploration the following question:
> **Research question 2:** What broader implications does the adaptation of 'the narrative of 'climate migration to the North as a future threat' in policymaking have for migration governance?

The methodology employed to answer these questions is qualitative. Non-numerical data in the form of three EU documents serve as the corpus for analysis. This dissertation is, first and foremost, a discourse analysis with positioning in Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) principles and an emphasis on narratives.

1.3 Corpus

The primary documents analysed are:
- a) European Agenda on Migration
    - A strategic document presented by the EU in May 2015. It outlines a comprehensive approach to migration management.
- b) New Pact on Migration and Asylum
    - A set of regulations and policies for migration and asylum processes for the EU. It was proposed in September 2020 and agreed between the European Parliament and the Council at the end of 2023.
- c) New Outlook on the Climate and Security Nexus
    - A Joint Communication from June 2023. It lays out the EU's plan for addressing the impact of climate change and environmental degradation on peace, security, and defence.

These documents not only represent an interest in European cooperation on the matter of migration. They also include suggestions for national policies and commitments for Member States. In the context of migration governance, these documents stand out as they set the standards in the EU currently. Further, the dissertation draws heavily upon secondary literature to establish whether the narrative of a climate-induced migration threat to the North has an empirical grounding and to address the second research question.

1.4 Organisation of the Dissertation

This dissertation is organised into seven chapters. The first of which provides background for the topic. The introductory chapter commences with an account of global migration governance and how the EU adopts regional rules and policies to manage migration flows. Further, the research questions and objectives of the dissertation are laid out, setting the stage for the subsequent chapters.

Then, the second chapter describes the advancement of policies relating to migration. It serves as a backdrop for the dissertation as it maps out the historical and current developments in the field of migration policy and gives a rundown of the primary documents in this dissertation.

The third chapter is focused on the underlying theories that have informed the analysis for the dissertation. It highlights literature on the securitisation of migration and the discourse concerning climate refugees to Europe. The chapter explains the multifaceted nature of migration dynamics and what empirical studies reveal about climate-induced migration. Finally, this section elaborates on the theoretical framework and two fundamental terms essential to this dissertation, 'discourse' and 'narrative'.

The method applied for the dissertation, discourse analysis, is further explained in the fourth chapter. Here, the process of data selection and analysis is laid out. The validity, trustworthiness, and positionality are clearly stated to explain the choices made in the dissertation and to ensure transparency in the analysis and discussion.

Chapter 5, namely 'Navigating Climate Migration in the EU Strategies and Policymaking', presents the analysis for each document under four thematic categories: (1) Climate Change as a Root Cause of Migration, (2) Perceptions of Crises and Threats, (3) Narratives of Climate Migration, and (4) Policy Implications of Climate Migration. Here, the main comparisons and connections between the documents are made. While this chapter provides the analysis needed to answer the first research question, the second is addressed more extensively in the subsequent chapter.

The discussion chapter, Chapter 6, brings the findings from the analysis into the context of secondary literature to discuss broader implications the adaptation of different narratives has for policymaking. This section looks at how the EU documents frame the concept of climate-induced migration while placing it in the context of research on that topic and considers how this framing affects migration governance.

In the concluding chapter, the findings from the analysis and discussion are synthesised, highlighting their significance for the broader field of migration research. Additionally, this chapter highlights possible contributions of potential future projects, leveraging the findings of this dissertation. A continued exploration of the topic is encouraged.

2. Historical Developments and the Idea of Controlling Mobility

2.1 Migration Policies – Developments and Milestones

The endeavour to control transnational migration and mobility can be traced to colonial ambitions, with slave trade serving as a crude symbolic element in the relationship of migration and who controls it. As Bakewell (2008, p. 1343) writes:

> While the theories and practice of development appear to have moved away from such blatant hangovers from the colonial past, many of these roots remain in place; in particular, the ongoing ambivalence, or at times hostility, towards human mobility that is outside the control of the states.

How migration has been viewed has swung between optimism and pessimism throughout history (de Haas, 2010; Ibrahim, 2005). At times, migration has been perceived as a source of economic growth and cultural enrichment. Conversely, it has been considered a threat to national security and employment stability. The positive contributions (diverse skills, talents, and perspectives) are recognised when migration is viewed optimistically. Conversely, during periods of pessimistic views on migration, migrants can be viewed as threats. This outlook has mainly been applied to migration from the Global South, perpetuating stereotypes feeding into discriminatory policymaking (Stępka, 2022); Migrants are presented as "potential job thieves, welfare scroungers and criminals, and immigration more generally as an essential threat to employment, wages and welfare provisions including access to affordable housing, education and health care" (de Haas, 2024, p. 10).

Different schools inform these perceptions. According to neoclassical theory, individuals make migration decisions and differences in labour markets drive them (European University Institute, n.d.). In the historical-structural school of thought, the causes of international migration are seen to originate from historically conditioned macrostructural forces (Morawska, 2012). More recent scholarship emphasises the diversified reasons for migration. While all these schools of thought had different times of domination, they exist simultaneously and shape understandings of migration.

In 1951, UN Member States agreed upon the Refugee Convention of Geneva. Prior, a convention on the international status of refugees from 1933 focusing on administrative measures was setting standards for migration governance (Jaeger, 2001), in addition to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the European Convention on Human Rights (1950). The 1951 Convention introduced a recognised definition of the legal category 'refugee' and outlined rights for refugee, including legal protection and assistance. Sixteen years later, the 1967 Protocol supplemented this Convention, and removed the phrase "events occurring before 1 January 1951" to broaden the scope of the Geneva Convention beyond events in Europe relating primarily to World War II (The UN Refugee Agency, n.d.-a). While the Convention remains authoritative, the rise of right-wing ideologies and notions in Europe and North America has led to the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol being, at times, side-lined or entirely disregarded in favour of restrictive migration policies (Esses et al., 2017). One element of this has been the efforts to close borders to Europe and the US by building walls, negotiations, and agreements with states neighbouring conflicts to contain displacement (Kramer, 2024; Bartoszewicz, 2016).

The refugee category constructs separation between 'forced' and 'voluntary' migration. However, the realities of migration are more complex, as Erdal & Oeppen (2018, p. 993) describes, "an analytical description of an individual's migration decisions along a

forced-voluntary continuum is necessarily more reflective of the complexity of individual experiences, agency and contextual circumstances than a binary labelling of forced or not." In the face of the increasingly complex global challenges there are both slow and rapid environmental changes and different degrees of urgency in political conflicts (Green & Pécoud, 2023; Castles, 2010; Geddes, 2015). Many migration decisions consider multiple factors, for example considerations about labour opportunities and expectations of future climate-induced issues might could be combined in reasoning for personal migration choices. In this context, it is becoming more challenging to categorise migrants. Despite this there are overarching laws and institutions governing them, while leaning on simplistic ideas and distinctions, such as 'labour migration' and 'forced migration'.

Historical events affect migration governance and public perceptions of migration. The Cold War largely defined international dynamics following World War II; Deep-seated hostility and animosity increased (Creppell, 2011). These tensions still influence international relations, especially how responsibility for refugees and migration is understood within the global community. The 9/11 attacks further exacerbated tensions, evoking high emotions and polarisation, particularly regarding religion and ethnicity (Lazaridis, 2011). A civilised 'us' (Western, Judeo-Christian) serves as a contrast to the non-civilised 'them' (Muslims) (Thorleifsson, 2019). The consequences of the Syrian Civil War were discussed in European media and by policymakers as a refugee crisis.[3] While there was considerable international effort to assist Syrian refugees while "imaginaries of hordes of foreigners [would] overrun Europa and Britain'', and these portrayals often linked migrants to rapists and terrorists (Thorleifsson, 2019, p. 194).

Attitudes towards migration and mobility change constantly. Leading up to the 2008 financial crash, societal factors, such as demography, economy, and social aspects, rendered many (developed) economies reliant on labour immigration (Castles, 2010). Subsequently, high-skilled migrants were considered valuable, and the lower-skilled migrant workers were deemed unfit. This attitude aggravated the mobility of the former group to be celebrated, and the latter as unwanted. Also, migration "re-awakened archaic memories of invasion and displacement" (Castles, 2010, p. 1567) by evoking historical parallels of past conflicts and population movements. Influxes of migrants bring changes in social dynamics, economic structures, and cultural landscapes. These echoes underscore the multifaceted nature of migration shaping contemporary perceptions and responses to migration. As shown by Hulme (2008) and Stępka (2022), scare headlines in the media has strengthened these notions of invasion for decades. Thus, a duality of migration is cemented, where some types are good and others bad. This is the root for many of the negative attitudes towards migration today, affecting discussions on migration.

2.2 Global Political Commitment to Collaboration on Migration

A breakthrough in political commitment to sharing responsibilities for refugees occurred in 2016 when the United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted the UN's New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants. This declaration aimed to address a long-lasting gap in the international protection system through ensuring that all Member States officially recognise their responsibilities in managing refugees (The UN Refugee Agency,

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[3] The phrase "refugee crisis" is contested, as described by Alcalde (2016), "Some of the criticisms focus on the word "crisis"; others, on the concept of "refugee"; others still, on the combination of the two words; and others, on the absence of alternative words that explicitly state the causes and those responsible for this situation". In the context of this dissertation, it is applied as a reflection of how the migration flows caused by the Syrian Civil War are often described.

n.d.-b). While the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol focused on the legal status and protection of refugees, the New York Declaration expanded on this by addressing contemporary challenges and gaps in the global response to forced displacement.

The commitments of the Member States upon adopting the New York Declaration can be summarised as follows (The UN Refugee Agency, n.d.-b): Member States pledged solidarity, reaffirmed human rights obligations, agreed on international responsibilities, pledged robust support, agreed upon the core of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF)[4], and agreed to work towards a global compact on refugees and a global compact for safe, orderly, and regular migration. The process of developing the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) and the Global Compact for Migrants (GCM) aimed to strengthen international work on human mobility (The UN Refugee Agency, 2018a;b).

The GCR is, similarly to CRRF, a framework highlighting responsibility-sharing and international cooperation, ensuring that host communities are supported. As mentioned, few migration-related documents have the authority to enforce sanctions on those who break them. The GCM is no exception as a non-binding document respecting the sovereign right of states to self-determination. Nonetheless, it is designed to support cooperation, provide policy options regarding international migration, and grant states flexibility based on their situations (IOM, n.d.-a). Despite the lack of a global actor with a full mandate to govern migration, the UN provides frameworks addressing migration and guiding international responses. While these frameworks are internationally recognised guidelines for migration, they are non-binding. Nonetheless, these instruments have served as the basis for several multilateral and bilateral agreements and ratifications of UN protocols.

These frameworks have been the subject of study for multiple scholars, such as Green & Pécoud (2023), Micinski & Lefebvre (2024), Lavenex (2020), and Türk (2019). A common conclusion is that although the UN provides frameworks for migration, challenges of fragmentation of migration governance and sovereignty persist. Also, Türk (2019) raises the issue of geopolitical interests in controlling migration as a point of contention. There is a question of whether the global compacts act as a means for the Global North to evade its responsibilities under the Refugee Convention; advocating for supporting neighbouring countries to conflicts contribute to impeding migrants from coming to Europe and the US.

2.3 Climate Refugees

Despite the term 'environmental refugees' being introduced and defined by Essam El-Hinnawi all the way back in 1985, the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development made little reference to climate change when discussing the root causes of international migration (Apap & Harju, 2023). Rather, the focus was primarily on poverty (United Nations, 1995). Since then, the topics of the environment and forced migration have become increasingly integrated with each other (Apap & Harju, 2023). An example of this is the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement from 1998, which refers to people who flee conflict, general violence *and natural disasters* (United Nations, 2004). In 2009, the Council of Europe suggested that these guiding principles should be the foundation for a global framework for those crossing international borders due to climate-induced issues and natural disasters (Apap & Harju, 2023).

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[4] The CRRF is one of two annexes to the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants from 2016 (The UN Refugee Agency, n.d.-c). It contains a set of commitments to be implemented in situations involving large-scale movements of refugees.

The Refugee Convention does not cover natural disasters and climate-induced migration. Still, despite inadequacies in current definitions of climate-induced migration[5], there are many non-binding agreements and initiatives working with climate migration. The GCM and the GCR cover various aspects of migration, including climate change and environmental degradation. One of the key objectives of the IOM, the leading intergovernmental organisation in the field of migration, is to manage environmental migration. This includes assisting and protecting migrants and displaced persons and making migration a choice in the context of climate change, environmental degradation, and disasters due to natural hazards (IOM, n.d.-b). Another example of an initiative is the state-driven Platform on Disaster Displacement, led by the EU and Kenya. It is focused on addressing disaster-induced displacement, including those relating to climate change (United Nations Network on Migration, 2020; Platform on Disaster Displacement, n.d.). However, as Podesta (2019, para. 11) states, "the current system [...] is not equipped to protect climate migrants, as there are no legally binding agreements obliging countries to support [them]", making the legally binding agreements made today more influential.

2.4 EU documents on Migration, Asylum, and the Climate and Security Nexus

EU migration policies have developed significantly since the post-war period until now. First, guest-worker policies were implemented, such as recruiting foreign workers from outside Europe to take on temporary contracts to fill gaps in the labour market. Then the focus changed; the aim became to receive highly skilled migrants and return 'irregular' migrants[6] (Wiesbrock, 2016). Before digging into the documents analysed in this dissertation, a brief summarisation of this change in the EU's migration governance prior is provided to contextualise the status of EU migration governance from 2015 onwards. Wiesbrock (2016) divides migration history in the EU after 1945 into four periods:

1) Post-colonial migration and labour migration (1945-1975)
2) The halt to labour migration and an inflow of family migrants (mid-1970s onwards)
3) An increase in asylum applicants (late 1980s onwards)
4) A rise in employment-related migration (late 1990s onwards)

While the EU aims to align its policies with the Geneva Convention and the European Convention on Human Rights, there has been separate agreements and treaties within the EU. In this context, the EU line on migration evolves constantly. The EU was established with the purpose to ensure the free flow of goods, services and people. However, the realisation of human mobility within the region was not immediate. Only recently, with the incorporation of the Schengen acquis into the European Union through the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, significant progress was made (European Council, 2023).

While human mobility within the EU has become easier for many, getting into the EU from external countries has not, fostering critique of the EU as a 'Festung Europa'

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[5] Unlike 'refugee', 'climate refugee' lacks an accepted definition and legal framework. The term conflates migrant categories affected by climate change, including those not fulfilling refugee status criteria. 'Ecologically displaced' emphasise environmental factors *without* implying legal status. This dissertation applies "climate-induced migration" and "climate migration".

[6] "In the global context, a person who, owing to irregular entry, breach of a condition of entry or the expiry of their legal basis for entering and residing, lacks legal status in a transit or host country. In the EU context, a third-country national present [in] a Schengen State who does not fulfil, or no longer fulfils, the conditions of entry" (European Commission, n.d.-a). While 'irregular migrant' is often preferred to 'illegal migrant', it is associated with crime. Therefore, some prefer 'migrant in an irregular situation', as the situation is irregular–*not the person* (Crépeau & Vezmar, 2021).

(Bartoszewicz, 2016). This critique emphasises how "the foci of the common policy instruments lie on the prevention of undocumented migration, the strengthening of border controls and the reduction of asylum applications in the EU" (Alscher, 2005, p. 5). Geddes (2008) present an EU aspiration of transforming into an area without internal frontiers, but rather external, to step up efforts of controlling the perceived threat of migration.

Since the turn of the millennium, the EU has been working towards establishing a common framework of rules for legal migration for third-country nationals and a European Common Asylum System (Carrera, 2019). This endeavour has resulted in several directives, with some of the earliest dating back to 2003 and 2005, respectively the Family Reunification Directive and the Asylum Procedures Directive (Directive 2003/86/EC; Directive 2005/85/EC).

Huysmans (2000) points out that the contrast of the policies included in, e.g. the Schengen agreement, to the regulations regarding third-country nationals is a clear sign of privileging sustaining the delegitimisation of the presence of immigrants, asylum-seekers and refugees in the EU. These policy documents were written roughly two decades before the Agenda, the New Pact, and the New Outlook. Wirthová (2024) has researched general EU discourse between 1999 and 2019 on environmental migration and found a predominant focus on funding research and implementing measures to mitigate the impacts of climate change rather than addressing migrants' needs. The scope of this dissertation has a more contemporary focus as all three documents explored are from the last decade, with the oldest dating back to 2015 and the most recent from 2023.

Notably, considerable attention has been directed towards the European Green Deal initiative in recent times. In 2019, the European Commission officially and explicitly recognised climate change as a *root cause* of migration. Still, the European Parliamentary Research Service refers to Professor Isabel Borges' claim that "the absence of an accurate definition of what constitutes a person displaced by environmental factors has resulted in the inability to measure exactly the number of existing and potential displacement flows" (Apap & Harju, 2023, p. 4). The lack of clear categories on what "climate migrants" are affects the governing of international migration; the impacts of climate change on human mobility patterns are all discussed under the umbrella term of 'climate migration' (Bettini, 2013).

2.4.1 European Agenda on Migration

The European Agenda on Migration is a strategic document outlining an "approach to migration management addressing the asylum and migration challenges as well as defining steps to be taken to ensure strong borders, fair procedures and a sustainable system able to anticipate future problems in the context of asylum and migration" (European Commission, n.d.-b). The European Commission presented it in May 2015. The document develops Former President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker's political priority aim from 2014, "Towards a new policy on migration" (European Commission, 2015b). It emerged as a response to what is referred to as the "crisis in the Mediterranean" (European Commission, 2015a; 2015b). This document is significant as it is now the dominant EU document on migration strategies. Also, in the description of the document, written by the Commission, a formulation of future problems is applied, directly connecting it to this dissertation's study objectives.

This 22-page strategic document is structured into five sections: an introduction providing an overview of the relationship between migration and the European Union (p. 2), 'Immediate Action' focusing on swift responses to the Mediterranean crisis (pp. 3-6), 'Four Pillars to Manage Migration Better' detailing levels of action for a fair, robust, and

realistic EU migration policy (pp. 6-17), 'Moving Beyond' exploring future reflections on completing the Common European Asylum System, shared management of the European border, and a new model of legal migration (pp. 17-18) and an annex section.

2.4.2 New Pact on Migration and Asylum

The New Pact on Migration and Asylum is a proposal from September 2020 laid out by the European Commission. The pact was officially agreed upon in April 2024 (Riegert, 2024), but technical discussions which will continue throughout 2024 before the package can be fully adopted. The New Pact is, in short, a policy framework. It has five binding legislative aspects and four non-binding recommendations. The New Pact on Migration and Asylum is designed to both manage and normalise migration in the long term. It is "a set of regulations and policies to create a fairer, efficient, and more sustainable migration and asylum process for the [EU]" (European Commission, n.d.-c). These claims about the Pact as a new political instrument provide a background for investigating whether these claims align with the actual rhetoric applied and suggestions made in the proposal.

The New Pact responds to deficiencies exposed during the 2015-2016 refugee crisis and the challenges faced by different EU Member States. Spanning 28 pages, the New Pact is divided into nine sections, starting with a contextualising introduction (pp. 1-2), followed by a section on the need and background for a comprehensive 'Common European Framework for Migration and Asylum Management' and what its content should be (pp. 3-10). Then the section 'a Robust Crisis Preparedness and Response System' lays out the aims of the New Pact, and how it could work as a blueprint for anticipation and resilience (pp. 10-11). The document then moves onto 'Integrated Border Management' touching on internal and external EU borders (pp. 11-15), before addressing 'Reinforcement against Migrant Smuggling' (pp. 15-17). How the EU has and should work with external actors receives much attention in a section spanning seven pages (pp. 17-24), this flows into a chapter on 'Attracting Skills to the EU' (pp. 24-26). Towards the end comes a section about healthy and fair systems of migration management (pp. 26-28). In the end, the Commission looks ahead at the 'Next Steps' including how to make the New Pact a reality.

2.4.3 New Outlook on the Climate and Security Nexus

In June 2023, the European Commission and the High Representative adopted a Joint Communication on how the EU will "address the growing impact of climate change and environmental degradation in the fields of peace, security, and defence (European Commission, 2023a). The New Outlook on the Climate and Security Nexus is a testament to the EU's recognition of climate change as a threat-multiplier and its intertwining with crisis management and defence; "The climate and security nexus impact migration, displacement, pandemics and political instability" (European Commission, 2023b). The New Outlook establishes a framework of 30 concrete actions for addressing the impacts of climate change and environmental degradation on peace, security and defence.

The New Outlook spans 24 pages. Each chapter provides a rundown of the topic at hand whilst either simultaneously or concludingly listing instruments, policies, and tools relating to the topic. At the end of each chapter key actions at the EU level are listed in bullet list format. The introductory section (pp. 1-4) highlights the critical need for a fresh perspective on the climate and security nexus that aligns with the European Green Deal's external dimension and the Strategic Compass on Security and Defence. There are four main chapters; the first takes on 'Evidence-based analysis and foresight as an enabler for action' (pp. 5-8); the second chapter is titled 'Operationalising the climate and security

nexus in EU external action' (pp. 8-14); the third chapter is forward looking at tackles the topic 'Ensuring a sustainable and climate-resilient European security and defence'; lastly, Chapter 4 'International Cooperation' gives more attention to combined global efforts (pp. 18-22). The document concludes with a brief paragraph about the way forward (p. 23).

2.4.4 The Nature and Scope of the Documents

These three documents have different degrees of binding commitments. This dissimilarity is essential to recognise as the language used may vary due to the document's nature. The *European Agenda on Migration* from 2015 was presented as a response to the crisis in the Mediterranean (European Commission, 2015b). It sets out a European response while using existing EU agencies and tools. Therefore, it is more of a strategic framework than new binding measures. The European Commission put forward the Agenda. While not yet implemented, *New Pact on Migration and Asylum* includes five legislative proposals that will be binding EU law when adopted. The Pact also includes four recommendations, which are not legally binding but are expected to be followed. Similarly to the Agenda, the Commission put forward the New Pact. The *New Outlook on the Climate and Security Nexus* offers a new outlook and recommendations for an EU framework for responding to challenges of climate and security. It is not a binding legal document for Member States. However, it was put forward by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, laying the groundwork for changes within the EU legislative system.

The three EU documents described above, with their different degrees of commitment, serve as significant representations of the EU's attitudes and visions for actions in the fields of migration, security, and climate change. The EU's collaboration on the emerging issue of climate migration is rooted in these documents. Therefore, an analysis of these documents will provide useful insights into the EU's rhetoric regarding climate migration.

A discussion on the accuracy of referring to these documents as "EU documents" is valid, as the documents are presented by the High Representative and the European Commission, and not the EU. Nonetheless, as the documents altogether are largely agreed upon in the EU, they should reflect a consensus among EU Member States. Therefore, they are considered as reflective of an EU unanimity in this dissertation.

3. Theory

3.1 Migration and Climate Change

3.1.1 The Rhetoric of Climate-Induced Migration

Global migration governance is a contested field with no clear regime, and the actors who make significant contributions currently are setting the tone—especially within the emerging field of 'climate migration'. Green & Pécoud (2023) explain several reasons for looking at discourse in global migration governance, particularly as the way 'people who migrate' are described matters.

Bettini (2013) raises concerns about popular narratives in media and political arenas and how they frame climate-induced migration as a global security crisis. The alarmist tones in the media and the securitisation of climate-induced migration feed off each other. De Haas et al. (2020, p. 49) conclude that "by deploying alarmist rhetoric around future waves of 'climate refugees', media, politicians, UN agencies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and humanitarian organizations have turned climate change into an immediate security threat linked to migration." Apocalyptic narration is often applied to the unfamiliar case, mobilising fear and urgency. Climate migration is treated as detached from existing population movement patterns; there is a new and unfamiliar trend (Bettini, 2013).

Generally, the antipathy one can witness toward immigrants reflects a fear of migrants socially overrunning a nation (Creppell, 2011). Thorleifsson (2019, pp. 193-4) argues that the imaginaries attached to migration from the South are enforce wrongful depictions of a "nation and civilization in danger." Immigrants are positioned as a disruption of existing traditions by bringing new cultures, and that the cultural differences threaten the "natives' way of life" (Ibrahim, 2005). These fear-based narratives are on the rise (Stępka, 2022), creating erroneous ground for discussions and policy (de Haas et al., 2020; Thorleifsson, 2019).

Puggioni and Trombetta (2023) suggest a discursive shift when discussing climate migration, embracing a positive approach. The discourse on resilience often discusses how local populations resist, adapt, and overcome climate change—still, migration is not considered as adaptation strategy. Geddes (2015) highlights that the EU's external governance of migration is prone to understanding migration as the failure to adapt. This builds onto the dominant political discourse understanding migration as a problem that needs to be 'fixed' (Castles, 2010), attributing negative qualities to those who migrate. Also, applying a view that migration is an 'issue', or a 'burden' suits the "model of development that keeps poor people 'out there'" (Bakewell, 2008, p. 1355). This notion is agreed on in several international development organisations despite research showing that accepting the broader mobility of the population in policy is in better agreement with boosting general welfare. Multilateral and public discussions applying this negative view of migration has implications for EU policies (Geddes, 2015).

In EU countries, migration is not dealt with as just an economic or security dilemma. It is also a moral dilemma. Bartoszewicz et al. (2022) state that most people weigh various moral aspects in their attitudes towards migration issues. The desire to provide aid instead of receiving migrants is prevalent. Still, respondents accepted that they had the readiness to help those in need by, e.g. offering jobs. A mentality of "if it is needed, we will contribute" tends to moderate notions of "we can help them where they are". There is an idea of a *burden*, which many countries accept to take part in carrying.

3.1.2 Debunking Myths: Climate Change and South-North Migration

De Haas et al. (2020) express how with the emerging term "climate refugee", we witness the construction of a migration threat. Albeit global warming being one of the most pressing issues facing humanity and a justified cause for concern, it does not necessarily entail mass migration. Environmentalists often make the connection between climate change and migration to increase support for climate action (De Haas, 2024; Trombetta, 2014); a common equation is how sea-levels will rise and cause the migration of those inhabiting the affected areas. However, this calculation is speculative (Telford, 2018). Still, the narrative of mass migration is "the most widely shared narrative told by politicians, interest groups and media across the ideological spectrum" (de Haas, 2024, p. 12).

De Haas et al. (2020) demonstrate that ways in which these ideas can be refuted: the implementation of adaptation strategies; in the case of acute disasters, most people move over short distances; displacements are mostly temporary; travelling long-distance is expensive, the majority cannot afford it; impoverishment increase with environmental stress depriving many from the opportunity to migrate long-distance. A lack of resources hinder long-distance migration as mobility is an economic privilege (Bakewell, 2008; Nyberg-Sorensen et al., 2002). Kraler et al. (2020) conclude that environmental factors mostly *indirectly* influence migration decisions through impact on income and wages. Researchers concur that climate-induced long-distance mass population movements is improbable and that associated narratives disrupt policymaking (de Haas et al., 2020; Bakewell, 2008; Huang, 2023; Huckstep & Dempster, 2023; Tanner, n.d.).

Discussions on mitigating risks linked to climate migration are based on similar erroneous information. Castles (2010) states that these policies are either repressive (tight border control) or liberal (addressing root causes), but both aim to hinder migration as something "harmful and dysfunctional". Not only are these policies flawed, as they are based on a negative view of migration, but they can also be counterproductive in limiting migration. In terms of the repressive policies, Bettini (2013) draws attention to how stricter migration policies intend to "solve" migrants drowning in the Mediterranean, emphasising the effects of erroneous discourse on policy. Regarding the liberal tools, many attempts to hinder migration flows relies on foreign aid. However, aid tends to encourage people to emigrate (Lanati & Thiele, 2018; de Haas, 2010). Nyberg-Sorensen et al. (2002) point out that no evidence shows that humanitarian aid affects refugee flows to destinations (such as the Global North). Also, aid given to the neighbouring countries receiving migrants does not have an apparent effect "in terms of reducing the number of people seeking asylum in developed countries[7]" (Nyberg-Sorensen et al., 2002, pp. 3-4). They also argue for a focus on long-term approaches (development aid) rather than short-term (humanitarian assistance) to ensure constructive migration governance.

Notably, there have been increased migration flows from the Middle East and Africa to Europe (Bartoszewicz et al., 2022), and with 'the refugee crisis' there has been an arrival of thousands of migrants in Southern Europe (Lanati & Thiele, 2018). While acknowledging that most migration is short-distance and that many right-wing parties in Europe paint an erroneous apocalyptic picture, it is essential to not neglect how migration to the Global North affects receiving countries. The real experiences of countries expressing their struggles should not be diminished. As Wiesbrock (2016, p. 181) states, there needs to be a balance where security concerns of EU Member States are respected.

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[7] Notably, while Nyberg-Sorensen et al. (2002) uses the developed/developing dichotomy in their paper, many of the other more recently published articles used in this dissertation prefers using North/South, but the point remains as the "migration flows" discussed are the same.

3.1.3 Securitisation: Constructing Threats and Shaping Policies

Through the lens of securitisation theory, one can better understand how language constructs security (Stępka, 2022). The Copenhagen School views security as constructed by powerful actors and relevant audiences through inter-subjective social and discursive interactions. The powerful actors propose definitions which rely on the idea of a threat, and the audience accepts these definitions (Buzan et al., 1998). Drawing on the theoretical frameworks of the Copenhagen School, highlighting how language constructs security and how problems are transformed into threats through governance practices (Trombetta, 2014), it becomes clear that the securitisation of climate-induced migration involves discursive and institutional dimensions. The theorists Buzan and Wæver (1997) have highlighted how the securitised issue (e.g. migration) is placed above what one could call "normal politics"; in this context, influential societal figures create security discussions by presenting an issue as a significant threat to a specific thing.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, migration has been viewed positively and negatively throughout history. However, in recent decades, there has been an increasing trend of viewing migration through the lens of security, framing migrants as individuals seeking better opportunities, and potential threats to national security (de Haas et al., 2020). New concerns have entered regarding political order as focus is given to migration's perceived capacity to disrupt homogeneity and public order (Huymans, 2000; Ibrahim, 2005). This focus pertains especially to migration from the Global South, where migrant representations are associated with "the criminal" and "the invader" (Huymans, 2000). As Bartoszewicz (2021, p. 96) writes, "sometimes [...] symbolic narrative is enough to start perceiving something as a threat."

Nyberg-Sorensen et al. (2002) point out how concerns related to terrorism and asylum seekers and are combined with the inclination to confuse the status of refugees and illegal migrants. The lumping together of these concepts obstructs political discussions on migration by promoting erroneous images of migration. There is a migration-security dichotomy, where economic, environmental, social and political unrest is lumped together with the concept of migration (Topulli, 2016). Burrows and Kinney (2016) highlight discussions on the link between climate change, migration, and security issues and how policymakers increasingly relate the three. Similarly to de Haas et al. (2020), they claim that considerable uncertainty remains in the connection between the three.

Bartoszewicz et al. (2022, p. 2) concludes that "the societal narratives on migration are forecasts and [...] can be classified as dystopias." Their findings revealed how other security challenges are often seen as more dangerous in the immediate future, but migration was seen as an increasing threat. In other words, this relates directly to topics discussed in this dissertation, 'future threat', as the timeline is brought in. While discussions on migration from the Global South to the Global North has received this kind of increased security focus for a long time, discussions on climate change have been intensified, particularly considering its influence on migration. There is a projection of a future security threat connected to climate-induced migration.

Bettini (2013) and Thorleifsson (2019) criticise the securitisation of climate-induced migration, highlighting alarmist narratives in the media and politics constructing 'a global security crisis', as mentioned. They argue that such narratives reinforce fear and urgency and perpetuate misrepresentations of a migrant threat. Trombetta (2014) concludes that securitising moves generally fail to bring about the desired action. Similarly, Warner and Boas (2019) argue that the tendency to securitise climate change may increase but that instrumental securitisation risks backfiring like a "political boomerang", mainly when economic and political changes co-occur.

3.2 The Linguistic Lexicon of Migration

There is a connection between narratives of migration and what policies are implemented (de Haas et al., 2020), as seen with the rise of anti-immigrant parties in many European countries (Bermeo & Leblang, 2015). As previously touched on, security concerns are playing a major part in shaping the discourse at hand. Bartoszewicz (2021, p. 98) states:

> Security can be understood as a phenomenon not solely evident from a material distribution of power, but socially constructed through language (speech acts) within certain social structures (positions of authority), whereby those in power convince their audience that there is something to be feared (a threat that must be affectively recognised and internalised).

The language connecting migration to security stems from authorities' speech acts constructing ideas of a threat. Brader et al. (2008) found that group cues in immigration discourse can elicit anxiety and that these anxieties impact political behaviour and legislation. This underscores the importance of investigating EU discourse on migration, as it is arguably the biggest authority of migration governance in Europe.

Pietrandrea and Battaglia (2022) explain that the language we use to discuss migration creates connections between different aspects of migration through lists and parallels. This structured language plays a significant role in shaping public discourse on migration, often leading to the promotion of manipulative categories. Specifically, the language used by certain political factions, influenced by the right, tends to frame migrants as threats, particularly by associating immigration with terrorism. Subsequently, policies aimed at reducing migration from specific regions are legitimised by this categorisation (Pietrandrea & Battaglia, 2022; Thorleifsson, 2019).

The populist ideas brewing in Europe influence political rhetoric nationally and internationally tend to be based on the idea of "the other". This idea relates to the dichotomy of North/South in discussions of migration. Language use constructs images of the self and the other as communities are depicted as "different". Migrants, especially asylum seekers and refugees, are often constructed as a threat to homogeneity. Ibrahim (2005) also points out that migrants are categorised in public discourse based on a constructed presumption of behaviour and risk plaguing the South. Also, there is a concept of a "we" which lays ground for policy discussions and action (Bartoszewicz, 2021). When defining oneself with words, one simultaneously creates an "other". Thorleifsson (2019) points out that this construction of a divide satisfies populist needs for division, and de Haas (2024) concludes that it contributes to division between working classes, 'native' and 'migrant' workers. As language is used to separate a "we" from a "them", populist emotions of anger, hatred and fear directed towards the other are matched with a nativist pride. Therefore, the dichotomies of North/South and we/them are enhanced. It reiterates these narratives and is institutionalised and adopted in policymaking (Bartoszewicz, 2021).

Another key concept visible in migration discourse is the "burden" (Bartoszewicz et al., 2022; Bakewell, 2008). Many receiving countries struggle to tackle migration and while understanding that migration is not necessarily all-positive for receiving countries, it is crucial to be aware of how this type of language use contributes to the alienation of migrants. When referring to challenges regarding people, talking about a "burden" rather than discussing it from a more affective point of view can cause dissociation. The moral perspective of helping *people* is not considered as much as reducing the *burden*. Again, these narratives and discourses affect what aid is given and what policies are implemented.

3.3 Theoretical Framework for Analysis

The theoretical framework in this dissertation is based on four key concepts: securitisation, climate migration, linguistics, and rhetoric. The dissertation considers how language constructs security perceptions of climate-induced migration. The concept of climate migration provides an empirical basis for the study, enabling the identification of narratives concerning climate change and migration and how they are linked to policy responses and foreign aid allocation. Through applying literature on securitisation, the analysis examines the processes in which climate migration is elevated to a matter of security. By using insights from linguistics and rhetoric, their role in shaping policy measures and perceptions is recognised. Subsequently, an analysis of the EU's political rhetoric, mainly through notions of security and threat, is enabled. Overall, this theoretical framework provides a comprehensive perspective for analysing the securitisation of climate migration in EU discourse, considering the implications for policymaking and migration governance.

Within this framework, empirical evidence on climate migration is assessed, recognising that climate-induced mass migration from South to North is unlikely. The framework also includes insights from linguistics and rhetoric, recognising their role in shaping policy measures and public perceptions. The literature applied examines how political rhetoric constructs attitudes towards migration, mainly through notions of security and threat. Overall, this provides a comprehensive perspective for analysing the securitisation of climate migration in EU discourse, considering the implications for policymaking and migration governance.

Lastly, the concepts of 'discourse' and 'narrative' are applied in this dissertation. These terms are sometimes used interchangeably, but here, narrative is understood as "social constructions about specific cases" and discourse as "frameworks for construction of broader and more abstract phenomena" (Benjamin & Svarstad, 2008, p. 51). In this dissertation, the main concern is *the narrative* of 'climate migration to the North as a future threat' within *the discourse* on securitisation of migration. An analysis of discourse examines argumentative structure (Hajer, 2006). By investigating it, we seek to uncover assumptions and motivations behind the producer of the discourse. Narratives can be found in the sphere of discourse (Bettini, 2013); "generative narrations of 'sequence[s] of events, experiences, or actions with a plot that ties together different parts into a meaningful whole" (Feldman et al., 2004, p. 148). In this dissertation, the linguistic bodies of the Agenda, the New Pact, and the New Outlook are analysed concerning the discourse on migration and security, specifically looking at rhetoric and narratives on 'the threat' of climate migration.

4. Method

4.1 Qualitative Methodology

This dissertation examines the visibility of the narrative of 'climate migration to the North as a future threat' in three EU documents addressing climate and migration. The method applied is a qualitative discourse analysis emphasising narratives. The approach chosen allows for an exploration of the migration discourse in the EU. The analysis focuses on the words chosen, narratives imposed, and policies suggested. Due to limitations on the time and size of this dissertation, the documents have been carefully chosen as a basis for answering the dissertation question.

With a positioning, both ontologically and epistemologically, in *critical realism*, this dissertation focuses on how the global process of migration does not just influence discourse but also contributes to it. In the context of critical realism, the ontological reality is the existence of a real world as the object of research, and the epistemological relativity is the shortcomings of human enquiry (Bygstad, 2020). The theoretical background with this specific epistemology and ontology allows an examination of how perceptions of migration are reflected in the language used in the EU. Critical realism provides a way to understand social phenomena as constructed, and in this dissertation, a key recognition is that while observable events do contribute to defining dynamics of migration governance, deeper "unobservable" socio-political structures are also significant (Bygstad, 2020; Easton, 2010; University of Warwick, n.d.). In line with critical realism, the underlying structures and how they shape perceptions, politics and action are revealed. Some criticisms exist regarding critical realism's perceived overemphasis within social science and its potential conflation of the philosophy of science with sociological theories (Zhang, 2023). Still, critical realism allows holistic perspectives that consider both observable trends in migration discourse and the structures shaping them. While acknowledging the potential limitations, this dissertation remains rooted in critical realism.

4.2 Discourse Analysis

Document analysis is a qualitative method used to systematically analyse documents. Within this category is *discourse analysis*, the "examination of argumentative structure […] as well as the practices through which these utterances are made" (Hajer, 2006, p. 66). While this dissertation is primarily a classic discourse analysis, it considers several CDA principles: 'facts cannot be isolated from the domain of values', 'all thought is mediated by power relations', 'language as central to construction of subjectivity' and 'certain groups are privileged' (Kincheloe & McLaren, 1994[8]).

Discourse analysis often dominates the empirical material in document analyses (Tjora, 2017). It is used as opposed to content analysis, which examines the content more so than the language, with the latter being what we are more interested in in this study. Context is highly relevant in the discursive analysis, more than in content analysis. For this dissertation, the context is paramount as the documents do not occur in a vacuum. They are affected by and set the standards for international migration discussions and politics. Also, the second research question explicitly draws upon contextual information. There are many subgroups of document analysis, e.g. semiotic, interpretive, written or recorded conversations. However, it is often used more generally (Karppinen & Moe,

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[8] Kincheloe and McLaren (1994) struggle to define CDA due to the diverse theories it encompasses. Despite this, they outlined some key principles while emphasising the evolving nature of critical theory and its aversion to rigid definitions.

2012). This is the case for this research, where both micro-level discourse and macro-level analysis is applied; The meaning of individual words and phrases is central, but also the overall themes, patterns, rhetorical strategies, and the broader context.

Narratives are often connected to the idea of storylines as something that has a beginning, middle, and end (Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2008). However, when talking about specific stories, people tend not to discuss all these three components but rather aspects of them (Hajer, 2006, p. 69). Drawing on Benjaminsen and Svarstad (2008), the narrative concept at the core of this dissertation is based on a beginning (a situation without problems), a middle (climate change causes a migration influx), and an end (threats and negative consequences are emerging). Political intervention based on these simplistic narratives lack holistic perspectives. Therefore, by drawing on studies of climate migration this dissertation considers whether research support the narratives promoted in the documents analysed or not. Similarly to Benjaminsen and Svarstad (2008), this dissertation frames narrative as connected to a broader discourse; the narrative of 'climate migration to the North as a future threat' to the discourse of securitisation. In this context, the analysis has focused on how climate change's influence on migration pattern is addressed, how climate migration is framed in terms of threats or crises particularly to the EU, what narratives or perspectives emerge regarding climate migration, and whether the documents propose concrete measures to address its impact on the EU.

4.3 Data Selection

The corpus forming the basis for the dissertation is *European Agenda on Migration*, *New Pact on Migration and Asylum*, and *New Outlook on the Climate and Security Nexus*. While the UN has some mandates from signatory nation-states to ensure that frameworks are agreed upon to address migration and guide international responses, there are no global actors with the legal task to govern migration. However, as a regional body, the EU has made concrete policies and governing documents regarding migration and migration related to climate change. While these EU guidelines are not necessarily legally binding, they represent multilateral agreements on understandings of migration and approaches to managing it. The documents represent current discourse and political commitments in Europe. They are useful to examine to answer the research question regarding a narrative of 'climate migration to the North as a future threat', possibly justifying specific forms of foreign aid and political intervention. The research question "What broader implications does the adaptation of 'the narrative of 'climate migration to the North as a future threat' in policymaking have for migration governance?" will not have a clear-cut answer as it would require comprehensive research of political debates and decisions. However, to connect the results of the first research question to broader political implications in the second research question, secondary literature is applied.

4.4 Analysis

In the pre-coding process, sections of roughly 1-3 paragraphs in each framework were given brief descriptions to make the coding more manageable. These descriptions mainly focused on the purpose of the section, simplifying pattern recognition. Then, the coding concentrated on the "actual language used by the participant" (Leavy, 2014, p. 590) by picking out key statements that relate to the overarching questions of this dissertation. These quotes varied from document to document as their nature and content differed. After this initial process, I had three lists of quotes based on each part of the corpus.

These quotes were then assigned codes based on their relation to 'climate migration to the North as a possible threat'. I applied an inductive coding approach with no predefined code frame. While I had some indication from the initial reading of the documents, I strived to identify the most emergent themes in a thematic coding process. Thematic coding allows the researcher to link passages of common themes into categories (Gibbs, 2007). This way of coding is less prone to bias. However, it requires an awake eye as thematic coding relies heavily on the researcher's ability to recognise patterns and emerging themes within the data, especially when conducted without a predefined code frame. To systematise this process, the work is illustrated in the table below and more detailed in Table 2-5 regarding thematic categories in Chapter 5.

Table 1

Method

Process		
(1) Identifying key statements	(2-3) Thematic Coding	
	Assigning codes	Organising in thematic categories
(1) Corpus	(2) Codes, *see:*	(3) Thematic Categories
Agenda	Table 2	Climate Change as a Root Cause of Migration
New Pact	Table 3	Perceptions of Crises and Threats
New Outlook	Table 4	Narratives of Climate Migration
	Table 5	Policy Implications of Climate Migration

The data was closely examined to identify the visibility of a 'climate migration to the North as a possible future threat' narrative in the EU documents. To synthesise the codes into meaningful patterns and themes, a process of immersion in the data was conducted. This immersion goes beyond surface-level observation; it requires spending considerable time evaluating the data and reviewing it repeatedly to organise it in a meaningful manner into thematic categories. In any coding process, the researchers' thought process and processing of the codes and content contribute to the analysis. This process is difficult to explain as it is inherently complex, and much of the coding is intuitive.

An example of the intuitive process can be exemplified through how I read the statement "No member state should shoulder a disproportionate responsibility" (New Pact, p. 2). While it does not explicitly apply the term 'burden', the verb "to shoulder" is often used to describe "to take on a burden or responsibility". My (the researcher's) reading of the statement, therefore, allowed it to be coded as a "burden" and, successively, be put into the thematic category "Perceptions of Crises and Threats".

Further, as all the statements are part of a larger document and relate to each other, some conclusions are possible can be drawn on what the authors refer to in other contexts. For example, knowing that the European Commission recognised climate change as a root cause of migration in 2019 (Apap & Harju, 2023), it is fair to recognise that when the documents released after 2019, New Pact and New Outlook, discuss root causes of migration it embeds climate change.

In Chapter 5, 6, and 7, the findings are presented in what Leavey (2014, p. 601) refers to as "narration" as opposed to "displaying". It is a literary presentation of the data. This is not to say that the research is presented as a story in its traditional literary sense, but more as a representation of the results in a written construction of meaning. Then it is, as previously mentioned, connected to the current discussions and political development regarding climate migration in the Global North, especially Europe.

4.5 Validity, Trustworthiness, Limitations and Positionality

The validity and trustworthiness of this qualitative document analysis has been mindfully and actively strengthened. Below, my positionality has been considered and accounted for to ensure transparency. The documents examined were carefully chosen as authoritative sources on the topic of migration and climate change in the multilateral context of the EU. The broad set of secondary sources helps triangulate the findings and compare claims.

When looking at research from an ontological perspective, regarding *what exists*, and with the belief that research can be objective, one can claim that "objective knowledge relies on the degree to which researchers can detach themselves from the prejudices of the social groups they study" (Kusow, 2003, p. 592). However, a complete emotional detachment is difficult to achieve when researching political topics such as migration. Nonetheless, I seek to ensure a reliable and comprehensive dissertation on migration discourse.

While working with the documents, a systematic analytical approach and coding process was adopted. The coding was done solely by me and could have benefitted from inter-coder reliability to ensure consensus. However, the analysis and results have been discussed with associate professor Hilde Refstie and research fellow Bruno C. Gabellini to mitigate some bias. With a master's background in language studies, I've leveraged my experience with discourse analysis to mitigate the risks associated with a lack of inter-coder reliability.

A popular way to apply document analysis in research is in conjunction with other sources, such as interviews, to triangulate findings. However, as this dissertation is a study of the documents themselves there is little use of triangulating results. Nonetheless, if one were to see if these findings correlate with oral discussions and common discourses within the organisation of the EU, it would be more relevant to apply other methods as well. This could also ensure that one would reveal more of the intention of specific phrases and statements made in these frameworks.

In terms of positionality, I am a former member of a generally migration-positive political party. My stance is supportive of migrants' rights, and I believe that migration can bring positive contributions to societies culturally and economically. Further, I am situated in the Global North, which shapes my cultural background and the way I understand the world around me. While I have focused on explaining the choices made in the dissertation, anchoring the analysis and discussions in scholarly literature, and maintaining a critical and balanced approach throughout my research, I invite readers to consider my positionality, critically assess the arguments presented, and recognise the influences shaping my viewpoint.

5. Navigating Climate Migration in the EU Strategies and Policymaking

Three documents—*European Agenda on Migration*, *New Pact on Migration and Asylum*, and *New Outlook on the Climate and Security Nexus*—are analysed to examine the presence of a narrative of 'climate migration to the North as a future threat' in EU strategies and policymaking.

As explained in Chapter 4, my analysis approach was based on thematic inductive coding. First, thematic keywords (codes) were noted alongside the statements in the documents and then organised according to what point they made regarding the question, "Does the narrative of 'climate migration to the North as a future threat' serve as a justification for specific forms of foreign aid and political intervention in strategic EU documents?". With this question in mind, the corpus was prepared and refined by removing irrelevant or extraneous information. The codes were derived from the document's content, not from a pre-set list. Based on the codes, thematic categories were constructed, making the basis for the four sections in this chapter:

(1) Climate Change as a Root Cause of Migration
(2) Perceptions of Crises and Threats
(3) Narratives of Climate Migration
(4) Policy Implications of Climate Migration

The first thematic category, 'Climate Change as a Root Cause of Migration', allows an identification of whether the documents acknowledge climate change as a significant driver of migration to the EU. 'Perceptions of Crises and Threats', the second thematic category, allows a look at how climate migration is perceived in terms of a threat. Then, the third category, 'Narratives of Climate Migration', undercovers other narratives concerning migration, especially regarding predictions of future developments. Lastly, 'Policy Implications of Climate Migration' identifies whether concrete measures are taken to mitigate or respond to climate migration. At the end of this chapter, a recapitulation of the findings is presented while referencing corresponding scholarly literature.

Some quotes are applicable to multiple thematic categories within the analysis. This overlap reflects the interconnected nature of discourse; themes intersect and intertwine. The aim is to highlight justifications for specific forms of foreign aid and intervention in the EU rooted in the perceived threat of climate-induced migration. Therefore, their perceived contribution to shaping an argument within each thematic category guides the placement of these quotes.

For readability, the citations in running texts referring to the primary documents are not done in traditional APA in-text citation form. The headings clearly indicate which documents the citations refer to.

5.1 Climate Change as a Root Cause of Migration

It is critical to investigate whether the documents in question recognise the link between climate change and migration, as a way of determining whether the narrative of 'climate migration to the north as a future threat' serves as a basis for certain types of foreign aid and policy intervention in the EU.

5.1.1 European Agenda on Migration

In the Agenda, the word 'climate' is used once. Related terms such as 'environment' and 'sustainability' are used a total of seven times, and only once in an ecology context. The only time 'climate' is applied it is in a threat context: "Civil war, persecution, poverty, and climate change all feed directly and immediately into migration, so the prevention and mitigation of these threats is of primary importance for the migration debate" (p. 7). There is a recognition of an interconnected relation between climate change and migration. Thus, other references to '(root) causes of migration' in the Agenda point to climate change.

The statement does not state that migration itself is a threat but rather the root causes of it. Nonetheless, by lumping together factors, 'migration' is presented in a threat narrative. The Agenda does not frame climate migration as a singular threat, but rather connects climate, migration, and negative outcomes. Readers must decipher whether 'migration is the negative outcome', 'climate change is the negative outcome', or 'climate change is the negative outcome because it leads to migration'. Other descriptions in the Agenda provide context, as (not-high skilled) migrants are described as "vulnerable" and the situation of (irregular) migration as "a serious problem" (p. 3; p. 7). The first description entails a lack of autonomy, and the second an entirely negative view. Arguably, the Agenda does not frame the migration as a threat but rather as a disruption where the actors (migrants) have little control. Yet, the migrants constitute a challenge to be managed and mitigated. This implies action to tackle climate change as an exacerbator of migration; increased migration justifies political intervention.

Similarly, the Agenda highlights actions targeting 'threats' perceived to increase migration; "Many of the root causes of migration lie deep in global issues which the EU has been trying to address for many years" (p. 7). The statement builds on the root causes mentioned, including climate change. It stresses how the EU has been working with addressing these global issues *regardless of migration*, underlining a broader commitment to tackling climate change. Nonetheless, migration is framed as something that adds to the motivation to address these issues. It is visible as migration is suggested to be part of the broader development agenda; "The [UN] will shortly adopt the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and migration-related targets should be included" (p. 16).

Further, "We need to use the EU's global role and wide range of tools to address the root causes of migration" and "it is the interest of all to address the root causes which cause people to seek a life elsewhere" (p. 2; p. 7), highlights political action to prevent migration both presently and in the future. The need for the EU to leverage its role globally to address the reasons for migration is underscored. The phrase "it is in the interest of all" implies a collective motivation for or benefit of preventing migration, suggesting that 'the Global North' would benefit from hindering migration. This framing aligns with addressing migration as imperative for global security and well-being. It does not recognise climate migration as an adaptive response. Instead, it is framed as an issue to be solved.

5.1.2 New Pact on Migration and Asylum

While the Agenda uses the word 'climate' once, the New Pact mentions it four times and connects it directly to migration trends. One of the first things stated is that "key societal challenges faced by the world today — demography, climate change, security, the global race for talent, and inequality — all have an impact on migration" (p. 1). The connection is further underlined later; "Demographic and economic trends, political instability and conflict, as well as climate change, all suggest that migration will remain a major phenomenon and global challenge for the years to come" (p. 17). In the same manner as the Agenda, the establishment of an interconnected relation between climate change and migration causes other references to 'root causes' to point to climate change. Notably, the portrayal of migration as a global challenge while linking it to climate change contributes to climate migration being portrayed as something inherently negative. Climate migration is, again, framed as a problem to be solved rather than an adaptive response.

The New Pact states that work to "address the challenges of climate change can […] help people feel that their future lies at home" (p. 20) regarding crucial efforts in the EU's provision of development assistance. A connection is made between political action and preventing a future climate-induced influx of migrants. The use of 'home' constructs an idea of belonging and rootedness in a geographical space, implying that those having to move from a region are no longer 'home'. Rhetorically, it reflects a strategy to construct attachments and encourage people to stay in their *familiar* environments as optimal.

Further, the New Pact discusses migration and its root causes in numerous sections, e.g. "It is important to address the complex challenges of migration and its root causes […]. By working together, the EU and its partners can improve migration governance, deepen the common efforts to address shared challenges and benefit from opportunities" (p. 17). This statement builds on proactively addressing root causes to prevent migration, and the collective efforts needed to do so. This type of action is further underscored several times (p. 19; p. 24), and these statements will be further addressed in Chapter 5.4.

5.1.3 New Outlook on the Climate and Security Nexus

'Root causes' is not a significant theme in the New Outlook, as it is more concerned with the outcomes of migration than its causes. Nonetheless, the document connects migration to climate and security:

> Extreme weather events, rising temperatures and sea levels, desertification, water scarcity, threats to biodiversity, environmental pollution and contamination and loss of livelihoods threaten the health and well-being of humanity and can create the potential for greater migratory movements and displacement, pandemics, social unrest, instability and insecurity. (p. 1)

> The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that, since 2008, an annual average of 21.5 million people have been forcibly displaced by weather-related events, such as floods and heatwaves. These numbers are expected to increase in the coming decades, exacerbating demographic change and putting stress on cities and urban areas where the demand for housing, food, energy and jobs may rise, thus contributing to increasing social impacts of climate change. (p. 1-2)

Factors leading to potential migration influxes are identified and linked to social consequences. The first statement is phrased in a highly complex manner, reflecting the multifaceted nature of the challenges which climate change pose. The second statement applies the term "stress", suggesting potential threats to established infrastructure and social systems while possibly referring to areas experiencing the effects of climate change *and* receiving areas.

The varied ramifications are highlighted throughout the New Outlook; "Climate change and environmental degradation will transform the way actors involved in peace, security and defence will plan, invest and operate" (p. 14). This complexity is reflected as the New Outlook encourages focus on scientific inputs such as the Global Conflict Risk Index, which "will be broadened [to assess] impacts related to amplified migration and displacement, to examine indirect effects of climate change and environmental degradation" (p. 5). The link between climate change and migration is stated explicitly. The usage 'impact' is relatively neutral, but here, it refers to 'risk' and therefore holds a connotation of negative impact. Further, a proactive stance is taken as anticipating and addressing *potential challenges* associated with climate-induced migration is highlighted.

One of the concrete effects of climate change, sea-level rise, is brought up as it could potentially cause a large influx of displacement and migration: "Sea-level rise also presents a security risk due to the scale of potential displacement and migration of people" (p. 2). As the next chapter will go into, this statement also relates to security risks as it connects climate change impacts to geopolitical concerns. There is a clear linkage between what is explained as a 'a security risk' and an influx in migratory movements.

5.1.4 Summary of Climate Change as a Root Cause of Migration

In essence, the Agenda recognises the link between climate change and migration, but it does not highlight it to the same extent as the New Pact and New Outlook does. In the latter two, addressing climate change is directly linked to preventing migration. Although all the documents recognise climate migration as a challenge, there are differences in how they prioritise addressing climate-induced migration. This is clearly shown in the table that structures the statements below.

Table 2

Climate Change as a Root Cause of Migration

	Codes
European Agenda on Migration	
We need to use the EU's global role and wide range of tools to address the root causes of migration. (2)	Root causes
Civil war, persecution, poverty, and climate change all feed directly and immediately into migration, so the prevention and mitigation of these threats is of primary importance for the migration debate. (7)	Root causes; threats
Many of the root causes of migration lie deep in global issues which the EU has been trying to address for many years. (7)	Root causes
It is in the interests of all to address the root causes which cause people to seek a life elsewhere [...]. (7)	Root causes
The United Nations will shortly adopt the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and migration-related targets should be included. (16)	Migration; Climate change

Table 2 (continued)

New Pact on Migration and Asylum	
Key societal challenges faced by the world today – demography, climate change, security, the global race for talent, and inequality – all have an impact on migration. (1)	Root causes
Demographic and economic trends, political instability and conflict, as well as climate change, all suggest that migration will remain a major phenomenon and global challenge for the years to come. (17)	Migration; Climate change
It is important to address the complex challenges of migration and its root causes […]. By working together, the EU and its partners can improve migration governance, deepen the common efforts to address shared challenges and benefit from opportunities. (17)	Root causes
Work to [...] address the challenges of climate change can all help people feel that their future lies at home. (20)	Migration; Climate change

New Outlook on the Climate and Security Nexus	
Extreme weather events, rising temperatures and sea levels, desertification, water scarcity, threats to biodiversity, environmental pollution and contamination and loss of livelihoods threaten the health and well-being of humanity and can create the potential for greater migratory movements and displacement, pandemics, social unrest, instability and insecurity. (1)	Migration; Climate change
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that, since 2008, an annual average of 21.5 million people have been forcibly displaced by weather-related events, such as floods and heatwaves. These numbers are expected to increase in the coming decades, exacerbating demographic change and putting stress on cities and urban areas where the demand for housing, food, energy and jobs may rise, thus contributing to increasing social impacts of climate change. (1-2)	Migration; Climate change
Sea-level rise also presents a security risk due to the scale of potential displacement and migration of people. (2)	Migration; Climate change
The Global Conflict Risk Index will be broadened to look beyond droughts to assess, for example, impacts related to amplified migration and displacement, to examine indirect effects of climate change and environmental degradation. (5)	Migration; Climate change
Climate change and environmental degradation will transform the way actors involved in peace, security and defence will plan, invest and operate. (14)	Climate change; Governance

5.2 Perceptions of Crises and Threats

Examining the application of a threat narrative helps to understand whether climate migration to the North is portrayed as a threat in the strategic documents and influences the EU's political discourse and policy measures.

5.2.1 European Agenda on Migration

The Agenda stands as a response to the 'Refugee Crisis' in the Mediterranean but maintains focus on the future; "Every crisis will be different, but the EU needs to heed the lesson and be prepared to act in anticipation of a crisis, not just in reaction" (p. 11). As established, the Agenda views climate change as one of the catalysts of migration, and here the anticipation of crisis (migration influx) is sufficient justification for laying the groundwork for political action. A proactive response is emphasised. Similarly, the Agenda refers to a point in the EU "when a mass influx emerges" (p. 4), establishing that there is an inevitability which must be accounted for. In this context, the Agenda suggests a legislative proposal regarding distribution, *not intervention*.

 The proactive stance regarding crisis anticipation is repeated; "Identifying risk trends is increasingly necessary for effective operational preparedness" (p. 11). The statement underscores the understanding of migration as a threat. While not alluding to intervention directly, it entails that measures could be implemented. The proactive attitude emphasises the importance of identifying risk trends before crisis escalates.

 Similarly, the Agenda states that the work on tackling migration upstream "will be closely connected to broader political initiatives to promote stability" (p. 5). This builds on the fear of migration as a disruption of stability. It appears to refer to mitigating "traditional" security threats, as the paragraph it is stated in refers to "the crisis in Syria" and "the situation in Libya". The quote reflects a top-down approach, coming from the EU as a distant higher-level authority, and aims to reduce the need for people to migrate.

5.2.2 New Pact on Migration and Asylum

The New Pact highlights crisis-resilience through a focus on proactiveness and adeptness: "the EU will always need to be ready for the unexpected"; "The EU must be ready to address situations of crisis and force majeure with resilience and flexibility – in the knowledge that different types of crises require varied responses" (p. 10; p. 10). Both quotes suggest uncertainty, highlighting the need for preparedness to act in 'crises'. A proactive approach is advocated based on *possible* developments of migration influxes. Similarly, the statement "The effectiveness of response can be improved through preparation and foresight. This needs an evidence-based approach, to increase anticipation and help to prepare EU responses to key trends" (p. 10) highlights proactiveness, but also scientific responses. While the New Pact does not explicitly state what the science entails, it clearly suggests a nuanced approach to ensure effective action.

 While these three quotes tackle the unexpectedness and promote proactiveness generally, other sections explicitly suggest concrete action. An example of this is:

> In situations of crisis that are of such a magnitude that they risk overwhelming Member States' asylum and migration systems, the practical difficulties faced by Member States would be recognised through some limited margin to temporarily derogate from the normal procedures and timelines. (p. 11)

The New Pact highlights how 'crises' of migration influxes could 'overwhelm' states in the EU, aligning with the perception of migration as a threat towards stability. A need for policy flexibility is recognised, justifying political intervention on a national level. This demonstrates how narratives of 'migration threats' are translated into concrete measures.

Other statements suggest action more focused on the New Pact and what it can contribute to, especially in *times of crisis*. Some statements directly pertain to the idea of a crisis while addressing policy. Two examples are "A new durable European framework is needed, to manage the interdependence between Member State's policies and decisions and to offer a proper response to the opportunities and challenges in normal times, in situations of pressure and in crisis situations" (and "The New Pact's goal of putting in place a comprehensive and robust migration and asylum policy is the best protection against the risk of crisis situations" (p. 1; p. 10). There is a clear emphasis on preparedness and holistic strategies. Self-reflexivity is demonstrated when it comes to the EU's role in migration governance through reflections on its own strategies and role. Similarly to previous statements regarding 'crisis', there is also a sense of anticipation in these examples. In addition, they explicitly suggest the integration of diverse policy domains.

Other sections in the New Pact suggest implementing new instruments, such as "[A Migration Preparedness and Crisis Blueprint] will be immediately effective but will also act as important operational support to the EU's ability to respond under the future arrangements" (p. 10). The New Pact advocates a proactive approach highlighting potential emerging challenges. The statement does not argue for political intervention now but, as previous statements, lays the ground for future action.

Similarly, a suggested tool is "a new legislative instrument [that] would provide for temporary and extraordinary measures needed in the face of crisis" (p. 10). This demonstrates the EU's proactive and adaptive approach to possible new migration trends. This statement also justifies (legislative) measures to support political intervention in the future in face of migration crises. Notably, this tool was put in bold, emphasising its significance for the EU. Its objectives were described as follows: first, "to provide flexibility to Member States to react to crisis and force majeure situations and grant immediate protection status in crisis situation", and second, "to ensure that the system of solidarity established in the new Asylum and Migration Management Regulation is well adapted to a crisis characterised by a large number of irregular arrivals" (p. 10). Both objectives highlight the dynamic nature of migrations, but the former applies it as a justification for granting policy flexibility to Member States, and the latter a more collaborative approach. Overall, the challenges posed by a potential crisis in the form of an influx of migrants justifies action here.

5.2.3 New Outlook on the Climate and Security Nexus

The first sentence of the New Outlook builds on the notion of climate change as a threat to stability; "Climate change and environmental degradation pose increasing risks to international peace and security" (p. 1). The statement recognises an interconnectedness between climate change and security, without mentioning migration. Nonetheless, most statements in the New Outlook are concerned with general approaches. This means implicitly referring to migration, as the link to climate change is made in other sections.

"The EU must make further progress in addressing the linkages throughout the whole conflict cycle between the climate and environmental crises, peace and security, in line with the EU's Integrated Approach" (p. 10). The statement further emphasises the interconnectedness of the environment with peace and security, reinforcing the idea that

these are not isolated challenges; climate stability appears as a prerequisite for maintaining stability. Also, applying the term 'crises' contributes to a sense of urgency.

The New Outlook continuously emphasises the complex implications of climate change; "climate and environment-related policies and practices should be seen to be increasingly conflict-sensitive, and at the same time climate and environmental considerations should continue to be mainstreamed into EU peacebuilding, stabilisation, crisis management and post-conflict recovery" (p. 10). The statement recognises climate change as an exacerbator of tensions and a contributor to the emergence of conflicts. While the statement underscores an urgency to mitigate risks, it also takes on a proactive approach, again, to address possible future challenges.

Similarly, the New Outlook further underscores taking on a nuanced understanding of climate-related challenges to make proactive changes in EU approaches. References are made to intensification which the EU needs to prepare for; there are clear indications of a future disruption of stability (a crisis):

> The need to include the impact of environmental degradation in the debate as well as current realities and future projections regarding the scale of climate change and the impact of environmental degradation, in the context of intensifying strategic competition and complex security threats, require a new outlook on the climate and security nexus. (p. 1)

The security and military capacities of the EU are brought up, highlighting a threat perception relating to climate change. An example is "As a result of more frequent and severe weather events, Member States' security and defence capabilities are likely to be called upon more often" (p. 11). The idea of an increasing threat is constructed. Similarly, the statement "Further strengthening civil-military coordination and preparedness at EU and national level […] is critical to ensure a timely and effective response compatible with the principled approach of EU Humanitarian assistance and requires further acceleration" (p. 11) underscores the threat perception attached to climate change. The perception of a future threat is present, but it does not point directly to migration.

Regarding climate change, the New Outlook states that "while a lot is being done to advance green transition and manage its challenges, there is an increased risk for instability, insecurity and even conflict" (p. 3). The statement assumes a causal relationship between climate change and negative outcomes, such as instability, insecurity and conflict. Specifically, 'increased risk' suggests urgency and climate change as a pressing problem requiring immediate attention. In addition, terms such as 'instability', 'uncertainty' and 'conflict' evoke emotions and emphasise potential consequences of inaction on climate change. It is framed as a disruption of stability. The sense of urgency and complexity is further underscored by statements such as "The security and defence implications of climate change and environmental degradation have thus become more urgent, challenging and multifaceted" (p. 3). Climate change is portrayed as a destabilising force, emphasising a need for political action to address its consequences, including migration.

Regarding previous efforts, the New Outlook states, "The EU has been at the forefront in addressing climate change as a threat-multiplier since 2008 and its links to EU crisis management and European defence since 2020" (p. 1). The EU has held a proactive role in recognising climate change as an exacerbator of issues. With the expected increase in migration, it is foreseeable that this proactiveness will advance; new types of aid and intervention will be applied. This signals the EU's perception of the need for responses which tackle consequences of climate change, such as migration.

5.2.4 Summary of Perceptions of Crises and Threats

In terms of the application of a threat narrative, the Agenda discusses crises, risks and stability in the context of migration in general, rather than addressing climate-related aspects specifically. Similarly, the New Pact does not explicitly link migration crises to climate change, but it emphasises varied nature of the factors that contribute to migration flows and the resulting crises. The New Outlook, on the other hand, emphasises climate change as the primary threat. This trend is evident in the evolution of the statements in the table below. Simply put, this shift is likely due to the older documents' inherent focus on migration. Given the findings from the analysis in Chapter 5.1, there is an increasing degree of securitisation combined with an increasing link between climate change and migration.

Table 3

Perceptions of Crises and Threats

	Codes
European Agenda on Migration	
The Commission will table a legislative proposal by the end of 2015 to provide for a mandatory and automatically-triggered relocation system to distribute those in clear need of international protection within the EU when a mass influx emerges. (4)	Pressure
This work will be closely connected to broader political initiatives to promote stability. (5)	Burden
Every crisis will be different, but the EU needs to heed the lesson and be prepared to act in anticipation of a crisis, not just in reaction. (11)	Burden
New Pact on Migration and Asylum	
A new durable European framework is needed, to manage the interdependence between Member State's policies and decisions and to offer a proper response to the opportunities and challenges in normal times, in situations of pressure and in crisis situations. (1)	Crisis; Policy
Yet the EU will always need to be ready for the unexpected. (10)	Unexpected
The EU must be ready to address situations of crisis and force majeure with resilience and flexibility – in the knowledge that different types of crises require varied responses. (10)	Crisis; Response
The effectiveness of response can be improved through preparation and foresight. This needs an evidence-based approach, to increase anticipation and help to prepare EU responses to key trends. (10)	Prediction; Preparation
A new legislative instrument [that] would provide for temporary and extraordinary measures needed in the face of crisis. (10)	Crisis; Policy
The New Pact's goal of putting in place a comprehensive and robust migration and asylum policy is the best protection against the risk of crisis situations. (10)	Crisis; Policy
[A Migration Preparedness and Crisis Blueprint] will be immediately effective but will also act as important operational support to the EU's ability to respond under the future arrangements. (10)	Threat Prediction; Policy
The objectives [...] will be twofold: firstly, to provide flexibility to Member States to react to crisis and force majeure situations and grant immediate protection status in crisis situations, and secondly, to ensure that the system of solidarity established in the new Asylum and Migration Management Regulation is well adapted to a crisis characterised by a large number of irregular arrivals. (10)	Crisis; Policy
In situations of crisis that are of such a magnitude that they risk overwhelming Member States' asylum and migration systems, the practical difficulties faced by Member States would be recognised through some limited margin to temporarily derogate from the normal procedures and timelines […]. (11)	Crisis; Policy

Table 3 (continued)

New Outlook on the Climate and Security Nexus	
The EU has been at the forefront in addressing climate change as a threat-multiplier since 2008 and its links to EU crisis management and European defence since 2020. (1)	Threat
The need to include the impact of environmental degradation in the debate as well as current realities and future projections regarding the scale of climate change and the impact of environmental degradation, in the context of intensifying strategic competition and complex security threats, require a new outlook on the climate and security nexus. (1)	Predictions of impact; Policy
Climate change and environmental degradation pose increasing risks to international peace and security. (1)	Risk
While a lot is being done to advance green transition and manage its challenges, there is an increased risk for instability, insecurity and even conflict. (3)	Threat; Security
The security and defence implications of climate change and environmental degradation have thus become more urgent, challenging and multifaceted. (3)	Urgency; Security
The EU must make further progress in addressing the linkages throughout the whole conflict cycle between the climate and environmental crises, peace and security, in line with the EU's Integrated Approach. (10)	Crisis; Security
[C]limate and environment-related policies and practices should be seen to be increasingly conflict-sensitive, and at the same time climate and environmental considerations should continue to be mainstreamed into EU peacebuilding, stabilisation, crisis management and post-conflict recovery. (10)	Crisis; Policy
As a result of more frequent and severe weather events, Member States' security and defence capabilities are likely to be called upon more often. (11)	Security
Further strengthening civil-military coordination and preparedness at EU and national level […] is critical to ensure a timely and effective response compatible with the principled approach of EU Humanitarian assistance and requires further acceleration. (11)	Military; Policy

5.3 Narratives of Climate Migration

Investigating 'Narratives of Climate Migration' reveals other ideas concerning migration, especially regarding predictions of future developments. This assists in understanding whether the underlying thoughts in the EU documents build on the narrative of 'climate migration to the North as a future threat'.

5.3.1 European Agenda on Migration

The Agenda references the foreseen impact of migration on the receiving countries; "the EU should step up its support to the countries bearing the brunt of displaced refugees" (p. 5). While the usage of 'brunt' here does not necessarily imply a negative portrayal of migrants, it does refer to their reception as a burden on receiving countries. Framing 'displaced refugees' as a global challenge opens a discussion about whether 'challenge' refers to the displacement *or* the receiving of migrants. Similarly to the 2015 debates on 'the Syrian Refugee Crisis', and whether it was those fleeing that was the crisis *or* the European experience as a receiver of migrants. Emphasising the challenge the receiver faces stress the effects on the Global North, specifically the EU, and it draws attention to the need for solutions ($\approx$ political action).

The idea of a burden is underlined by statements such as "Some Member States have already made a major contribution to global resettlement efforts. But others nothing" (p. 4). Uneven efforts are highlighted, demonstrating a perception of receiving migrants as straining. Naturally, there are challenges when it comes to receiving a large influx of migrants. However, regarding the narrative, the New Pact still contributes to perpetuating a negative view of receiving migrants.

The Agenda states that "while most Europeans have responded to the plight of the migrants, the reality is that across Europe, there are serious doubts about whether our migration policy is equal to the pressure of thousands of migrants" (p. 2). This influx, whether it is caused by climate or other root causes, is here justifying the implementation of new political measures. The word 'plight' is significant as it underscores a sense of vulnerability. It speaks to empathy for migrants but the second part of the sentence, which highlights a *European struggle*, moderates it.

5.3.2 New Pact on Migration and Asylum

The New Pact relies heavily on the idea of future crises, as shown, but it also highlights a sense of urgency. When stating that "the circumstances of crisis demand urgency and therefore the solidarity mechanism needs to be stronger, and the timeframes governing that mechanism should be reduced" (p. 10-11), proactiveness is highlighted again. Also, a clear emphasis on inevitable time-pressure is present; migration crises are understood as persistent and certain. The New Pact advocates for a robust solidarity mechanism and shorter response times, emphasising rapid action. The timeframes and solidarity mechanisms for all 'crises' are tackled together, despite the complexity of migration challenging the one-size-fits-all approaches. Specifically, climate-induced migration requires long-term planning and short-term decisions across different distances.

> The task facing the EU and its Member States, while continuing to address urgent needs, is to build a system that manages and normalises migration for the long term and which is fully grounded in European values and international law. (p. 1)

The New Pact underlines building frameworks for the long term, encouraging a proactive approach. In this statement, the language is significant, especially knowing that "European values" have been historically used to distinguish European identity from non-European identities (Ivic, 2019). Importantly, in the context of the statement, this language is not used to separate between people. However, it does reinforce the concept of 'us' and 'them' as identities are shaped.

Like the Agenda, the New Pact contributes to the idea of migration as a burden. By stating that "No member state should shoulder a disproportionate responsibility […] all Member States should contribute to solidarity on a constant basis" (p. 2), the New Pact highlights responsibilities, and applying the term 'shoulder' reflects the idea of migration as a burden. Yet, it remains a balanced statement as one must recognise that efforts must be made in the face of receiving migrants.

The statement "The majority of migrants undertake their journeys in a regular and safe manner, and well-managed migration, based on partnership and responsibility-sharing, can have positive impacts for countries of origin, transit and destination alike" (p. 17) appear positive but enforces a dichotomy opposing general understandings of migration as complex. By applying 'regular and safe manner' as a category, 'irregular and unsafe' is constructed as an opposite. Critique appears to be given to those who do not opt for migration in the manner the EU seek to encourage.

5.3.3 New Outlook on the Climate and Security Nexus

As stated, the New Outlook directly connects ideas of crisis and security to climate change and indirectly to migration. Further, an emphasis is put on the complexity of the issues connected to climate change; "Climate and environmental considerations are increasingly integrated in all humanitarian interventions in recognition of how conflict, and climate change and environmental degradation, exacerbate humanitarian needs and vulnerabilities" (p. 11). This suggests climate change is not happening in isolation but rather in conjunction with existing conflicts and environmental challenges. The statement calls for integrating climate and environmental considerations in humanitarian interventions, signalling a need to adapt responses to environmental and security dynamics.

Similarly to the New Pact, the New Outlook highlights a sense of urgency; "The EU should scale up its engagement to facilitate and support Member States to address the growing magnitude, complexity and urgency of the challenges involved" (p. 14). A transformation is anticipated, encouraging internal changes within the EU. The scale and complexity of these challenges require swift and comprehensive action to address impacts, including those associated with migration. The New Outlook also encourages updating the Global Conflict Risk Index and annual trend analysis "to better connect the different policy strands and ensure that external action, policies and capabilities are fit for the future" (p. 3). A forward-thinking response is again highlighted and applied to arguments for new action within the EU, as will is further explored in Chapter 5.4.

The New Outlook aims to "strengthen climate and environment informed planning, decision-making and implementation through enhanced evidence-based analysis and foresight" (p. 5). Focus on knowledge for policy and political intervention is underscored several times; "responses to the security implications of climate change and environmental degradation will continue to rely on evidence-based policies and actions, including new information and developing insights, highlighting the importance of reliable and accessible analytics for all parties involved"; "The EU will continue to invest in the training of a pool of mediators while aiming to support capacity development of local mediators to engage

on peace and security impacts of climate change and environmental challenges" (p. 6; p. 11). There is a commitment to proactive and informed policy measures prioritising stability, resilience and sustainability. Highlighting that research and evidence-based analyses should guide decision-making processes shows a departure from popular narratives.

Some sections go more into how climate-induced migration might influence the European Union, which testifies to a focus on how to keep this area "safe". An example of this is "We should prepare ourselves for increased spill over effects on the European Union" (p. 3). The language reflects a sense of inevitability, posing a certain future challenge for the EU. The section continues: "These can arise through increased demand for aid, the disruption of supply chains or with people fleeing from uninhabitable areas or severe adverse conditions at home, with the potential of internal displacement and increased irregular migration", highlighting the possible consequences of climate change and directly linking it to the effects on the EU. Three of the effects mentioned are clearly attached to migratory movements. Notably, it is the last section which includes more crime-related topics, inadvertently presenting climate-induced migration as a threat.

5.3.4 Summary of Narratives of Climate Migration

This comprehensive section on narratives related to climate-induced migration highlights the concept of migration burden in the Agenda, which is further elaborated on in the New Pact, with additional emphasis on dichotomies such as "us" versus "them", and "regular and safe migration" versus "irregular and unsafe migration". Both the New Pact and the New Outlook emphasise the urgency of addressing the root causes that contribute to migration, with a particular focus on future development and climate change in the latter. These concepts and priorities are outlined in the table below.

Table 4

Narratives of Climate Migration

	Codes
European Agenda on Migration	
While most Europeans have responded to the plight of the migrants, the reality is that across Europe, there are serious doubts about whether our migration policy is equal to the pressure of thousands of migrants. (2)	Pressure
Some Member States have already made a major contribution to global resettlement efforts. But others nothing. (4)	Burden
[T]he EU should step up its support to the countries bearing the brunt of displaced refugees. (5)	Burden
New Pact on Migration and Asylum	
The task facing the EU and its Member States, while continuing to address urgent needs, is to build a system that manages and normalises migration for the long term and which is fully grounded in European values and international law. (1)	Urgency; Policy
No member state should shoulder a disproportionate responsibility […] all Member States should contribute to solidarity on a constant basis. (2)	"Burden"
The circumstances of crisis demand urgency and therefore the solidarity mechanism needs to be stronger, and the timeframes governing that mechanism should be reduced. (10-11)	Urgency; Policy
The majority of migrants undertake their journeys in a regular and safe manner, and well-managed migration, based on partnership and responsibility-sharing, can have positive impacts for countries of origin, transit and destination alike. (17)	Migrant narrative

Table 4 (continued)

New Outlook on the Climate and Security Nexus	
It is essential to better connect the different policy strands and ensure that external action, policies and capabilities are fit for the future. (3)	Future threats
It is essential to better connect the different policy strands and ensure that external action, policies and capabilities are fit for the future. These can arise through increased demand for aid, the disruption of supply chains or with people fleeing from uninhabitable areas or severe adverse conditions at home, with the potential of internal displacement and increased irregular migration [...]. (3)	Impacts on the EU
[To] strengthen climate and environment informed planning, decision-making and implementation through enhanced evidence-based analysis and foresight. (5)	Foresight
The EU's responses to the security implications of climate change and environmental degradation will continue to rely on evidence-based policies and actions, including new information and developing insights, highlighting the importance of reliable and accessible analytics for all parties involved. (6)	Security predictions
The EU will continue to invest in the training of a pool of mediators while aiming to support capacity development of local mediators to engage on peace and security impacts of climate change and environmental challenges. (11)	Future impacts
Climate and environmental considerations are increasingly integrated in all humanitarian interventions in recognition of how conflict, and climate change and environmental degradation, exacerbate humanitarian needs and vulnerabilities. (11)	Future impacts
The EU should scale up its engagement to facilitate and support Member States to address the growing magnitude, complexity and urgency of the challenges involved. (14)	Urgency

5.4 Policy Implications of Climate Migration

This last section of analysis examines whether 'climate migration' or narratives regarding it are applied as justification for political action. In other words, in this part of the analysis, the last element of the research question, "Does the narrative of 'climate migration to the North as a future threat' serve as a justification for specific forms of foreign aid and political intervention in strategic EU documents?" is investigated.

5.4.1 European Agenda on Migration

The Agenda suggests several actions for the EU concerning climate migration; most are broad, but others are more specific. In the former category, suggestions such as "Stronger action to link migration and development policy" (p. 16) are made. The statement is unclear as to its implementation in either receiving or sending countries nor does it address the distinction between forced and voluntary migration. This creates ambiguity. Still, the statement remains a call to action based on an understanding of development policy as a tool for mitigating migration-related issues. While this statement does not address whether the development policy is targeted towards origin countries in this statement, other sections do this explicitly: "The EU's legal migration policy should also support the development of countries of origin" (p. 16). This focus connects root causes of migration and the mitigation of them to prevent mass migration.

The Agenda stating that "the goal should be to encourage more secure borders, but also to strengthen the capacity of countries in North Africa to intervene and save lives of migrants in distress" (p. 12) has multiple implications. First, encouraging *secure* borders relates to ideas of increased destabilisation of security with migration influxes. Also, emphasising the strengthening of the capacity of countries in North Africa relates to ideas of "helping them where they are", reflecting a preference of political intervention external to the EU. Both aims in the statements reflect a hesitancy to receive migrants, as they signal that migrants should not cross over to the 'Global North'.

Some statements regarding origin countries suggest collaboration; "Partnership with countries of origin and transit is crucial and there are a series of established bilateral and regional cooperation frameworks on migration in place" (p. 8). Highlighting partnership implies a strategy involving multiple parties for managing EU border crossings. This is consistent with previous statements as it stresses shared responsibility.

5.4.2 New Pact on Migration and Asylum

Similarly to the Agenda, the New Pact suggests cooperation with states outside of the EU, especially neighbouring countries and partner countries[9]; "The prerequisite in addressing this is cooperation with our partners, first and foremost based on bilateral engagement, combined with regional and multilateral commitment"; "The EU's neighbours are a particular priority" (p. 17; p. 18). This underscores commitments to addressing migration challenges collectively, and *outside of the EU*. The focus on neighbouring nations aligns with the understanding that an influx in migration will have regional effects on Europe. Similarly, "Addressing the root causes of irregular migration [and other factors relating to migration] are valuable objectives for both the EU and our partners to pursue through comprehensive, balanced and tailor-made partnerships" (p. 2) emphasises cooperation.

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[9] There is no exact definition of an EU partner country, but the European Commission has a list of International Partnerships: https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/countries_en

Once again, root causes are emphasised, focusing on addressing mitigating factors such as climate change as a means of reducing irregular migration.

Similarly to the Agenda, collaborative efforts are highlighted in the New Pact: "Mixed flows of refugees and migrants have meant increased complexity and intensified need for coordination and solidarity mechanisms"; "the proper functioning of migration and asylum policy inside the EU also needs reinforced cooperation on migration with partners outside the EU" (p. 3; p. 3). These statements align with a view of increased collaboration as a must in the face of new migration dynamics.

Collaboration is also emphasised in the statements "This common response needs to include the EU's relationship with third countries[10], as internal and external dimensions are inextricably linked" and "The EU should build on the important progress made at the regional level, through dedicated dialogues and frameworks (p. 2; p. 18). Partnerships beyond EU borders are encouraged as they impact "the effectiveness of policies inside the EU" (p. 2) further underscores cooperation. It demonstrates an inward focus while applying efforts outside of the EU. This is concretely referred to here: "In the Commission proposals for the next generation of external policy instruments, migration is systematically factored in as a priority in the programming" (p. 20). This statement demonstrates that predictions of potential future migration influxes affect policy efforts.

The benefits of partnerships for both parties are also highlighted; "Comprehensive, balanced and tailor-made partnerships, can deliver mutual benefits, in the economy, sustainable development, education and skills, stability, and security, and relations with diasporas" (p. 17). In addition to justifying these partnerships as a measure to prevent migration influxes, the statement links climate and security to migration.

The New Pact suggest flexibility and width when it comes to instruments for migration governance. Concretely, that a new approach should:

> Deploy a wide range of policy tools, and have the flexibility to be both tailor-made and able to adjust over time. Different policies such as development cooperation, security, visa, trade, and agriculture, investment and employment, energy, environment and climate change, and education, should not be dealt with in isolation. (p. 17)

The statement connects climate change mitigation efforts directly to development work to prevent migration. Similarly, the link between development assistance as a type of aid to address irregular migration and forced displacement is underlined. This aid "will continue to be a key feature in EU engagement with countries, including on migration issues" (p. 19). In other words, external efforts are justified to tackle the root causes of migration. Addressing root causes of migration and providing aid is also linked in suggestions for action: "Increase support for economic opportunity and addressing the root causes of irregular migration" (p. 24). Foreign aid and political intervention are justified as ways to address root causes of migration, including climate change.

5.4.3 New Outlook on the Climate and Security Nexus

The New Outlook links policy action directly to climate change and its effects; "[Due to the potential future risks and dependencies, it is] critically important to continue investing in both climate adaptation and mitigation and in protecting and restoring the environment"

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[10] "A country that is not a member of the European Union as well as a country or territory whose citizens do not enjoy the European Union right to free movement" (European Commission, n.d.-d).

(p. 3). This is a justification for "investing" to mitigate the *potential* risks of climate change. This is also linked to displacement and migration; the EU "addresses displacement and migration related to disasters, climate change, and environmental degradation, in particular through humanitarian, development and peace actions" and "[launches] a new global EU action […] to deepen knowledge on the drivers, vulnerabilities and risks that lead to internal displacement and to improve capacities for affected partner countries to address these risks" (p. 13). Both statements highlight concrete EU actions, underlining connections between migration and climate change within a security context. The latter statement highlights the importance of knowledge in this setting.

Operationalisation is a recurrent theme throughout the New Outlook. One of the document's key aims is to "operationalise the climate and security nexus in EU external action from policy to implementation" (p. 4). The emphasis on the climate-security nexus within this context indicates action based on understanding climate and security as *interconnected*; "The climate and security nexus needs to be operationalised coherently in all EU external action from policy formulation and decision-making to implementation" (p. 8). The statement continues with specifics: "The various EU initiatives, ranging from climate action and adaptation to conflict prevention, crisis management and humanitarian action, are most effective when synergies and complementarities are maximised in line with the EU's Integrated Approach" (p. 8). Similarly to previous statements, there is an idea of a potential future threat as conflict prevention and crisis management is highlighted. This also lays the ground for implementing initiatives.

Measures regarding implementing the nexus are mentioned, both pointing to discussions on the nexus and others as concrete measures. About the former:

> To facilitate the inclusion of the climate and security nexus into discussions and decision-making at political and strategic levels, the Commission services and the EEAS will start conducting an annual comprehensive trend analysis covering, among other things, the impacts of climate change and environmental degradation on conflicts, displacement and migratory movements and natural resource competition. (p. 5)

The New Outlook demonstrates a practical approach to connecting climate and security. Knowledge is understood as vital for the work ahead. This statement shows that climate change and its immediate effects on migratory movements influence EU action. In reference to this, a framework for predicting the impact of climate change in the face of risk is suggested: "a dynamic, short-term and sub-national conflict risk model, paying particular attention to environment and climate-related variables, […] to improve the EU's early warning and anticipation capacity" (p. 6). This reflects an approach considering timely responses, possibly changing for future scenarios. Similarly to other statements, policy flexibility in the face of a crisis is seen as an attractive option.

Cooperation is a significant topic in the New Outlook, like in the other documents. Regarding climate and security issues, it is stated that "The EU needs to adopt a more proactive and comprehensive response to the multifaceted challenges. As these are global challenges, the EU will seek further close cooperation with its international partners and stakeholders to promote multilateral solutions" (p. 3). Similarly to previous statements, a sense of urgency is created, and the importance of being proactive is underlined. However, the primary intention of the statement appears to be to highlight a shared responsibility.

The New Outlook highlights external efforts; "The EU will continue its efforts in all relevant UN fora"; "Many initiatives led or supported by the EU […] have a strong partnership component which is highly relevant for the climate and security nexus" (p. 20;

p. 19). Again, cooperation beyond EU borders is encouraged. The New Outlook appears more general in this regard, at least in comparison to the regional focus in the New Pact.

Cooperation is also underlined regarding how the EU must "better integrate the climate, peace and security nexus in the EU's external policy, including Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and international cooperation and partnerships" (p. 3). Here, work with the relations external to the EU is implied. Other statements, such as "Particular focus should be put on community-level resilience and the resilience of cities and urban areas as they are often the focal point of migration and displacement" (p. 10), similarly build on international relations. Indirect references are made to addressing challenges posed by climate-induced migration, possibly in both origin and receiving countries. It reflects attempts to prevent mass migration *or* prepare for it.

In the area between cooperation and financial strategies, the New Outlook states:

> [Economic] and investment plans, developed together with EU partners for the Western Balkans, and the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhoods, can contribute to creating or maintaining stability by increasing resilience to the impacts of climate change and environmental degradation, and tackle some of the root causes of migration and displacement. (p. 10)

As is commonly known, the Western Balkans work as a transit hub and key corridor for many (irregular) migrants coming to the EU, particularly from the Middle East, Asia and Africa. The geographical aspect is highlighted while emphasis is placed on migration. It is one of the few times where concrete migration streams are mentioned. The reference to tackling root causes highlights how intervention is needed to prevent migration and displacement *from the South to the Global North.* The statement highlights connections between resilience-building, the impacts of climate change, and addressing the root causes of migration. It suggests a proactive economic response to climate-induced migration.

The New Outlook suggests mitigating the risk for and effects of climate change through financial solutions. Two statements do this while referring to *the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe* and the EU's funding for biodiversity. First, the "EU funds actions that are instrumental in strengthening disaster risk reduction, preparedness and anticipatory action" (p. 9). This does not necessarily point to climate migration, but the statement appears to position mitigation, preparation and action as key strategies to prevent risks induced by climate change. The second statement links this to *migration*: "These funds address some of the links between climate change, environmental degradation and insecurity, while indirectly helping to manage climate displacement and migration" (p. 9). This does not just connect security, migration and climate change, but also justifies aid based on *predicted climate migration*.

5.4.4 Summary of Narratives of Climate Migration

In this chapter, the analysis reveals whether the term "climate migration" or narratives about it are used as justification for policy action in the documents. The Agenda once again takes a broad approach, proposing actions based on migration in general, as shown in section 5.1.1, which also includes climate-induced migration. Similarly, the New Deal addresses policy measures targeting root causes more generally, but with a greater emphasis on climate change compared to the Agenda. The New Outlook integrates action, migration and climate change, illustrating a clear link in the approach to all three factors. In addition, there is an increasing emphasis on an evidence-based approach. The table spanning over the next two pages demonstrates this development.

Table 5

Policy Implications of Climate Migration

	Codes
European Agenda on Migration	
Partnership with countries of origin and transit is crucial and there are a series of established bilateral and regional cooperation frameworks on migration in place. (8)	Partnership
The goal should be to encourage more secure borders, but also to strengthen the capacity of countries in North Africa to intervene and save lives of migrants in distress. (12)	Borders; External
Stronger action to link migration and development policy. (16)	Policy
The EU's legal migration policy should also support the development of countries of origin. (16)	Policy
New Pact on Migration and Asylum	
[W]orking closely with partners has a direct impact on the effectiveness of policies inside the EU. (2)	Partnership
Addressing the root causes of irregular migration [and other factors relating to migration] are valuable objectives for both the EU and our partners to pursue through comprehensive, balanced and tailor-made partnerships. (2)	Partnership
This common response needs to include the EU's relationship with third countries, as internal and external dimensions are inextricably linked. (2)	External relationships
Mixed flows of refugees and migrants have meant increased complexity and intensified need for coordination and solidarity mechanisms. (3)	Coordination
[T]he proper functioning of migration and asylum policy inside the EU also needs reinforced cooperation on migration with partners outside the EU. (3)	Cooperation
Comprehensive, balanced and tailor-made partnerships can deliver mutual benefits, in the economy, sustainable development, education and skills, stability, and security, and relations with diasporas. (17)	Partnership
The approach needs to deploy a wide range of policy tools, and have the flexibility to be both tailor-made and able to adjust over time. Different policies such as development cooperation, security, visa, trade, and agriculture, investment and employment, energy, environment and climate change, and education, should not be dealt with in isolation. (17)	Policy tools
The prerequisite in addressing this is cooperation with our partners, first and foremost based on bilateral engagement, combined with regional and multilateral commitment. (18)	Partnership
The EU should build on the important progress made at the regional level, through dedicated dialogues and frameworks. (18)	Cooperation
The EU's neighbours are a particular priority. (18)	Partnership
This will continue to be a key feature in EU engagement with countries, including on migration issues. (19)	Cooperation
In the Commission proposals for the next generation of external policy instruments, migration is systematically factored in as a priority in the programming. (20)	Policy instruments
Increase support for economic opportunity and addressing the root causes of irregular migration. (24)	Policy
New Outlook on Climate and Security Nexus	
The EU needs to adopt a more proactive and comprehensive response to the multifaceted challenges. As these are global challenges, the EU will [cooperate closely] with its international partners and stakeholders to promote multilateral solutions. (3)	Cooperation; Policy
[T]he EU needs to better integrate the climate, peace and security nexus in the EU's external policy, including Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and international cooperation and partnerships. (3)	External policy
[Due to the potential future risks and dependencies, it is] critically important to continue investing in both climate adaptation and mitigation and in protecting and restoring the environment. (3)	Investment
Operationalise the climate and security nexus in EU external action from policy to implementation. (4)	Operational-isation

Table 5 (continued)

New Outlook on Climate and Security Nexus (continued)	
To facilitate the inclusion of the climate and security nexus into discussions and decision-making at political and strategic levels, the Commission services and the EEAS will start conducting an annual comprehensive trend analysis covering [...] the impacts of climate change and environmental degradation on conflicts, displacement and migratory movements and natural resource competition. (5)	Research
[A] dynamic, short-term and sub-national conflict risk model, paying particular attention to environment and climate-related variables, [...] to improve the EU's early warning and anticipation capacity. (6)	Research
The climate and security nexus needs to be operationalised coherently in all EU external action from policy formulation and decision-making to implementation. (8)	Operationalisation
[EU initiatives], ranging from climate action and adaptation to conflict prevention, crisis management and humanitarian action, are most effective when synergies and complementarities are maximised in line with the EU's Integrated Approach. (8)	Policy initiatives
EU funds actions that are instrumental in strengthening disaster risk reduction, preparedness and anticipatory action. (9)	Funds
These funds address some of the links between climate change, environmental degradation and insecurity, while indirectly helping to manage climate displacement and migration. (9)	Funds
Particular focus should be put on community-level resilience and the resilience of cities and urban areas as they are often the focal point of migration and displacement. (10)	Resilience
[Economic] and investment plans, developed together with EU partners for the Western Balkans, and the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhoods, can contribute to creating or maintaining stability by increasing resilience to the impacts of climate change and environmental degradation, and tackle some of the root causes of migration and displacement. (10)	Investment
The EU addresses displacement and migration related to disasters, climate change, and environmental degradation, in particular through humanitarian, development and peace actions. (13)	Policy action
The EU [launches] new global EU action […] to deepen knowledge on the drivers, vulnerabilities and risks that lead to internal displacement and to improve capacities for affected partner countries to address these risks. (13)	Research
Many initiatives led or supported by the EU […] have a strong partnership component which is highly relevant for the climate and security nexus. (19)	Partnership
The EU will continue its efforts in all relevant UN fora. (20)	Cooperation

42

5.5 From Recognition to Action: EU Discourse on Climate-Induced Migration

In answering whether the narrative of 'climate migration to the North as a future threat' serves as a justification for specific forms of foreign aid and political intervention in strategic EU documents, the analysis focuses on: (1) how climate change's influence on migration pattern is addressed; (2) how climate migration is framed in terms of threats or crises, particularly to the EU; (3) what narratives or perspectives emerge regarding climate migration; and (4) whether the documents propose concrete measures to address climate migration's impact on the EU. While summarising the results from chapters 5.1-4, conclusions are drawn regarding these four aspects of the research question.

First, regarding climate change's influence on migration patterns, all three documents acknowledge the connection between climate change and migration. Notably, the Agenda only mentions climate change once, while the New Pact and the New Outlook give it significantly more attention. Climate change is connected directly to migration in the New Pact. While in the New Outlook, it is connected to security. When discussing the root causes of migration, proactive political action aimed at them is seen as imperative for maintaining global stability in all the documents. In the New Outlook, it is especially linked to security risks. Migration is framed as a global challenge, and it is understood as a problem to be solved rather than an adaptive response.

While 'environmental refugees' have been discussed since 1985 (Apap & Harju, 2023), there seems to be a shift in how it is discussed in the EU in the past decade. With the commencement of the European Green Deal in 2019, a climate-focused path has been laid out. This is reflected in the increased focus on climate in the two most recent documents compared to the Agenda. The growing recognition of climate change's impact on migration aligns with the historical accounts of migration made by de Haas (2010) and Ibrahim (2005). It reflects the increasing importance of climate change in shaping migration dynamics. Burrows and Kinney (2016) similarly highlight how policymakers are increasingly linking climate change, migration, and security issues. However, it is essential to note that while there is a growing recognition of the impact of climate change on migration dynamics, this may be disproportionate to the actual impact it will have. These possibly exaggerated narratives contribute to increased securitisation of migration.

Regarding how climate migration is framed in terms of threats and crises, proactive preparedness is a recurrent theme throughout. The Agenda *generally* identifies migration as a threat and underscores the importance of identifying risk trends before they escalate into crises. The New Pact and the New Outlook advocate crisis resilience. The former emphasises migration crises, and the latter underscores climate change as a threat-multiplier. The rhetoric in the three documents carries an idea of potential future disruption of the status quo in Europe. However, as de Haas et al. (2020) and Nyberg-Sorensen et al. (2002) point out, most migrants moving due to acute disasters move across borders within their region or remain internally displaced. This renders narratives about a massive future influx of migrants due to climate change too simplistic and inaccurate.

In the Agenda, the term "threat" is applied, and in the New Outlook, climate change and migration are linked with terms such as "threat-multiplier" and "security risk", while establishing a sense of inevitability when it comes to a migrant influx. When the EU documents apply this type of language and structures these types of arguments for political action, it affects the broader political climate in the EU; "security can be understood as [...] socially constructed through language" (Bartoszewicz, 2021, p. 2) and powerful actors construct it (Buzan et al., 1998). Migration is seen as something that can disrupt public order (Huysmans, 2000). Research shows that this disrupting ability is linked to discussions on climate-induced migration in multilateral organisations (de Haas et al.,

2020). This idea of disruption is found in all three documents. Moreover, as has been established, narratives of a "nation and civilization in danger" and "security crisis" due to migration from the South are wrongful (Thorleifsson, 2019, pp. 193-4; Bettini, 2013). However, this narrative still appears to receive more attention within the EU. As Bettini (2013) states, with unfamiliar cases such as climate-induced migration, apocalyptic narration is often applied. Notably, it appears that the use of 'threat' in the documents tends to point directly to the root causes of migration *and not necessarily* the migration induced by climate change.

Throughout the documents, uncertainty regarding what can occur in the future is established, with an emphasis on preparedness for crisis. Fear-based rhetoric is on the rise (Stępka, 2022), and it reinforces securitisation (Bettini, 2013). In the Agenda, alarmist rhetoric takes place in the form of statements such as "when a mass influx emerges" and "every crisis will be different". Similarly, the New Pact discusses how to prepare for the "unexpected", highlighting uncertainty, and the New Outlook discusses climate change regarding foreseen developments. The dubiety of the future seemingly sways in favour of proactiveness to target potential *threats*. Notably, the language utilised when discussing migration, particularly climate-induced migration, legitimises political action through speculation and fear-based rhetoric.

In exploring what narratives or perspectives emerge regarding climate migration in these documents, it is apparent that the Agenda gives less attention to climate-induced migration specifically compared to the other documents. Still, the document frames migration as burdensome for receiving countries while highlighting doubts about current policy capacities. The New Pact similarly uses language that could perpetuate negative views of migration. Research shows that the narratives of a migrant disruption, often evoked by populist anti-immigrants, are also apparent in foreign aid and intervention strategies (Bartoszewicz, 2022; Clemens & Postel, 2018; Huysmans, 2006; Lazaridis, 2011). A concrete example is presented in Bell et al. (2023), they revealed a European desire to exclude immigrants from the welfare state, reflecting 'welfare chauvinism'—the idea that benefits of the welfare state should primarily be reserved for the native population rather than shared with immigrant populations. A hesitancy towards receiving migrants is displayed while applying the idea of a 'burden'.

The New Pact introduces a dichotomy of those who migrate in a "regular and safe manner" (in cooperation with the EU) and those who migrate in an "irregular and unsafe manner". A discursive dichotomy of 'orderly' and 'disorderly' is established (de Haas, 2024). Dichotomies, binary views and dualities can perpetuate negative stereotypes and cause a feeling of "displaced" people and invasion to manifest (Castles, 2010; Datta, 2009; Hulme, 2008; Stel, 2021; Stępka, 2022). This furthers the view of migration as inherently negative and the "unpredictable climate-migration" as a threat. The New Pact and the New Outlook reflect a sense of urgency within the EU; they advocate for new research, frameworks, and proactive policy development to respond to the perceived future challenges linked to climate change and migration.

Regarding policy implications and climate migration, the linkage is increasingly present from document to document. The Agenda, being the oldest, discusses migration-related issues generally. However, it concretely suggests more secure borders, strengthening capacities external to the EU, and forming partnerships. The aim is to reduce the necessity for people to migrate. The New Pact emphasises addressing the root causes of migration, including climate change. A wide range of policy tools are suggested, and there is an emphasis on flexible approaches as there is a sense of uncertainty. Lastly, the New Outlook links policy action directly to the effects of climate change. Proactive responses to global challenges, as climate migration, are suggested to be solved by

operationalising the climate-security nexus in external action and cooperation with international partners.

Notably, all three documents underscore cooperation and comprehensive approaches. However, global solidarity has been under pressure due to tone-changing events such as the Cold War and the 9/11 attacks (Creppell, 2011; Lazardis, 2011). A civilised 'us' has been put in contrast to a non-civilised 'them', often referring to the dynamics of West and East but also North and South (Thorleifsson, 2019). Naturally, this also pertains to security questions, but also discussions on desired migrants and undesired migrants in general. This is also reflected in the reference to 'European values' in the New Pact. While referencing what the system should look like, the New Pact reflects the idea that there is something that separates Europeans from others (Ivic, 2019). The wish to 'keep certain groups out of Europe' is addressed by Bakewell (2008) and is an accepted idea in many international organisations despite research showing that it does not improve the welfare of those "inside". All the documents suggest action to mitigate and prevent irregular migration and climate change. However, New Pact and the New Outlook link the two "issues" more directly in the form of preventing climate migration.

Based on the analysis of the Agenda, the New Pact, and the New Outlook, the narrative of 'climate migration to the North as a future threat' justifies specific forms of foreign aid and political intervention. However, this rationalisation has increased with time. While all three documents acknowledge the effect of climate change on migration, the emphasis on action directly linked to preventing specifically climate migration is more present in the latter two. The New Outlook considerably explores the intersection of climate change, security, and migration while highlighting the potential risks associated with climate-induced migration. It suggests proactive and comprehensive responses to address it. Similarly, the New Pact advocates for addressing the root causes of predicted migration issues, including climate change-induced ones. While the Agenda recognises the importance of addressing migration challenges, including those caused by climate change, it does not *primarily* portray climate in the same manner as the New Outlook and the New Pact.

6. Climate Migration in the Intersections of Discourse and Decision-Making

The preceding chapter demonstrated that the suggested ways forward for the EU regarding migration, asylum, climate, and security strive to counteract misguided and stereotyped narratives, such as 'climate migration to the North as a future threat' by applying research and knowledge-based solutions. However, the discourse that spans the documents reflects that the narrative is increasingly pronounced. As has been discussed in Chapter 3.1 in this dissertation, climate-induced mass migration from the Global South to the North is unlikely (de Haas et al., 2020; Huang, 2023; Huckstep & Dempster, 2030; Tanner, n.d.; Telford, 2018). Therefore, the narrative the EU adopts is speculative, drawing attention away from the factual realities of displacement and migration. This inconsistency is the starting point as this dissertation now explores the implications of applying this faulty narrative in policymaking. This chapter addresses how the discourse analysed in the EU documents may influence political debates and decisions in Europe regarding migration. In other words, how the documents' framing of climate-induced migration affects its governance.

Securitisation of migration tends to perpetuate alarmist narratives, construct global security crises and reinforce misrepresentations of migrants as threats. This approach, criticised by scholars such as Bettini (2013) and Thorleifsson (2019), creates fear and urgency rather than addressing the root causes of migration. In addition, securitisation often leads to policy measures that are ineffective or counterproductive (Nyberg-Sorensen et al., 2002). Securitisation blurs the distinction between different types of migration and conflate economic, environmental, social and political issues with security issues (Topulli, 2016). This approach overlooks the nuanced drivers of migration and can lead to misguided policy responses. Moreover, the instrumental securitisation of climate change risks failure, as it does not lead to the desired actions and can exacerbate political tensions (Warner & Boas, 2019). In essence, the securitisation of migration reflects a problematic framing, perpetuating misunderstandings and hindering constructive policy responses.

The documents have different aims, but they all carry meaning when establishing EU positions on climate migration. Bettini (2013) argues that climate migration is often detached from existing population movement patterns in discussions, but this is not a clear trend in the EU documents. Especially the Agenda and the New Pact lump together concepts of past influxes, future influxes, root causes (e.g. climate change), threats and crises. While this does not pertain directly to Bettini's argument about separating climate migration from other forms of migration, the documents reflect how concerns relating to security are often discussed in combination with migration issues, obstructing political discussions concerning migration (Nyberg-Sorensen et al., 2002) and triggering apocalyptic narration (Bettini, 2013). While the Agenda makes mostly indirect connections between climate change and migration influxes, a threat narrative is applied when it comes to future migration. Moreover, in the New Pact and the New Outlook, 'crises', 'the unforeseen' and 'threats' are explicitly linked to climate migration. A sense of fear and urgency is mobilised.

Economic, social and political unrest are often lumped together with the concept of migration, enforcing the migration-security dichotomy (Topulli, 2016), which is apparent in these documents. The uncertainty of future climate-induced migration is added into the mix, confusing policymaking. Holistic responses are highlighted with references to tackling 'root causes', especially in the Agenda. Simultaneously, the need to be proactive and change internal EU policies is given much attention. Climate change is framed as both a threat-multiplier and a cause for migration in the New Outlook, by lumping these issues together and then highlighting ways of addressing this to ensure peace and security. The ways in which these issues are discussed throughout the documents appear to justify

action based on the premise of a future threat. However, the actions suggested are broad and based on notions of an inevitable but uncertain influx which might occur due to climate change. In this sense, the grouping of issues causes the policy suggestions to lack focus.

The EU has the potential to set the tone for discussions on climate migration for global governance in these documents. As Bartoszewicz (2021) states, security is socially constructed through language. So, when these documents lump security issues with migration and, at times, climate change, a precedent is set where fear of future climate migration is seen as a legitimate reason for political intervention and aid. Further, concrete measures to ensure policy flexibility for Member States accommodate the increasingly immigrant-negative and often faulty views in Europe to further root.

The linkage between ecological stress, security, and conflict is turning into conventional wisdom (Bettini, 2013), and is reinforced by its application in the multilateral political setting of the EU. On this basis of this linkage, the New Pact and the New Outlook justify aid and political intervention, and new partnerships and coordinated efforts with the aim of preventing climate migration. The documents connect climate change efforts to political intervention, development work and foreign aid to prevent migration. This happens much more indirectly in the Agenda. However, all three documents point to climate change as a root cause of migration and, in turn, justify intervening "at the root" through development policies and aid.

How climate-induced migration has been discussed has not led to action to prevent or solve perceived migration-related issues as they do not correspond with the actualities of migration (Bettini, 2013). Moreover, how climate-induced migration has been addressed in the Agenda, the New Pact and the New Outlook do not strive far from these trends. Castles (2010) writes that migration is often perceived as a problem which must be 'fixed' by applying policies. The EU documents highlight the application of new measures, developmental policies and aid to prevent mass migration. To 'fix' migration issues, policymakers often resort to liberal or repressive policies (Castles, 2010). The EU tends to lean towards primarily addressing root causes of migration through aid and development but also highlighting resilience building. The former can be classified as liberal, and the latter repressive. Interestingly, both policies aim to hinder "harmful and dysfunctional" migration. Continuing this view of migration is often faulty and, in turn, misinforms policymaking. Datta (2009) and Stel (2021) similarly connect how the categorisation of "undesirable" types of migration affect liberal policies; aid is given to prevent people from countries typically perceived as aid-receiving from migrating (to the North). Notably, there is an emphasis on scientific approaches in the documents, especially in the New Outlook. That said, the overall strategy appears to not align with the research in this field.

There is a desire to provide aid instead of receiving migrants in Europe (Bartoszewicz et al., 2022), and evidently in the documents at hand. Still, little research points to humanitarian aid influencing refugee flows (Nyberg-Sorensen et al., 2002), and some even suggest that aid tends to encourage people to emigrate (Lanathi & Thiele, 2018; de Haas, 2010). Therefore, the EU seems to encourage something that is not rooted in science as a measure for preventing mass migration while simultaneously highlighting that they are making science-based decisions. Also, when the EU legitimises aid as a response to migration, this, in turn, gives national policymakers ground for implementing the same measures and further fuels this trend in Europe. Notably, some research (Nyberg-Sorensen et al., 2002) suggest that developmental aid is a better option than humanitarian aid as it is more long-term.

Migration discourse often fails to recognise migration as an adaptation strategy (Puggioni & Trombetta, 2023). The analysis has shown that the EU suggests action and discusses external migration based on migration as the failure to adapt instead of an

adaptation method, much like the conclusion reached by Geddes (2015). Also, as the lack of autonomy is highlighted in the Agenda, the idea that it is possible to 'solve' problems attached to migration by rescuing migrants from those exploiting them; "reducing migrants and refugees to passive victims is simplifying the reality" (de Haas, 2024, p. 15). Similarly, the liberal policies aim to 'fix' root causes in the origin countries rather than laying the groundwork for actual predicted migration streams to neighbouring countries of those areas hit hardest by climate change. Also, this general focus on origin countries masks internal differences of countries.

By looking critically at how climate migration is portrayed in these documents, this chapter emphasises the need for a nuanced understanding of migration as an adaptation strategy and the potential pitfalls of security narratives in crafting effective policy responses. A more holistic approach that addresses the root causes and recognises the diverse realities of migration is essential to promote informed and constructive policymaking in the EU and beyond. The broader implications of applying a securitised discourse, specifically a narrative of 'climate migration to the North as a future threat', include measures inadvertently increasing migration, reinforcing the notion that aid can be withheld in the absence of migration risk, and perpetuating negative stereotypes associated with migrants.

7. Conclusion

By examining the *European Agenda on Migration* (2015), the *New Pact on Migration and Asylum* (2020), and the *New Outlook on the Climate and Security Nexus* (2023), this dissertation investigates EU discourse on climate migration. Utilising document analysis, specifically discourse analysis focusing on narratives of climate migration, the following questions are addressed:

1) Does the narrative of 'climate migration to the North as a future threat' serve as a justification for specific forms of foreign aid and political intervention in strategic EU documents?
2) What broader implications does the adaptation of 'the narrative of 'climate migration to the North as a future threat' in policymaking have for migration governance?

Since 2015, the European Union has changed its framing of climate-induced migration. While the Agenda barely considered climate change's influence on migration, recent documents, such as the New Pact and the New Outlook, acknowledge its influence on migration patterns and security concerns. As has been demonstrated, mass climate migration to the North is unlikely. The articles, books, and works point to how applying faulty views on migration is harmful, as poorly informed policies are implemented and politicians adopt language reinforcing populist right-wing views on migration. Nonetheless, neither I nor the researchers referred to in this dissertation can accurately depict the future and know for sure the implications of these policies. Therefore, reasonable thought must be given to the fact that there could be some truth in narratives regarding climate migration as a future threat, but for the purpose of this dissertation, the research that has been done on these matters by acknowledged scholars stands. Concludingly, there is a dissonance between EU discourse and scientific understanding of climate-induced migration. This aligns with De Haas' (2024) recent conclusion on how the overarching discourse on migration, also found in political systems, lacks basis in scientific inquiry.

Narratives of climate migration as a threat is most present in the New Pact and New Outlook. The Agenda considers migration in general as a threat, but it also focuses overall on handling the root causes of migration rather than the migration itself. However, the New Pact and New Outlook emphasise migration crises and view climate change as a multiplier of threats. While research suggests that most migrants displaced by disasters tend to migrate short distances, all three documents highlight preparedness for migration crises in the EU. The language is generally alarmist, focusing on uncertainty, while calling for proactive measures to address the potential threats. The increasing use of fear-based rhetoric throughout the document mirrors securitisation trends and legitimises political action through speculation and alarmist rhetoric. In this way, climate change and migration are increasingly framed within a securitisation discourse of migration in the EU.

With the acknowledgement of climate change as an exacerbator of migration *and* security crises, measures to prevent all three are justified throughout the documents. However, the interconnection is increasingly highlighted. The Agenda concretely justifies more secure borders and strengthening capacities external to the EU; the New Pact suggests a range of policy tools and flexibility; the New Outlook highlights the operationalisation of the climate-security nexus in external action and proactive measures. All the documents suggest increased international cooperation. It is made clear by the suggested measures that the EU does not recognise migration as an adaptation method; they seek to prevent it as it is a problem, and not support it as adaptation.

While the documents do not explicitly support the narrative of 'climate migration to the North as a future threat', the language and rhetoric reveal how ideas about future migration influxes and its security implications justify proactive and preventative political measures. Measures are suggested while the realities of new migrations dynamics are not yet clear. The considerable focus on aid and policy measures to prevent migration does not consider current research on drivers of climate migration and its unfolding. The gap between science and action may result in measures inadvertently spurring migration flows and exacerbating political tensions. Lastly, it is essential to note that EU discourse and action affects broader political debates, and anti-immigrant attitudes and populism in Europe may be enforced by the application of threat-narratives.

Concretely, the dissertation has found a shift in the EU's approach to climate migration as the impact of climate change on migration and security is increasingly emphasised. Although the research considers mass climate migration to the North unlikely, the rhetoric used mirrors securitisation trends and legitimises political action through fear-based narratives of climate migration. The narrative of mass climate migration to the North does not only divert attention from global issues such as climate change and inequality, but it also leads to policies that do not correspond with the reality of migration and reinforce the idea that aid can be withheld if there is no risk of migration to the North during times of crisis. In other words, there are significant issues with utilising fear of climate migration as a justification for policies, fundraising and interventions.

This dissertation is entirely based on statements from the EU documents European Agenda on Migration, New Pact on Migration and Asylum, and New Outlook on the Climate and Security Nexus. It is a representative analysis of EU discourse on climate migration. Due to the limitations of the scope of this master-level dissertation, there is little room for widening the analysis to include other forms of communication from the EU or examining the actual implementation and effectiveness of the policies proposed. However, both expansions pose exciting areas for further research.

Considering Hein De Haas' publication on May 11, 2024, introducing four dominant narratives on migration, namely the Mass Migration Narrative, Migration Threat Narrative, Migrant Victim Narrative, and Migration Celebration Narrative, reinforces the importance of this dissertation's main topic and findings. To explore how these narratives manifest within the strategic documents is compelling but given the timeline, incorporation is not achievable in this dissertation. Nonetheless, acknowledging its relevance suggests for similar research in the future to build upon the combination of discourse analysis within a multilateral context and de Haas' migration narratives.

A potential study following up on the results from this dissertation would be to investigate the impact of migration discourse on national policies and public perception. Based on the conclusions of this thesis, I propose for the EU to contribute to research on the impacts of climate change on migration, with a commitment to integrate these insights into policymaking (as they state to do in these documents). This proposal emphasises the importance of understanding the link between research and policy, particularly within the complex dynamics of the EU. Exploring this interaction would provide valuable insights.

The application of alarmist narratives such as 'climate migration to the North as a future threat' take place in an increasingly securitised migration debate, highlighting the necessity for cultivating informed discussions. This dissertation underscores the need for a nuanced understanding of climate migration that transcends alarmist narratives and fear-based rhetoric. As we stand at the intersection of policy and perception, the path forward demands evidence-based measures and narratives that advocate resilience, compassion, and human adaptation in the face of environmental change.

8. Literature

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
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