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'Into the Land of Longing'

Allegory, Symbolism, and Salvation in the Works
of C. S. Lewis

Master's thesis in Language Studies with Teacher Education

Supervisor: Yuri Cowan

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Abstract

This thesis investigates how myth has affected the way in which C. S. Lewis uses mythic structures in his fictional works to communicate kerygma, which is the proclamation of salvation through Jesus Christ. Myth played an integral part in Lewis's own conversion to Christianity, mainly because it awakened a longing for God. This joy, as he termed it, was largely caused by myth's ability to appeal to the imagination. However, it was not a mode in which Lewis wrote. Rather, he utilised the modes of allegory and symbolism which respectively employ different qualities common to myth, namely a concretisation of abstract concepts in the former, and a revelation of that which is 'more real' in the latter. By analysing *The Great Divorce* (1945), which incorporates both allegory and symbolism, and the mainly symbolic *The Last Battle* (1956), this thesis considers how the mythic structures of allegory and symbolism combine a rational and mythic consciousness to promote a salvific message. The doctrines of salvation created in each narrative are contingent on an appeal to the imagination which unifies the mythic and rational. In both cases this is most visible in the characters' personal eschatology, that is, in the destiny of the soul in the afterlife, and the attainability of Heaven. Thus, Lewis used modes of writing that promote that same joy he found in myth in order to communicate to his readers that quality which ultimately led him to God.

Sammendrag

Denne avhandlingen undersøker hvordan myter påvirket måten C. S. Lewis brukte mytiske strukturer i sine skjønnlitterære verk for å kommunisere kerygma, altså forkynnelsen om frelse gjennom Jesus Kristus. Myter spilte en viktig rolle i Lewis sin egen konvertering til kristendommen, hovedsakelig fordi det vekket en lengsel etter Gud. Denne gleden, som han kalte det, ble forårsaket av mytens evne til å appellere til fantasien. Men Lewis skrev ikke myter selv. I stedet brukte han skrivemetodene allegori og symbolisme som benytter seg av forskjellige karakteristikk knyttet til myte, henholdsvis konkretiseringen av abstrakte konsepter og åpenbaringen av noe som er «mer ekte». Ved å analysere *The Great Divorce* (1945), som inkorporerer både allegori og symbolisme, og den hovedsakelig symbolske *The Last Battle* (1956), tar denne avhandlingen for seg hvordan de mytiske strukturene i allegori og symbolisme kombinerer en rasjonell og mytisk bevissthet for å kommunisere et frelsesbudskap. Frelsesdoktrinene som er skapt i hver bok er avhengig av en appellering til fantasien som samler det mytiske og rasjonelle. I begge tilfeller er dette tydeliggjort i karakterenes personlige eskatologi, altså i sjelens endelige destinasjon i livet etter døden, og i oppnåeligheten av Himmelen. På denne måten brukte Lewis skrivemetoder som fremmer den samme gleden han fant i myter for å kommunisere til hans lesere den egenskapen som til slutt ledet ham til Gud.

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To God in whom I find my peace and identity, may this bring You glory any way it can.

And finally, to my Dad, Nick Lindley, and Morfar, Anton Overn: I miss you. Though you are not here to see me complete this thesis, I rest assured that you are rejoicing with Jesus in Glory. I dedicate this to you both.

Sarah Overn Lindley
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*'My flesh and my heart may fail, but God is the strength
of my heart and my portion forever.' Psalms 78:26*

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Introduction

A very interesting conversation would occur between C. S. Lewis and Belinda Carlisle if they were ever to meet and discuss the meaning of Carlisle's lyrics in the 1987 hit, 'Heaven is a Place on Earth', in which she repeatedly states one can 'make Heaven a place on Earth'. I am not arguing that Lewis and Carlisle would disagree, for Lewis did indeed claim in the final chapters of *The Last Battle* (1956), that Earth and, by extension, the titular land of Narnia, are imitations of Heaven. As the Unicorn explains, "The reason why we loved the old Narnia is that it sometimes looked a little like this" (Lewis, *Battle* 160-1). Perhaps, then, Lewis's intention was, in accord with Carlisle's lyrics, to 'make Heaven a place on Earth' (Carlisle). As Lewis writes in the preface to *The Great Divorce* (1945): if one, when the time comes, chooses Heaven, Earth will 'have been from the beginning a part of Heaven itself' (ix), and in this encouragement, Lewis's readers are urged to search for the heavenly in the mundane. In *The Great Divorce* and *The Last Battle*, Lewis combines allegory and symbolism, and thus, concrete and abstract concepts, in different ways to create a heavenly realm in which the characters are faced with the possibility of life everlasting.

Clive Staples Lewis (1898-1963) was an Irish scholar and writer, well traversed within the Christian fiction genre, and arguably one of the most prominent Christian authors of the 1900s. Best known for his series, *The Chronicles of Narnia* (1950-6), he also wrote a number of Christian fictional and nonfictional works, in which salvation and access to Heaven is a common topic in several of them. Before he converted to Christianity, Lewis did not understand "how the life and death of Someone Else (whoever he was) two thousand years ago could help us here and now" (qtd. in Carpenter 44). Following his conversion, one could assume that a major concern of his was to explain this mystery to others. Indeed, Bernadette Setsuko Nakao writes that Lewis found 'forms of myth, allegory and fairy-tales ... ideal forms for what he wanted to say' (82). But what did he want to say? And why did he believe it would be best communicated through these specific modes of writing? Nakao provides us with a short answer: 'Lewis's intention of writing fiction was both aesthetic as well as *Kerygmatic*' (82). It is this kerygmatic purpose that will form the backdrop here. According to *The Merriam-Webster Dictionary*, the word 'kerygma' is derived from the Greek *kēryssein*, which means 'to proclaim', and denotes 'the apostolic proclamation of salvation through Jesus Christ' ('Kerygma'). Kerygmatic literature, then, is literature that proclaims this salvific message as the way to God, either directly, as most of Lewis's fiction does, or indirectly, as we will see Lewis argued was true for non-Christian myths. Nakao argues that Lewis's fiction proclaims

this message both by ‘means of reason but also by means of the “baptism of the imagination”’ (82). This suggests a connection between kerygmatic literature and the appeal to the imagination, as well as between the ‘forms of myth, allegory and fairy-tales’ and this imaginative function. Lewis used both the mode of allegory and the mode of symbolism in *The Great Divorce* and a primarily symbolic mode in *The Last Battle*, combined with a rational and mythic consciousness, to appeal to the imagination. This combination depicts the rationality of the mythical in *Great Divorce* while creating a collective consciousness in *Last Battle*. Ultimately, this creates doctrines of salvation in which the appeal to the imagination plays an integral part in the eschatology of each character and their ability to attain Heaven.

According to Lewis, the greatest appeal to the imagination could be found in the mode of myth. As Christina Hitchcock explains, Lewis believed myth ‘reache[d] the imagination, which is the organ of meaning’, and that it reveals to the reader a deeper truth than that which can be grasped through fact in the intellect (86). So, in Lewis’s eyes, the appeal to the imagination in myth – the opening of the mind to the possibility of the seemingly impossible – is a mouthpiece through which the kerygmatic message is communicated in the deeper truth of God. Indeed, as Margaret P. Hannay claims, Lewis saw myth as an expression of longing for God; it ‘was not merely a branch of literary study but the core of literature and theology alike’ (14, 16). Hitchcock writes that, to Lewis, the longing for God was present in both Christian and non-Christian myths because humans are both ‘rational and imaginative’, and the combination of these can serve to reveal truths about God despite differing dogmas (86). Evidently, the original intention behind a myth, and however much the original authors and their readers believed its contents to be true, did not deter Lewis from having this view of myth. In *The Weight of Glory* (1949), for instance, Lewis writes that pagan myths are ““dim dreams or premonitions”” of the redemption provided through the incarnation of Christ (qtd. in Hitchcock 86). To Lewis, myth was a lens of reality allowing the reader to access deeper truth, and that deeper truth concerned God. Thus, myth was the intersection between what arguably were Lewis’s two main fields of interest, namely literature and theology. Yet, as Hannay writes, ‘few individuals have risen to the creation of original myth’, and Lewis himself only attributed Franz Kafka, Novalis, and George MacDonald with this novelty in newer times (18). I argue therefore that Lewis never intended to create original myth himself, but rather used other modes such as allegory and symbolism to communicate the same ‘premonitions’ of Christ’s redemption as he found, for instance, in Pagan myths. However, it begs the question of how Lewis utilised this intersection between literature and theology in his own writing career.

In *The Merriam-Webster Dictionary* 'Myth' is defined as 'a usually traditional story of ostensibly historical events that serves to unfold part of the world view of a people or explain a practice, belief, or natural phenomenon' ('Myth'). Therefore, myth is not a genre of writing, but rather a mode of writing, because the classification of myth, in the context of this definition, rests on what it is about and not how it is written. Because Lewis wanted to communicate kerygma, this definition, along with Hannay's claim, supports my assertion that Lewis did not intend to write myth. Yet, one finds hints of myth, or mythical structures, throughout both his fictional and non-fictional corpus. This fascination suggests that the mode of myth and its characteristics held some intrinsic value to him, despite not being a mode he used directly. As mentioned above, Lewis saw myth as an appeal to the imagination. So, if myth both points back to God and appeals to the imagination, which subsequently reveals deeper truth, this poses the possibility that the deeper truth is closely related to God. I therefore argue that Lewis utilised mythic structures in his fiction because he believed the association with myth intrinsically facilitated kerygma.

As I will explore in the first chapter, myth played a crucial part in both Lewis's spiritual and authorial journey. I argue that Lewis understood myth as inherently kerygmatic because it greatly affected his own salvific process by igniting and reigniting a 'Joy' which ebbed and flowed throughout his life, for instance when reading Norse and Celtic mythology, or *Phantastes* (1858) by George MacDonald (Lewis, *Joy* 191, 207-9). Lewis described this joy as 'an unsatisfied desire which is itself more desirable than any other satisfaction' (*Joy* 18). The role myth played in Lewis's spiritual journey points to the suggestion that the deeper truth Lewis found in myth related to God. Following this longing, or joy, as he also called it, Lewis describes throughout his autobiography, *Surprised by Joy: The Shape of my Early Life* (1955), how it eventually led him to Christianity. In the conclusion to the final chapter, Lewis writes that joy was no longer a subject of interest to him after his conversion, showing that it was always a 'pointer to something other and outer', which eventually turned out to be Christ (*Joy* 276). This in turn suggests why Lewis believed, as Hannay explains, that myth is an avenue through which God communicates with mankind (15). To Lewis, it turned out to be just that: a beckoning to enter into what he called 'the land of longing' (*Joy* 253), in which he could uncover the universal truth of God. Consequently, this view of myth formed the backdrop in Lewis's career as a Christian author.

Yet, as stated above, Lewis did not explicitly write myth. The kerygmatic message was communicated through other modes of writing, but I propose in the first chapter that Lewis utilised characteristics of myth when authoring his fictions. Indeed, the very choice of

allegorical and symbolic modes of writing points to a conscious application of mythic structures to his fictional narratives, which in turn facilitates kerygma. Looking at Lewis's fictional writing career, Michael Ward argues Lewis displayed a steady move from the allegorical to the symbolic, with his first novel, *The Pilgrims Regress* (1933), being the most allegorical, and his final fictional work, *Till We Have Faces* (1956), the most symbolic (Ward 31-2). This gradual move was probably a conscious one, indicated by the pronounced distinction Lewis made between allegory and symbolism in *The Allegory of Love* in 1936. The modes of allegory and symbolism must therefore have served their separate purpose to Lewis. In fact, both allegory and symbolism are similar to myth, albeit not in the same way. Allegory is similar in its concretising function, while symbolism shares myth's intent in seeking truth.

Allegory and symbolism are, however, not mutually exclusive. Indeed, Ward argues that much of Lewis's fictional corpus, such as *The Great Divorce* (1945) and *The Chronicles of Narnia*, incorporate both (32). Chapter two and three will deal with two such cases: the former being centred on *The Great Divorce* and how the mode of allegory affects the salvific process, while the latter explores how the use of symbolism affects the salvific process in the final instalment of the *Narnia* series, *The Last Battle*. In both instalments, kerygma is perhaps best represented in the personal eschatology of the characters, which is most prominent in their ability to access Heaven. In the second chapter, I will first examine the *Great Divorce*'s classification as a mainly allegorical work, before arguing how the rational and mythic aspect of the narrative affects the unavoidable either-or question between Heaven and Hell, or rather, salvation and damnation. In the final chapter, I will explore how *Last Battle*, as a 'supposal', as Lewis called it, uses symbolism to portray salvation and access to Heaven. I will first examine how the bringing together of abstract and concrete aspects affects the characters' salvific journeys and the representation of Heaven. Finally, I argue how the unification of the mythic and rational realms represent something 'more real' by imitating a Platonic archetypal realm. In both books, the appeal to a complete imagination, in which the mythic and rational co-exist, becomes a deciding factor in determining the characters' eschatology.

Defining Allegory and Symbolism

In 1936, Lewis wrote a book on medieval allegorical love poetry, titled *The Allegory of Love*. In it, Lewis writes that allegory is 'a mode of expression' because it is a tool which can express that which is abstract or immaterial by creating '*visibilia*', that is, concretisations that are 'confessedly less real' than the abstractions in our perceived reality (*Allegory* 44-5, 48). In

Dante Alighieri's *Divine Comedy* (1321), for instance, the *visibilia* is the journey which represents the road to salvation, or, as in the children's film *Inside Out* (2015), the characters are *visibilia* of different feelings. The tangibility provided by the concretisation allows for the expression of topics that are otherwise out of reach. According to Andrew Wheat, Lewis believed abstractions were mostly inexpressible without help from concretisations (24). This is apparent in Lewis's first fictional novel, *The Pilgrim's Regress*, in which he uses the mode of allegory to narrate his own salvific journey. For instance, when the main character John sees 'a green wood full of primroses', he begins reminiscing about primroses from his childhood, and an island is suddenly revealed to him (Lewis, *Regress* 7). As mentioned, Lewis's move towards Christianity was mainly spurred on by the abstract longing he called joy, which he frequently found in myths, meaning the primroses act as *visibilia* for the vessel – a certain myth, for instance – that revealed the *visibilia* for joy, namely the island.

In the preface to the third edition of *Regress* published in 1952, Lewis claims that 'when allegory is at its best, it approaches myth, which must be grasped with the imagination' (*Regress* xvi). An appeal to the imagination, then, is the feature of myth that the allegory should most readily seek in order to facilitate a retreat into 'the land of longing', and subsequently take on the kerygmatic quality that myth does. The question becomes one of how allegory can achieve this. Lewis argues that myth uses concretisations to communicate that which "can otherwise be understood only as an abstraction" (Lewis qtd. in Wheat 23). Similarly, Lewis also claims that the concretisations in allegory 'make the inner world more palpable' (*Regress* xvi). Both modes are thus able to approach that which is intangible and make it more accessible. However, this does not necessarily create an appeal to the imagination. As Wheat writes, to Lewis, one big difference between the two modes was that, whereas myth appeals to the reader's imagination by taking on "ever varying meanings" which transcend the author's original attention, Lewis saw allegory as a story "into which *one* meaning has been put" (qtd. in Wheat 23). Myth accesses and reveals a deeper universal truth, while allegory carries no such promise of absolute knowledge. As mentioned, myth was to Lewis a lens of reality that allowed for the revelation of deeper truths. In allegory, however, it is the author's inner thoughts that create the basis for the reality conveyed, meaning that it is up to Lewis, as a Christian author, to imbue his allegorical writings with a reality reflecting his own Christian convictions.

As explained, Lewis attempts in *The Pilgrim's Regress* to do this by narrating his own journey to God using *visibilia*. I write *attempt* because Lewis denied that it was any good. In the 1952-preface, Lewis reluctantly provides an explanatory key to his allegory, 'only because my allegory failed' (*Regress* xvi). It fails *because* the key is necessary to understand it,

defeating the purpose of the allegorical mode altogether. What property allegory does, or could, share with myth becomes inaccessible because the concretisations remain just that; too concrete and narrow to really appeal to the imagination. As explained in the preface by Lewis himself, ‘all good allegory exists not to hide but to reveal; to make the inner world more palpable by giving it an (imagined) concrete embodiment’ (*Regress* xvi). The concretising criterion of allegory, then, is followed by a criterion of intelligibility, strikingly similar to the concretisation and revelatory properties in myth. In claiming that *Regress* failed because it requires a running headline, Lewis subsequently removes its ability to approach myth. It may seem self-contradictory to claim first that Lewis never intended to write myth, and then subsequently emphasise how his first allegory is not a myth, but as stated above, to Lewis, allegory was most valuable when it approached myth; when the allegory succeeds in creating a comprehensible connection between the abstract and the concrete, then will it have the power to reveal truths through the imagination like myths do. Because *Regress* fails to concretise properly on the allegorical level, it cannot ascend to the mythical level, nor appeal to the kerygmatic quality intrinsic in myth.

Lewis uses this understanding of allegory and its *visibilia* to explain symbolism. If, as Lewis argues in *The Allegory of Love*, ‘our passions, being immaterial, can be copied by material inventions, then it is possible that our material world in its turn is the copy of an invisible world’ (*Allegory* 45). The act of looking through the perceived reality to find something more real in the invisible world is what Lewis terms symbolism, meaning that the given realm is ‘less true’ than what the symbolist uncovers. As Lewis claims, to the symbolist, ‘We are the “frigid personifications”’ and ‘the heavens above us are the “shadowy abstractions”’ of something that is even more real than what we already perceive (Lewis, *Allegory* 45). Similar to how an allegorist creates *visibilia* to concretise abstractions, so does a symbolist regard our reality as *visibilia* concretising an invisible, truer world. In this way, symbolism seems to don similar properties to myth, because at its core lies a belief in the existence of something deeper and more universal. As Lewis continues, symbolism is ‘a mode of thought’, while allegory, as previously stated, is ‘a mode of expression’ (*Allegory* 48). Much like myth facilitates the understanding of deeper truth via the creation of a different reality, symbolism accesses a different level of reality by seeking something more real.

The difference between symbolism and allegory is perhaps best exemplified in Nicholas Carr’s article where he presents Coleridge’s assertion that symbolism brings the concrete and abstract together into one plane (173). In fact, Lewis claims that one does not find the ‘greatest expression’ of symbolism until the time of the Romantics, which ‘is significant of the profound

difference that separates it from allegory' (*Allegory* 46). Coincidentally, the very reason Romantics like Coleridge preferred symbolism to allegory was because the former 'evokes the unity of "throwing together"' of the abstract and concrete, whereas the latter remains dualistic in its separation of the concrete and abstract (Carr 173). Thus, symbolism's ability to create something 'more real' coincides with the combination of the concrete and abstract.

Lewis uses the words *symbolism* and *sacramentalism* synonymously to denote the correlations between 'sensible imitations' and the truer reality; symbolism is the act of 'see[ing] the archetype [*sic.*] in the copy' (Lewis, *Allegory* 45). Seeing symbolism as an act of sacramentalism indicates an underlying tone of kerygma, much like the one found in myth. As defined in *The Merriam-Webster Dictionary*, sacramentalism is the 'belief in or use of sacramental rites, acts, or objects', which 'are inherently efficacious and necessary for salvation' ('Sacramentalism'). If symbolism is a sacramental act, the understanding gained when the symbolist grasps how the almost Platonic archetype relates to the copy, or rather how the true reality relates to our reality, is intrinsically salvific. Whatever truth is uncovered in this process will naturally be divine in nature if the process of attaining it is truly salvific. According to Michael Raiger, because Lewis understood symbolism as a 'sacramental vision', the 'sensible images are imitations of a higher spiritual reality' (122). In this way, symbolism takes on a kerygmatic quality akin to that of myth in its definition as sacramentalism. As mentioned, the truth uncovered in myth is universal and relates to God. Because Lewis was a Christian, his sacramental view of symbolism would have related to that same universal truth. I argue therefore that, to Lewis, the truth uncovered in both instances must be one and the same.

Hitchcock writes that Lewis believed symbolism to be 'most fully embodied in what he called Myth', which appeals to the organ of meaning through the imagination (85-6). It follows that symbolism also appeals to the imagination, and that there is a close connection between the two modes: they both seek to reveal truths or real realities, and do this by appealing to the imagination, which in turn reveals deeper truths. This is further confirmed when one combines Lewis's own understanding of myth as pointing back to God, with his sacramental definition of symbolism. In myth there is a form of sacramental symbolism, because myth intrinsically reveals that which relates to God. In this way, myth is always symbolic, because it points to God. On the other hand, symbolism is not necessarily myth, for though it also serves to reveal that which is 'more real', at least in Lewis's mind, it does not necessitate any mythical structure.

Keeping in mind that Lewis intended to convey kerygma in his fiction, then, the question becomes one of how the modes of allegory and symbolism affect this. In both *The Great Divorce* and *The Last Battle*, Lewis unifies the mythic and rational consciousnesses, and in so

doing, conveys a message in which the appeal to the imagination is a deciding factor in the characters' salvation. It is when the mythic structures of the ghosts, which are 'less real', are faced with the very real setting of Heaven, that Lewis demonstrates the rationality of Heaven. The promise of something 'more real' in the possibility of transfiguration to Solid Person promotes the unification of the mythic and rational consciousnesses, and in so doing creates a doctrine of salvation that rests on an imaginative renewal. In contrast, *The Last Battle* creates a reality that more readily represents the collective consciousness, by supposing that the land of Narnia is an extension of Earth. This fluid and combined reality already embodies the unification of the rational and mythic consciousnesses, and becomes a symbol of that which is 'more real' by pointing to the new Narnia. This collective reality is in itself the doctrine of salvation, because it promotes an opening of the imagination. In both *The Great Divorce* and *The Last Battle*, Lewis communicates the kerygmatic message that the way to salvation's accomplishment is found in the role of imagination, because by allowing for the combination of the mythical and rational – the appeal to, and adoption of, the complete imagination – Lewis reveals the deeper truth of God and life everlasting.

Chapter 1 – Myth: Entering the ‘Land of Longing’

Lewis did not always see myth as a longing for God, nor did he originally attribute it with any revelatory properties regarding deeper truth. According to Humphrey Carpenter in his book on ‘the Inklings’, Lewis initially believed myths to be wholly untrue and thus, ‘worthless’ (43). That is not to say that he found them unenjoyable, for as Lewis writes in *Surprised by Joy*, he enjoyed both Norse and Celtic mythology from an early age (132). Yet, according to Carpenter’s account, myth did not carry enough intrinsic value as enjoyable stories to convince Lewis they were of any real value. In his autobiography, Lewis explains that the myths stirred up the experience of joy in him, but this delight quickly turned into scholarly exposition (*Joy* 191). Evidently, Lewis’s disregard of myth was initially caused by replacing the experience of joy with something rational. While he may have thought this rational scholarship would yield truths, the incentive to explore myths – that is, joy – was not of a rational quality, and therefore fell flat. As Lewis explains himself, ‘I woke from building the temple to find that the God had flown’ (*Joy* 192). Lewis did not originally read myth or seek knowledge about it to find God, but rather sought to satisfy and stir the feeling of joy. It may very well be that he wanted to pinpoint what quality in myth was causing him to experience joy, but I argue that he did not set out on that mission with any desire to find God. He did, after all, describe himself as ‘the most dejected and reluctant convert in all England’ (*Joy* 266) when he eventually became a Christian. Nevertheless, when Lewis had followed the road of satisfaction to its end via scholarly interest, he was left none the wiser about myth and its connection with joy. Thus, his initial understanding of myth was that it held no truth, and was worthless as anything but surface-level enjoyment.

However, this understanding was to be radically changed. Carpenter writes that Lewis’s long-time friend J. R. R. Tolkien believed the original creation of myths happened as a way of making sense of that which was seemingly inexplicable. According to Carpenter, Lewis recorded in September of 1931 a conversation between himself and Tolkien in which they discussed the origins and integrity of myth. Tolkien argued that originally, ‘the world was alive with mythological beings ... the whole of creation was “myth-woven”’, and that because mankind comes from God, who cannot lie, so must man’s ‘*imaginative inventions*’ bear some speck of ‘eternal truth’. According to Carpenter, Lewis was on this night convinced by Tolkien’s argument (42-4). One can find echoes of this conversation throughout Lewis’s corpus, for instance in the quotation in the introduction about Pagan myths from *The Weight of Glory*, or in the essay titled ‘Myth Became Fact’ from *God in the Dock* (1971) to which I will return to later. His autobiography also includes an account of how myth instilled in him that joy

which he later realised was a longing for God. This indicates that Lewis eventually adopted Tolkien's view of myth, and agreed that myth pointed back to the eternal truth of God.

Naturally, C. S. Lewis let his own life seep into what he wrote. One of Lewis's acquaintances, Owen Barfield, claimed that "Somehow what [Lewis] thought about everything was secretly present in what he said about anything" (qtd. in Jacobs 162). Whatever convictions or beliefs Lewis conveys through his fictional work are based on concepts he believed and followed in his private life. As Lewis writes in his autobiography, he admitted in 1929 'that God was God', after having for a long time felt 'the steady, unrelenting approach of Him whom I so earnestly desired not to meet' (*Joy* 266). This conversion to Theism in 1929 was, according to Carpenter, followed by a conversion to Christianity in 1931 (46). I argue that Lewis's experience after this walk of faith affected the way he chose to present kerygmatic elements in his fiction; that is, how he chose to directly or indirectly proclaim 'salvation through Jesus Christ' ('Kerygma').

The conversation with Tolkien about myth incidentally occurred around the same time as his conversion to Christianity, indicating a correlation between the two respective convictions. This is further confirmed in his autobiography, in which he writes about what he called 'The first Move'. When rereading the Greek tragedy *Hippolytus* by Euripides – 'which was certainly no business of mine at the moment' – he was brought back 'into the land of longing' he had fleetingly inhabited at different points in his life (*Joy* 252-3). Myth played an integral part in reigniting the journey which eventually led him to Christianity. This in turn suggests that the appeal to the imagination which Lewis saw as a main characteristic of myth indirectly communicated kerygma, because to Lewis it unintentionally reignited his search for God. All the intellectual and joyful moves that followed this first one culminated eventually in the following conclusion about Christianity and Jesus Christ: 'If ever a myth had become fact, had been incarnated, it would be just like this. ... And no person was like the Person it depicted; as real, as recognisable' (Lewis, *Joy* 274). Therefore, it may very well be that myth held an inherent kerygmatic value in Lewis's eyes because it played an integral part in his own conversion. The myths had built a reality which yielded truths that always pointed towards what he eventually concluded was the universal truth, namely 'that Jesus Christ is the Son of God' (Lewis, *Joy* 275).

If one accepts that myth held a natural kerygmatic quality to Lewis, the question becomes one of how that quality affects or relates to myth's property of conveying reality and truth. According to Hannay, Lewis saw Biblical myth as encapsulating "the non-describable" in a way history cannot, for where history records the factual event, myth expresses the 'real

essence of the event', and in this way, 'myth is truer than history' (14). Having this view on the correlation between history and myth means that the mythical essence and the historical fact become tiered 'levels' of truth, not in terms of worth, for they each serve their purpose, but in terms of veracity. A factual truth is not incorrect, but it is less true than a mythical truth, because the latter retains that which is unquantifiable, and thus, presents a 'deeper' reality than the former. The distinction between *reality* and *truth* is of importance here. In his essay 'Myth Became Fact', Lewis writes that myth provides readers with a reality that fosters 'innumerable truths on the abstract level'. He then distinguishes between the two by claiming that 'truth is always *about* something, but reality is that *about which* truth is' (*Dock* 43). Myth can therefore not be described as *being* truth. Rather, it provides a context, or a lens, through which one can perceive truths, and this is the *reality* Lewis speaks of. Saying myth reveals a deeper truth merely means it provides a new plane of reality which in turn yields new truths that resonate more than old truths did on the old plane of reality. Besides, Lewis defined 'good myth as a "Story out of which ever varying meanings will grow for different readers and in different ages"' (qtd. in Hannay 17). If myth creates a reality in which many meanings arise, then given that the truths which myth operates with are universal and unchangeable, the ever-varying meanings must all point back to the same truth.

That is, however, not to say that Lewis saw myth and fact as wholly disjointed, nor am I claiming Lewis discounted historicity altogether. As Hannay writes, 'Lewis did not believe that the Incarnation of Christ was one of the instances where the historicity of the event is immaterial' (15). In fact, Lewis claims that the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ unified myth and fact. In 'Myth Became Fact' Lewis writes, as the title indicates, that the two levels of truth are made equal, because 'By becoming fact it does not cease to be myth: that is the miracle'. This miracle – the incarnation of Christ being fully myth and fully fact – 'is the marriage of heaven and earth' (Lewis, *Dock* 44-5), which was especially important in Lewis's own salvific process. In his autobiography, Lewis writes that he was searching for a religion that had 'reached its true maturity'. First believing either Hinduism or Christianity to be the answer, because 'Whatever you could find elsewhere you could find better in one of these', Lewis continues that he discounted Hinduism because it had 'no such historical claim as in Christianity' (Lewis, *Joy* 273-4). The historical accuracy of the myth of Christ was therefore especially important to Lewis, for in its accuracy lied the key to his own salvation. If Lewis did not believe that Christ actually existed, the salvation granted by the resurrection would hold no importance to him.

However, in all other cases of myth, Lewis would not expect or demand historical accuracy. As Hannay writes, to Lewis, it is unimportant whether Eve ate an actual fruit in an actual garden of Eden (15). The repercussions of the fall of man are of greater importance; it matters that man is sinful and that God had a plan of redemption, and this message is conveyed whether the book of Genesis is historically accurate or not. From this understanding, I would also argue that Lewis's apparent favouring of myth over fact is not a value-laden statement, but that where it mattered, namely in the incarnation of Christ, Lewis found that 'Here and here only in all time the myth must have become fact; the Word, flesh; God, Man' (*Joy* 274). Accordingly, Lewis must have disbelieved any historical accuracy in any other myth. But, as previously stated, he also believed that myth holds an essence of truth that history does not. It is therefore clear that Lewis's use of mythical modes of writing expresses an intention to convey that essence.

The point of departure here is, however, not Lewis's view on the validity of Biblical myth, but how Lewis's view on the correlation between myth and truth postulates that myth is inherently kerygmatic. If the purpose of myth, to Lewis, was to express essential truth, not factual accuracy, the question becomes: what is that essential, 'deeper' truth? As mentioned previously, Hannay writes that Lewis believed it is the 'search for God which finds expression in myth', and that Pagan myths also reflected this search for 'Joy' as Lewis labelled it (16). It follows that there is a correlation between the search for God and the revelation of deeper truth if the non-Christian myths also create a reality that fosters innumerable truths. However, I do not believe joy in itself is the deeper truth, for it does not permanently satisfy. As Lewis writes, 'anyone who has experienced [joy] will want it again' (*Joy* 18). The expression of joy in myth requires a further exploration of joy in order to bring about permanent gratification. Thus, because myth stems from a desire for God, it will seek to satisfy that desire. Moreover, whatever satisfaction is found will be of a divine quality because it resulted from a desire for God, and it is this satisfaction provided by divinity that is the deeper truth.

Furthermore, as Hannay argues, Lewis did not regard myth as bound to a particular art form or 'pattern of words', like poetry, but rather as a sequence of events that "delights and nourishes". He argued that just like poetry communicates a theme, so does myth communicate "something inexpressible" (Lewis qtd. in Hannay 17-8). Accordingly, if myth does seek to express joy, it is plausible that the route to indulge that joy and the delightful and nourishing sequence of events are one and the same. This means that joy, when explored to its maximum, leaves the indulger delighted and nourished. Consequently, joy must, when explored to its fulness, yield that inexpressible *something* characteristic of myth. Lewis certainly found this to

be true in his own life. When describing the experience of first reading *Phantastes* by George MacDonald, Lewis writes about a transformation where ‘the confusions that had hitherto perplexed my search for Joy were disarmed’, in which ‘the common things [were] drawn into the bright shadow’. It was this bright shadow he later identified as ‘Holiness’. MacDonald’s novel, along with other similar ‘stabs’ were all reminders of ‘the desired’, because of their inadequacy in completely satisfying the desire (*Joy* 207-9, 256). Lewis found in MacDonald’s mythical writing that inexpressible *something* that fleetingly gratified his joy, which later turned out to be signposts encouraging his eventual conversion to Christianity. The reality revealed by the mythical was Holiness, and the deeper truth revealed was God himself.

Moreover, Hannay explains that Lewis believed God communicates with man through myth, and ‘that Christianity is the great embodiment of myth, the original of which all others are merely images’ (14-5). If all non-Christian myths point back to Christianity, then all myths must possess some element or morality common to Christianity for it to be recognisable as pointing to God. What Lewis thought this Christian element was may be answered by his comment on myth in *Miracles*: myth is “‘at its best, a real though unfocused gleam of divine truth falling on human imagination’” (Lewis qtd. in Hannay 16). All of these revelations of myth – divine truth; holiness; joy; desire for God; the inexpressible something – amount to one explanation: because Lewis believed that myth always refers back to God, or what he saw as divine truth, while also conveying a ‘deeper’ truth, the deeper truth and the divine truth must converge. To Lewis, then, myth is inherently kerygmatic, for from it flows the divine and deeper truth that points back to God.

Allegory and Symbolism: Truth, Reality, and Kerygma

As mentioned in the introduction, myth is not something that is easily created. However, by incorporating mythic structures into writing, Lewis is able to appeal to the truths that are revealed in the reality created in myth. Allegory and symbolism are natural modes to choose, for in them are characteristics found in the mode of myth. Thus, they must also appeal to some of the same truths that myth does, yet these two modes of writing are more accessible than myth, allowing for the communication of kerygma. As mentioned, Lewis distinguishes between truth and reality when talking of myth, and argues in ‘Myth Became Fact’ that ‘What flows into you from the myth is not truth but reality’ (*Dock* 43). If myth concretises that which is otherwise intangible, while also creating a reality, then the concretisations must contribute to creating that reality, which in turn reveal a deeper truth. Allegory shares this concretising function by

creating *visibilia* to communicate abstractions, as explained in the introduction. What these concretisations amount to, however, differ from myths. While an allegory can convey the meaning the author puts into it, which the reader may subjectively interpret otherwise, this does not mean that the allegory departs from the reality it is created in. As Wheat explains, to Lewis, allegory does not invent a different, transcendental reality, but expresses the current reality within a different domain of comprehension, and thus reveals the author's inner thoughts which are otherwise unattainable (24-5). Allegory does therefore not possess the same ability to inherently communicate kerygma as myth does, because, at least according to Lewis, allegory first and foremost is a translation of the author's own thoughts. Thus, it does not necessarily appeal to the imagination, and may not facilitate the revelation of universal truths necessary to be inherently kerygmatic.

However, the inability to create transcendent realities also serves a purpose. As Lewis explains himself, the 'transcendent reality' of myth is a story which changes as the reader changes, for "a good myth" has "ever varying meanings", while an allegory is a story "into which *one* meaning has been put" (qtd. in Wheat 23). The upshot of this is that allegory becomes the mode of subjectivity; it hinges on the author's intent, while myth is a mode of objectivity, its meaning always referring back to a universal, deeper truth, despite the reader's understanding of it being ever-changing. However, this is not a widely accepted opinion. George MacDonald, for instance, would contest this understanding. In his essay 'The Fantastic Imagination' (1893), he asserts that each reader of a story 'will read its meaning after his own nature and development'. In fact, MacDonald argues it may be better for the reader to extract their own meaning from a story, because a reader's interpretation may surpass the author's intended meaning (316-7). Lewis's maxim that allegory contains only one meaning, does not necessarily signify that the reader cannot grasp a different meaning from the allegory, but it does suggest that there exists a right and wrong way of interpreting an allegory. Moreover, it insists that Lewis's own meaning is the absolute truth that can be found in his text, which in turn creates an imagined objectivity pertaining only to Lewis's infused meaning. So, if the reader is unable to grasp that meaning, the allegory will lose its purpose.

Gordon Teskey, too, would disagree with Lewis. He argues that if one focuses on a work's 'presumably inflexible meaning', one overlooks allegory's 'continuous provocation of what has been called "the restructuring of the text by each reader"' (Honig qtd. in Teskey 44). Teskey prescribes the allegory with a quality akin to Lewis's understanding of myth. Just as Lewis argued the myth takes on ever-varying meanings for each reader, so does Teskey suggest each reader interprets their own meaning, creating every-varying meanings within its

readership. Lewis's understanding of allegory carries similarities to the traditional approach of seeing the allegory as something separate from the reader's reception, a notion which Teskey criticises because part of its beauty lies in the 'iconic rudiments of an interpretation we must build for ourselves' (43). Lewis's use of allegory, within this singular mindset, points to a desire to impose one meaning on his readers. But by limiting oneself to a singular meaning, I argue that Lewis counteracts the kerygmatic intent of his work. It was in part through the gentle teasing of joy in myths that Lewis eventually was drawn to the deeper truth of God. Thus, by claiming his allegories have only one meaning, he does in turn remove its ability to resonate with different readers because it cannot appeal to the imagination in its rigid state.

We are at an impasse, for one cannot deny that Lewis desired allegory to ascend to the level of myth, which he *did* believe held ever-varying meanings and appealed to the imagination. As Lewis states, 'allegory rises to myth' when the 'single concepts' within an allegory transcend their original bounds as individual concepts and are united as a cohesive set. It is then the allegory represents principles and gives the inaccessible abstraction 'new life' (Lewis, *Allegory* 221). Essentially, Lewis appreciated allegory most when it resembled myth. However, there is a disconnect between the singular meaning of allegory and its ability to rise to myth, meaning that allegory must be able to depart from its supposed singular meaning. Teskey and MacDonald argue, and I agree, that a story can never have just one meaning because it is interpreted upon reception, and thus prescribes the readers with an ability to infer different meanings. Lewis, however, assigns this duty to the author. To him, the concepts within an allegory have one intended meaning at conception, and it is up to the author to piece these together in such a way that the reader can extract ever-varying meanings when received. I do, however, not believe there is any way of ensuring that the author is able to do this in a way that appeals to every reader. Lewis's view necessitates an audience that interprets a text in the way the author intended, creating a restricted possibility of communicating any meaning at all.

In Lewis's mind, then, allegory does not necessarily have any meaning beyond that which the author intended, creating a clear division from myth. As Barfield summarizes: allegory is "a more or less conscious hypostatization of *ideas* ... and myth the true child of Meaning, begotten on imagination" (qtd. in C. W. Starr 121). So, because myth has its origin in imagination, which allows it to reveal deeper truth and create a separate reality in which the reader is no longer oblivious to that truth, allegory will also, to Lewis, only have value insofar as its ideas work to appeal to the imagination. In *The Allegory of Love*, however, Lewis makes the following claim about allegory: 'The inner life, and specially the life of love, religion, and spiritual adventure, has ... always been the field of true allegory; for here there are intangibles

which only allegory can fix and reticences which only allegory can overcome' (*Allegory* 166). Thus, while allegory is limiting in its ability to create a transcendental reality, and does not necessarily appeal to the imagination, it can still convey a kerygmatic message.

In *The Allegory of Love*, we find echoes of what Lewis wrote in the previously mentioned 1952-edition of *Regress*, almost twenty years later: 'For the function of allegory is not to hide but to reveal, and it is properly used only for that which cannot be said, or so well said, in literal speech' (*Allegory* 166). This indicates that Lewis's opinions on the function of allegory remained the same throughout most of his writing career, which is interesting because it also shows that he continually valued the allegorical mode's ability to reveal his inner thoughts. However, as Ward claims, Lewis was a symbolist at heart. Gradually, Lewis moved away from the allegorical towards the symbolic, culminating in his last novel, *Till We Have Faces* (1956), which is regarded his most symbolic novel (Ward 31-2). Being published only four years after the third edition of *Regress*, and two decades after *The Allegory of Love*, one can assume that Lewis would have mastered the mode of allegory and its concretisation property by then, even if his first attempt was futile. Thus, the constancy in his opinion on allegory is juxtaposed in the face of his decision to write in the mode of symbolism and begs the question why he would make this choice after finally having mastered the mode of allegory.

Till We Have Faces is subtitled 'a myth retold' (Lewis, *Till Faces* iii). If the reframing of a myth about Cupid and Psyche can yield a narrative imbued with symbolism, then a symbolic narrative can surely approach myth in its characteristics. That is, however, not to say that myth and symbolism are indistinguishable. As Lewis writes myth 'is not, like truth, abstract' (*Dock* 43), it still seeks to make that which is impalpable concrete. I argue that symbolism pays no such heed, for it does not have to be primarily concrete, nor does it have to make that which is unclear clear. However, the Romantic understanding of symbolism indicates that the mode combines the abstract and concrete. This is relevant because, as Wheat writes, Lewis was a self-proclaimed 'post-Romanticism Romantic', which consequently meant his understanding of allegory was Romantic in nature and akin to that of Coleridge (23). For instance, Lewis's explanation of *visibilia* carries resemblance to Coleridge's understanding of allegory as presented in Carr's article. Coleridge said allegory is the "translation of abstract notions into a picture-language" (qtd. in Carr 172), to which Lewis would wholeheartedly agree, as described earlier. Lewis took inspiration from the Romantic idea of symbolism, then, because it allowed him to incorporate the concrete into the symbolic. But in order to understand what this idea entails, we must first grasp the Romantic understanding of allegory, because it indicates why they favoured symbolism.

Carr explains that the Romantics saw allegory as containing two non-converging lines, reflecting ‘the signifier’ and ‘its signified’. They dismissed the mode as factitious, because they believed the disunion promoted a ‘constraining and instrumental’ reality, which contradicted the ‘Romantic preferences for the organic, the infinite, and the imagination’ (Carr 171, 173). The Romantics disliked the mode because it lacked freedom and eschewed it in favour of modes that promoted a ‘freer’ reality. Indeed, as Wheat writes, the Romantics saw allegory as ‘worthwhile only insofar as it is “visionary” or rises to the level of symbolism’ (24). Only when allegory takes on characteristics belonging to other modes is it able to meet the criteria set by the Romantics. The dismissal of allegory in favour of symbolism thus indicates that symbolism does possess a reality-making property which allowed the Romantics to modify it to their ‘freer’ wishes. Carr writes that, whereas allegory was lacking in its never-converging equivalences, Coleridge understood symbolism as allowing room for both the concrete and the abstract to coincide (173). Symbolism does not separate the signifier and the signified into two different planes, meaning the mode avoids cases of incomprehensibility such as *Regress* in which the signifier and the signified are, according to Lewis, only united in his revisions. Wheat writes that Lewis too thought allegory was best when resembling symbolism, though he was not as harsh in devaluing the mode as the Romantics were (24). However, it is not surprising that Lewis gradually moved from allegory to symbolism. Being convinced that allegory only carries one meaning, Lewis found in symbolism the antidote which allows for a transfer of kerygma similar to that which is found in myth.

It is as if allegory and symbolism approach myth from different sides of a scale. Lewis retains in *The Allegory of Love*, the Coleridgean idea that the allegorist creates something ‘confessedly less real’ than the given material world, while a symbolist, in contrast, departs from their given material world ‘to find that which is more real’ (45). This respectively mirrors myth’s concretising function, and its revelation of deeper truth. Consequently, the use of allegory means that Lewis intended to create something ‘less real’ with *The Great Divorce*, and, conversely, to access something ‘more real’ when utilising the mode of symbolism in *The Last Battle*. As I wrote in the introduction, Nakao claims that Lewis was fond of indirectly conveying his thoughts in ‘forms of myth, allegory and fairy-tales which he found were the ideal forms for what he wanted to say’ (82). It follows that the mode of writing indicates intention: because Lewis intended to communicate kerygma, myth is the natural choice. But because myth is vague and unapproachable, Lewis uses allegory and symbolism to yield the same result. However, by infusing his fiction with that which resembles myth, Lewis is able to appeal to the imagination and make use of the kerygmatic quality inherent in myth.

Chapter 2 – *The Great Divorce*: Allegorical Salvation

The mode of allegory produces representations that are less real than the abstract concepts they embody, meaning the concrete representations of kerygma in the allegorical mode will also be of a substance less real than what they represent. Lewis argued that allegory was optimal for expressing ‘love, religion, and spiritual adventure’ (*Allegory* 166), meaning that what is ‘less real’ is what makes allegory optimal for this expression. I argue that Lewis chose allegory with this in mind because the concretisation makes that which is impalpable more lifelike, and thus attainable. In a kerygmatic context, allegory allows Lewis to concretise abstract concepts such as forgiveness, divine intervention, and damnation, as well as sins, such as envy, lust, and greed. By incarnating them as corporeal structures, Lewis is more readily able to use these structures as chess-pieces to physically demonstrate salvation.

That is not to say that one should try to find meaning in the concretisation itself. By supplying the third edition of *Regress* with ‘a running headline’, Lewis feared that readers would be encouraged to understand allegory merely as ‘a way of saying obscurely what could have been said more clearly’, and that his explanation would never quite grasp the meaning of the allegory (*Regress* xvi). Lewis emphasises here the importance of relinquishing the urge to intellectually understand allegory, because its purpose is to appeal to the imagination, not rational understanding. As explained in the previous chapter, it is when the allegory takes on the mythic quality of appealing to the imagination that it can reveal deeper, kerygmatic truths. In fact, Lewis believed that allegory ‘at its best’ should appeal to the imagination rather than the intellect, which in turn allows it to approach myth (*Regress* xvi). Considering how much Lewis valued ‘good’ allegory with its relation to myth, it only seems logical that he would take his own advice and create an allegory in *The Great Divorce* which does converge into myth by appealing to the imagination.

The devaluation of rationality in favour of imagination mirrors an aspect of Lewis’s own salvific process. As described previously, Lewis attempted to confront his inquiry into joy with rationality and scholarly evaluation, ultimately leaving him without any of ‘the old thrill’ of joy (Lewis, *Joy* 191-2). The intellectualisation of joy and the intellectualisation of allegory yield the same result to Lewis: when one tries to identify what it embodies, one loses sight of its meaning. The focus should not be on how the concretisations relate to abstractions, but what the translation from abstract to concrete *means* in its entirety. Lewis presents in ‘Myth Became Fact’ the opinion that any myth that is prescribed with meaning becomes allegory, for when you look for an abstract meaning, ‘the myth would be for you no true myth but a mere allegory’ (*Dock* 43). Infusing the myth with an expressed meaning defeats myth’s ability to create ever-

varying meanings, reducing it to an allegory whose meaning relies on the author's intention. One may say that allegory relates to myth much like the desire for joy first related to joy itself, and moreover, how the joy itself eventually related to God in Lewis's own life. Lewis writes in his autobiography that the desire to experience joy never generated more than images, and that these, 'if idolatrously mistaken for Joy itself, soon honestly confessed themselves inadequate. All said, in the last resort, "It is not I. I am only a reminder. Look! Look! What do I remind you of?"' (*Joy* 255-6). I am not claiming that allegory is completely like this desire, but that in comparison to myth, which Lewis believed created whole realities, allegory only initially generates images; it is the composition of these images that can amount to something akin to the meaning-making and kerygmatic ability of myth.

The Binariness of Heaven *or* Hell

The salvific doctrine in *Great Divorce* requires a distinct choice between Heaven and Hell. In its preface, Lewis writes that he does not believe there is any way to embrace both sides of the 'either-or' question: there is no 'turn[ing] evil into good' (vii). This idea bleeds through the narrative, signified by the unambiguous binarity of the gospel in the fictional afterlife, which results in the complete divorce between good and evil, and between Heaven and Hell. Salvation in *Great Divorce* is achieved when one makes the decision to cast off the non-Heavenly in order to remain in Heaven. I argue the salvific process happens in two separate planes of reality: first, in the intratextual reality, which relates to the characters' understanding of reality as it transpires in the text; and second, in the extratextual reality, which concerns the process of salvation as seen through the lens of the allegorical and symbolic modes. Though this dual reality yields the same result, for salvation cannot occur in the second plane without also occurring in the first, I argue that it contributes to the text being both an allegory and, as Barfield claims, 'a symbol of symbolism itself' (9). The two planes of reality converge in the transfiguration from ghost to Solid Person. In the characters' plane of reality, Dunai explains that the doctrine of salvation is characterised by a 'gradual and often painful process of acquiring self-awareness', made necessary by the characters' varying aspects of possessiveness, pride, and worldliness, of which they must truly repent (11). It is when the ghosts truly repent or submit to divine intervention that they receive salvation and are able to turn into Solid People. Likewise, in the literary plane, the act of transforming from ghosts to Solid People happens when the ghosts transgress the limits of their allegorical state and become symbols. In this plane, salvation occurs at the point where allegory becomes symbol.

Only once in *Great Divorce* do we witness such a salvation of a ghost. The narrator observes that the ghost in question has a little, red lizard on his shoulder, and witnesses the conversation that transpires between these two creatures and an angel (Lewis, *Great Divorce* 106). In *The Allegory of Love*, Lewis claims that it is impossible to speak and think about ‘inner conflicts’ without using metaphors, such as ‘fight[ing] against “Temptation”’, to explore the inner world (*Allegory* 60-1). The lizard in *Great Divorce* is whispering things into the ghost’s ear, personifying the ghost’s inner conflict of lust. The ghost does not possess the self-awareness in the intratextual plane to understand the necessity of divine intervention. The angel repeatedly asks the ghost if he can kill the lizard, but, as the ghost replies, ““You’d kill *me* if you did”” (Lewis, *Great Divorce* 108-9). In keeping it alive, the lizard affects the ghost’s extratextual reality: he ironically claims that the ghost is a real man, and that the Solid Person is ““a cold, bloodless abstract thing”” (Lewis, *Great Divorce* 110). If the ghost believed this contradictory reality of Heaven, he would never have been able to become truly real. Once the ghost allows the angel to kill the lizard, the ghost begins to grow solid and the lizard is reincarnated as a great stallion (Lewis, *Great Divorce* 111). In defying the lizard’s claims, the ghost’s intratextual reality is transfigured. Whereas the ghost was literally under the allegorical representation of his immorality, he is after the transformation able to command his desire to faster ascend the mountains of Heaven.

This need for self-awareness in the intratextual plane, combined with the extratextual transformation means that when an allegory approaches symbolism it must become introspective. The ability to transform into a symbol rests on the individual character’s ability to recognise what abstraction they represent, and repent of it. In the intratextual reality, it is when the characters are made aware of their sin that the ‘looming “either/or”’ question must be answered. However, the characters of the novel are rarely able to deny themselves long enough or to a degree where they are able to attain the necessary self-awareness. For instance, the Big Ghost, as Dunai argues, has an issue with Heaven’s ‘disregard for earthly systems of value’ (13). The Big Ghost’s sense of justice is offended when he learns that his acquaintance Len, who was a murderer on Earth, has received forgiveness in Heaven. As the Big Ghost argues, ““I done my best all my life, see? I done my best by everyone”” (Lewis, *Great Divorce* 27). It is the Big Ghost’s envy, Dunai argues, that gradually has ‘turned him away from the path to paradise’ (13-4). In the extratextual plane, however, the Big Ghost is not merely feeling envious or boastful, he is a concretisation of those concepts; he *is* envy and he *is* self-praise. In this allegorical state, Len argues that the Big Ghost’s ““feet will never grow hard enough to walk on our grass”” (Lewis, *Great Divorce* 29). The blindness on the intratextual level hinders a

transformation of the Big Ghost on the extratextual level. In this way, as Raiger argues, Lewis uses ‘tropes of allegory and symbol’ to depict ‘the Christian understanding of sin and redemption’ (110). The interaction between allegory and symbolism creates a self-reflexive comment on Christianity by highlighting the stubbornness of the allegorical ghosts in face of the symbolic angles.

However, whereas I claim that *Great Divorce* remains mostly an allegory due to the lack of transformation, Raiger, borrowing Barfield’s words, concludes that it is “‘a symbol of symbolism itself’” (qtd. in Raiger 129). In fact, Raiger claims Lewis’s development from the allegorical to the symbolic is completed in *Great Divorce*, and that it is ‘an updated version of [*Regress*], with the allegorical elements subsumed into the symbolic in a more effective manner’ (124). Raiger does not spend any time detailing the connections between the two, but claims that *Great Divorce* takes on primarily symbolic functions. However, if Lewis wrote *Great Divorce* to rectify the mistakes of *Regress*, it makes little sense for Lewis to abandon the allegorical mode altogether. Raiger does not dismiss all allegorical understanding, but when Lewis claimed *Great Divorce* to be “‘a fantasy’” in its preface, Raiger takes this as ‘a grand claim for its status as a form of symbolism’, because its images represent a realer realm, namely that of spirituality (120). Indeed, when the characters exit the bus, the narrator explains that the people suddenly appear transparent, not because they had changed, but because the surroundings were of a different quality (Lewis, *Great Divorce* 20-1). The people, now ghosts, have in the realm of spirituality been reduced to something that appears less real than their surroundings. While this may be symbolic of the relationship between the sinner and Heaven, because Heaven is of a ‘realer’ quality, one can also, as the narrator says, see ‘the whole phenomenon the other way around’ (Lewis, *Great Divorce* 21), and understand the ghosts as allegories. Just as Lewis explained that the allegorist takes that which is given and makes it ‘confessedly less real’ (*Allegory* 45), so has the bus ride to Heaven quite literally made the people less real by reducing them to phantoms.

In Heaven, the ghosts are met by a host of Solid People. The ghosts are given the choice to acclimate to Heaven by surrendering to forgiveness, or to return to Hell in the grey town. Raiger argues that in *Great Divorce* the modes of symbolism and allegory are illustrated respectively through the characters’ choice of Heaven or Hell. When the ghosts choose Heaven, they are ‘pointing through images to a world more real than the physical’, whilst the choice of Hell points ‘to a fictional realm in which a person is reduced to a thin shadow of itself’ (Raiger 121-2). In this way, the ghosts who choose Heaven and thereby become Solid People approach the reality of symbolism, while the ghosts who return to Hell are stuck in their allegorical

realities. The characters decide if they want to remain ‘frigid personifications’ of allegories, or turn into something that is not concrete in the allegorical sense, but concrete in the newfound ‘realer’ reality. Thus, as Raiger writes, the characters are given the ‘choice in determining [their] own relation to the world’ (130), and consequently how ‘real’ they want to be. If the characters make the decision to become solid, their characterisation becomes symbolic because they materialise as heavenly people, and thus become more real than their ghost-forms.

It is as if Lewis has introduced a new dimension of reality. As the narrator recounts, it was ‘a larger *sort* of space ... which made the Solar System itself seem an indoor affair’ (Lewis, *Great Divorce* 20). Whereas the allegorical deals with concrete and abstract domains, or materiality and immateriality, Lewis’s Heaven and its symbolism introduce a layer of reality which reflects both the abstract and concrete in one solid dimension. The setting is symbolic because of the coexistence of the abstract and concrete in one plane, but its characters are allegorical, because they only exist in one plane at one time, first as ghosts that are unable to live in Heaven, then, if they choose it, as Solid People who belong to the solid plane. In this way, *Great Divorce* is both a symbol of symbolism and allegory alike, and its classification as either allegory or symbolism becomes important because the characters’ eschatology, and thus the narrative’s kerygmatic message, is contingent on the connection between the two modes.

However, I contest that *Great Divorce* is primarily symbolic, for while it does contain symbolic elements, it remains mainly allegorical. First of all, the narrator’s description of his fellow bus passengers indicates a literal rigidity: ‘They were all fixed faces, full not of possibilities but impossibilities ... One had a feeling that they might fall to pieces at any moment’ (Lewis, *Great Divorce* 17). It induces a sense of concreteness akin to that of the allegory, without any secure promise of transformation, and indicates that a reduction from man to ghost has taken place. This reduction is further highlighted when the Big Ghost whom the narrator first refers to as ‘he’, is reduced to an ‘it’ when he rejects the Solid Person Len’s intervention (Lewis, *Great Divorce* 26, 31). Upon refusing Heaven, the ghost loses his final hold on humanity, and is reduced to nothing more than grumbling bitterness.

Indeed, when the characters exit the bus, they are one by one confronted with their sins, as in the case of the Big Ghost, and in turn prove to be concretisations of those sins, meaning that the characters must literally deny their very own being in order to accept salvation. The ghost who once was ‘a well-dressed woman’, for instance, is quite literally losing face as a result of her vanity. She does not feel good enough, and asks, “‘How can I go out like this among a lot of people with real solid bodies?’” (Lewis, *Great Divorce* 60). The irony is that she is, in her new state as a ghost, too visible and too transparent at the same time. She feels

shame because “they’ll see right *through* me”, and because “they’ll *see* me” (Lewis, *Great Divorce* 60-1), exemplifying how her vanity has made her obsessed with how she appears to others. She refuses to join the Solid Person on a journey into Heaven, because she cannot stand the supposed shame of being transparent, yet she takes no action to become more solid.

Another example is the Dwarf and the Tragedian who are the split allegorical representation of self-pity. The two ghosts represent one person: the Dwarf is the ghost of the earthly person, with ‘the sort of face he must have had when he was a man’ (Lewis, *Great Divorce* 122), while the Tragedian is the personification of the man’s self-pity. The Dwarf holds on to the Tragedian by a chain, and through it, receives everything the Solid Person says as ridicule. In letting his self-pity grow, the Dwarf begins ‘growing smaller’, and eventually, as the narrator relates, ‘The Dwarf was now so small that I could not distinguish him from the chain to which he was clinging’ (Lewis, *Great Divorce* 130-1). The Dwarf is convinced that he is of no worth to the Solid Person, and in turn, the Tragedian slowly overtakes his entire persona, causing his true self to vanish to the point where the Tragedian is the only part of him that remains visible. Because the ghosts entertain the sinful natures they possessed in their old reality of Earth, they are unable to exist in the newfound reality of Heaven.

This leads me to the second aspect of why I argue *Great Divorce* is mainly allegorical. The symbolic aspect of *Great Divorce* is only attainable when the ghosts choose to become Solid People. Because most of them choose to return to Hell, and therefore remain in the realm of allegories, the symbolic aspect of the narrative is made inaccessible. The artist ghost, for instance, literally vanishes into thin air when he decides to leave Heaven once he realises he is “already completely forgotten on Earth” (Lewis, *Great Divorce* 87). By rejecting existence in the newfound reality of Heaven, his disappearance becomes an allegorical representation of the fact that he has disappeared from all earthly memory. Raiger argues that this ‘is a figural representation of the mode of allegory, the transformation of a reality into a fiction’ (121). Instead of taking on the symbolic quality of becoming ‘more real’, whatever reality the artist retained in his ghostly state is reduced to that which is even ‘less real’ in the act of disappearing. Thus, in their embodiment of specific sins, the ghosts are reduced to creatures without any real depth beyond this singular characteristic, creating two-dimensional sinners who cannot affect their surroundings until they take on the solidness of symbolism. This is further exemplified when the narrator ‘tried to pluck a daisy ... but it wouldn’t twist’, or when he observes another ghost ‘feverishly trying to fill his pockets with the apples’ (Lewis, *Great Divorce* 21, 48). The ghosts are unable to affect the Heavenly realm in any significant way until they deny themselves long enough to transform into Solid People.

The characters are confronted with their allegorical states because they are invited to take on a symbolic layer of becoming ‘more real’ in Heaven. In this way, their allegorical states are juxtaposed with the solidity of Heaven, causing their salvific journeys to fork in two. As Dunai argues, the characters are mainly hindered in entering Heaven due to three main barriers, namely possessiveness, pride, and the ‘firm adherence to earthly systems of justice and reward’. Combined, Dunai argues that these three barriers create a doctrine of salvation in which introspection and ‘true repentance’ are the stepping stones to attainment (11). The characters’ salvific journeys hinge on their ability to assimilate to the country they now inhabit; they must transform from concretisations of sins into solid personas by accepting the divine intervention necessary to truly repent. Thus, their allegorical states are necessary for Lewis to communicate a doctrine of salvation in which transfiguration happens through self-denial and forgiveness.

In this way, the transfiguration of salvation appears both attainable and unattainable. The gentle coaching of the Solid People, signifies that salvation is only one very small choice away, such as in the case of the formerly well-dressed woman who is urged to take the step into “infinite happiness”, and is promised that “An hour hence ... you will not care” (Lewis, *Great Divorce* 61). However, almost all of the ghosts seem unable to take the required leap of faith. As Dunai writes, Lewis ‘does not insist upon closure or finality in his representation of his unruly guests to paradise’ (11). The uncertainty, as well as possibility, of transfiguration means that *Great Divorce* tinkers on the edge between allegory and symbolism, and that the two modes at times will bleed into each other. Raiger argues, and I agree, that the fusion of allegory and symbolism in *Great Divorce* can be understood as a meta indication of the ‘division between the early and later Lewis’ (129). However, Raiger argues that the allegorical representation in *Great Divorce* is present primarily as a critique of his failed allegorical endeavour in *Regress*, while the added symbolic representation gives ‘a vision of the sublime end of human desire’ that was never present in *Regress* (129). I argue, however, that the combination of allegory and symbolism is a literary device in itself, and not a mere correction of previous works. As I have previously mentioned, Lewis believed that ‘love, religion, and spiritual adventure’ particularly lends itself to the mode of allegory, for through its concreteness it articulates the ‘intangibles’ which are elsewhere inexpressible (*Allegory* 166). The consequence is therefore an insistence on the need for the mode of allegory to convey the value of symbolism in the narrative: without the bus passengers starting out as ghosts, there would not be a need for salvific transfiguration.

By introducing the symbolic mode as something attainable, yet subsequently remaining in the allegorical mode throughout the narrative, Lewis is utilising the modes themselves to

communicate kerygma, and to point towards the ‘realer reality’ that awaits those who choose to receive salvation. The ghosts’ earthly lives, if they choose Heaven, will always have been symbolic of the reality they can experience in Heaven, but if they choose Hell, they will always be mere allegories representing sins. This means, as Raiger argues, that the transformation from ghost to Solid Person ‘is symbolic of the act of symbolism itself’ (120). When the allegorical representations become symbols, the ghosts’ newfound status as Solid People will permeate their past and cast it in a different light, meaning the time they spent as mere allegories loses all importance. But then again, this only happens once in the entire book.

The Solidity of Heaven

Having argued that *Great Divorce* remains mostly allegorical in its depiction of salvation, I propose that the question of whether Heaven itself in *Great Divorce* is allegorical or symbolic remains for the individual reader to answer. In Lewis’s understanding of allegorists and symbolists, Heaven can only be symbolic if Lewis himself left ‘the given’ to represent that which is ‘more real’ (Lewis, *Allegory* 45). It is this perspective Barfield seems to have adopted. Following the scientific revolution, the idea of factuality and truth hinges on ‘the overriding importance of solidity in our estimate of what constitutes reality’, and thus, argues Barfield, Lewis is able to marry fact and myth in Heaven’s solidity by using ‘*materiality itself* to symbolise immateriality’ (Barfield 7-8). By using that which is the symbol of reality, namely solidity, to depict Heaven, Lewis proposes that Heaven is the ‘realist’ reality there is. In doing so, he very literally creates something ‘more real’, because he introduces a new level of realness as an alternative to the ghosts’ experiences on Earth.

However, this can be understood as an allegorical representation as well. Lewis uses something extremely concrete, solidity itself, to encapsulate the abstract realm of Heaven. There is no guarantee that what Lewis is depicting actually represents the reality that awaits in a supposed afterlife. The creation of a ‘more real’ level of reality by using materiality can in fact be understood as the most concrete allegorical depiction of the book, for it makes concrete that which is completely unknown, namely the afterlife. Moreover, in the preface to *Great Divorce*, Lewis was very adamant about its status as ‘a fantasy’, writing that ‘the transmortal conditions are solely an imaginative supposal: they are not even a guess or speculation at what may actually await us’ (*Great Divorce* x). So, Lewis also denies that he attempted to create something real, meaning he did not intentionally set out to create a symbolic representation of Heaven.

Thus, any allegorical or symbolic understanding of Heaven's solidity depends on whether the reader believes in the existence of Heaven or not. Lewis writes in *The Allegory of Love* that 'the world which we mistake for reality is the flat outline of that which elsewhere veritably is in all the round of its unimaginable dimensions' (45). In symbolism, one seeks to access the dimensional reality, because it will be 'more real' than the flat outline. By claiming that Heaven is of a different, more solid quality, or in the words of the spirit of MacDonald, that "Heaven is reality itself" (Lewis, *Great Divorce* 70), the Heavenly reality becomes that which is 'more real'. As the spirit of MacDonald explains, when a ghost attains Heaven, past grievances "take on the quality of Heaven" (Lewis, *Great Divorce* 69). For the ghosts who choose Heaven, whatever reality they have experienced previously on Earth or in the grey town will have been the flat outline of the dimensional reality of Heaven. In this sense, as Raiger argues, the 'realer' reality of Heaven is 'a form of symbolism as Lewis defines it' (120). Likewise, if the reader assumes an understanding similar to Raiger's claim, the reality one currently lives in will be 'the given', and the narrative of Heaven becomes the symbolic expression of that which awaits those who are convinced by this.

However, if one does not accept Heaven as reality itself, it will merely be a concrete representation of hypothetical afterlife. The solidity will be no more than an allegory, or a 'mode of expression' (Lewis, *Allegory* 48), of the abstract concept of Heaven. This difference of understanding is perhaps best illustrated in the apostate ghost. The ghost ridicules the Solid Person, Dick, for having believed in "a literal Heaven and Hell" when they lived on Earth (Lewis, *Great Divorce* 34). In rejecting that he is standing in Heaven, the ghost also rejects Heaven's reality and solidity. He is not looking for anything "superstitious or mythological" (Lewis, *Great Divorce* 34), meaning that to him, only that which is rational has any true value. As the Solid Person says, "you have experienced truth only with the abstract intellect" (Lewis, *Great Divorce* 40), and he has not yet opened himself up to the imagination that invites any deeper truth. The insistence on a wholly rational point of view limits the ghost from understanding that he is standing in Heaven, or that he was previously in Hell. By rejecting any mythic understanding, the apostate ghost in effect removes the possibility of Heaven and Hell's existence. That is of course not to say that the reader who understands Heaven in *Great Divorce* as an allegory and the apostate ghost are the same, or that they are condemned to the same destiny, for as Dunai explains, while the ghost's intellectualisation thwarts his salvation, it does not hinder damnation (15). The ghost will certainly arrive at a destination sooner or later, and by avoiding the either-or, the choice of Hell is made for him. The reader is of course not

condemned to this same conclusion, but it does determine how one accepts the possibility of Lewis's narrative and its relation to reality.

But what is Heaven of *Great Divorce* if not even a guess at the real thing? The use of solidity to concretise that which is 'most real' points to an on-the-nose critique beyond the discussion of the possible existence of Heaven. I propose that this purpose is to communicate the possibility of a reality in which the mythical is completely rational. As Barfield argues, through *Great Divorce*, Lewis counteracted the vagueness of the 'mushy intellectual milieu' by providing a definite 'either/or' (7). This is observed in the question of whether one accepts Heaven as reality or not, as in the example of the apostate ghost, but also, as Dunai argues, in 'the necessity of choosing to reside either in heaven or hell' (8), which is a question all the ghosts must answer. While the apostate ghost rejects all mythic understanding, he admits to still believing in Heaven and Hell "in a spiritual sense, to be sure" (Lewis, *Great Divorce* 34). Raiger takes this as a satiric juxtaposition of the adoration of myth with the denial of God (117). The ghost refuses to acknowledge God as fact and Heaven as reality, because the supernatural aspect of it seems implausible, posing an ironic contradiction. His concrete body has already supernaturally transformed into a spirit, causing the disconnect between his rational thought process and mythic corporeality to concretise the split between the rational and mythic understandings. As Barfield writes, myth and matters of the spirit, what we now term "the unconscious", were once an accepted part of the collective consciousness (8). If the apostate ghost opened up to this consciousness, he would be able to acknowledge that God and Heaven are facts, because it would not be a contradiction. Through the apostate ghost, then, Lewis is critiquing the dismissal of the mythic consciousness, and in so doing, reintroduces the collective unconsciousness as a possibility. This is also represented in Heaven's solidity, which is the 'realist' element of the novel, despite being filled with distinctly mythic qualities, such as the ghosts, angels, speaking waterfalls, and even a herd of unicorns (Lewis, *Great Divorce* 49, 62).

It is this disconnect between Heaven's solidity and mythopoeic property that interests Barfield. To Barfield, the world of mythopoeia, 'where everything *flows*', poses a stark contrast to Lewis's solid world, which is marked by 'cause-and-effect' (7). The mythic follows a rigid set of rules, as exemplified in the banishment of those who resist Heaven, and, as Barfield argues, in the omnipresent question of Heaven *or* Hell (Barfield 7-8). Indeed, the temporal reality of Lewis's Heaven disqualifies the characters from accepting salvation gradually, for as a Solid Person fittingly declares, "There is no other day. All days are present now ... This moment contains all moments" (Lewis, *Great Divorce* 108-9). Heaven *or* Hell becomes the omnipresent and inescapable 'either-or' question that seeps through the narrative. This is

underlined further by the fact that Heaven is inhospitable to the ghosts who visit. The wonders of the garden are unattainable, and thus renders the revelations of the garden useless without submitting to its binary nature. In this way, Lewis argues a combination of the mythic and rational over the dismissal of one in favour of the other.

Indeed, *Great Divorce* is a testament to Lewis's love for the mythopoeic. Upon entering into Heaven, the narrator's description carries similarities to Lewis's account of the 'baptism of his imagination'. As Lewis writes in his autobiography about reading *Phantastes* by George MacDonald for the first time:

It is as if I were carried sleeping across the frontier, or as if I had died in the old country and could never remember how I came alive in the new. For in one sense the new country was exactly like the old. ... But in another sense all was changed. I did not yet know (and I was long in learning) the name of the quality, the bright shadow, that rested on the travels of Anodos. I do now. It was Holiness. (Lewis, *Joy* 207)

A similar paragraph can be found in *Great Divorce* when the narrator first meets the spirit of MacDonald and explains how *Phantastes* brought him 'New Life' and 'Holiness' (Lewis, *Great Divorce* 66-7). But the points of interest are the similarities it carries to the narrator's description of Heaven. His fellow bus passengers, for instance, 'were as they had already been'. Even the surroundings appeared the same as on Earth. The sunrise, for instance, 'were like those of the summer morning', but again 'there was a certain difference' (Lewis, *Great Divorce* 19-20). Heaven is in some ways the same as Earth, but at the same time, 'a larger sort of space' (Lewis, *Great Divorce* 20), much in the same way *Phantastes* introduced to Lewis something larger than the materiality around him by opening his imagination to the mythic consciousness. Thus, as Raiger argues, *Great Divorce* is the culmination of the struggle between the 'two Lewises' – the analytical and the mythopoeic (114), and urges the unification of the two. This is apparent in Lewis's depiction of Heaven as a completely rational place, visible first in the looming either-or question that decides the characters' eschatology, and secondly through the meta use of materiality to create a 'truer' reality. This rationality makes the mythic plausible in its concreteness, but the mythic is necessary for the rationality to function. The mythical conveys some of that Holiness which allows both the narrator to recognise the connections between Heaven and Earth, and the ghosts to defy their bounds as allegorical concretisations.

Chapter 3 – *The Last Battle*: Supposal and Symbolic Salvation

A person's existence as it appears in our perceived reality is only a mere imitation of an existence that is truly real, argues Lewis. He summarises 'what Christianity is about' in the following way: 'This world is a great sculptor's shop. We are the statues and there is a rumour going round the shop that some of us are some day going to come to life' (*Mere Christianity* 159). In this analogy, the two realities appear separate because the 'statues' are aware of the possibility that there is something 'more' out there, but are not necessarily able to attain it. Lewis calls the first reality in which the statues, or people, exist in their natural state, biological life or *Bios*, which denotes that which depends on 'subsidies from Nature in form of air, water, food' and so on. The second, spiritual life or *Zoe*, denotes 'the higher and different sort of life that exists in God'. Lewis continues that *Bios* may bear symbolic resemblance to *Zoe*, but moving from one to the other necessitates 'as big a change as a statue which changed from being a carved stone to being a real man' (*Mere Christianity* 159). One may say that that which is biological is the copy of spiritual life, which is the archetype. This posits a connection between the two concepts, and an ability to access one from the other. As Richard L. Clarke explains, Lewis saw the connection between *Bios* and *Zoe* as 'a question that demands an answer' (46). This is where symbolism comes in; it serves to reveal how our biological reality relates to God's spiritual reality, creating a kerygmatic understanding of how the copy imitates the archetype.

However, as Clarke explains, Lewis terms the depiction of the supernatural in the natural *transposition* (47). This is not exactly symbolic, because according to Lewis it was 'not adequate in all cases to cover the relation between the higher medium and its transposition in the lower'. Rather he claims it to be *sacramental* (Lewis, *Weight of Glory* 23-4). Yet, as Clarke says, Lewis uses *transposition*, *symbolism*, and *sacramentalism* interchangeably when talking of how the supernatural is represented in the natural (48). In the definition of symbolism and sacramentalism in *The Allegory of Love*, for instance, Lewis indicates that the two concepts are one and the same. Therefore, I will use the term symbolism to denote this depiction between the supernatural and natural. As stated previously, Lewis saw symbolism as accessing something 'more real' than the given, perceived reality around us, but this means that that which is 'more real' is accessible. Moreover, Lewis conflated the act of symbolism, that is, discovering the archetype in the copy, with sacramentalism. After having established this connection, Lewis writes in *The Allegory of Love* that symbolism originated in Greece with Plato, who expressed that 'All visible things exist just in so far as they succeed in imitating the Forms' (45-6). As Clarke explains, Plato believed that everything in our world imitates a

“world of ideal forms”. Moreover, that ideal world ‘is the true reality and, thus, the standard by which this illusory world is to be measured’ (Clarke 34). Lewis’s argument that the symbolist sees our perceived reality as an allegory of that which is ‘more real’ bears resemblance to Plato’s understanding of the ideal world. In the Platonic sense, symbolism serves to reveal how our perceived reality imitates the realm of Forms.

Indeed, Clarke argues that Lewis was a Platonist at heart (29), and Raiger concludes that Lewis’s sacramental symbolism and its depiction of a deeper reality are based on Platonic metaphysics (122). While Raiger may be correct in thinking Lewis’s idea of symbolism as sacrament originated in Plato, I argue that Lewis did not necessarily agree with Plato in dismissing imitations as imperfect. As Clarke explains, Plato’s metaphysics are ‘bifurcated’ in that he saw both physical objects and mathematical concepts as ‘flawed imitations or *reflections* of the corresponding ideal forms’ (34). To Plato, the imitation will never be as perfect as the idea it represents, and the separation between the idea and imitation is unchangeable. However, I argue that Lewis’s understanding of the connection between true reality and its imitations was not one of critical nature, but rather a kerygmatic belief that God uses these imitations to communicate with man. Indeed, as Douglas B. Miller explains, Lewis believed that God could provide an author with material concerning divinity, but the author can never create something that transcends its confines as ‘an *imitation*’ (4). Thus, Lewis agreed with Plato that there exists a truer reality than the given reality, and that the given is filled with imitations of the truer one.

Lewis’s understanding of archetypes, then, is closely connected with the Platonic understanding of the world of Forms. If the symbolist’s task is to reveal that which is more real, then symbolism must attempt to reunite the imitation with its original Form. In the Christian mindset, this act becomes sacramental, for through it, the symbolist accesses the realm of which God possesses knowledge and in connecting imitation to Form – or in Lewis’s terms, in connecting *Bios* to *Zoe* – the symbolist reveals reality as it relates to universal truth. I argue that incorporating mythical structures into a rational world is a form of symbolism, because the mythic imitates the Forms in a different way than our perceived reality imitates the Forms. The composition of both imitations in one mode of writing creates a more complete imitation of the Forms. As Lewis said, in myth “we do not retreat from reality: we rediscover it” (qtd. in S. C. Lee 19). Thus, by appealing to mythical structures, one recomposes the ordinary through a lens akin to myth, giving it a realer essence than the one found in our perceived reality.

The question becomes how one can know that the combination of the mythical and rational creates something ‘more real’. I return again to Barfield who argued that the collective consciousness originally relied on both atomic and mythic understandings of the world. Barfield

argues that the mythic consciousness has now become what we call “the unconscious”, and that this is a ‘symbolic type of consciousness’ (8). If the mythic consciousness is symbolic, and symbolism creates connections between *Bios* and *Zoe*, then the collective consciousness must resemble *Zoe* because it brings both the atomic, or rational, and mythic consciousness together. I therefore believe that Lewis saw the mythical and rational as two sides of the same coin of *Bios*, and that the unification of the two more readily imitates the true essence of *Zoe*. Additionally, symbolism creates a plane in which both the abstract and concrete can exist, as described in the first chapter. This does not mean that *Bios* equals all that is concrete, nor that the archetypal *Zoe* are merely abstractions, because Plato would deny that symbolism can perfectly represent or reveal the Forms. Besides, while Lewis saw *Zoe* as describing the eternal life of God, and claims that one can ascend to it (*Mere Christianity* 159), I do not think he would argue that *Zoe* can be fully realised in the realm of *Bios*. However, if symbolism, or rather, sacramentalism, hinges on the coexistence of the abstract and concrete in one plane, that must mean that this coexistence contributes to the attainability of *Zoe* because it facilitates a ‘truer’ representation than that which is only *Bios* in quality.

The Creatures of Heaven, Earth, and Narnia

I argue that the co-existence of the concrete and the abstract in the same plane was one of the reasons Lewis utilised the mode of symbolism when writing the *Narnia* series. The co-existence allows for a more accurate representation of souls, because whatever is trapped in the abstract in the given reality, or in the concrete in allegory, is expressible as one in symbolism. Seung Chun Lee argues that Lewis took inspiration from Tolkien’s ideas on the representation of souls when writing *Narnia* (19). As Lewis asks in his essay titled ‘Tolkien’s *The Lord of the Rings*’ in *On Stories: And Other Essays on Literature* (1966): “‘why, if you have a serious comment to make on the real life of men, must you do it by talking about a phantasmagoric never-never land of your own?’” Lewis answers his own question by claiming that ‘the real life of men is of that mythical and heroic quality’ (*On Stories* 89). The mythical aspect of Narnia becomes necessary to accurately depict ‘the real life of men’, because the soul cannot be completely grasped in the rational consciousness of our world or in the concrete embodiment of allegories. Yet again, he partly mirrors Plato, who, according to Clarke, believed the soul and the body were separate objects because the soul embodies the Forms more readily when not trapped in corporeality (53). In the land of Narnia, then, those Narnians who are non-human are closer to

the Form they imitate in the archetypal realm, because Lewis allows for the representation of the soul in physical terms.

Isolated, this becomes a form of allegory, but because the characters retain abstract qualities they are not reduced to mere allegories, such as the Big Ghost's reduction to an 'it' in *Great Divorce*. However, as S. C. Lee writes, the 'mythic and heroic quality' is only expressible in what Lewis called 'imagined "visible souls" which wear "their insides and the outsides"' (Lewis qtd. in S. C. Lee 19). In *The Voyage of the Dawn Treader* (1955), for instance, Lewis writes that because Eustace slept 'on a dragon's hoard with greedy, dragonish thoughts in his heart, he had become a dragon himself' (73). Eustace wakes up physically draped in his abstract thoughts. The concretisations represented in *Narnia* do not reduce the characters to something less, but symbolically transforms them into something 'more'. This mirrors one of Lewis's own recommendations: instead of realistically portraying "'character delineation'", one can 'mak[e] the character an elf, a dwarf, or a hobbit' (*On Stories* 89). In this way, Lewis partly contends Plato's distinction between soul and body, but keeps the property it has of relating to the archetypal realm. In this way, the mythic aspect of *Narnia* allows for an expression of the realness of mankind because it combines corporeality with that which resembles the Forms.

The connection between body and soul suggests that the characters' eschatology is visible in their physical depictions. This does not mean that the characters cannot receive salvation if their bodies portray the 'wrong' features, but it suggests that a renewal of the mind is necessary to be saved. It is as if the body represents the characters' outsets, and the changing, or unchanging, attitude of their minds decides their salvation. This correlates with S. C. Lee's claim that Lewis saw mythic stories as 'liberat[ing] human being's Archetypes' (19). When a story incorporates a symbolic image by embodying an archetype, it liberates the characters' truer selves by creating a composition of both mythic and rational qualities. From this, I propose that salvation in *The Last Battle* happens in the symbolic transformation of the mind, when the imagination more readily reflects *Zoe* by adopting the collective consciousness of the mythic and the rational.

Thus, I do not think the salvation happens when the characters enter into the new *Narnia* through the stable door, as several of them do in the final chapters of *Last Battle*, for one can remain blind to *Zoe* despite being fully exposed to it. The Dwarfs are an example of this. Their stubbornness is concretely represented in their small, yet strong, physical build, and further exemplified in the repeated declaration that "'The Dwarfs are for the Dwarfs'" (Lewis, *Last Battle* 72, 74, 120, 140). In the symbolic sense, the Dwarfs' true selves are marked by a tenacity to do what they believe serves them best, and, as Tirian says, they are 'enemies, as likely as

not' (Lewis, *Last Battle* 63). When the Dwarfs pass through the stable door into the new Narnia, they are unable to comprehend that they are anywhere but inside a stable (Lewis, *Last Battle* 136-7). They can neither see, nor smell the garden, signalling that they have remained in *Bios*, though they are in *Zoe*. The salvation in *Last Battle* must therefore rely on something else. As Aslan explains, the Dwarfs' "'prison is only in their own minds, yet they are in that prison; and so afraid of being taken in that they cannot be taken out"' (Lewis, *Last Battle* 140). The Dwarfs' eschatology is tied to their imagination, and they cannot open their minds to the possibility of the new Narnia. Thus, the kerygmatic aspect of symbolism lies in this case in its appeal to, and transformation of, the imagination.

Conversely, the act of 'de-symbolisation' will have a damning quality, apparent when the Narnians are judged by Aslan in the final chapters of *Last Battle*. Those whom Aslan permit can pass through the door to the new Narnia, but the rest are dismissed and disappear into Aslan's 'huge black shadow' (Lewis, *Last Battle* 144). In this final judgement, the narrator explains that the talking bears who were dismissed ceased to be talking bears, becoming 'just ordinary animals' (Lewis, *Last Battle* 144). They become purely natural creatures without any mythic qualities because they are dismissed from divinity. Said another way, they are barred from *Zoe* and their *Bios* takes over because the mythic is altogether excluded. They are 'de-symbolised' and become 'less real', removing them from salvation. Susan Pevensie, too, is a victim of this. She "'is no longer a friend of Narnia"' because she is too preoccupied with "'nylons and lipstick and invitations"' (Lewis, *Last Battle* 128). Susan's newfound aesthetic interests create an 'outside' that reflects an 'inside' occupied with impermanent beauty, and once again, the adherence to a wholly rational mindset removes the attainability of the eternal reality.

Susan's case is juxtaposed with the description of the eventual transformation of the other earthly people. When Tirian finally enters the stable, he is met by 'Seven Kings and Queens ... all with crowns on their heads and all in glittering clothes'. They turn out to be the children who at various points travelled to Narnia from Earth, but they have all taken on an ageless quality. Polly, for instance, should be an old woman by now, but has 'no grey hairs on her head and no wrinkles on her cheek' (Lewis, *Last Battle* 126-7). This means that their royalty better represents their 'true forms'. Moreover, they are no longer limited by their earthly bodies, and 'even fat little Puzzle and short-legged Poggin the Dwarf' are able to keep up with Jewel the Unicorn when he begins running towards the mountains in new Narnia (Lewis, *Last Battle* 161). Their 'insides' no longer produce outsides that yield varying degrees of physical ability. They have ascended to a realer realm, in which their old physical imitations no longer have any

power, meaning their new depictions as Kings and Queens prove that they are legitimate heirs to the new Narnia.

Thus, the characters' eschatology does not hinge on their physical embodiments, though it originally represented their 'insides'. Said another way, the characters of *Last Battle* are not limited by their concretisations. Emeth the Calormene, for instance, is described as 'young and tall and slender, and even beautiful in the dark, haughty, Calormene way' (Lewis, *Last Battle* 105). This poses a contrast to how the other Calormene men are described. They are, 'unlike the fair-haired men of Narnia ... dark, bearded men', and their country is described as 'great and cruel' (Lewis, *Last Battle* 25). Being worshippers of Tash, their skin colours become a racist concretisation of their beliefs. Emeth, however, is on a righteous quest to find truth, and is able to receive salvation because he abandons his dedication to Tash when he rationally understands Aslan as 'the Glorious One', yet he does not dismiss the almost mythic "'marvel of marvels, that he called me Beloved'" in the process (Lewis, *Last Battle* 153-5). His salvation was not contingent on his concrete embodiment, nor on his misconceptions about Tash, but rather on the act of accepting the transformation of his imagination.

The Realms of Heaven, Earth, and Narnia

Jessica Fulton Lee claims that in *Narnia*, 'Lewis sets the stage for questions about how the modern world, fairy-tale, and God relate to one another' through the culmination of three different realities – the reality of war-time England, the reality of the mythical in old Narnia, and the final, 'Eternal reality' in new Narnia (6). By extending the primary reality with the mythic reality, Lewis attempts to create a realer reality, because the combination allows us to more readily access the eternal reality of *Zoe*. As Barfield argues in his article on *Great Divorce*, the scientific revolution excluded the mythical from "'common sense'", yet, Lewis felt most at home in the 'mythic, symbolic type of consciousness' (8). This is apparent in the mythical structure of *Narnia*. As Nathan C. Starr explains, Aslan refers to both Earth and Narnia as "'the Shadowlands'", meaning that neither region 'reveal[s] the pure essence of divine creation' on its own (13). Yet, through the incorporation of mythical elements, such as talking beasts and realm-jumping, Lewis creates a world in which the mythical consciousness can be understood as an addition to the rational consciousness, creating an appeal to the imagination from which the 'pure essence of divine creation' can more readily flow.

In accepting *Narnia* as a representation in which the mythical consciousness has not been dismissed, Narnia can be rendered an allegorical replacement of our world; its

incorporation of mythical structures becomes the concretisation of the former collective consciousness. Yet, Lewis himself opposed this reading, claiming in a letter from 1962 that “‘The Narnian books are not as much allegory as supposal’” (qtd. in Higgins). Once again, as in *Great Divorce*, maybe it is up to the reader to determine whether *Narnia* is an allegory or mainly symbolic. However, Lewis claims, for instance, in the 1962-letter that “‘Only after Aslan came into the story ... did I remember the scriptural ‘Lion of Judah’” (qtd. in Higgins). This suggests that Aslan’s embodiment as a lion is a mere coincidence and not the concretisation of Christ’s description as the “‘Lion of the tribe of Judah’” (*NIV Bible*, Rev. 5.5), which in turn supports the reading that *Narnia* is not an allegory. Accepting the author’s intent, then, I propose that *Narnia* is not a representation in the way that it *replaces* our world allegorically, but a representation in the way that it *supplies* our world with a mythical element, and thus symbolically reveals something that is ‘more real’.

In a letter from 1958, Lewis writes once again that Aslan is not an allegorical figure of Christ, but rather,

he is an invention giving an imaginary answer to the question, ‘What might Christ become like, if there really were a world like Narnia and He chose to be incarnate and die and rise again in *that* world’ ... This is not allegory at all. ... This ... works out a *supposition*. ... Allegory and such supposals differ because they mix the real and the unreal in different ways. (*Letters of Lewis* 283)

An allegory is entirely fictional in that it creates concretisations where there were only abstractions. These may be based on the author’s inner life, but in Lewis’s mind, the very concept of allegory is that it creates something that ‘is a fiction’ (Lewis, *Allegory* 45). In this way, *Narnia* is not an allegory, for though it may represent a ‘wider’ reality in that it includes the mythical consciousness, the land of Narnia does not replace our world. Similarly, Aslan does not *replace* Christ, for he *is* Christ. As he says to Lucy and Edmund in *Dawn Treader*, on Earth “‘I have another name. You must learn to know me by that name’” (Lewis 188). Furthermore, in a 1960-letter to one of his young readers, Lewis writes that he is ‘not exactly “representing” the real (Christian) story in symbols’, yet at the very ‘*edge* of the Narnian world Aslan begins to appear more like Christ as He is known in *this* world’ (*Letters to Children* 92). What Lewis has created is a *supposition*. It is something not exactly like Earth, but a narrative in which the real Christian story is expanded upon. It follows that just as our world is *Bios*, so is Narnia *Bios*, albeit in mythical terms, but both are imitations of the very same *Zoe*. In this way, the correlations between the old Narnia, our world, and the new Narnia, as well as the

connection between Aslan and Christ, are the deciding factors in determining the symbolic function of *Narnia*. Lewis has created a collective realm, reflecting two realities, or worlds, that promotes a collective consciousness more akin to a reality that resembles the realm of Forms.

The question becomes one of how symbolism fits into this, for as stated previously, Lewis believed the symbolist leaves the perceived reality ‘to find that which is more real’ (*Allegory* 45). How can symbolism seek true reality when the symbolist is first and foremost imitating? Unlike allegory, I argue that symbolism in itself is not a type of fiction, but rather a device used in fiction to access true reality. As Lewis wrote in a letter in 1943, symbolism “convey[s] to the imagination what the intellect is not ready for” (qtd. in Ward 225). In the context of *Narnia*, the use of symbolism re-introduces the original, collective consciousness, by appealing to the imagination. If Earth represents rational consciousness as *Narnia* expresses mythical consciousness, then the ease with which the children of Earth travel between the two realms suggests that the two consciousnesses are not mutually exclusive, but rather co-exist to express deeper truth. In *The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe*, for instance, the three older Pevensie siblings disbelieve Lucy when she claims to have found a magical land in a wardrobe, but when they accidentally enter into *Narnia* because they seek refuge from Mrs Macready’s reprimands (Lewis, *The Lion* 52), Lewis seems to suggest that the mythical is accessible if only one opens oneself up to it. In fact, with the exception of Susan, the characters are unable to ignore the mythic again. Thus, the mythical appears to be accessible through the imagination, literally providing a deeper truth via the new reality of *Narnia*. As S. C. Lee writes, Lewis saw the ‘imaginative world’ as providing ‘a richer understanding of the realities of the world’. When reading MacDonald, for instance, Lewis describes that what “enchaned me in his imaginative works turned out to be the quality of the real universe” (S. C. Lee 19). Thus, the incorporation of the mythic consciousness becomes symbolic of that which is true in ‘the real universe’.

On all subsequent trips, the children are dependent on what is going on in *Narnia*, and are whisked away without forewarning to help the *Narnians*. In *Prince Caspian* (1951), for instance, Edmund describes a feeling of being “dragged along. A most frightful pulling” before the four siblings are transported to *Narnia* (Lewis 12). Similarly, Eustace and Jill experience in *The Last Battle* “a most frightful jerk and a noise: and there we were in *Narnia*” (Lewis 51-2). This signals that when the door to the mythic is opened, you become absorbed by it, almost as a form of entrapment. However, the children seem to long for it. As described in *Dawn Treader*, Lucy and Edmund often talked of *Narnia* because they had been promised a return to the mythical country (Lewis 9). Through their previous *Narnian* endeavours, the children are inspired by their imagination and experience a delightful longing for what the land

of Narnia has to offer. This partly mirrors what Lewis writes in the following, oft-quoted passage from *Mere Christianity*: ‘If I find in myself a desire which no experience in this world can satisfy, the most probably explanation is that I was made for another world. ... Probably earthly pleasures were never meant to satisfy it, but only to arouse it, to suggest the real thing’ (136-7). The desire which Lucy and Edmund have for Narnia was spurred on by their knowledge of it and memories from it, but it also suggests that they desired a mythic reality that was inaccessible in their initial perceived reality. The limited *Bios* of Earth longs for the *Bios* of Narnia, because the combination better mirrors *Zoe*.

The mythical structure allows for the exploration of what the Christian world might look like when expanded to include the mythic consciousness. As Hitchcock argues, through *Narnia*, Lewis introduces a world he ‘considered more real than our own’ (85), much like ‘the real universe’ he found in the works of MacDonald when he was younger. Thus, *Narnia* provides its reader with two ‘truer’ realities. The first is the old Narnia, which is truer than the wholly rational realm of Earth, or as Aslan calls it, “‘the Shadowlands’” (Lewis, *Last Battle* 171), and the second is the new Narnia, which is even truer than the old Narnia. As N. C. Starr argues, Lewis first takes the reader to ‘a world of the imagination’ in Narnia, only to reveal in the final chapters of *Last Battle* that Narnia was only a “‘Bright Shadow of Reality’” (12). In this way, the very existence of Narnia and the entire narrative of *The Chronicles of Narnia* have been symbolic of the heavenly reality revealed in the new Narnia; the new Narnia becomes the Form of which both the old Narnia and Earth were mere imitations. Whereas the earthly people have ‘intruded’ on the mythical reality of Narnia by accessing it in their rational states, they merely appear in the new Narnia in the same way the Narnians do, suggesting that the true reality of *Zoe*, meaning complete presence with God, incorporates both the mythical and rational naturally.

In the new Narnia, the reader witnesses a symbolic transformation of the old Narnia. I say *transformation* even though the two versions of Narnia are separate places, because as the narrator indicates: to explain the differences between the old and new Narnia is challenging, because the two are ‘in one sense just the same ... yet at the same time they were somehow different’. He concludes that the new Narnia is ‘a deeper country: every rock and flower and blade of grass looked as if it meant more’ (Lewis, *Last Battle* 160). The old Narnia has been a pointer towards the new Narnia in that it reflected its truth, without its depth, and the new Narnia therefore becomes a replacement of the old Narnia. Or, as N. C. Starr writes, the new country is ‘Narnia idealized, and made *real* in the clarity and beauty of detail’ (14). Once again, as in *Great Divorce*, the heavenly realm is the embodiment of the ‘unimaginable dimensions’ that

are merely a 'flat outline' in the given reality (Lewis, *Allegory* 45). In this way, Narnia is in itself a recovery of what S. C. Lee calls 'the true nature of all earthly things' (19). The new Narnia recovers that which is of divine quality in the wake of the destruction of the old Narnia. As Jewel the Unicorn says, "The reason why we loved the old Narnia is that it sometimes looked a little like this" (Lewis, *Last Battle* 161). In this way, the old Narnia is succeeded by a heavenly counterpart which fulfils all desires which were unattainable in the old Narnia and on Earth, meaning the new Narnia is a more archetypal version of them both. As N. C. Starr points out, the new Narnia is 'a world as old as Plato. As Lord Digory says, when first catching sight of the new Narnia, "It's all in Plato, all in Plato"' (Lewis qtd. in N. C. Starr 14). Lewis evokes Platonic metaphysics to communicate that the old Narnia and Earth relate to the new Narnia as Plato's Forms relate to their imitations. The return of Digory, Penny, and the Pevensie children, for instance, was never possible in the old Narnia because they had become adults, but as a result of dying in "a real railway accident" (Lewis, *Last Battle* 171), they now find themselves in the new Narnia along with Eustace, Jill, King Tirian, and many others.

It is remarkable that, just as the Pevensie children first entered Narnia through the door of a wardrobe, so do the characters of *Last Battle* enter into the New Narnia through the door of a stable (Lewis, *Last Battle* 132). In this, Lewis proposes that one can open up and accept salvation much as one may accept the mythic consciousness, making the appeal to the imagination symbolic of the road to salvation. The stable symbolises Jesus Christ's birth and incarnation in a stable in Bethlehem, and embodies Christ's own claim in the Gospel of John: "I am the way and the truth and the life. No one comes to the Father except through me" (John 14.6). This is perhaps the most obvious kerygmatic element of the novel, because the stable in *Last Battle* becomes the literal way of travelling to God, and provides the Narnians with their new permanent home. As Jewel the Unicorn proclaims, "I have come home at last! This is my real country! I belong here" (Lewis, *Last Battle* 161). The old Narnia was a place of war and disunity, whilst the new Narnia becomes a place of cohabitation with Aslan and unity with each other, providing the ultimate *Zoe*. The characters are let in on something much more 'real' than they initially intended to find, much like the Pevensie children's first retreat into the wardrobe. The difference from merely travelling between Earth and the old Narnia is that the effects of the retreat into Heaven are permanent, unlike the impermanency in, for instance, Digory and Polly's visit to Narnia as children, or in the joy one may feel when reading, say, George MacDonald's *Phantastes*.

Conclusion

In myth, Lewis experienced the awakening of the indescribable longing he called joy, which brought him ‘into the land of longing’ (*Joy* 253). Throughout his autobiography, *Surprised by Joy*, Lewis describes how that joy played a major part in his conversion to Christianity. Lewis developed a kerygmatic view on myth, meaning he believed God uses myth to communicate with mankind. Accordingly, Lewis understood myth as a longing for God and, as Hitchcock quotes, “dim dreams or premonitions” of Christ’s redemptive story (Lewis qtd. in Hitchcock 86). It is perhaps why Lewis wanted, as Nakao argues, to write kerygmatic literature (82), despite the fact that creating original myth is an almost unapproachable feat. I argue therefore that Lewis resorted to modes of writing that encapsulate the kerygmatic quality of myth by taking on features of myth. The question becomes what it is that makes myth inherently kerygmatic in Lewis’s mind. According to Hitchcock, Lewis saw myth as an appeal to the imagination, ‘the organ of meaning’, which revealed a deeper truth than that which can be understood intellectually (86). This is made possible by myth’s ability to create a reality that Lewis argues facilitates the revelation of ‘innumerable truths’ (*Dock* 43). To Lewis, these truths were of a deeper, universal, and more divine quality, which pointed back to God. Thus, as Nakao argues, Lewis utilised imaginative structures and reason to convey kerygma (82). I therefore suggest a connection between the appeal to the imagination and kerygmatic literature, and through that, mythic literature. In the combination of rational and mythic consciousnesses, Lewis creates doctrines of salvation contingent on the appeal to an imagination that contains both consciousnesses. This collective consciousness is revealed in different ways in the modes of allegory and symbolism, which feature different aspects of the mode of myth, as seen in the two novels, *The Great Divorce* and *The Last Battle*.

In Lewis’s article titled ‘Myth Became Fact’, he writes that myth concretises that which “can otherwise be understood only as an abstraction” (Lewis qtd. in Wheat 23). Similarly, allegory creates *visibilia*, that is, concretisations of abstract ideas, which allows for the exploration of an author’s inner thoughts in palpable terms. Thus, both allegory and myth have the same function – they both serve to make sense of abstract concepts in concrete terms – yet, myth always appeals to the imagination, while the concretisation in allegory can easily amount to nothing more than a cipher to be decoded. However, to Lewis, allegory was a mode into which one meaning has been put, meaning that he believed the reader would receive the message he had infused the allegorical narrative with. Even though this view on allegory can be contested with a reader-centric understanding of allegory, it suggests that Lewis deliberately imbued his allegories with kerygma in order to convey the intended message.

In allegory, Lewis believed one leaves what is given in the perceived reality to create something that is ‘confessedly less real’. Symbolism, on the other hand, leaves the given in order to find that which is ‘more real’ (Lewis, *Allegory* 45). Just as Lewis believed myth pointed to the universal truth about God in the revelation of deeper truth, so did he claim the symbolist accesses a realer reality in symbolism. The creation of something that is ‘more real’ is made possible through what Carr calls the ‘throwing together’ of the abstract and concrete in one plane (173). This mirrors the Platonic idea that there exists a realm of archetypes, or in Lewis’s terms, a spiritual reality of *Zoe*, of which our biological world is merely imitating. Symbolism allows for a realer depiction of concepts, such as characters’ true selves, because it more accurately represents *Zoe*. Lewis defined symbolism as an act of sacramentalism, giving it a kerygmatic function akin to that of myth, because the reality it uncovers is of a divine quality.

In *Great Divorce*, Lewis makes the reality of Heaven attainable through the depiction of a move from the allegorical to the symbolic. Lewis uses the concept of solidity to create a setting that reduces the characters to ghosts that are allegorical representations of sins. They are given the opportunity to become ‘more real’ by casting off all that is non-Heavenly. Despite the fact that the majority of the ghosts return to Hell, Lewis posits that a person’s own eschatology hinges on the very rational either-or question of Heaven or Hell. The characters’ imaginations are required to accept this rational quality of Heaven, creating a doctrine of salvation that hinges on the mythic transfiguration from ghost to Solid Person. However, in Lewis’s author-centric view of meaning, one cannot be sure that this is the message he wanted to convey. If Lewis infused *The Great Divorce*, a narrative in which only one person attains salvation, with *one* meaning, what does this indicate about the intended meaning? In an intratextual sense, it is almost as if the ghost who is saved is symbolic of the reader who extracts Lewis’s intended meaning, which in turn removes most readers from compiling their own interpretations from what Teskey called the allegory’s ‘iconic rudiments’ (43). Further research might therefore lend itself to a discussion on how the reader’s reception versus the author’s intent in Lewis’s allegorical works affects the kerygmatic message of salvation.

In *The Last Battle*, too, the salvific process involves a move from one state to another, this time from imitation to archetype, or rather, from biological *Bios* to the spiritual *Zoe*. This move is made possible in the supposed extension of our rational world, first with the mythical Narnia, and secondly with the spiritual or eternal reality of Heaven in the new Narnia. The characters’ abstract qualities are depicted in their corporeal bodies, and shows that the acceptance of a collective consciousness – an imagination in which both the rational and mythical co-exist – is necessary to attain Heaven. While the lack of positive outcomes in *Great*

Divorce suggests an exclusivist doctrine of salvation, *Last Battle* embodies a more inclusivist salvation because of its inclusion of Emeth, who has followed Tash his entire life. However, this inclusivity is juxtaposed by the exclusion of Susan. This poses an interesting dilemma, especially when seen in combination with the well-dressed ghost of *Great Divorce*. They are both excluded from their respective Heavens for being preoccupied with their appearances. It may very well be a coincidence that both are women, and they are certainly not the only ones to be excluded from Lewis's Heavens, but the pronounced exclusion of Susan in particular suggests a misogynist view of salvation in which women are dismissed due to traditionally feminine pursuits. While this is strictly a theological dilemma, it is amplified by the book's literary status as a symbolic supposal. Lewis is indirectly arguing, through the use of the mode of symbolism, that this conclusion is a 'realer' depiction of the archetypal Heaven and eschatology of vain people. Thus, in both *Great Divorce* and *Last Battle*, the mode of writing affects, or even determines, the doctrine of salvation. This in turn could create the basis for a broader discussion on the connections between different modes of writing and how the salvific message is depicted in that mode, not only within Lewis's corpus, but in Christian fiction as a whole.

But 'what, in conclusion, of Joy?' (Lewis, *Joy* 276) one may ask, for it is, after all, what I believe spurred on Lewis's quest to write kerygmatic literature. In both books, the appeal to the imagination plays a deciding factor in determining the personal eschatology of each character. This is indicated by the combination of rational and mythic qualities as the way to attaining Heaven. Thus, the concretisations of *The Great Divorce* and the archetypal depictions of *The Last Battle* both amount to the same kerygmatic intent. By imbuing his narratives with mythic qualities, Lewis makes, as Carlisle's lyrics declare, 'Heaven a place on Earth'. For it is in the creation of a bridge between the rational and mythic that Lewis communicates that joy which eventually led him to accept the deep truth of God and life everlasting.

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Appendix 1: The Thesis' Relevance for the Teaching Profession

I will be the first to admit that this thesis is not noticeably relevant for my future profession as an English and mathematics teacher. The topic was chosen mainly out of personal interest in C. S. Lewis's works and the notion of how the afterlife, which no one truly knows anything about, is depicted in fictional literature. However, I would argue that the entire process in itself has been educational and will make me a better teacher in the long run. From creating a plan, to conducting research, to receiving feedback, and everything in between, I have learnt valuable lessons about planning a project and completing that plan accordingly. This will benefit my teaching career because it has confirmed for me the importance of being prepared.

This entire process has proven to me the importance of autonomy. After having written more than one exam on the role that autonomy plays in a pupil's internal motivation, I have enjoyed seeing this in praxis in my own life. The greatest piece of advice I received prior to picking a thesis topic was to choose something I genuinely thought was interesting, and I will say that on days that are especially unmotivating, the interest I have in the subject has played a major part in spurring me on. Seeing the importance autonomy has had in my own dissertation journey, I will certainly implement it in my own lessons and assignments when possible, which I hope in turn will inspire internal motivation and a love for learning.

However, I have, as an easily overwhelmed student, greatly valued scholarly assistance to guide this autonomous journey. Thus, working closely with a supervisor, receiving feedback, and adapting my work according to that feedback, has reminded me of the importance of a teacher who is invested in what you are doing. Receiving insightful feedback is crucial to both my thesis' quality and my own motivation, as Cowan's comments have spurred on new lines of inquiry and assured me in times of uncertainty. If I was unsure before, I am now completely certain that a teacher's (seemingly) genuine interest is of the utmost value, and it is a determination I will strive to demonstrate for my future pupils. After all, learning is made all the more fun when your teacher seems to enjoy the subject themselves

On a more personal note, I have learnt a lot about working under suboptimal conditions over the past year. Adjusting to a new day-to-day in which my health takes the steering wheel has taught me grace like never before, and I believe this will make me a more caring teacher who better understands her pupils' needs, especially in times of trouble. The significance of having teachers who accommodate in difficult times has never been more prominent than now.

All that to say, my biggest takeaway from this entire process is that while it has challenged me, yes, I have also learnt that dedication, along with a good night's sleep, can do wonders when all else fails, and all in all, I think I will be a better teacher for it.



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