

Anders Lyng

# Not Just a Good Samaritan

An Analysis of Underlying Motivations in  
Norwegian Foreign Aid Allocation

Master's thesis in Political Science

Supervisor: Gunnar Fermann

June 2023



Anders Lyng

# **Not Just a Good Samaritan**

An Analysis of Underlying Motivations in Norwegian  
Foreign Aid Allocation

Master's thesis in Political Science  
Supervisor: Gunnar Fermann  
June 2023

Norwegian University of Science and Technology  
Faculty of Social and Educational Sciences  
Department of Sociology and Political Science



Norwegian University of  
Science and Technology



# Sammendrag

Norge er ikke ansett som en stormakt i internasjonal politisk sammenheng, men heller som en humanitær stat – noe som uttrykkes i utenrikspolitikken gjennom et vekstorientert fokus og håndlag for konfliktløsning. Dette reflekteres også i den norske bistandspolitikken, som er ansett som humanitær og en refleksjon av norsk godvilje. Likevel er det rimelig grunn til å anta at norsk utenrikspolitikk og i forlengelse norsk bistandspolitikkk er selvorientert på samme måte som i andre land. I denne avhandlingen blir norsk bistandspolitikkk analysert for å vurdere hvorvidt den er styrt av underliggende interesser gjennom analyse av humanitære, oljepolitiske, handels- og sikkerhetspolitiske interesser. Dette gjøres i to deler: Først gjennom csQCA ved å analysere de 37 landene som mottok mest norsk bistand 2010-2021. Deretter gjennom en prosess-springing-case av et land som er valgt ut basert på data fra resultatene av csQCA-metoden. Den valgte casen, Colombia, har over perioden vært et hovedmål for norsk bistand og tilfaller alle interesser i datasettet. Resultatene indikerer at norsk bistand er hovedsakelig motivert av humanitære interesser, men også at sikkerhetspolitiske interesser er nesten like prevalente, mens olje- og handelspolitiske interesser er tilstedeværende i enkelte av mottakerlandene med høyest bistandsnivå. Videre indikerer data at land som mottar mest bistand nesten garantert har en av olje-, handels-, eller sikkerhetspolitiske interesser til stede, noe som indikerer at selv om ingen klare mønster kan fastsettes, finnes underliggende interesser som motiverer bistandsflyten. Dette gir grunnlag for å anta at humanitære interesser er sekundære i norsk bistandspolitikkk, og heller brukes til å maskere andre utenrikspolitiske motiver. Disse funnene støttes av casestudien som viser at selv om humanitære interesser kan påvises, at det også er sterk støtte for oljepolitiske og sikkerhetspolitiske motiver, og at handelspolitiske motiver ikke kan forkastes.

# Abstract

Norway is not considered to be a large power in international politics, rather being viewed as a humanitarian state with well-meaning foreign policy and a knack for conflict resolution. This is also reflected in their foreign aid practice which is considered to be humanitarian in nature and a reflection of their goodwill. However, there are grounds to understand Norwegian foreign policy and by extension their foreign aid practices as self-serving, as one does with nearly all other states. In this thesis, Norwegian foreign aid is analyzed to assess whether there are underlying interests in aid distribution by analyzing humanitarian interests, oil political interests, trade interests and security political interests. This is done in two parts: Firstly, by using csQCA consisting of the 37 top recipients of Norwegian foreign aid in the period 2010-2021. Secondly a process-tracing study is applied to a selected case based on the data from the csQCA. The selected state, Colombia, is amongst the top recipients of Norwegian foreign aid as well as a significant interest of all dependent variables. The results indicate that Norwegian foreign aid is mainly led by humanitarian interests, although security political interests are almost as prevalent, whilst trade and oil interests are present in some of the top aid recipients. Furthermore, data indicate that top donors of foreign aid are almost guaranteed to have one of oil political interests, trade political interests or security political interest present, indicating that although no clear pattern can be discerned, there are underlying interests which determine aid allocation. This is grounds for assuming humanitarian interests are not necessarily the main determinant of foreign aid, but rather used to mask other foreign political interests. This is backed up by the finding of the process tracing study which show although humanitarian interests are present, there is also a strong inclination towards oil political and security political interests, and trade interest cannot be ruled out.

# Acknowledgements

This thesis is a continuation of a paper written for a subject analyzing Norwegian foreign aid interests in China. It is also a development of my work over several years looking into the effects of and interests behind foreign aid. Because of this, I hope to contribute to the standing field of study of foreign aid and encourage others to follow suit – there are still many questions left to raise.

I want to thank my supervisor Gunnar Fermann for his contribution to not only my thesis but also my interest in the field of foreign policy – a field I wish to continue pursuing. Hopefully we can work together again in the future.

Furthermore, I want to thank my family, who despite my lack of communication have been a great support.

Finally, I want to thank my partner Lea. This would not have been possible without your support and dedication through all the years of study. Thank you for supporting me over the years, especially in times of my mental and physical absence. This thesis is dedicated to you.





# Table of contents

Figures .....	xi
Tables .....	xi
Graphs .....	xi
Abbreviations .....	xii
1 Introduction .....	13
2 Literature review .....	15
2.1 Foreign aid .....	15
2.2 Different types of development aid .....	15
2.2.1 Bilateral and multilateral aid .....	15
2.2.2 Development and humanitarian aid .....	16
2.3 The aid debate .....	16
2.4 Foreign aid as foreign policy .....	17
2.5 Political interests in foreign aid.....	18
2.6 Norwegian foreign aid .....	19
3 Theoretical framework .....	20
3.1 Foreign policy .....	20
3.2 Foreign policy analysis .....	20
3.3 Foreign political theory.....	21
3.3.1 Ideational liberalism .....	21
3.3.2 Commercial liberalism.....	21
3.3.3 Firm led diplomacy .....	21
3.3.4 Security and military politics.....	22
3.4 Deductive bridge .....	22
4 Method .....	25
4.1 Research desing .....	25
4.2 Qualitative Comparative Analysis .....	25
4.3 Crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis .....	25
4.4 Process tracing .....	26
4.4.1 Testing in process tracing.....	27
4.5 Variables.....	28
4.5.1 Foreign aid .....	28
4.5.2 Oil production .....	28
4.5.3 Trade Intensity Index .....	29
4.5.4 U.S. security political interest .....	31
4.5.5 Humanitarian crisis.....	32

5	Empirical mapping and discussion .....	34
5.1	Model 1.....	34
5.2	Model 2.....	36
5.3	Findings.....	39
5.3.1	Variables.....	39
5.3.2	Configurations .....	43
5.4	Implications.....	45
5.4.1	Variables.....	45
5.4.2	Configurations .....	46
5.5	Adressing equifinality and summary .....	47
5.6	Why not use fzQCA.....	47
5.7	Selection of case study .....	48
5.8	Foreign aid to Colombia .....	48
5.8.1	High level timeline.....	49
5.8.2	Aid distribution .....	49
5.8.3	H1: Oil interests.....	50
5.8.3.1	Exploration license .....	51
5.8.3.2	Statoil’s interference in embassy establishment .....	51
5.8.4	H2: Trade agreement .....	52
5.8.5	H3: Alliance and security politics .....	54
5.8.5.1	NATO involvement .....	55
5.8.6	H4: Humanitarian interests .....	55
5.8.7	Applying tests.....	57
5.8.7.1	H1: Hoop test.....	58
5.8.7.2	H2: Straw-in-the-wind test.....	58
5.8.7.3	H3: Hoop test.....	59
5.8.7.4	H4: Smoking-gun test .....	59
5.8.8	Discussion.....	60
6	Summarizing discussion.....	61
7	Conclusion .....	63
8	References .....	64

# Figures

<i>Figure 1: Visualized QCA results model 1</i> .....	36
<i>Figure 2: Visualized QCA results model 2</i> .....	38

# Tables

<i>Table 1: Deductive bridge</i> .....	23
<i>Table 2: U.S. Security political relation by country</i> .....	31
<i>Table 3: Truth table model 1</i> .....	35
<i>Table 4: Truth table model 2</i> .....	38
<i>Table 5: Consistency per variable</i> .....	39
<i>Table 6: Configurations with outcome</i> .....	43
<i>Table 7: Most prevalent configurations with positive outcome</i> .....	44
<i>Table 8: High level timeline</i> .....	49
<i>Table 9: Sector distribution of Norwegian foreign aid in Colombia 2010-2021 (Cutoff: 100 million NOK)</i> .....	49
<i>Table 10: Timeline oil interests</i> .....	51
<i>Table 11: Timeline security political interests</i> .....	55
<i>Table 12: Timeline humanitarian interests</i> .....	56
<i>Table 13: Test results</i> .....	59

# Graphs

<i>Graph 1: Yearly oil production in MB/D per country from 2010-2021 (eia, 2023)</i> .....	28
<i>Graph 2: Highest yearly oil production in MB/D (2010-2021)</i> .....	29
<i>Graph 3: Trade intensity index, all countries 2010-2021 all observations (WITS, 2023)</i> .....	30
<i>Graph 4: Average TII per country with cutoffs (WITS, 2023)</i> .....	31
<i>Graph 5: Humanitarian crisis data with cutoff</i> .....	33
<i>Graph 6: Oil production vs foreign aid</i> .....	39
<i>Graph 7: TII vs aid</i> .....	40
<i>Graph 8: U.S. Security political interest vs aid</i> .....	41
<i>Graph 9: Humanitarian crisis vs aid</i> .....	41
<i>Graph 10: Norwegian aid to Colombia in NOK (2000-2021)</i> .....	50
<i>Graph 11: Norwegian-Colombian trade and foreign aid, 2012-2018</i> .....	52
<i>Graph 12: Import vs Norwegian foreign aid in USD (2000-2018)</i> .....	53
<i>Graph 13: Norwegian-Colombian export vs foreign aid in USD (2000-2018)</i> .....	54
<i>Graph 14: Battle-related deaths per year (VDEM, 2022)</i> .....	56
<i>Graph 15: Political violence in Colombia (2000-2021) (VDEM, 2022)</i> .....	57

# Abbreviations

ANH	National Hydrocarbons Agency of Colombia
csQCA	Crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EIA	US Energy Information Administration
fzQCA	Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis
IGO	International Governmental Institution
INGO	International Non-Governmental Institution
MB/D	Million Barrels a Day
MNC	Multinational Corporation
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NOK	Norwegian Krone
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization of Economic Development and Cooperation
PRC	People's Republic of China
QCA	Qualitative Comparative Analysis
TII	Trade Intensity Index
UN	United Nations
USD	United States Dollar

# 1 Introduction

Norway is one of the leading proponents for equality and peace worldwide, having a formidable reputation for humanitarian values and egalitarianism. Domestically, Norway is known as a country with strong welfare and egalitarian policy, consistently reaching top scores in rankings of human development, happiness, and equality. Internationally Norway is known for its humanitarian foreign policy and role in conflict prevention, as well as being proponents for environmental protection and social development. Despite this, Norway is also one of the largest producers of oil worldwide and alleged war profiteer (Henley, 2023), which directly opposes their progressive stances. This view of Norway is becoming more prevalent in public discussions, which unveils the more self-centric view of Norwegian foreign policy.

Norway is also one of the largest donors of foreign aid per capita worldwide (Statista, 2023). This institution has a tremendous domestic support, with as many as 90% of Norwegian voters being positive towards the practice (Lagerstrøm & Seferi, 2021). However, literature on aid effectiveness is highly debated, as some point towards foreign aid being not only ineffective but also even destructive to recipient states (Easterly, 2003; Mallik, 2008). Despite this, foreign aid donations keep increasing yearly worldwide, and Norwegian aid is no exception. This has led to some researchers arguing that foreign aid is no more than a front for non-humanitarian foreign policy interests, especially in the case of large powers such as the U.S. and China. Although there is a large literature concerning Norwegian foreign policy and foreign aid effectiveness, research on interest formulation in Norwegian foreign aid remains largely uncontested. Surely, if countries are aware of the disputed effectiveness of foreign aid, the aid flows would be better spent elsewhere. With the development of Norway as an economic power within the realm of aid, and the economic volatility which increasingly affects countries today, this question has never been more relevant than today. Is Norwegian foreign aid motivated by other interests than humanitarian?

In this thesis, foreign policy interest in Norwegian foreign aid practice are analyzed. This is accomplished by assessing what are Norwegian foreign political interest – namely oil, trade, and security politics, and analyzing these variables through crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA). This allows data to be set into patterns which can be assessed individually or through sets of configurations, revealing what are the central interests in aid flows. The results of the csQCA are then discussed with relevant literature and a case is selected from the most prevalent configuration, which is evaluated through a process tracing study. The results indicate that there is a prevalence of non-humanitarian interests in Norwegian aid flows, which is confirmed through a case study of Colombia. The implications are that even though Norwegian foreign aid is humanitarian in nature, it is as least as likely to go to security political interests, and some is given to countries where trade is high or countries with high oil production.

With this thesis the goal is to add to the literature about aid as foreign policy in the case of Norway, addressing a gap in the foreign aid and foreign policy literature. By analyzing Norwegian foreign aid practices one can gain a deeper understanding of underlying processes and overhead structures which influence foreign aid allocation, even in countries which are not considered to express foreign political interests through foreign aid. As a largely unassessed field there is much, we still could learn about Norwegian foreign aid practices which in turn could enforce development and better the livelihoods of those on the receiving end of aid flows.

The thesis starts off by assessing the definitions of foreign aid, before a deep dive into what constitutes the relevant literature on foreign aid efficiency and political motivations of foreign aid. Thereafter a presentation of foreign policy and foreign policy analysis before the relevant foreign political theory which in turn is used to develop hypotheses through a deductive bridge. After presenting hypotheses comes a presentation of csQCA and process tracing before the variables and data are presented. The following chapter discusses the csQCA models, the respective findings and selected case, before the case is studied through process tracing which is tested and further discussed. Lastly the conclusion summarizes the findings and gives suggestions for further scientific inquiry into the subject matter.

## 2 Literature review

In this section, the terms of foreign aid and its subcategories of bilateral and multilateral aid as well as development aid and humanitarian aid are clarified and their use in this thesis is presented. Furthermore, the literature of aid effectiveness, aid as foreign policy and political motivations of aid are ascertained, before a rundown of the literature on Norwegian foreign aid.

### 2.1 Foreign aid

Foreign aid, also known in the OECD (Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development) as Official Development Assistance (ODA), is defined to be the practice of “government aid that promotes and specifically targets the economic development and welfare of developing countries” (OECD, 2023b). And although the definition of ODA has seen some alterations in the 54 years since its conception, the core of ODA as a concept has stayed true to this definition. There are however some discriminatory rules that apply to ODA which distinguishes it from other forms of aid – such as military aid not being reportable as ODA, some peacekeeping operation measures are not applicable as ODA, as well as some cultural programs not qualifying as ODA when reporting to the OECD. In a vernacular sense, however, foreign aid may be referring to a wider margin of foreign assistance, also including military assistance, weapon donations and funding of peacekeeping operations, as well as non-governmental assistance from private companies, usually NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations) or INGOs (International Non-Governmental Organizations) such as Doctors Without Borders, UNICEF etc. Differing countries may also apply different definitions to what accounts as ODA, although most if not all OECD countries apply the definition mentioned above. For the purposes of this assignment, the OECD definition of ODA will be used, and the terms of ODA and foreign aid are used interchangeably.

### 2.2 Different types of development aid

Though OECD with its 38 countries has a somewhat firm grasp on the definition of foreign aid, the lines separating types of aid and aid subcategories are somewhat blurred, maybe even intentionally so. In this section different types of foreign aid, namely bilateral and multilateral aid are presented, as well as humanitarian aid and development aid, with the goal of 1) clarification of the lines separating the different types of aid and 2) arguing for how each subcategory will be employed in latter chapters.

#### 2.2.1 Bilateral and multilateral aid

A simple definition separates the world of bilateral and multilateral aid: Aid flows that go directly from government to another state government or from NGOs to a recipient state are also often considered to be bilateral aid. Multilateral aid is considered to be “contributions from official (government) sources to multilateral agencies which use them to fund their own developmental programs” (OECD, 2023a). Though this simple distinction separates aid flows in a meaningful way to reflect the difference between a single-state operation and multi-state supported initiative, the distinction complicates empirical research tremendously. Considering that reporting of ODA donated by state is often done purely through bilateral initiatives, findings that could indicate what could be

considered political trade deals in foreign aid practices are difficult to extract from data. This is made worse by what can be considered cash pooling in multilateral aid projects, where states donate aid in a pool that is administered by an IGO or INGO which is responsible for distributing the aid funds to projects or states. This means there is no clear way of extracting data from multilateral aid flows, I.E which country donated how much and to whom. If one wants to analyze the patterns of aid allocation one would therefore have to make assumptions about multilateral data or disregard it completely. Many therefore disregard multilateral data, which then excludes almost 70% of Norwegian aid (NORAD, 2023). The same is done in this thesis as multilateral aid is disregarded for causes of simplicity, which means the results may not paint the full picture.

### 2.2.2 Development and humanitarian aid

In contrast to development aid, humanitarian aid is more often directed towards areas suffering from humanitarian crises, and the scope of the aid is more on a short-term basis seeking to relieve suffering through emergency provisions, medical aid and other short-term relief solutions (OECD, 2023b). However, the lines between humanitarian aid and development aid are blurred as 1) humanitarian aid is useful in reestablishing or causing development in disaster areas, and 2) humanitarian aid can in the same way as development aid be governed by foreign political interests, depending on the way its distributed. And even though most of humanitarian aid is donated from NGOs specializing in emergency aid, over 75% of the funds channeled through these companies are state funded, not privately raised (NORAD, 2020). Private aid companies, such as Doctors without Borders, UNICEF etc. are also highly likely to “follow the flag” when distributing aid, meaning funds flow through the same countries as the companies country of origin or main donating state (Fuchs & Öhler, 2021). Morgenthau expressed concerns about humanitarian aid and private aid already in 1962: “While humanitarian aid is per se nonpolitical, it can indeed perform a political function when it operates within a political context. The foreign aid that private organizations provide will be attributed for better or worse to their respective governments insofar as humanitarian aid emanating from a foreign country is recognized by the recipient country or its inhabitants to perform a political function” (Morgenthau, 1962, p. 301). It is because of this rational to assume humanitarian aid through private aid flows also are likely to hold foreign political interests, especially in cases where aid is received directly from government initiatives. Because of this, all manners of aid which is donated through the Norwegian government will be assumed to be an expression of foreign policy, whether donated directly to a state, IGO or INGO.

## 2.3 The aid debate

The aid debate describes a long running disagreement in the scientific community of foreign aid, although its importance has increased after the turn of the century. Its premise is simple – on the one hand some scientists believe that foreign aid is effective in its current form, whilst the other side believes the aid paradigm of today is ineffective and therefore new forms for aid are necessary to increase aid effectiveness. The former, often cited to be led by the director of the UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network, Jeffrey Sachs, argues that today’s solutions are effective in creating sustainable development, but more funds are needed to lift the developing countries out of poverty. In fact, Sachs has called for a doubling of the amount of foreign aid worldwide, arguing



that twice the funds would lift many more out of poverty on a permanent basis (Sachs, 2005).

The other side of the debate argues the opposite. Spearheaded by William Easterly, this side argues that there exists no clear evidence as to foreign aid being effective in creating lasting, long-term economic growth. Central in today's solution is a top-down approach to foreign aid which sees aid funds flow from donor to either government, government administration, government owned companies or sizeable private companies, which subsequently is responsible for the administration of funds. Not only is this an inefficient structure of aid, but it also creates and perpetuates harmful power structures, especially in countries where corruption is rampant. Because of inefficiency in this system, Easterly calls for a market-oriented approach to foreign aid where aid is used to develop small business which could cause a more natural economic growth. In fact, he calls out Sachs in what he defines as an empirical law of foreign aid – every 20 years, economists will call for a doubling of foreign aid. But as of 2023, as foreign aid has been doubled many times since its inception, the efficiency is still questionable at best – and little to no change in aid structure has been undertaken (Easterly, 2003, 2006, 2007; Easterly & Williamson, 2011).

Still, the study of aid is not unlike most scientific fields, which are extremely complex. We know from over 60 years of foreign aid that though it has its uses in catastrophes and emergency help, development aid is not proven to consistently increase the economic development of the recipient state. A lot of the research of foreign aid effectiveness also proves that though there may be some effect of the aid on growth (McGillivray et al., 2006), it is often insignificant or even negative in the long term (Mallik, 2008), and preconditioned by good institutional quality and already well-established monetary and fiscal policies (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Keefer & Knack, 1997). Even more, leading theories on economic development is predicated on well-established institutions, such as rule of law, private property rights and a fair taxation system, protecting small business development and ensuring growth and market fairness (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012).

And even though we have all this empirical data of foreign aid inefficiency, foreign aid donations are still increasing rapidly in the western world, reaching a record high of 204 billion in 2022, an 13,6% increase since 2021 (OECD, 2023b). For if it is not the results motivating further increase in foreign aid, what could then be the catalyst? Surely governments are not inclined to throw away money without getting anything in return.

## 2.4 Foreign aid as foreign policy

Hans Morgenthau pinpointed a central part of the foreign aid discussion in 1962 which is still debated today - which is foreign aid as foreign policy. Whilst many would claim foreign aid to be non-political and an end in itself, others claim there are political ramifications of foreign aid, whether one would like it or not. Morgenthau himself claimed it was preposterous for countries to claim that they had no foreign aid policy, just as it would be if they had no military policy or financial policy (Morgenthau, 1962). Assuming any given government as a rational unit, how could one not view foreign aid as a tool of foreign policy? Not utilizing aid in a foreign political context would not only be a missed opportunity, but also mismanagement of public funds. As there are possible gains to be made on foreign aid donations, both politically and economically, any state would be incompetent not to at least attempt to profit from the practice. Especially considering these interests are not mutually exclusive – aid can profit economically and politically

and still be humanitarian in nature. In fact, the international economy could benefit from profit-seeking aid considering this gives free-market incentives to develop the global south – increasing living standards as a side effect.

## 2.5 Political interests in foreign aid

Now that foreign aid has been presented as a type of foreign policy, the interests which constitute the usage of foreign aid can be assessed. As efficiency of foreign aid is at best debatable, one has to question the motives behind foreign aid allocation and its continuous growth. If states are aware of the inadequacies of foreign aid, there are no reasons to assume they have no other intentions when donating foreign aid. Considering foreign aid simply can be used as currency in interactions with foreign governments, there are many well-documented ways to profit from funds moving across borders.

Morgenthau argues foreign aid has since its conception been utilized as a political tool. He was one of the first to conceptualize the political motivations behind foreign aid, addressing aid from a political realist perspective. He argued that foreign aid was not to be considered humanitarian or developmental by any means, but rather as a form of bribery, sending funds to poor countries in exchange for services, military alliances, or other statewide security-enforcing measures. For Morgenthau, foreign aid was only a front with no developmental backbone, possibly even reinforcing corruption and undermining local political institutions (Morgenthau, 1962). And although the field of political motivations of foreign aid is not as large a field of scientific inquiry as aid efficiency, literature indicates that foreign aid is being used with non-humanitarian motivations at hand. Alesina & Dollar demonstrate how American foreign aid allocation is dictated equally as much by foreign political and strategic interest as they are by humanitarian motives, specifically in the form of colonial history and political alliances (Alesina & Dollar, 2000). The U.S. being the largest donor of foreign aid worldwide (OECD, 2022) should itself be enough proof that donor countries have underlying interests at hand.

What do these countries gain from donating foreign aid? There are two central themes that reappear in the literature: security politics and economic gains. As mentioned by De Mesquita and Smith (2009), “Donors give aid to large, geographically proximate states, especially those with whom they maintain trade relations or whose security alignments may be up for grabs” (Mesquita & Smith, 2009, p. 336). For the rich western states (and China), there are tremendous political gains to be extracted from foreign aid. In fact, USAID themselves admits to this in their budget justification. When mentioning their work in the Indo-pacific area, where the goal is to “out-compete China” and “build economic systems durable against PRC (Peoples Republic of China) manipulation” (USAID, 2023), proving states are more than aware of the political effects of foreign aid

Security politics may include strengthening of diplomatic relations (Adhikari, 2019), creating or reinforcing military political alliances, spread of soft power (Zeng, 2019), or fortification of regional security. Several studies indicate that a developing country receiving foreign aid from the US increases their chances of flipping their vote towards the US’s stance when voting in the UN General Assembly (Adhikari, 2019; Brazys & Panke, 2017). One reason this study is so prevalent is the magnitude of data – not many rewards of foreign aid are simple to deduce from available data sources. Larger patterns of aid interests are therefore difficult to uncover, and as most foreign policy studies need to be interpreted from accessible data sources.

Another explanation of foreign aid donations is economic gains. There are several ways a donor state could profit from countries receiving foreign aid. Firstly, developing states into self-sufficient economies opens up another market to export and import goods. Even better, if you have been central in developing their economy through foreign aid, you may be first in line to access goods, export markets, human capital etc. In addition to this, the state could benefit through back-door dealings, i.e., donating aid to corrupt governments which is again refunded in the shape of trade deals or direct investment (Hühne et al., 2014; Martinez-Zarzoso, 2019; Noh & Heshmati, 2021).

## 2.6 Norwegian foreign aid

Norway is to no one's surprise one of the most renowned countries in foreign aid literature – not unlike in every other measurement of goodwill and humanitarian values on a global scale. Not only is Norway amongst the top donors worldwide both measured in per dollar and as a percentage of GDP, but Norwegian aid has also been found to be more efficient in economic development but also free of any security political ties – unlike large powers such as the US and China (Engh, 2009). Because of this, the Norwegian aid regime is supported by as many as 90% of the population (Lagerstrøm & Seferi, 2021), and is rarely criticized in public space or a topic in political discussion. Some criticism has arisen in the latter years, however, pointing towards how Norwegian aid is getting more politicized in prioritizing Norwegian interests, and not the interest of the less fortunate (Jerve, 2007), its lacking control of results (Rystad, 2020) or its selection of states for distribution (Blaker, 2020). Still, there is little to no scientific inquiry looking for foreign political interests in Norwegian aid policy.

Norway has also been criticized by amongst others Easterly for selecting “easy cases” when distributing aid – countries where it is simpler to create sustainable growth over time, or even the illusion of growth (Easterly & Pfitze, 2008). Not only does this make Norwegian aid out to be effective in aid results, but also could also give priority in trade relations, as they are more likely to profit from their donation in the medium to long term.

In summary, there is a strong inclination towards foreign aid being used as foreign policy, usually state-to-state but also through private companies. Foreign aid can be used to strengthen military or security political relations, win advantageous trade deals or even rights to raw material. Even though Norway is considered to be a good Samaritan in regard to foreign aid, there is no reason to assume all foreign aid is motivated only by humanitarian interests, even less so as domestic financial issues arise. As the literature lacks any real inquiry into Norwegian foreign aid motivations, it makes sense to start in an exploratory study to map eventual interest which can be rigorously tested over time.

## 3 Theoretical framework

In this section the theoretical anchoring of foreign policy will be presented through an assessment of foreign policy, foreign policy analysis and the existing theory which underbuilds foreign policy motivations. Lastly, hypotheses will be deduced from the theoretical frameworks which will be analyzed in subsequent chapters.

### 3.1 Foreign policy

Foreign policy can be defined as “the territorial state’s outwards- and aim oriented business where strategies are selected and means of action are used in the light of the state’s collective self-understanding, foreign political goals, means of power and the concrete challenges the state faces” (Fermann, 2013, p. 47). Foreign policy is all the decisions made by the state which are oriented towards other states and their connected units. Foreign policy therefore makes up everything a state does that is not considered domestic politics, although these forms of politics can and sometimes will be intertwined. What is to be considered foreign policy in this context is every decision made by the national state in which relations with other states can be considered to be affected (Fermann, 2013). By examining foreign policy, one can extract central components of a foreign political strategy, which is often done through the use of foreign policy analysis.

### 3.2 Foreign policy analysis

Foreign policy analysis is the study of foreign political decision-making processes and behavior through analyzing the features of government, central decision makers, the society which makes up the state or the international society which encompasses the state. This is done through examination of interest arise, how they are selected, employed and/or legitimized (Fermann, 2013). This implies two levels of analysis in foreign policy: Firstly, the outside-in-oriented approach, which seeks to understand the state’s position in the international system and the decisions made because of external pressures. Secondly the inside-out approach where foreign policy decisions are analyzed through the society which makes up the state through internal pressures and domestic political processes. These distinctions separate where interest formulations are created, but both can be true at the same time. Because of this one has to elect the approach which most economically answers the given question – using the framework of foreign political theory (Fermann, 2013).

In this thesis a rational choice approach to foreign policy will be employed to analyze foreign aid by examining how interests of foreign aid are selected and employed through analyzing the interests of the government in a rational choice perspective of foreign aid. A rational choice approach to foreign policy seeks to explain the interests and actions of the state by examining the best course for action given its international and domestic preconditions (Allison, 1969). Foreign aid allocation (Y) is examined through interest formulations (X), which are deduced from already existing theoretical frameworks. Assuming the Norwegian government to be a rational actor we can find underlying interests of aid allocation by establishing indicators of interests and analyzing the relevant patterns that emerges.

## 3.3 Foreign political theory

### 3.3.1 Ideational liberalism

According to Moravcsik, one can boil down empirical liberal theory onto foreign policy to three ideals: ideational liberalism, commercial liberalism and republican liberalism. Ideational liberalism attributes foreign policy decisions to values and norms, using other states' values as a precondition of acceptable behavior. This approach to liberalism has large implications for foreign policy, as countries seek to validate their behavior through the values of other states. Individuals and groups therefore are assumed to be rational actors in pursuit of material and ideal welfare. This increases goodwill and makes foreign policy a tool for priority optimization, created by domestic values which determine the foreign political goals of the state. Using this background, foreign aid as foreign policy is used as a tool to increase the humanitarian happenstance of the recipient country, or even spread social norms which increase welfare generally caused by domestic cultural and socioeconomic values. This is therefore motivated by the states' own identity, which it seeks to validate through the acknowledgment of other states (Moravcsik, 1997).

### 3.3.2 Commercial liberalism

Commercial liberalism focuses on the incentives which are created by transborder trade and seeks to explain the individual and collective behavior of states on behalf of patterns of market incentives. These patterns of trade are then facilitated or restricted by the government using relevant trade or security policy. The measure of facilitating free trade is used in two manners – as a tool for increasing trade and the relative benefit of the state, as well as decreasing risk of interstate conflict as countries are mutually dependent. The main goal of commercial liberalism is to analyze the states' transnational economic strategy on domestic groups and individuals – and how these actors affect policy. Assuming foreign aid as foreign policy, one can analyze trade in two ways: Firstly, from an actor-perspective, trade policy can be viewed as result of pressures from internal actors and lobbyists which have interest in lower cost trade to increase their respective earnings. Secondly, free trade can be used as a means for the government to further develop the nation's economy, securing trade deals and new trade partners to ensure economic development through both import and export (Moravcsik, 1997).

### 3.3.3 Firm led diplomacy

The emergence of MNCs (multinational corporations) and globalist developments have caused a change in diplomatic relations between states. Corporations evolve and grow in tandem with technological development, capital mobility and cost of transportation and communication, causing firms to be more likely to expand to other countries. This leads to competition with the domestic market and the emergence of MNCs as large actors across borders. This has ramifications for foreign policy through increased importance of corporations in diplomatic relations, as firms expanding over borders is in the economic interests of both the originating and emerging markets. Furthermore, this has caused governments to adapt to an international economy affected by global competition, pushing states to keep corporate interests in mind when dealing with other states diplomatically (Strange, 1992). With changes in diplomacy comes changes in states' interests, and interest may change to see foreign aid allocated towards private corporations as a means to appease critical diplomatic allies. This also opens up a new pathway for foreign political interaction, as foreign policy could be expressed through and influenced by private interests – which makes business interests central when analyzing

foreign policy. For foreign aid interests, this may indicate both that domestic companies as well as international companies are central in both receiving foreign aid as well as repaying favors gained from foreign aid inflows.

### 3.3.4 Security and military politics

Security politics is also a relevant factor when analyzing foreign policy. Kenneth Waltz' theory of neorealism explains foreign relations through an international anarchical system by using market politics as an inspiration – as the states placement in the hierarchy gives opportunities and limitations on actions relative for all states. This balances itself out to a peaceful state which is caused by market forces. This leaves the states with more leniency than in its real political counterpart, allowing the creation of alliances and removing the need for a zero-sum game. This top-down view of foreign policy uses structure to explain actions from an outside-in perspective (Waltz, 1979). Building on this system is Snyders security dilemma in alliance politics, which presents how states act in an alliance in fear of two factors: fear of entrapment and fear of abandonment. Fear of entrapment includes being entrapped in to doing what you otherwise wouldn't do or doing something against your own will – one example of this is participation in NATO-led "military peace-keeping" missions as in Libya in 2011 (Libya-utvalget, 2018). Fear of abandonment simply includes fear of being left out of the alliance, should you not meet the demands that are expected of you. States have to continually balance these two fears – not being abandoned and not being entrapped – through foreign political tight-rope acts. By giving in to much to demands you risk damaging alliances or domestic political relations, and by not pulling your weight you risk being left exposed to the anarchic world of international politics (Snyder, 1984). Norway, being one of the lesser contributors to NATO in terms of military spending per capita (NATO, 2023) has to pull their weight in other ways. A proposed way for Norway to balance their alliance politics is to use money to develop states which are close to NATO in terms of military relations and security political manners. This includes direct military alliances and security political interests such as fighting rebel interests, spreading military security, and strengthening regional security. This is represented through central NATO actors, in this case represented by the U.S., which is the de facto leader of NATO and its military political decision making.

## 3.4 Deductive bridge

Using these theoretic frameworks, a "deductive bridge" has been built by extracting hypotheses by employing foreign policy theory to foreign aid through levels of analysis, system of orientation, theoretic grounds and focus of empirical mapping (Fermann, 2013, p. 125):

<b>Level of analysis</b>	<b>System of orientation</b>	<b>Theoretic grounds and central writers</b>	<b>Empirical statements / hypotheses</b>	<b>Focus of empirical mapping</b>
Features of Norwegian government and central actors	Inside-out	<b>Commercial liberalism:</b> Foreign policy is caused by internal pressures from domestic business actors (Moravcsik, 1997; Strange, 1992)	H1: Norwegian foreign aid is motivated by lobbying domestic oil interests	Preferences in domestic oil interests and influence of central actors
Features of Norwegian government	Inside-out	<b>Commercial Liberalism:</b> Foreign policy is caused by internal pressures from domestic business actors (Moravcsik, 1997; Strange, 1992)	H2: Norwegian foreign aid is motivated by governmental trade interests	International trade data and agreements
International politics	Outside-in	<b>Foreign political interpretation of structural realism theory:</b> (Snyder, 1984; Waltz, 1979)	H3: Norwegian foreign aid is motivated by pressures from the NATO-alliance	Security political leanings of recipient states and influence of alliance leaders
Features of Norwegian government	Inside-out	<b>Ideational liberalism:</b> Foreign policy expressed through a domestic identity of humanitarian values (Moravcsik, 1997)	H4: Norwegian foreign aid is motivated by humanitarian interests	Foreign aid allocation and humanitarian conditions of recipient states

*Table 1: Deductive bridge*

The theoretical foundation gives four hypotheses of foreign policy interests of foreign aid to be examined. From the framework of commercial liberalism one can analyze potential

actors and government interests in trade and raw material production which can influence foreign policy interest. These interest leads us to H1 and H2 which analyze central domestic actors in establishment of foreign policy interests, especially in the context of Norway who have significant interest in foreign oil. Cross-border trade is applied as a feature of Norwegian government, analyzing a wider interest in trade which is not only affected by one sector. This is examined through central trade data and trade deals, as these are the main indicators of foreign trade relations. Pressures from the NATO-alliance and the U.S. are used to analyze whether foreign aid is used in a structural realistic manner to increase alliance bonds and therefore reducing the fear of abandonment whilst suppressing the fear of entrapment in military political operations. Finally, foreign aid as a humanitarian interest caused by central domestic values and self-images, which is caused by Norway's role as a peace negotiator and lack of foreign political values. These values are created by the collective identity of the Norwegian demos which makes up the state. This will be analyzed by using humanitarian crisis data in recipient states to analyze whether foreign aid is donated to states in humanitarian crisis.



## 4 Method

In this section the research design as well as the variables for analysis are presented. The section starts off with a presentation of the research design before introducing crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis and subsequently Process Tracing. Afterwards, the variables and their respective coding practices are demonstrated.

### 4.1 Research desing

In this thesis QCA (Qualitative Comparative Analysis) is employed to analyze configurations in a set of variables based on Norwegian foreign policy goals. The dependent variable (Y) is Norwegian foreign aid allocation, as a set of 37 countries has been selected based on a single criteria: They have received more than 1 billion NOK in foreign aid from Norway in the period 2010-2021. These countries are then given indicators for every of the independent variables (X), which each represent a plausible Norwegian foreign policy interest. X1 is total oil production per capita, X2 is Trade Intensity Index (TII), X3 is U.S. security political interest, and X4 is humanitarian crisis. By analyzing the results from the analysis, patterns in aid donations can be established, and one can analyze whether other interests than humanitarian are present or central in Norwegian aid policy. The analysis is divided into two parts – firstly a simple analysis of patterns using the aforementioned data, and secondly a more complex analysis controlling for high/low levels of foreign aid funds. Using results from the QCA, a state from the most prominent configuration is picked to do a process-tracing analysis as a means to further establish causality in the data.

### 4.2 Qualitative Comparative Analysis

Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) is a research approach as well as a method of social science which is based on a set-theoretic approach to data. It was first introduced by Ragin in 1987 with the goal of moving between a comparative and qualitative approach to social science ((Ragin, 1987)Ragin 2008, Rioux and Ragin 2009). By using QCA, the researcher aims to systematically compare cases through the balancing between generalizability and complexity in patterns of data which could form set-like structures. The goal of QCA is to establish pathways towards an outcome through establishing combinations of conditions, which are known as configurations. Based on the configurations revealed by the data, the researcher can identify patterns, multiple pathways, similarities, or differences in causal pathways towards the outcome (Ragin, 2000, 2013; Ragin, 1987).

### 4.3 Crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis

In csQCA, one seeks to find similarities or differences in patterns leading to outcomes by using Boolean algebra. Boolean algebra constructs a set of variables with only two possible values. These values are either 1, indicating present, high, or large, or 0 represents absent, low or small. This allows the researcher to assign binary values to variables which again can be set into a truth table which reveals sets of configurations which are relevant to the outcome. This is done through 4 steps: Building a dichotomous

dataset, setting up a truth table, calculating consistency and coverage, and generating parsimonious explanations for the configurations found.

Building a dichotomous dataset includes coding values from variables to reflect the aforementioned structure of present (1) or not present (0). Based on the data available this can be done through a simple restructuring of data or possibly coded from the ground up. Both qualitative and quantitative data can be used, although qualitative data is more likely to be affected by bias. The researcher therefore has to be aware of the hermeneutic spiral – the process of ascribing new understandings to data after a deeper understanding of the subject matter is gained - when coding the data to ensure reliability and validity (Ragin, 1987; Tjora, 2017).

Setting up a truth table is the first synthesis of raw data and is structured by presenting cases and their respective variable scores and sets the stage for analysis of configurations. The configurations generated may vary in 5 categories:

- Configurations with a "1" outcome
- Configurations with a "0" outcome
- Configurations with a "-" outcome, indicating an indeterminate result.
- Configurations with a "C" outcome, showing a contradictory configuration.
- Configurations with a "L" outcome, or a "logical reminder", cases that are possible that are not observed in the data.

The configurations are developed through using logical AND/OR, used to find relevant configurations in which one or several of the findings are present. By presenting a logical AND (\*) the researcher indicates that two variables appear together in the configuration – i.e.,  $X*Y$  indicating both X and Y are present. Using the logical OR, one can present configurations in which at least one or the other is present i.e.,  $X*Y+Z$ , indicating the variable X and either Y or Z (or both) are present in the given configuration (Ragin, 2013).

Central parameters in csQCA are consistency and coverage. Consistency measures to what extent any variable is present in every positive outcome ( $Y=1$ ). This is simply calculated by dividing the number of cases where X is present whilst Y is present, and dividing this by all cases in which Y is present. Coverage measures the respective consistency of every configuration found in the data by dividing the number of times a configuration is present in outcomes with the total number of findings with that outcome. By calculating coverage one can find the configurations which are most likely to lead to a positive or negative outcome, and therefore find which configurations are most likely to have a causal path towards any outcome (Ragin, 2013; Ragin, 1987).

The final goal of the method is to create parsimonious explanations from the findings. This is a process based on Boolean minimization, seeking to compress long, complex expressions to short, parsimonious expressions of data. This is done by shortening configurations into expressions which are clear for the reader and generate data which is easier to examine and simplifies the process of analysis and theory generation (Ragin, 1987).

#### 4.4 Process tracing

Process tracing is a qualitative methodology of analysis used to establish if and how a potential cause or several causes influenced a single change or a set of changes. This is done through applications of formal tests to examine the strengths of evidence relating

the potential cases to changes. A vital component of the process tracing method is formulation of hypotheses which are subsequently tested to ensure correlation and possibly causality. By using tests one can establish necessity and sufficiency of every hypothesis, seeking to find which hypothesis is more likely to be the causal connection to the change at hand (Bennett et al., 2014).

#### 4.4.1 Testing in process tracing

By testing the hypotheses one can find non-sufficient or sufficient evidence to support correlation and/or causality. There are four central tests that are widely used: The straw-in-the-wind test, Hoop test, smoking-gun test, and the doubly decisive test (Bennett et al., 2014).

The straw-in-the-wind test is neither sufficient or necessary to confirm a hypothesis, and holds low certainty and uniqueness for hypothesis support, but it could be a valuable benchmark for a hypothesis - especially if confirmed in tandem with other tests. In this test, the researcher applies data to establish whether the causality of the chain of events is plausible. This is done by finding data or evidence in support of the effect on the change which may point towards a relation. An example of this could be in a corruption-related case where one government official is said to be taking money from a private investment group to change policy, where the change in policy is the dependent variable (Y) whilst investment group bribery is the independent variable (X). If one could establish that there has been contact between the government official and the investment group, the straw-in-the-wind test could be passed (Bennett et al., 2014).

The Hoop test seeks to eliminate certain hypotheses from the running, although it does not necessarily support any hypothesis in particular. For example, if one could prove the change in policy to have happened during a conference, participation in this conference would be a central component in establishing causality. If the investment group were not present at this conference, one could rule out this hypothesis (Bennett et al., 2014).

The smoking-gun test is used to confirm a single hypothesis, although other hypotheses have not yet been ruled out. Using the same example, if one could present data showing money was transferred from the investment company to the government official, one could confirm that bribery was central in changing policy, although other hypotheses may still be true (Bennett et al., 2014).

Finally, the doubly decisive test confirms a hypothesis and rules out all others. To pass this test evidence must be presented that fully supports one hypothesis and others are rejected. If the government official under testimony confirms that he changed the policy only because of bribes from the private investment company, we can for certain establish causality and rule out every other explanatory variable. Because of the data needed to pass this test, it is very rarely passed in process tracing studies (Bennett et al., 2014).


By evaluating all hypotheses and tests, one can analyze which factors are central to an outcome, both in cases of simple causality and complex causality. As social science often demands a constructivist approach to causality, process tracing cannot necessarily facilitate a clear causal mechanism i.e., who shot the victim, but testing can strengthen and weaken hypotheses and therefore better ones understanding of causal mechanism. Therefore, in a setting of complex causality, the passing of tests does not necessitate weakening the remaining hypotheses, but rather adding to the causal chain (Bennett et al., 2014).

## 4.5 Variables

### 4.5.1 Foreign aid

The dependent variable, bilateral foreign aid, is selected to establish a dataset of states that have received enough foreign aid over the given period 2010-2021. The selection criteria of the data are "has received more than 1 billion NOK in foreign aid from Norway between 2010 and 2021", which leaves us with 37 countries worldwide out of a possible 130. All data is received from NORAD's own website, which reflects where bilateral Norwegian aid donations have gone over the recent years (NORAD, 2023). The timespan is selected to reflect the most recent data and a long enough time to where several interest could have been formulated and materialized. The selected countries represent all continents, excluding North America, and has a wide range of recipients, culturally, economically, and politically – although most are African or Asian. The countries are then divided into two categories – the countries who received most foreign aid and the countries that received least foreign aid, split down the middle (NORAD, 2023).


### 4.5.2 Oil production



Graph 1: Yearly oil production in MB/D per country from 2010-2021 (eia, 2023)

To measure whether oil production or oil reserves in any given country has an effect on aid allocation, measures of oil wealth have to be quantified. There are multiple ways of measuring oil wealth, ranging from oil reserves, oil production or even oil export. For the purpose of this assignment, oil production has been elected as an indicator. This data is received from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) and measures the total production of oil in the given state, as measured in mb/d (1000 barrels a day) on a yearly average. This data is also temporally from the same period of 2010-2021. To find a reasonable cutoff for what constitutes a state with high enough petroleum production to attract Norwegian attention, the median for every country in the world is used as a basis. The average is highly skewed towards the highest producing states, and the cutoff is therefore set to the top 20% of countries in terms of oil production. This data is based on the average for every country in the dataset over the given period, and the top 20% of countries in terms of oil production means the state is amongst the 35 oil producing countries worldwide. This places them in the same category as the US, Russia, and

Norway themselves. This sets the bar at 235 mb/d, or 235 000 barrels a day produced in the year where oil production was highest in the given state over the period. This ensures that spikes in oil production are accounted for in the data, not only showing consistency over time, but also high spikes in oil production which may have sparked interest over the given time period. The basis for electing oil production is twofold – firstly, it measures directly how much oil is produced in any given country, and therefore indicates how much oil is to be extracted. Secondly, this is also an indicator of willingness to invest in oil production, which is important to consider when analyzing oil interests. If a state is plagued by a lack of rule of law, corruption or price cooperation, the willingness to invest is reduced making it less likely to be attractive for potential international investors. Unlike oil export, oil production therefore covers both the bases of Norwegian oil interests: influence of the oil price as well as potential investments in oil fields.



Graph 2: Highest yearly oil production in MB/D (2010-2021)


Graph 2 demonstrates the results from coding, where every country is presented alongside their respective oil production and the cutoff at 235. This leaves 11 countries with oil production above cutoff, although Syria has been coded as 0 due to non-existent oil production over several years – leaving the final tally at 10. If Norwegian foreign aid is affected by oil interest, one would expect countries with higher oil production to receive more foreign aid.

### 4.5.3 Trade Intensity Index

The Trade intensity index (TII) is an indicator measuring how much a country trades with another given country compared to the worldwide average. This is calculated simply by dividing the sum of exports and imports of trade between two countries and dividing it with the average trade done with the secondhand country on a worldwide basis. This is therefore interpreted as an index, going from zero meaning no trade at all, 1 meaning just as much trade as the worldwide average. It has no theoretical cap, although scores in the dataset goes as high as 258, meaning Norwegian trade with the country in


question is 258 times more than the worldwide average. The TII score signifies what is essentially the expected trade for any given country, although this indicator does not account for several factors which can impact the score. Amongst these factors are regional differences, as one expects Norwegian trade to be more likely to be higher with Scandinavian countries than the worldwide average; economy size, as trade is more likely to happen with states who have a larger economy: and country size, as countries with small populations are less likely to have many trading partners, causing skewedness in the data (WITS, 2023).

Another thing that TII does not account for is the level of total trade within a single country compared to countries on a worldwide basis. This means that a high trade intensity index between two countries does not have to mean that the country of analysis trades more with the specific country than other countries, but rather that trade is higher than expected worldwide. The more a country trades, the higher their average trade intensity index will be. It is therefore challenging to attribute values to trade intensity index based on a high/low format, especially without knowing the average TII of the given state.



Graph 3: Trade intensity index, all countries 2010-2021 all observations (WITS, 2023)

As per graph 3, most of the observations are on the lower end of the spectrum (<200), whilst some countries reach a high of 1000 times the average trade on a world basis, specifically the northern European countries such as Sweden and Iceland. This means using the average would be favored by the highest scores, skewing the average towards the higher end. To account for this issue, the cutoff for TII has been set to the median of the total TII for all countries registered in the non-European data – which is set to 8.28. This score indicates that Norway has a trade intensity index of more than 8.28 times the world average on half of the world’s states, meaning that if Norway trades more than 8.28 times the world average with any given state, this means that the state is in the top 50% of trade intensity compared to other states. To ensure that the results are as representative as possible, all countries with a population of <1 000 000 has been removed from the data, as these are either dragging down the median or increasing it with impossibly large scores, whilst not being relevant to the central data of high trade in ODA recipient states. Larger countries and geographically proximate countries are kept in, which further reinforces the validity of the positive scores of non-proximate states.



Graph 4: Average TII per country with cutoffs (WITS, 2023)

Graph 4 demonstrates all countries and their respective scores, with the black line indicating cutoff for being counted as high trade intensity. This leaves 20 countries with an above average TII average, starting with Tanzania.

4.5.4 U.S. security political interest

<b>Military ally</b>	Brazil, Colombia, India, Jordan, Pakistan
<b>None</b>	China, Haiti, Myanmar, Palestine, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Syria, Zambia, Zimbabwe
<b>Security interest</b>	Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Congo-Brazzaville, Ethiopia, Guyana, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Lebanon, Liberia, Mali, Malawi, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Sout Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Ukraine, Vietnam, Yemen

Table 2: U.S. Security political relation by country

Defining a security interest is the most subjective indicator in the dataset, as what constitutes a security interest may range from a state where the US is looking to increase security through internal or external influence, but a security interest may also be defined as a country in which the US are monitoring the security situation or working to improve their relationship with the state to increase the overall security. A recent example of this is the talks that were held between the then president of the United States, Donald Trump, and his North Korean counterpart Kim Jong-un in 2019. Though they through these meetings sought to reduce the military political tensions between the two countries, Nort Korea is not accounted for as a security political interest in this

instance. The definition for security political interest has been coded to include 3 dimensions: Military ally, security interest and none. Military allies simply include the explicit allies of the US, including NATO allies and all other treaty-bound agreements. Security interests are defined as states in which the US has worked to increase the state's security in the international climate, through means such as foreign aid, exchange of military personnel or resources, or through other means of direct influence. None indicates states where the US has not actively worked to increase security political stability, though they still could have strong trade bonds or other relations with these countries.

The data for this indicator is simply coded from the primary source of the official U.S. department of state website, state.gov, specifically using the most recent version of the website named "U.S. relations with X" country. Each of these codes were registered manually using explicit information from the website, where relations are expressed either as direct military ally, work that has gone to strengthen the regional or state security, or where none of the above are mentioned. Table 2 presents the results, showing only five countries being coded as "none", whilst 32 countries are scored as either "Security interest" or "Military ally". A reliability check for this variable was attempted by inquiring twelve experts on U.S. foreign policy about the data. This was done through a coding exercise, asking the experts to code the countries within the same categories with the goal of comparing the results and of assessing the reliability of the coding through external validation. However, none of the inquired experts responded to the inquiry, leaving the data in its original coding with no means of checking the reliability.

#### 4.5.5 Humanitarian crisis

Humanitarian crisis data is measured through data retrieved from ACAPS, which is a nonprofit humanitarian information provider working with amongst others the Norwegian MFA. ACAPS provides a humanitarian conditions indicator, indicating how much a states' population is suffering from any ongoing crisis. The indicator ranges from 0 to 5, and is based on the amount of people in every category, which is specified as follows:

Level 1 (0-1): Minimal humanitarian conditions

Level 2 (1-2): Stressed humanitarian conditions


Level 3 (2-3): Moderate humanitarian conditions

Level 4 (3-4): Severe humanitarian conditions

Level 5 (4-5): Extreme humanitarian conditions

Considering aid is given to states and people in need, the threshold for humanitarian crisis has been set to 2 – stressed humanitarian conditions. As levels 1 and 2 include states such as Egypt, Spain, and Italy, which are not states in range of what generally would be considered humanitarian crisis nor first in line when distributing foreign aid, it is reasonable, if not generous, to set the cutoff to level 3. As the data is only available as from 2023, the scores have been cross-referenced with relevant historical data to ensure the data is representative of the period 2010-2021. This is done by comparing the scores with relevant development patterns such as HDI, GDP and corruption levels, as well as using conflict and crisis timelines to ensure temporal relevancy (ACAPS, 2023).





*Graph 5: Humanitarian crisis data with cutoff*

Graph 5 shows the respective scores for every country as well as the cutoff for high/low humanitarian crisis coding, leaving 29 countries above the cutoff. Formally one would expect all recipients of over 1 billion NOK in aid over the set time period to have a humanitarian crisis over the cutoff value.

## 5 Empirical mapping and discussion

In this section the models of the csQCA are presented and discussed firstly by variables and afterwards by configurations. This is followed up by presentation of the case and the process tracing case study which is subsequently discussed.

### 5.1 Model 1

Model 1 consists of only oil production, TII, U.S. security political interest and humanitarian crisis, without the outcome variable of aid.

<b>Countries</b>	<b>No. of countries</b>	<b>Oil production</b>	<b>Trade intensity index</b>	<b>U.S. security political interest</b>	<b>Humanitarian crisis</b>
Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Mozambique, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania, Ukraine	10	0	1	1	1
Afghanistan, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Syria, Uganda	8	0	0	1	1
Palestine, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe	4	0	0	0	1
Colombia, Iraq, Nigeria	3	1	1	1	1
Liberia, Nepal	2	0	0	1	0
Myanmar, Haiti	2	0	1	0	1
China, India	2	1	1	0	0
Brazil, Vietnam	2	1	1	1	0
Congo- Brazzaville	1	1	0	1	0
Guyana	1	0	1	1	0
Indonesia	1	1	0	1	1
Sudan	1	1	0	0	1

*Table 3: Truth table model 1*

0000		1000			
		0001 PSE YE ZMB ZBE	SDN	1001	
0010 LBR NPL		0011 AFG MWI MLI NER PAK LKA SYR UGA	IDN	1011	1010 COG
	GUY	BGD ETH JOR KEN LBN MOZ SOM SSD TZA UKR	COL IRQ NGA		BRA VNM
	0110	0111		1111	1110
		0101 MMR HTI		1101	
0100					1100 CHN IND

Figure 1: Visualized QCA results model 1

From a simple analysis of the QCA results in model 1 we can establish that there are 12 independent configurations out of a possible 16. The most frequent configuration is -Oil\*TII\*US\*HC, demonstrating that low oil production, high trade intensity, U.S. security political relation and humanitarian crisis is the most frequent set of variables for aid recipients. Second most frequent is -Oil-TII\*US\*HC, reinforcing the idea that security politics and humanitarian crisis are central variables. Most interestingly we have three observations of Oil\*TII\*US\*HC in Colombia, Iraq, and Nigeria, strongly indicating that other interests than only humanitarian or developmental are in mind in these countries. Only 7 observations have no humanitarian crisis, which include large, second- and first world countries such as Brazil and China. No countries are observed to have no indicators at all, and only four countries are in configurations where only humanitarian crisis is present. Furthermore, two countries are a part of configuration -Oil-TII\*US-HC, indicating that the only foreign political interest present is security politics, whilst no observations support only oil interest or only trade intensity.

## 5.2 Model 2

Model 2 keeps the independent variables from model 1 but introduces the outcome variable of high foreign aid.

<b>Countries</b>	<b>No. of countries</b>	<b>Oil production</b>	<b>Trade intensity index</b>	<b>U.S. security political interest</b>	<b>Humanitarian crisis</b>	<b>Outcome</b>
Ethiopia, Lebanon, Mozambique, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania	6	0	1	1	1	0
Afghanistan, Malawi, Syria, Uganda	4	0	0	0	1	1
Mali, Niger, Pakistan, Sri Lanka	4	0	0	1	1	0
Bangladesh, Jordan, Kenya, Ukraine	4	0	1	1	1	0
Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe	3	0	0	0	1	0
Colombia, Iraq	2	1	1	1	1	1
China, India	2	1	1	0	0	0
Nepal	1	0	0	1	0	1
Liberia	1	0	0	1	0	0
Guyana	1	0	1	1	0	0
Palestine	1	0	0	0	1	1
Myanmar	1	0	1	0	1	1
Haiti	1	0	1	0	1	0

Sudan	1	1	0	0	1	1
Indonesia	1	1	0	1	1	1
Nigeria	1	1	1	1	1	0
Congo Brazzaville	1	1	0	1	0	0
Vietnam	1	1	1	1	0	0
Brazil	1	1	1	1	0	1

Table 4: Truth table model 2

00000		00010 YE ZMB ZBE		10010		10000
00001		00011 PSE	SDN	10011		10001
	00101 NPL	00111 AFG MWI SYR UGA	IDN	10111		10101
	00100 LBR	00110 MLI NER PAK LKA		10110	COG	10100
	01100 GUY	01110 BGD JOR KEN UKR	NGA	11110	VNM	11100
01001	01101	01111 ETH LBN MOZ SOM SSD TZA	COL IRQ	11111	BRA	11101
		01011 MMR		11011		11001
		01010 HTI		11010		11000
01000					CHN IND	11000

Figure 2: Visualized QCA results model 2

Model 2 introduces the outcome variable, high foreign aid, providing a more complex model where coverage and consistency can be calculated. In this model, there are 32 possible configurations possible, with 21 configurations being observable in the data. Building on model 1, the most prevalent configuration is -Oil\*TII\*US\*HC\*Aid, which indicates not only that most countries in the dataset are countries that score high on trade, security politics, humanitarian crisis, but also that these countries are more likely than other countries in the dataset of receiving more foreign aid. There are still no countries with no relevant indicators, as well as no countries not having no foreign political interests and being in the top half of aid recipients, as represented by -Oil-TII -US-HC-Aid. Only one country has only aid and humanitarian crisis, which is Palestine, and the rest of countries with only humanitarian crisis in model 1 are in the lower end of foreign aid funds received. Two of the countries with full score in model 1 receive more foreign aid than the median, whilst Nigeria is on the lesser half. Brazil is the only country receiving more than median foreign aid whilst having no humanitarian crisis but high oil production, trade intensity and security political relation. Four countries are recipients of high aid flows whilst having low oil production and low trade but being security political interests with a humanitarian crisis, as represented by -Oil -TII \*U.S\*HC.


## 5.3 Findings

### 5.3.1 Variables

Variable	Consistency *aid	Consistency -aid (Adjusted score)	Correlation	Per case *Aid	Per case -Aid
Oil production	0.32	0.22 (0.24)	0.105	0.031579	0.022222
Trade intensity index	0.53	0.56 (0.59)	-0.029	0.026316	0.027778
U.S. security political relation	0.84	0.67 (0.7)	0.204	0.030075	0.02381
Humanitarian crisis	0.84	0.72 (0.76)	0.145	0.029038	0.024904


*Table 5: Consistency per variable*

Table 5 presents the consistency for every variable both for cases where aid is present and present. Considering the odd number of countries, the consistency for -Aid has been standardized to reflect the relative size of \*Aid, scores of which can be seen in parentheses. Correlation is also calculated between each variable and aid to assess whether positive scores are likely to increase probability for high aid or reduce it. Finally, considering the number of observations for variables are not consistent and therefore total score does not necessarily reflect the relative effect, a per-observation consistency has been calculated to assess difference in consistency between single observations of each variable. The larger the score, the more consistent each observation of a variable is with the outcome or lack thereof.



*Graph 6: Oil production vs foreign aid*


Firstly, we can see the consistency of \*Aid for oil production, which indicates >50% of countries who receive more aid than the median is likely to have high oil production. When comparing this to countries who receive less foreign aid, the score is only 0.23, indicating that countries who are less likely to receive aid are less likely to have high oil production. We can also see this by calculating the correlation for the entirety of the dataset, which is presented in the far-right field of the table, showing that there is a positive correlation of 0.105 between oil production and foreign aid. This is visually represented in graph 6. Although not causal, the correlation indicates a higher chance of receiving more foreign aid if the country's oil production is high. The per case consistency demonstrates that each observation of Oil\*Aid holds more value than the other variables, indicating oil may be an important motivator in the countries in which it is present even though there are few observations within the dataset.



Graph 7: TII vs aid


The trade intensity index consistency is set at 0.53 for \*Aid countries, but 0.59 for -Aid. This indicates that more countries with high trade intensity index score 0 on foreign aid received. The score is also reflected in the correlation between TII and foreign aid, which is set at -0.029, hinting at a slight reduction in foreign aid when trade intensity is high. The per case -Aid consistency reinforces this, as it is the highest per case -Aid score in the dataset, in addition to the \*Aid per case being the lowest overall, implicating that trade is not necessarily a main motivating factor in foreign aid allocation.





*Graph 8: U.S. Security political interest vs aid*

U.S. security political interest has a high consistency with \*Aid, as 0.84 cases where aid is high are represented by \*Aid. However, the large score is also reflected in the high score of 0.7 for -Aid, which is as expected considering the large number of \*U.S countries. As \*Aid is higher than -Aid, countries that receive high foreign aid are more often also U.S. security interests. This is also reflected in the correlation, which is the largest in the dataset with 0.204, indicating a 20% increase in chance of high foreign aid should the country be a U.S. security political interest.



*Graph 9: Humanitarian crisis vs aid*

Finally, humanitarian crisis has the same consistency as U.S. security political interest of 0.84 when aid is present, although the consistency for -Aid is higher at 0.76. This indicates that countries with high foreign aid are as often present whilst having a humanitarian crisis as U.S. security political relation but are also more often present when aid is not present. This is also reflected in the correlation, which is positive but lower than U.S. security political interest at 0.145. This is highly likely a result of a 1

case difference in -Aid, considering there is only one more observation of HC than U.S - which is an indicator of how even their respective scores are.

There are therefore several interesting takeaways from consistency calculations. Firstly, there are no clear indications of any of these variables being present only at high or low aid, which suggests uncertainty in aid patterns. However, one can see that there are positive correlations and trends for oil production, U.S. security political interest and humanitarian crisis, though trade intensity has a negative correlation. One can also assess that the variables affect aid allocation in the following order: U.S, HC, Oil and TII. TII is the only variable that is more likely to be present in low aid cases, whilst the rest is present more often in high aid cases. Though U.S and HC are more prevalent in the data, the per case consistency indicates that oil has the largest consistency on a per-case basis, meaning that if all variables held an equal number of observations, oil production would be the most consistent with \*Aid. This is important considering the data is selected from the top aid recipients. If more cases had been selected this may have been reflected in the data.

### 5.3.2 Configurations

<b>Configuration</b>	<b>*Aid</b>	<b>-Aid</b>	<b>Percentage of *Aid</b>
-Oil-TII-U.S*HC	2	2	0.5
-Oil-TII*U.S-HC	1	1	0.5
-Oil-TII*U.S*HC	4	4	0.5
-Oil*TII*U.S-HC	0	1	0
-Oil*TII*U.S*HC	6	4	0.6
-Oil*TII-U.S*HC	1	1	0.5
Oil*TII-U.S-HC	0	2	0.0
Oil*TII*U.S-HC	1	1	0.5
Oil*TII*U.S*HC	2	1	0.66
Oil-TII*U.S*HC	1	0	1
Oil-TII*U.S-HC	1	0	1
Oil-TII-U.S*HC	1	0	1

*Table 6: Configurations with outcome*

There are a total of 19 configurations found in model 2 out of a possible 32. Table 6 presents all found configurations, presented alongside the quantity of \*aid and -aid outcomes and the ration of \*aid and -aid configurations, which applies mostly to contradictory configurations. As almost all configurations are contradictory, percentage of \*aid is used to determine which configurations are most prevalent in the data. First and foremost, the configuration with the most observations in model 2 is -Oil\*TII\*U.S\*HC, which has 10 total observations with 6 of them leading to a \*aid outcome and 4 to a -aid outcome. Countries with this particular set of qualities are therefore most likely to receive foreign aid and are also more likely to have high foreign aid income than low. The configuration with the highest total percentage of \*aid is interestingly Oil\*TII\*U.S\*HC – where all variables are present at once. These do however have only 3 observations, with one of them receiving less than median aid and the two others more. The countries that

receive more are Colombia and Iraq, and less aid is directed towards Nigeria. There are three configurations who have more \*aid scores than -aid, although these only consist of 1 observation. The observation with the lowest configuration tally of \*aid is Oil\*TII-U.S-HC, indicating that oil and trade alone is not enough to Norwegian foreign aid.

There are four configurations which are not present in model 1 out of a possible 16. All but one of these are configurations where neither or just one of the variables are present, which are oil production and trade intensity. The final missing configuration is Oil\*TII-U.S\*HC, which tells us no aid flows are directed towards states who have high oil, high trade, no security political relation to the U.S. and a humanitarian crisis. In the second model there are 13 out of a possible 32 configurations not in use, although there are no discernable patterns to be found.

<b>Configuration</b>	<b>Outcome</b>	<b>Coverage</b>
Oil+TII+US+HC	Aid	1
Oil+TII+US	Aid	0.9
US*HC	Aid	0.84
TII*US	Aid	0.42

Table 7: Most prevalent configurations with positive outcome

<b>Configuration</b>	<b>Outcome</b>	<b>Coverage</b>
Oil+TII+US+HC --> No aid	No aid	1
Oil+TII+US	No aid	0.83
US*HC	No aid	0.5
TII*US	No aid	0.39

Table 8: Most prevalent configurations with negative outcome

Table 7 and 8 present the most prevalent configurations and their respective coverages, calculated once for cases where high aid is prevalent and low aid is prevalent. The first takeaway from this is that all cases with no exception include a set of one of the independent variables, which was known as no cases are noted as -Oil-TII-U.S-HC in the first truth table. What is more interesting is the fact that one of oil production, trade intensity or U.S. security political interest is prevalent in 90% of the cases where aid is high, but only in 83% of the cases where aid is low – indicating that a configuration with either of these variables are more prevalent in high aid cases. The configuration US\*HC has a coverage of 0.84, meaning both of these are prevalent in almost all cases where foreign aid is high. Compared to the low aid cases of 0.5, both of these are more likely to

be motivators of high foreign aid allocation. Finally, we have TII\*U.S which is prevalent in 42% of high aid cases and 39% of low aid cases, also being a motivating factor behind foreign aid. Though these results do not specify clearly which configurations are central in foreign aid allocation, they direct us towards trends and interest in aid policy.

## 5.4 Implications

### 5.4.1 Variables

Oil production is the least frequent variable in the data with only 10 of the countries having over cutoff value. This indicates that oil is not of tremendous importance in Norwegian aid policy, although it may be an interest in some countries. Oil production having the highest per case consistency also indicates that in those countries where oil production is high aid is more likely to be sent, even though high oil production is rare amongst top aid recipients. The results are quite interesting, as one would not expect foreign aid to be distributed towards countries with high oil production, considering these countries often are likely to have a high GDP. However, as countries have high oil production they could still be plagued by civil war, as exemplified in Colombia, suffering from high income diversity or immigration flows etc., causing negative humanitarian environments. Another phenomenon that often comes with high oil production, especially in poorer countries, is the infamous resource curse, where an abundance of natural resources negatively affects countries' economic and democratic development. As mentioned, using oil production as a variable is useful in two ways: It measures the oil reserves of the given country, as well as measuring willingness to invest in oil production. One without the other would not be reliable enough to measure how much of an interest the country is for Norway. This means high oil production indicates that the country is both a potential good investment for possible long-term oil production, as well as a safe country for investing as good institutions such as private property rights and rule of law are likely to be present, although this is not certain on the basis of this indicator. I.e., a state's oil production could be public, a monopoly or even a cooperative cartel, which tremendously reduces the chances of Norway being able to purchase exploration licenses or fields through foreign aid. There is therefore on basis of this no way to causally infer oil production as a central interest in Norwegian aid allocation, but further statistical or qualitative inquiry in the world of the foreign investments made by Equinor may be grounds for causal inference.

Trade intensity is the only variable in the model which is more likely to be present in below median aid countries than high aid countries. This is interesting and indicates that trade may not be as important as other factors when aid is distributed. This is only relevant in high-aid cases, however, as high trade intensity is present in over half of all countries which have received more than 1 billion NOK of aid in the given period. The top countries with low trade intensity include war-torn countries such as Afghanistan and Syria, and countries where trade may be a determining factor in foreign aid allocation are on the lower end of aid recipients, such as China and Nigeria, which hold the two highest trade intensity index scores in the model at respectively 276 and 251. One could therefore make the argument that trade is important in aid allocation, although only directed towards countries that are not amongst the largest recipients of aid.

U.S. security interest is by all indicators a principal component when Norwegian foreign aid is allocated. Prevalent in 28 of 37 countries, the U.S. is allied with or working specifically with security politics in well over half of the countries where Norway directs

foreign aid. This is also backed up by the consistency which indicates that U.S. security political interest are make up 84% of over median foreign aid recipients and also 66% of below median aid recipients. Using these results, we can safely assume foreign aid is directed towards U.S. and NATO-interests, and Norway is using foreign aid to participate in military political relations. This is no surprise, however, as foreign aid is more likely to go to countries which share your security political relations. Still, considering Norway has next to no international security political ties, these findings are interesting as aid flows are probably determined on an alliance-basis. It is therefore plausible that Norway is using foreign aid as a means of gaining utility with NATO, using foreign aid funds instead of direct military funds or military support to balance their security political dilemma in alliance politics. Pairing this with trade and/or oil interests, foreign aid donations could prove a valuable asset for Norwegian foreign policy if the statesman knows their craft. Increasing the reliability of the variable could make be central in future analysis.

Unsurprisingly, humanitarian crisis is the most prevalent variable in the dataset, although with only one more observation than U.S. security political interest. This should be a central variable when foreign aid is distributed, as both humanitarian aid and ODA are mostly directed towards countries affected by poverty or exogenous crises. Still, humanitarian crisis is as likely to get high foreign aid as U.S. security interests, but also more likely to go to countries who get less aid. This is not a significant difference, and indicates that humanitarian crisis and U.S. security interest is equally as important in Norwegian foreign aid allocation. Humanitarian crisis is therefore a central component in aid allocation, and Norwegian foreign aid seems to be to a large degree dictated by humanitarian interests. However, as the data also includes humanitarian aid there may be an underlying difference between ODA and humanitarian aid, although that is a case for a different study. In this case one is inclined to assume aid is directed towards helping those in need. This is no surprise, as a lot of foreign aid is directed towards conflict areas such as Afghanistan and Syria, and even more recently Ukraine, who was the top recipient of Norwegian foreign aid in 2022 (NORAD, 2023).

#### 5.4.2 Configurations

There is always one of the four variables present in every case of both high and low aid, as represented by configurations Oil+TII+U.S.+HC both having a consistency of 1. This does not alone tell us much other than at least HC and U.S. are central components in foreign aid allocation, which is further reinforced by the fact that US\*HC has a consistency of 0.84 in high aid cases. This finding indicates that Norway is inclined to donate aid towards countries that are experiencing a humanitarian crisis as well as being U.S. security political interests. This is central to foreign aid allocation, as U.S. security interests with little to no humanitarian crisis are also highly likely to receive high foreign aid. The implication of this is twofold – humanitarian crisis is only a central component for donating foreign aid when the U.S. has security political interests in the country. In the flipside, as few of the observations in data are not U.S. security political interests, humanitarian crisis is not enough to ensure Norwegian foreign aid to these countries, of which there are plenty. Humanitarian crisis can therefore not alone be attributed to ensure Norwegian aid, as countries also have to be in the U.S. security political scope to be of interest. This shows if not a foreign political interest, then an aid political precondition – prioritizing crises in allied countries.

As implicated by the configuration Oil+TII+U.S having a coverage of 1, there is always at least one non-humanitarian interest present in every case where foreign aid is high. This holds several implications for foreign aid donations, as every case can be created by

different interests. Oil, trade, or foreign political interests are therefore central in Norwegian aid flows, although to varying degrees. Interest can be simply decided by one interest in addition to humanitarian crisis, or in combination with other variables. This is also reinforced by a simple correlation calculation, showing that high foreign aid is more likely to go to countries with more interest defined than countries with less. This implies that the more variables are present, a country is more likely to receive more foreign aid, and therefore the more interests that are present the more likely a country is to receive foreign aid on average. Having more than one interest present therefore increases a country's chances of receiving foreign aid. This again points towards foreign political interests in foreign aid allocation, whether it is oil, trade, or security politics.

There are two ways to view humanitarian crisis in foreign aid allocation. Either the variable is a central interest when donating foreign aid, as countries who receive more aid are likely to have a humanitarian crisis, but one could also make the argument that humanitarian crisis is used as a front to profit of one of the three remaining interests – oil, trade, or security politics. Humanitarian crises can therefore in foreign policy be viewed as opportunities, as foreign aid today may include profit in the coming years, which is more likely to be the case should the recipient government or private sector be desperate for aid funds.

## 5.5 Addressing equifinality and summary

The issue of equifinality in QCA is definitely present in these results. It does, however, bode for a question about causality in the form of a chicken-or-egg type discussion. Should foreign aid be motivated by other interests than humanitarian, does the payment precede the service, or vice versa? For humanitarian crisis the answer should be obvious – no aid is distributed before the humanitarian crisis begins. The same goes for U.S. security political interest, where foreign aid most likely is distributed towards states who are already in the scope of U.S. foreign policy. On the other hand, foreign aid as a transactional device in foreign policy could be a result of head-to-head discussion between government representatives as aid, trade deals and exploration licenses may be temporally independent. This adds a dimension to QCA as a method over a quantitative study, possibly explaining complex causality instead of disregarding it. However, for inductive and parsimonious purposes the framework of X preceding Y will be assumed.

In summary, Norwegian foreign aid is most likely to go to states who are security political interests of the United States and have a humanitarian crisis. Furthermore, there are also sporadic interests which lie within the realms of oil production, as well as trade intensity, although the latter is less likely to go to states with low foreign aid. By observing patterns, we can extract that humanitarian crisis and U.S. security political interest is central, as well as the fact that all but one high aid configurations include either oil, trade intensity or U.S. security political interest. The key takeaway from this is that Norwegian foreign aid interest exists within these four dimensions, and further developments as well as causality must be studied at a per-case basis or a Y-oriented quantitative study. The temporal chain of events is also a key missing piece in literature and could be grounds for further research.

## 5.6 Why not use fzQCA

Fuzzy-set QCA is a continuation of csQCA using a more complex approach to QCA using non-binary data, rather using data which spans from 0-1 with decimals. This allows the researcher to add another layer of complexity by sorting data in higher-lower brackets

rather than the binary high-low data used in csQCA. This gives a more nuanced result than its csQCA counterpart by indicating several levels of value in the data, allowing the researcher to find more complex configurations as well as a higher understanding of the relationship between the variables. The reason to apply csQCA instead of fzQCA to this thesis is based on variables. Firstly, TII data scales from 0-258, with only three of the countries having a score over 50. Translating this to a scale would remove the value of countries with a lower but still high TII, diminishing the value of interesting findings. A TII of 20, which is quite high in a worldwide perspective would be in comparison to a score of 258, which would cause countries with high trade intensity to be regarded as low trade in the data. Secondly, translating U.S. security political interest to a scale would also invite challenges as the value of a security political interest is unreliable when scaled, which would cause low reliability in the study. Had other data been selected, a fzQCA-analysis would not only have been more nuanced, but also preferred over csQCA, increasing the complexity of the data increasing the value of the findings (Ragin, 2000, 2013).

## 5.7 Selection of case study

Using the results from the QCA analysis, Colombia is selected as a case study to assess causality. The reasoning for this is threefold: 1. Colombia has positive scores for all variables and is therefore a plausible case for confirmation of any of these variables. 2. Although it consists of only three observations, the configuration Oil\*TII\*U.S\*HC is the configuration with the most positive outcomes in the dataset. 3. Although not all indicators may prove to be causal, it has the largest chance of finding interesting developments. As it would be preferable to analyze more than one case to establish external validity, it is practical to use the configurations with most variables present, as this gives most ground for finding interesting causal pathways to foreign aid. Therefore, Colombia is selected although there are configurations which are more apparent in the data – as all variables could be attributable to other cases.

## 5.8 Foreign aid to Colombia

The civil war of Colombia is one of the longest running conflicts worldwide, spanning almost 60 years since its inception (Human Rights Watch, 2023). The war, fought between three sides of the Colombian government, far right paramilitary groups and cartels, as well as far-left guerilla groups such as ELN and FARC, came to a halt in 2016 after long term peace negotiations between the parties, mainly represented by the Colombian government and FARC. This saw a ceasefire for the first time since the inception of the war, with the end product seeing FARC entering Colombian politics as a political party. Central in these negotiations was Norway and Norwegian representatives, as the country was selected as a guarantor for the peace process by the Colombian government. Norway, in NORAD's words, was selected on the background have a reputation for peacekeeping: "There is a widely shared perception, both in Norway and internationally, that Norway is a nation that has a special tradition of promoting peace" (Fabra-Mata & Wilhelmsen, 2018, p. 3).

As the negotiations were ongoing, Norwegian foreign aid to the country started ramping up to unprecedented levels, reaching a record high of 670,6 million NOK in 2019. Around the negotiations and implementation, Equinor won an exploration license in Colombian territory, Norway and Colombia implemented a trade agreement (EFTA, 2023), and Colombia expressed interest in joining NATO (InterAksyon, 2013) – and the humanitarian



crisis diminished for a while before worsening again (VDEM, 2022). Could the increase in foreign aid therefore be explained by the peace process and humanitarian interests, or could foreign political interest play a part in Colombian aid?

Building on the deductive bridge from chapter 3, four hypotheses are derived which can explain Norwegian foreign aid motivations in Colombia:

H1: The sharp increase in foreign aid to Colombia in 2015-2017 is caused by domestic oil interests.

H2: The sharp increase in foreign aid to Colombia in 2015-2017 is caused by implementation of the 2014 trade deal.

H3: The sharp increase in foreign aid to Colombia in 2015-2017 is caused by the pressures from the NATO alliance.

H4: The sharp increase in foreign aid to Colombia in 2015-2017 is caused by humanitarian interests.

### 5.8.1 High level timeline

The high-level timeline presents the development of Norwegian interactions with Colombia, the increase of foreign aid and the domestic development of the Colombian civil war.

2010	2012	2014	2014	2016	2016	2017
Norway included in peace negotiations	Colombia expresses NATO interest	Trade agreement	Statoil wins exploration license	Foreign aid increase	Ceasefire	Colombia becomes NATO partner state

Table 8: High level timeline

### 5.8.2 Aid distribution


To explain what the interests behind foreign aid are, a reasonable start is to look at the aid flow data, i.e., to what or whom aid is distributed.

Sector	Aid in NOK
Governance, civil society, and conflict management	1.9 billion
Environment and energy	1.1 billion
Emergency help	288.9 million
Production and trade	120.5 million
Health and social welfare	117.6 million

Table 9: Sector distribution of Norwegian foreign aid in Colombia 2010-2021 (Cutoff: 100 million NOK)

According to NORAD, 3.7 billion NOK was given to Colombia between 2010 and 2021 as a stable aid flow between 2010 and 2015, where aid donations were increased fivefold until 2019 where new norm of foreign aid settled. Overall, 3,7 billion NOK was distributed over the period, with 1.9 billion of the funds being earmarked to governance, civil society, and

conflict management, which was donated mostly through multilateral aid agencies. 1.3 billion went through Norwegian private aid agencies, mostly through Flyktninghjelpen, who received over 400 million. 330 million went to the public sector of Norway or other countries, mainly through KFW Entwicklungsbank. Although one could analyze where these funds were distributed, there are no possible ways to trace where the funds went as most data is nonexistent, as exemplified by KFW Entwicklungsbank who although are a German public institution, does not publicly disclose to which projects funds are allocated. Multilateral aid agencies and private aid agencies also do not clearly enclose which sector and from which donor foreign aid funds go. This makes it impossible to assume anything from aid data alone, and it is necessary as one often does in foreign policy analysis to analyze the interests behind aid and circumstances around. This affects the use of process tracing, which is generally used in foreign policy analysis to assess processes causally by analyzing the causal pathways of decisions and the logical context behind every step. In this thesis process tracing will rather be used through analyzing the timelines of hypotheses from a rational choice perspective, using a high-level timeline of interest to extract foreign political interest. By doing this, one can find actors, interests and decisions which are central in interest formulation through foreign aid (NORAD, 2020, 2022, 2023)



Graph 10: Norwegian aid to Colombia in NOK (2000-2021)

Assessing the data from graph 10, Norwegian aid to Colombia has been low since the start of the century and whilst peace negotiations were ongoing. Aid then skyrocketed after the signing of the ceasefire in 2016, continually rising after the deal was struck. Colombia has therefore up until 2016 been an afterthought in Norwegian aid policy, subsequently increasing as interactions with the Country has increased. At the surface level this indicates foreign aid allocation is central only to the ceasefire deal, although several factors may explain this increase in foreign aid.

5.8.3 H1: Oil interests

Equinor, formerly Statoil, is a Norwegian company, and although marketing itself as an energy company, its main area of operation is in oil and gas which makes up 99.85% of their business (Jarstad et al., 2022). Although the company is publicly traded, 67% of the share is owned by the Norwegian government (Equinor, 2023), realistically making it

in charge of all of Equinor’s business. They are responsible for 70% of Norwegian oil production, and is present in 30 countries worldwide (Equinor, 2023). In 2022, Equinor had a net income of 234 billion NOK in 2022, making it one of the largest oil companies worldwide (Pedersen et al., 2023). It therefore goes without saying that Equinor is a probable actor in Norwegian foreign policy as a publicly owned company with large scale influence (Strange, 1992).

2010	2013	2014	2016
Statoil starts the process of withdrawing from Venezuela	Establishment of embassy in Bogota	Statoil awarded exploration license	Increase in foreign aid

Table 10: Timeline oil interests

**5.8.3.1 Exploration license**

Equinor has had interest in South America since the 1990s with oil production in countries such as Brazil and Colombian neighbor Venezuela. In July 2014, it was announced that Statoil had purchased exploration licenses in Colombia after the Colombian licensing round the same year (Dagens Næringsliv, 2014). This included 33% of the license in the COL-4 are in the northern coast of Colombia. The remaining rights were distributed to Exxonmobil and Repsol who are both privately owned companies. Although Equinor announced their withdrawal from Colombia in 2020 with little value to show for it (Equinor, 2021a), their interest coming in to the exploration was of value, leaving the interest of foreign aid relevant in all but hindsight.

The Colombian exploration licenses were distributed by Ecopetrol. Ecopetrol is the largest company in Colombia, and is a publicly traded company with the Colombian Ministry of Finance and public credit owning the majority share at 88.5% (bnamericas, 2023). This leaves Ecopetrol in the same place as Equinor as a tool for foreign policy. The board members of Ecopetrol are selected by the government (Ecopetrol, 2017), then led by then President Juan Manuel Santos, famous for his economic development policy. The exploration license had to be approved by the National Hydrocarbons Agency of Colombia (ANH) (Dagens Næringsliv, 2014), further reinforcing the Colombian governments inclusion in the decision. Ecopetrol even pronounced Statoil as one of their main export partners in their 2016 sustainability report (Ecopetrol, 2017, p. 147).

**5.8.3.2 Statoil’s interference in embassy establishment**

Statoil have earlier been central in Norwegian foreign policy. The Norwegian Colombian embassy in Bogota was established in 2001, but quickly got closed down in 2008 after input from Statoil who wanted to prioritize the Venezuelan embassy in Caracas. This happened as Statoil invested heavily in Venezuelan oil fields and made new discoveries, facilitating what was expected to be years of oil and gas resources. However, as the Venezuelan government nationalized the oil industry and increased taxes on foreign investors, Statoil’s investments in Venezuela decreased in value (Løvås & Ånestad, 2017). After years of negotiations and a failed international boycott, Statoil started the process of gradually withdrawing from Venezuelan territories (Carazo, 2007; TV2, 2011). What was left of Statoil in Venezuela in 2017 was classified as a financial investment

(Løvås & Ånestad, 2017), before ultimately withdrawing completely in 2021 (Equinor, 2021b).


The embassy in Caracas was closed down in 2013 and Bogota was reestablished, transferring the area responsibility from Venezuela to Colombia (Deloitte, 2021). Although there is no direct empirical influence linking this chain of events to Statoil, it is plausible as Statoil already had influence on the decision to keep the Venezuelan embassy in 2008.

**5.8.4 H2: Trade agreement**

In 2008, Norway together with other European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries signed a trade deal with Colombia. This agreement entered into force in September 2014, and is a free-trade agreement including commodities such as industrial goods, fish and maritime products as well as a bilateral agreement on agricultural products (EFTA, 2023). The scope of the agreement saw to liberalize trade of these products with no toll on products within the specified product categories, giving Norway access to sought-after commodities such as industrial wares and fish, whilst providing Norwegian businesses a solid platform for export (Regjeringen, 2020).

2014	2016
Trade deal implemented	Increase in foreign aid


Table 12: Timeline trade interests



Graph 11: Norwegian-Colombian trade and foreign aid, 2012-2018

Observing the data from graph 13, the free-trade agreement has led to a significant increase in Norwegian import from Colombia, although export has decreased since the implementation of the trade deal. As Norwegian imports were already high before the trade deal was implemented, it has been increasing ever since, indicating value has been extracted to Norwegian industrial and agricultural actors who are dependent on valuable import goods and services. At the same time, exports increased every year up until 2014, steadily declining after the implementation of the trade deal, increasing again after

2018. Although it is difficult to pinpoint what exactly causes the decrease in exports after 2014, one argument is that the ceasefire deal may have influenced trade as political uncertainty affects the countries businesses. And although in a binary sense a state measures value in export, import also positively affects the country’s economy considering cheap access to goods and services causes value in production and subsequently gives cheaper goods endogenously or causes more market-efficient exports to other markets. Considering this there is reason to believe Norway is profiting of the trade agreement, especially in the medium to long-term. As imports have increased foreign aid has also increased, potentially indicating the importance of Colombia as a Norwegian trade partner for Norwegian businesses. This coupled with the belief that exports will increase over time could cause an increase in foreign aid.




Graph 12: Import vs Norwegian foreign aid in USD (2000-2018)

<b>Correlation coefficient</b>	0.794
<b>P-value</b>	0.000

Table 13: Correlation and P-value

Observing the relationship between import and foreign aid in a long-term lens, there seems to be a correlation in increase of import and increase of foreign aid almost on a year-by-year basis. Increased imports therefore seem to have a causal effect on increased foreign aid, up until the implementation of the trade agreement in 2015 where aid increases almost fivefold over the following three years. This relationship is correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.794 and is significant at a 0.05 level, though the results are highly autocorrelated. Still, the relationship is clear and indicates that import is somewhat related to foreign aid. Although we cannot establish causality from this correlation, it strongly indicates import and foreign aid are linked. Norwegian imports from Colombia over the period includes mainly coffee, making up over 50% of the total import (The Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2023), making Colombia the second largest exporter of unroasted coffee to Norway, behind Brazil (OEC, 2023; Statistisk Sentralbyrå, 2019). Norway is the second largest consumer of coffee worldwide per capita, yearly consuming over 10 kilos per capita (Norsk Kaffeinformasjon, 2023). This leaves Norway dependent on Colombian coffee import, being important both for consumption and the national industry which roasts and sells 77% of domestic coffee

supply (Statistisk Sentralbyrå, 2019). The EFTA trade agreement removed all taxes on coffee imports (EFTA, 2008), creating a much more efficient coffee trade benefiting both Colombian producers as well as Norwegian coffee suppliers.



Graph 13: Norwegian-Colombian export vs foreign aid in USD (2000-2018)

There seems to be no clear correlation between foreign aid and exports, which indicates no foreign political interest in increasing exports. This is surprising considering export is the direct source of trade income. The decrease in export could however be caused by political turmoil as FARC entered Colombian politics, seemingly increasing over time as political stability increases. Still, there is ground to assume trade is not central in foreign aid donations as imports are lower than exports, causing a trade deficit which does not directly benefit the Norwegian government.

### 5.8.5 H3: Alliance and security politics

Colombia and the U.S. has had a long standing and complex diplomatic relationship. The U.S. have been an important trade partner for Colombia and of such central in the countries' economic and political development. Although some issues have plagued their relationship such as Colombia's cocaine problem in the 70s and 80s, the countries have upheld diplomatic relations. Colombia has over several years been one of the U.S.' largest aid recipient, as the U.S. has worked towards increasing the stability of the region politically to ensure peace, reduce illegal drug production and fight terrorism (U.S Congress, 2010). The therefore U.S. has strong a strong incentive towards bettering the country's security political situation, both as a trading partner, as a counterterrorism measure and to reduce production of illegal drugs (U.S Department of State, 2023a).

<b>2011</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>2017</b>
Colombia votes in favor of Libyan peacekeeping mission	Discussions started between parties	Colombia expresses interest in joining NATO	Colombia supports operation Ocean Shield	Increase in foreign aid	Colombia joins NATO as partner country

Table 11: Timeline security political interests

**5.8.5.1 NATO involvement**

Despite their long relationship, Colombia is not a direct ally of the U.S. However, military political relations have been strengthened in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Starting in 2011, Colombia voted in favor of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, allowing NATO to intervene in the Libyan civil war (United Nations, 2011), proving it’s NATO-oriented approach to security politics. In 2013, dialogue begun between NATO and Colombia, starting a cooperative initiative between the two parties (NATO, 2021). In fact, Juan Manuel Santos expressed interest in joining the military alliance when addressing the agreement in June 2013: “In June, NATO will sign an agreement with the Colombian government, with the Defense Ministry, to start the process of rapprochement and cooperation, with an eye toward also joining that organization” (InterAksyon, 2013). This was apparent in 2015 as Colombia supported Ocean Shield, an operation to counter piracy outside of Africa’s horn with a vessel (NATO, 2021). In 2017, the discussions bore fruits as Colombia became one of NATO’s Global Partners as the first country in Latin-America. This agreement saw Colombia and NATO working mutually to increase capabilities and interoperability, developing approaches to increase peace and security as well as increasing NATO’s involvement in Latin-American security politics (NATO, 2021).

Although Norway has not expressed publicly interest about Colombian partnerships with Colombia, it is likely foreign aid flows may go to Colombia as an effort to further develop and strengthen bonds in the alliance.


**5.8.6 H4: Humanitarian interests**

Norway was elected to be the guarantor for the peace negotiations between Colombian officials and the FARC in 2010. The selection was made on background of Norway’s reputation as a trustworthy peace facilitator, their availability for interactions with terrorist groups, financial resources and commitment to peace, as well as firsthand experience as they were involved in talks between Colombia and ELN in 2005-2007 (Fabra-Mata & Wilhelmsen, 2018). Norway’s role included facilitating talks and providing continuous support to the negotiating parties, both in public and secret discussions. For Norway, the goal was clear: stop the ongoing civil war to end violence and humanitarian suffering. With the end goal reached in 2016, Norwegian foreign aid to Colombia increased. Did however the ceasefire contribute to reduced humanitarian suffering in Colombia?

2010	2016	2016
Start of peace discussions	Ceasefire	Increase in foreign aid

Table 12: Timeline humanitarian interests


Norway was already involved in the failed peace process between Colombia and ELN three years prior to the start of peace negotiations between Colombian representatives and FARC. When negotiations started, Norway was elected as a guarantor by Colombia, which was accepted by FARC, who both saw the value of Norway’s experience as a conflict negotiator and their long-term commitment to peace - although there was some internal skepticism within FARC due to Norway’s NATO-membership. Norway was subsequently central in the discussions, providing representatives as facilitators for discussion and providing support to both negotiating parties. Norwegian representatives were important in gaining trust from both parties and sought to work to complete the deal in a manner which was fair to both parties. Norway was represented by a small core team which was supplemented by relevant support functions by necessity. Most of the foreign aid funds distributed to Colombia in the peace supporting process were directly distributed to these functions. A sharp increase in foreign aid towards the supporting functions were caused by 50 million NOK which was distributed to the embassy who contributed UN Postconflict Multi-Partner Trust Fund for Colombia in 2016. However, put together this makes up less than 15% of the increase in foreign aid from 2015-2016 (Fabra-Mata & Wilhelmsen, 2018).



Graph 14: Battle-related deaths per year (VDEM, 2022)

Over the years the conflict has diminished in scale, with battle-related deaths being reduced substantially towards almost zero post 2010, as the peace negotiations started. Nominally, this suggests not only the ceasefire, but also the peace treaty was central to reducing conflict, as the parties were determined to find agreement. Battle-related deaths have been stable since then, suggesting a significantly more peaceful state of affairs in Colombia as political conflict reduced. It is logical that Norway wanted a guarantee of increased humanitarian conditions before donating foreign aid, which the ceasefire deal provided.





Graph 15: Political violence in Colombia (2000-2021) (VDEM, 2022)

Graph 12 presents the political violence index in Colombia after the turn of the century. Political violence index asks the question “How often have non-state actors used political violence against persons this year?” and is measured on a scale from 0: none through 4: often (Coppedge et al., 2021, p. 226). Political violence developed from high levels at the start of the century and decreased continuously until 2017, the year after the ceasefire deal was signed. However, after 2017 the political violence index increases significantly until 2021, indicating political stability is diminishing causing reduction in humanitarian conditions. The indicator remains over the midpoint going into the current decade, indicating violence between political groups is high even if the ceasefire deal has been struck.

Conflict in Colombia is taking new forms after the ceasefire deal. Far-right activists from ELN, FARC dissidents and paramilitary successor groups have been central in increasing national violence. FARC dissidents who refuse the terms of the peace deal continue to commit abuses towards civilians and former FARC-fighters, committing massacres which in 2020 was at an high since 2014 (Human Rights Watch, 2023). The diminishment of Colombian security and humanitarian conditions invokes questions not around the inaugural motivations for foreign aid increase to Colombia, but rather to the continuous high aid flows which does not seem to increase living standards of the Colombian population. If the ceasefire was central for foreign aid allocation in 2016, more work should be done to further deescalate the conflict today. Still, a smoking-gun can be presented in this case which is the prevalence of aid used to facilitate discussions between the conflicting parties, although this only makes up an estimated 240 million NOK of the 940 million given in the time period of 2010-2016 (Fabra-Mata & Wilhelmsen, 2018; NORAD, 2023).

### 5.8.7 Applying tests

To examine the strength of each hypothesis, tests are applied in a relevant manner to assess whether there are causal links between hypotheses and foreign aid donations. As aforementioned these tests include the smoking-gun test, which assesses a causal link between observations and outcome; the hoop test which is used to assess whether there

is enough data to support a hypothesis; and the straw-in-the-wind test, which demonstrates if a correlation is supposedly strong enough to not be discarded.

#### **5.8.7.1 H1: Hoop test**

**Hypothesis:** The significant increase in foreign aid to Colombia in 2015-2017 is caused by domestic oil interests.

**Data:** Statoil had central interest in Colombia in the given period, as they won an exploration license which was distributed by the publicly controlled Colombian corporation Ecopetrol. The Colombian government is likely to be influential in distribution rights as a majority shareholder, and the government is also central in approving the exploration rights through the ANH. Statoil is also likely to be a contributing part in the process of moving the Norwegian embassy from Venezuela to Colombia, where it had been previously. This happened as Statoil divested in Venezuela and sought to redirect their Latin American investments elsewhere. Norway and Statoil have shared interests in developing oil fields, and as a publicly owned company Norway is the main profiteer of Statoil winning exploration licenses. When Statoil was distributed exploration rights, foreign aid increased two years after the news was publicized. The delay in foreign aid can be attributed to latency in foreign aid budgets.

**Inference:** Norway influenced the decision made by Ecopetrol to award Statoil with exploration rights by promising the Colombian government foreign aid.

**Summary:** Though there is no data which can be regarded as a smoking-gun, the correlation between oil interest and foreign aid cannot be sufficiently affirmed as causal. There is however enough data to pass a hoop test, affirming the relevancy of the hypothesis.

**Outcome:** The hoop test affirms the relevancy of H1.

#### **5.8.7.2 H2: Straw-in-the-wind test**

**Hypothesis:** The significant increase in foreign aid to Colombia in 2015-2017 is caused by implementation of the 2014 trade deal.

**Data:** An EFTA trade agreement was implemented in 2014 with Colombia, as well as a bilateral agricultural agreement. There is a strong correlation between imports from Colombia and foreign aid allocations, although no correlation between foreign aid and exports. Considering the fact that the trade agreement included coffee, which is the main Colombian export to Norway, there is reason to assume the trade agreement is in Norwegian interests.

**Argumentation:** As imports are important to a countries production and domestic economy, a free trade deal increases foreign aid as Norway is profiting from free-trade imports which are processed and redistributed domestically – especially coffee.

**Summary:** The data indicates there is a correlation between import and foreign aid donations. Additionally, the trade agreement caused a sharp upturn in foreign aid in the following years, indicating there could be a noteworthy relationship. The correlation is not likely to be causal, but rather a spurious variable in the context of foreign aid. It could however be a contributing factor to the increase of foreign aid to Colombia.

**Outcome:** The straw-in-the-wind test affirms the relevance of H2.

**5.8.7.3 H3: Hoop test**

**Hypothesis:** The significant increase in foreign aid to Colombia in 2015-2017 is caused by pressures from the NATO alliance

**Data:** NATO has since 2010 had a close partnership with Colombia. In 2011, Colombia supported the NATO-led Libyan intervention as a member in the UN Security Council. In 2012, discussions started between the parties as a cooperative initiative, with Colombia expressing interest in joining the alliance. In 2015, Colombia supported a maritime operation with military supplies. The two parties then signed an agreement causing Colombia to become a NATO partner state in 2017. Norwegian foreign aid to Colombia consistently increased over this period of time.

**Inference:** The hypothesis assumes that Norwegian foreign aid is distributed to countries who are directly or indirectly interests of NATO or its de facto leader, USA. As bonds strengthened between the two parties, foreign aid increased, with the most significant increase happening in the period 2016-2018. This fits temporally with Colombia partnering with the alliance, which can point towards aid being a result of security political interests. Although it is unlikely this is the sole reason for the increase in foreign aid, it is highly likely the process influenced the amount of aid Colombia received from Norway over the period.

**Outcome:** The hoop test is passed, affirming the relevance of H3.

**5.8.7.4 H4: Smoking-gun test**

**Hypothesis:** The increase of foreign aid is due to humanitarian interests as a result of Norwegian contributions in the peace process.

**Data:** Norway was central in facilitating the discussion between both parties. When the peace deal was struck Norwegian aid increased substantially over the following years. At least 50 million NOK was distributed to UNs Postconflict Multi-Partner Trust Fund for Colombia in 2016, which in part confirms foreign aid was distributed to support the functions of Colombian government post-conflict. However, high aid flows have continued even though political stability is diminishing indicating other interests may also be central in foreign aid allocation.

**Inference:** Norwegian aid is at least partly humanitarian as funds were used directly to facilitate a peace negotiation. Furthermore, some of foreign aid can also be determined to be used to continuously develop Colombian peace.

**Summary:** Data proves at least some of the foreign aid is distributed directly to conflict management, proving there is a sufficient link between foreign aid and humanitarian interests. However, not all aid can sufficiently be attributed to humanitarian interests, which makes a complex causal interaction possible.

**Outcome:** The smoking-gun test confirms H4

Hypothesis	Test	Outcome	Inference
H1: Oil	Hoop	Passed	Supported
H2: Trade	Straw-in-the-wind	Passed	Not insignificant
H3: Security politics	Hoop	Passed	Supported
H4: Humanitarian	Smoking-gun	Passed	Causal path

Table 13: Test results

### 5.8.8 Discussion

The findings from the process tracing implicate several conditions that are central to foreign aid allocation. Most significant is the humanitarian aspect, here represented by facilitating peace discussions and further reinforcing the government after the ceasefire has been signed. This is the strongest finding, passing a smoking-gun test and therefore confirming this hypothesis. Central in the finding is that Norway has been openly contributing to the peace process and legitimizing foreign aid as a means for humanitarian development. This is no surprise, as the entire institution of foreign aid is built on the humanitarian argument, and therefore it is central to the institution of foreign aid. However, the central argument is not that foreign aid is not humanitarian. As one can use foreign aid as a foreign political tool, this is often residual interests which can be either a consequence of humanitarian aid or humanitarian aid can be used to mask foreign aid interests. Even larger states without the reputation of peace and conflict management of Norway have humanitarian foreign aid interests. It would therefore be unlikely not to find a causal function between the two. Even still, the only causal mechanism found is the one of humanitarian interests, which has to be attributed as the main cause for foreign aid donations.

Oil interests pass the hoop tests, meaning the relevancy of the hypothesis is confirmed. Although the impact of Station on foreign aid in Colombia is not apparent, there is strong grounds for assuming this at least was relevant for the increase in foreign aid. Planning foreign policy on business interests is not unusual and can be determinate in building a sustainable economy – this goes for both trade interests and oil interests. Using publicly owned companies to exercise foreign policy is not unheard of – as exemplified by Susan Strange (Strange, 1992).

Although trade is correlated with the foreign aid increase in 2016, there is no theoretical data to back up the value of imports to a country's foreign policy. It is apparent that the trade deal has decreased the Norwegian trade balance with Colombia, as imports have increased, and exports decreased. However, the correlation between import and foreign aid is apparent, and further inquiry into the relationship between these two variables could be interesting from an economic point of view considering there could be benefits to the increase in import which is significant to Norwegian industry. Isolated, there may be reason to assume the implementation of the trade deal is a causal factor for foreign aid, although this would not explain the continuous increase as exports decreased. Even still in the long-term Colombia could prove to be an important trading partner of Norway should political stability cause increased international trade, and the trade deal could be of increasing benefit for Norway.

The data indicates that having Colombia as a security political interest as NATO is relevant to being an aid recipient, as well as the amount of aid which is received. Using foreign aid as a development tool for allies is beneficial to strengthen bonds, increasing the capacities of the state as well as fending off interests of rivaling states.

## 6 Summarizing discussion

The findings reinforce the results of the QCA – especially in terms of the configuration of humanitarian crisis and security political relation. As both are present in the case of Colombia, and even more prevalently so than the QCA data suggests considering their involvement with NATO, we can infer that the interest of foreign aid to countries with both humanitarian crises as well as security political relations are more likely to receive foreign aid. This seems to be a part of Norwegian strategy where foreign aid can be applied both as a tool for humanitarian policy as well as groundworks for securing their own and other NATO members strategic security. This coupled with non-definitive trade and oil interests may seem to be a cornerstone of Norwegian aid distribution, which is prioritizing humanitarian aid but being strategic and opportunistic in its employment. This strategy is waterproof as even if all fails, one can point towards humanitarian interest as the sole reason for aid donations. This is a well-structured use of foreign aid as foreign policy whilst still gaining the trust of other nations.

On the basis of both QCA results and contributing process tracing findings, there is an argument to be made about generalizability. The patterns of aid themselves may not be causal, but by more closely analyzing the processes around foreign aid donations increases the probability of the results. As such, finding and affirming all foreign aid interests temporally in the data in a single case study indicates that there are reasons for emerging patterns, which indicates that most foreign aid is distributed not on humanitarian basis alone. This is not to suggest that all cases that matches with QCA-results are central in foreign aid, but there is more likely than not to be underlying interest in several of the top – and bottom – Norwegian aid recipients.

Although this study has developed some interesting findings which can be overall considered to be generalizable, there are concerns around validity and reliability of the study. Firstly, the security political variable measures U.S. security political interest, whilst NATO-related interest is used in process-tracing to examine whether foreign aid is increased. Although these two interests overlap, it would increase the reliability of the study if the variables were confounded. Additionally, the variable is coded from somewhat unreliable data, which affects both the validity and reliability of the data. This can as mentioned be solved by reliability checks, already existing quantitative data, or through other sources of data such as NATO-partner countries or direct military alliances. Secondly, the selection of countries can be utilized in a more suitable manner, selecting both cases of aid recipients and non-recipients, which would increase the robustness of the results. Thirdly, other quantifications of oil interest could be employed, i.e., a composed variable of oil reserves and willingness to invest in the country, which would give a more valid measure of which countries could be in Norway's scope. This could enlighten which countries have high oil reserves but low production, which is not the case here. Fourthly, other, more theoretically driven cutoffs can be used to ensure reliability in what constitutes high/low of any variable. Finally, more interest can be central in Norwegian foreign policy which are not covered by this study. By increasing the number of variables, it will also be apparent which ones are more likely to be spurious correlations and which ones are directly causal.

Further research is needed to conceptually establish whether Norwegian foreign aid is motivated by non-humanitarian interests. To establish causality in large datasets, quantitative studies can be done to unravel whether Norwegian aid is going to countries where oil, trade, and security political interest are present to further establish causal results. Another way to establish causality is by selecting more case studies, through process tracing or other methods, which can then be used to establish causal relationships which are more likely to increase the validity of the results. As this study is used exploratively, subsequent research has the freedom (and restrictive nature) of using more focused deductive measures and narrowing down on fewer variables.

## 7 Conclusion

In this thesis the interest behind Norwegian foreign aid has been studied through two parts. In an attempt to map which patterns emerge in foreign aid distribution, csQCA was employed using data from 37 of the top recipients of Norwegian aid between 2010-2021, analyzing oil, trade, and security political foreign political interests. The data suggest that there are patterns to Norwegian foreign aid, especially foreign aid to security political interests with humanitarian crises, indicating that Norway prioritizes foreign aid to allies or "allies of allies." Furthermore, the data indicates that there is always at least one of the non-humanitarians amongst the top aid recipients, suggesting that although no clear patterns emerge, foreign political interest is always at hand. The second part is a process tracing study of the rapid increase of Norwegian aid to Colombia in 2016-2018. The findings indicate that although the only causal factor apparent is the Colombian peace process, there is evidence that both oil interests and Colombian NATO-partnership could be factors which increased foreign aid. One can even make the case that foreign aid increased as a result of the EFTA-Colombian trade deal, although there is not sufficient evidence to support this claim. The results are deemed to be somewhat generalizable, although more research is needed to supply this study.

The findings of the thesis contribute to the narrow field of Norwegian foreign policy through foreign aid, providing indications that foreign aid is used in a political manner through domestic trade and lobbying interests as well as pressures from alliances and central military political allies. These results can be built upon to further develop the true foreign political motivations of Norwegian foreign aid and subsequently decrease the status of Norway as apolitical in the aid discussion. This also further strengthens the real political view of foreign aid as a political tool, although humanitarian interests also are involved. Because of this, the legitimized goals of foreign aid should be taken with a grain of salt even though further studies are needed to establish a more causal inference between foreign aid and foreign policy in what are considered apolitical states. In terms of method, this gives ground for applying a differentiated mix of qualitative and quantitative approach to foreign aid inquiry, which today mostly consists of either of the mentioned. This also increases the validity of foreign aid in foreign policy studies, which can be accounted for when analyzing the development of alliance politics, trade policy as well as natural resource gains.

## 8 References

- ACAPS. (2023). *CRISIS IN SIGHT*. Retrieved 03.02 from <https://www.acaps.org/countries>
- Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. (2012). *Why Nations Fail*.
- Adhikari, B. (2019). United Nations general assembly voting and foreign aid bypass. *International Politics*, 56(4), 514-535. <https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/s41311-018-0152-2>
- Alesina, A., & Dollar, D. (2000). Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why? *Journal of Economic Growth*, 5(1), 33-63. <https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009874203400>
- Allison, G. T. (1969). Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis. *The American Political Science Review*, 63(3), 689-718. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1954423>
- Bennett, A., Checkel, J., & T. (2014). *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool*. Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/DOI:10.1017/CBO9781139858472>
- Blaker, M. (2020). Kina er verdens mektigste land - Norge bidrar med hundrevis av millioner i bistand. *Nettavisen*. <https://www.nettavisen.no/nyheter/kina-er-verdens-mektigste-land-norge-bidrar-med-hundrevis-av-millioener-i-bistand/s/12-95-3423928044>
- bnamericas. (2023). *Ecopetrol S.A (Ecopetrol)*. Retrieved 05.05 from <https://www.bnamericas.com/en/company-profile/ecopetrol-sa-ecopetrol>
- Brazys, S., & Panke, D. (2017). Why do states change positions in the United Nations General Assembly? *International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique*, 38(1), 70-84. <https://doi.org/10.2307/26940293>
- Burnside, C., & Dollar, D. (2000). Aid, Policies, and Growth. *The American economic review*, 90(4), 847-868. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/117311>
- Carazo, M. (2007). Venezuela-smell for Statoil. *Nettavisen*. <https://www.nettavisen.no/artikkel/venezuela-smell-for-statoil/s/12-95-1003522>
- Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Knutsen, C. H., Staffan I. Lindberg, Teorell, J., Altman, D., Bernhard, M., Cornell, A., Fish, M. S., Lisa Gastaldi, Gjerløw, H., Glynn, A., Hicken, A., Lührmann, A., Maerz, S. F., L., K., Marquardt, K. M., Mechkova, V., Paxton, P., . . . Ziblatt, D. (2021). *V-Dem Codebook v11.1*. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.
- Dagens Næringsliv. (2014). *Statoil har fått lisens i Colombia* <https://www.dn.no/stl/olje/statoil-har-fatt-lisens-i-colombia/1-1-5156421>
- Deloitte. (2021). *Områdegjennomgang av utenrikstjenesten Delleveranse 1: Kartlegging*. <https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/3595c39537ae4d688f6e22be409a7f84/omradegjennomgang-av-utenrikstjenesten-delrapport-1-kartlegging.pdf>
- Easterly, W. (2003). Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth? *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 17(3), 23-48. <https://doi.org/10.1257/089533003769204344>
- Easterly, W. (2006). *The White Man's Burden*. Oxford University Press.
- Easterly, W. (2007). "Can foreign aid buy growth? *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 17(3), 23-48.
- Easterly, W., & Pfütze, T. (2008). Where Does the Money Go? Best and Worst Practices in Foreign Aid. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 22(2), 29-52. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27648240>
- Easterly, W., & Williamson, C. R. (2011). Rhetoric versus Reality: The Best and Worst of Aid Agency Practices. *World Development*, 39(11), 1930-1949. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.07.027>
- Ecopetrol. (2017). *Integrated Sustainable Management Report*. <https://www.resourcedata.org/dataset/ecopetrol-sustainabilityreport-2016/resource/0235fb6f-56c7-47a2-8821-f7e07833f808>
- AGREEMENT BETWEEN COLOMBIA AND THE STATES OF THE EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION, (2008). <https://www.efta.int/media/documents/legal-texts/free-trade->



- relations/colombia/Record%20of%20Understanding%20and%20Annexes/EN/iii.pdf
- EFTA. (2023). *Colombia*. Retrieved 15.05 from <https://www.efta.int/free-trade/free-trade-agreements/colombia#anchor-1>
- eia. (2023). *Total Petroleum and Other Liquids Production Annual*. <https://www.eia.gov/international/data/world/petroleum-and-other-liquids/more-petroleum-and-other-liquids-data?pd=5&p=00000010000000000000008000000000000g00000000000000000000001g&u=0&f=A&v=line&a=-&i=none&vo=value&vb=170&t=C&g=none&l=249-8001020250000100000459140p00544c080080408201003g089k&s=1262304000000&e=1640995200000&ev=true>
- Engh, S. (2009). The Conscience of the World?: Swedish and Norwegian Provision of Development Aid. *Itinerario*, 33(2), 65-82. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0165115300003107>
- Equinor. (2021a). *2020 Årsrapport*.
- Equinor. (2021b). *Equinor fullfører salg av eiendel i Venezuela*. Retrieved 06.08 from <https://www.equinor.com/no/news/archive/202107-completes-divestment-onshore-asset>
- Equinor. (2023). *Kort om Equinor*. Retrieved 05.05 from <https://www.equinor.com/no/om-oss/kort-om-equinor>
- Fabra-Mata, J., & Wilhelmsen, A. (2018). *A Trusted Facilitator: An Evaluation of Norwegian Engagement in the Peace Process between the Colombian Government and the FARC, 2010–2016*. <https://www.norad.no/contentassets/33fb8fa056be4d2b9b6eadfda9f6b3e1/10.18-evaluation-of-norways-support-to-the-peace-process-in-colombia-20102016.pdf>
- Fermann, G. (Ed.). (2013). *Utenrikspolitikk og norsk krisehåndtering*. Cappelen Damm.
- Fuchs, A., & Öhler, H. (2021). Does private aid follow the flag? An empirical analysis of humanitarian assistance. *The World Economy*, 44(3), 671-705. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/twec.13021>
- Henley, J. (2023). Norway urged to step up Ukraine support after profiting from war. *The Guardian*, . <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/01/norway-urged-to-step-up-ukraine-support-after-profiting-from-war>
- Human Rights Watch. (2023). *Colombia*. Retrieved 06.05 from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/colombia>
- Hühne, P., Meyer, B., & Nunnenkamp, P. (2014). Who Benefits from Aid for Trade? Comparing the Effects on Recipient versus Donor Exports. *The Journal of Development Studies*, 50(9), 1275-1288. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2014.903246>
- InterAksyon. (2013). *Colombia heads toward NATO membership*. Retrieved 06.04 from <https://web.archive.org/web/20160313014808/http://interaksyon.com/article/63084/colombia-heads-toward-nato-membership>
- Jarstad, L., Rønning, I. K., & Hualand, A. (2022). Rekordresultat for Equinor. *NRK*. <https://www.nrk.no/norge/rekordresultat-for-equinor-1.15847598>
- Jerve, A. M. (2007). Slutt på ekte bistand. *Aftenposten*. <https://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/debatt/i/lzry3/slutt-paa-ekte-bistand>
- Keefer, P., & Knack, S. (1997). Why Don't Poor Countries Catch up? A Cross-National Test of an Institutional Explanation. *Economic Inquiry*, 35(3), 590-602.
- Lagerstrøm, B. O., & Seferi, G. (2021). *Holdning til bistand 2021*. [https://www.ssb.no/offentlig-sektor/artikler-og-publikasjoner/\\_attachment/455233?\\_ts=179e5a4a438](https://www.ssb.no/offentlig-sektor/artikler-og-publikasjoner/_attachment/455233?_ts=179e5a4a438)
- Libya-utvalget. (2018). *Evaluering av norsk deltakelse i Libya-operasjonene i 2011*. Regjeringen. <https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/departementene/fd/dokumenter/rapport-er-og-regelverk/libya-rapporten.pdf>

- Løvås, J., & Ånestad, M. (2017). Statoil på vent i Venezuela. *Dagens Næringsliv*.  
<https://www.dn.no/olje/venezuela/pdvsa/donald-trump/statoil-pa-vent-i-venezuela/2-1-219353>
- Mallik, G. (2008). Foreign Aid and Economic Growth: A Cointegration Analysis of the Six Poorest African Countries. *Economic Analysis and Policy*, 38(2), 251-260.  
[https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/S0313-5926\(08\)50020-8](https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/S0313-5926(08)50020-8)
- Martinez-Zarzoso, I. (2019). Effects of Foreign Aid on Income through International Trade. *Politics and Governance*, 7(2).  
<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v7i2.1830>
- McGillivray, M., Feeny, S., Hermes, N., & Lensink, R. (2006). Controversies over the impact of development aid: it works; it doesn't; it can, but that depends ...  
*Journal of international development*, 18(7), 1031-1050.  
<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.1335>
- Mesquita, B. B. d., & Smith, A. (2009). A Political Economy of Aid. *International Organization*, 63(2), 309 - 340.  
<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818309090109>
- Moravcsik, A. (1997). Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics. *International Organization*, 51(4), 513-553.  
<https://doi.org/10.1162/002081897550447>
- Morgenthau, H. (1962). A Political Theory of Foreign Aid. *The American Political Science Review*, 56(2), 301-309. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1952366>
- NATO. (2021). *Relations with Colombia*. Retrieved 04.04 from [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_143936.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_143936.htm)
- NATO. (2023). *Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014-2022)*.  
[https://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/2023/3/pdf/230321-def-exp-2022-en.pdf](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2023/3/pdf/230321-def-exp-2022-en.pdf)
- Noh, B., & Heshmati, A. (2021). Does official development assistance affect a donor's exports? South Korea's case. *SN Business & Economics*, 1(10), 141.  
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s43546-021-00145-7>
- NORAD. (2020). *Årsrapport*.  
<https://www.norad.no/globalassets/publikasjoner/publikasjoner-2021/norads-arsrapport-2020.pdf>
- NORAD. (2022). *Systematisk evaluering av norsk bistand*. Retrieved 31.03 from <https://www.norad.no/evaluering/>
- NORAD. (2023). *Bistandsresultater*. Retrieved 01.05 from <https://resultater.norad.no/no>
- Norsk Kaffeinformasjon. (2023). *Kaffeundersøkelsen 2022*. <https://kaffe.no/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Slik-drikker-vi-kaffe.pdf>
- OECD. (2023). *Bilateral Trade by Products*. Retrieved 16.05 from <https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/nor/partner/col?dynamicBilateralTradeSelector=year2003>
- OECD. (2022). *United States*. Retrieved 11.06 from [https://public.tableau.com/views/AidAtAGlance/DACmembers?:embed=y&:display\\_count=no?&:showVizHome=no#1](https://public.tableau.com/views/AidAtAGlance/DACmembers?:embed=y&:display_count=no?&:showVizHome=no#1)
- OECD. (2023a). *Frequently asked questions: official development assistance (ODA)*. Retrieved 14.02 from <https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-data/faq.htm>
- OECD. (2023b). *Official development assistance (ODA)*. Retrieved 02.02 from <https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/official-development-assistance.htm>
- Pedersen, E., Almås, G. B., Schibevaag, T. A., Nordmark, I., Norheim, H. J., & Oppedal, M. (2023). Opedal om krigs-profitør-beskyldninger: – Vi kan ikke gjøre noe med krigen i Ukraina. *NRK*. [https://www.nrk.no/rogaland/equinor-resultat-for-2022-er-klart-\\_fjoraret-ble-rekord-1.16281292](https://www.nrk.no/rogaland/equinor-resultat-for-2022-er-klart-_fjoraret-ble-rekord-1.16281292)
- Ragin, C. (2000). *Fuzzy-Set Social Science*. The University of Chicago Press.
- Ragin, C. (2013). *The Comparative Method : Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies* [Book]. University of California Press.

- <https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=784602&site=ehost-live&scope=site>
- Ragin, C. C. (1987). *The Comparative Method Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies*. University of California Press.  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/j.ctt1pnx57>
- Regjeringen. (2020). *Colombia - frihandelsavtale*. Retrieved 15.05 from <https://www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/naringsliv/handel/nfd---innsiktsartikler/frihandelsavtaler/partner-land/colombia/id438863/>
- Rystad, K.-M. (2020). Noe er alvorlig galt med norsk bistand til fattige land. *Nettavisen*.  
<https://www.nettavisen.no/okonomi/noe-er-alvorlig-galt-med-norsk-bistand-til-fattige-land/s/12-95-3423932608>
- Sachs, J. (2005). *The End of Poverty*. Penguin Press.
- Snyder, G. H. (1984). The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics. *World Politics*, 36(4), 461-495. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2010183>
- Statista. (2023). *Largest donors of humanitarian aid worldwide in 2022 (in million U.S. dollars), by country*. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/275597/largers-donor-countries-of-aid-worldwide/>
- Statistisk Sentralbyrå. (2019). *Kaffeavhengige nordmenn*. Retrieved 16.05 from <https://www.ssb.no/utenriksokonomi/artikler-og-publikasjoner/kaffeavhengige-nordmenn>
- Strange, S. (1992). States, Firms and Diplomacy. *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, 68(1), 1-15. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2620458>
- The Observatory of Economic Complexity. (2023). *Norway / Colombia*. Retrieved 03.05 from <https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/nor/partner/col>
- Tjora, A. (2017). *Kvalitative forskningsmetoder i praksis* (Vol. 3). Gyldendal akademisk.
- TV2. (2011). Statoils plan i Venezuela mislyktes. *TV2*,.  
<https://www.tv2.no/nyheter/innenriks/statoils-plan-i-venezuela-mislyktes/12939522/>
- U.S Congress. (2010). *Colombia : a country study* (R. A. Hudson, Ed. Vol. 5). Library of Congress. <https://countrystudies.us/colombia/>
- U.S Department of State. (2019). *U.S. Relations With Liberia*. Retrieved 01.02 from <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-liberia/>
- U.S Department of State. (2020a). *U.S. Relations With Republic of the Congo*. Retrieved 01.02 from <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-republic-of-the-congo/>
- U.S Department of State. (2020b). *U.S. Relations With Zambia*. Retrieved 01.02 from <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-zambia/>
- U.S Department of State. (2021a). *U.S. Relations With Burma*. Retrieved 01.02 from <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-burma/>
- U.S Department of State. (2021b). *U.S. Relations With China*. Retrieved 01.02 from <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-china/>
- U.S Department of State. (2021c). *U.S. Relations With Colombia*. Retrieved 01.02 from <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-colombia/>
- U.S Department of State. (2021d). *U.S. Relations With Malawi*. Retrieved 01.02 from <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-malawi/>
- U.S Department of State. (2021e). *U.S. Relations With Niger*. Retrieved 01.02 from <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-niger/>
- U.S Department of State. (2021f). *U.S. Relations With Nigeria*. Retrieved 01.02 from <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-nigeria/>
- U.S Department of State. (2021g). *U.S. Relations With Syria*. Retrieved 01.02 from <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-syria/>
- U.S Department of State. (2021h). *U.S. Relations With Ukraine*. Retrieved 01.02 from <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-ukraine/>
- U.S Department of State. (2021i). *U.S. Relations With Vietnam*. Retrieved 01.02 from <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-vietnam/>
- U.S Department of State. (2022a). *U.S. Relations With Afghanistan*. Retrieved 01.02 from <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-afghanistan/>

U.S Department of State. (2022b). *U.S. Relations With Bangladesh*. Retrieved 01.02 from <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-bangladesh/>

U.S Department of State. (2022c). *U.S. Relations With Brazil*. Retrieved 01.02 from <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-brazil/>

U.S Department of State. (2022d). *U.S. Relations With Guyana*. Retrieved 01.02 from <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-guyana/>

U.S Department of State. (2022e). *U.S. Relations With India*. Retrieved 01.02 from <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-india/>

U.S Department of State. (2022f). *U.S. Relations With Indonesia*. Retrieved 01.02 from <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-indonesia/>

U.S Department of State. (2022g). *U.S. Relations With Iraq*. Retrieved 01.02 from <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-iraq/>

U.S Department of State. (2022h). *U.S. Relations With Jordan*. Retrieved 01.02 from <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-jordan/>

U.S Department of State. (2022i). *U.S. Relations With Kenya*. Retrieved 01.02 from <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-kenya/>

U.S Department of State. (2022j). *U.S. Relations With Lebanon*. Retrieved 01.02 from <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-lebanon/>

U.S Department of State. (2022k). *U.S. Relations With Mali*. Retrieved 01.02 from <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-mali/>

U.S Department of State. (2022l). *U.S. Relations With Mozambique*. Retrieved 01.02 from <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-mozambique/>

U.S Department of State. (2022m). *U.S. Relations With Nepal*. Retrieved 01.02 from <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-nepal/>

U.S Department of State. (2022n). *U.S. Relations With Pakistan*. Retrieved 01.02 from <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-pakistan/>

U.S Department of State. (2022o). *U.S. Relations With Somalia*. Retrieved 01.02 from <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-somalia/>

U.S Department of State. (2022p). *U.S. Relations With South Sudan*. Retrieved 01.02 from <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-south-sudan/>

U.S Department of State. (2022q). *U.S. Relations With Sri Lanka*. Retrieved 01.02 from <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-sri-lanka/>

U.S Department of State. (2022r). *U.S. Relations With Sudan*. Retrieved 01.02 from <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-sudan/>

U.S Department of State. (2022s). *U.S. Relations With Tanzania*. Retrieved 01.02 from <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-tanzania/>

U.S Department of State. (2022t). *U.S. Relations With Uganda*. Retrieved 01.02 from <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-uganda/>

U.S Department of State. (2022u). *U.S. Relations With Yemen*. Retrieved 01.02 from <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-yemen/>

U.S Department of State. (2022v). *U.S. Relations With Zimbabwe*. Retrieved 01.02 from <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-zimbabwe/>

U.S Department of State. (2023a). *U.S. Relations With Colombia*. Retrieved 01.05 from <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-colombia/>

U.S Department of State. (2023b). *U.S. Relations With Ethiopia*. Retrieved 01.02 from <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-ethiopia/>

U.S Department of State. (2023c). *U.S. Relations With Haiti*. <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-haiti/>

United Nations. (2011). *Security Council Approves 'No-Fly Zone' over Libya, Authorizing 'All Necessary Measures' to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions*. Retrieved 01.06 from <https://press.un.org/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm>

USAID. (2023). *Budget Justification*. Retrieved 03.06 from <https://www.usaid.gov/cj>

VDEM. (2022). *Country Graph*. Retrieved 31.01 from [https://www.v-dem.net/data\\_analysis/CountryGraph/](https://www.v-dem.net/data_analysis/CountryGraph/)

Waltz, K. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. Waveland Press, Inc.

WITS. (2023). *TII - Trade Indicator*.

Zeng, K. (2019). *Handbook on the International Political Economy of China*.  
<https://doi.org/10.4337/9781786435064>



 **NTNU**

Norwegian University of  
Science and Technology