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Queen's Gambit: A Closer Look at Political Succession through a Typology and a Case Study of Henry VIII.

Master's thesis

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Preface

This thesis marks the result of a long fascination with Henry VIII, which I got to further develop in the class 'The Rise and Decline of Great Powers' here at NTNU. This work signifies my fifth and final year as a teaching student with a master's in Political Science. For that, and all my other opportunities, I am very grateful.

There are many individuals which deserve acknowledgment for their help and guidance during this process. First and foremost, I am extremely grateful to my thesis advisor: Torbjørn Knutsen, for encouraging me to write about primogeniture and Henry VIII. I appreciate the time, enthusiasm, and expertise you have put into this project. Without your spellchecking, constructive criticism, and thoughtful suggestions, this thesis would be significantly worse for wear. Thank you for being an exceptional advisor and for helping me navigate this sometimes-daunting endeavor. I will try to learn languages and read *Le Mage du Kreml*. I promise! I also would like to extend my sincere appreciation to Ross, Laura, Pia, Mari, Ragnhild and Idunn for reading and providing feedbacks on my drafts.

A minor post-mortem thanks should also be extended to Henry himself; I appreciate you living an interesting life. You have not bored me *yet*.

All errors are my own.

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Sanna Sætre

Trondheim, 6. June 2023
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Abstract

This thesis examines the nature of succession as a crucial factor in understanding how rulers gain and loose power. The process of succession is when a ruler is replaced by another. This can determine the longevity of the ruler, the strength of institutions and the stability of both state and leader. The subject of succession has long been overlooked or covered only briefly in the literature. This thesis aims to correct this by presenting a typology, followed by a case study on hereditary succession, exemplified by the reign of Henry VIII.

Previous research suggests that there are 3 types of political succession: by force, hereditary, and electoral. This thesis also introduces a category to encompass successions lacking a standard procedure.

The study of Henry VIII found that many of his actions as a ruler could be explained by his troubles with the successional standard of hereditary monarchies: primogeniture. Initially, his problems were of a domestic and interpersonal nature, as he sought a divorce due to personal need and for the sake of England's successional line. However, his issues would also become international and consisted of a religious component due to papal power and dynastic power politics. Lastly, his issues were biological as he was reproductively challenged at a time where his offspring were a dynastic necessity. Thus, Henry VIII illustrates the weaknesses of primogeniture and the chaos which can disrupt if the line of succession is unclear due to either illness or war, internal strife, or biological complications.

This thesis aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of the intricate dynamics of succession, shedding light on potential implications for leaders, institutions, and states. Due to the inevitable and crucial role of succession, it emphasizes the imperative of more successional research which also focuses on electoral succession and succession by force.

Sammendrag

Denne masteroppgaven tar utgangspunkt i politisk suksesjons natur som en avgjørende faktor for hvordan statsledere erverver og mister makt. Suksesjon er en prosess der den øverste statslederen blir utskiftet. Denne prosessen kan være avgjørende for statslederens regentskap, styrken til institusjoner og stabiliteten for både stat og leder. I tillegg er suksesjon et forskningsemne som har blitt forbigått eller kortfattet dekt av forskningslitteraturen. Denne oppgaven tar sikte på å rette opp i dette ved å presentere en typologi, etterfulgt av en casestudie om suksesjon ved arv, som vil bli eksemplifisert ved å se nærmere på Henrik VIII sin regjeringstid.

Tidligere forskning foreslår at det eksisterer 3 typer politisk suksesjon: med makt, ved arv, gjennom valg. Denne oppgaven utpeker enda en kategori som fanger opp suksesjoner uten en standard prosedyre.

En studie av Henrik VIII viser hvordan mange av hans handlinger som statsoverhode kan forklares av problemer med primogenitur, datidens suksesjonsstandard i arvelige monarkier. Opprinnelig var problemene hans av en innenriks- og mellommenneskelig natur ettersom han ønsket en skilsmisse grunnet personlig årsaker, og av hensyn til den engelske arverekkefølgen. Deretter ble hans problemer av en internasjonal og religiøs art grunnet pavemakt og dynastisk maktpolitikk. Til slutt var hans problemer også biologiske, ettersom han slet med å reprodusere i en tidsepoke der hans avkom var en dynastisk nødvendighet. Dermed illustrerer en casestudie av Henrik VIII svakhetene ved primogenitur, og kaoset som kan oppstå hvis arverekkefølgen er diffus grunnet sykdom og krig, interne konflikter eller biologiske komplikasjoner.

Denne oppgaven sikter mot å bidra til en mer kompleks forståelse av den intrikate dynamikken i politisk suksesjon, og potensielle konsekvenser for ledere, institusjoner og stater. Grunnet suksesjon sin uunngåelige og essensielle funksjon understreker oppgaven nødvendigheten av mer forskning på emnet, særlig om suksesjon ved valg og makt som ikke behandles i dybden i denne oppgaven.

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INTRODUCTION

A succession is an inescapable rite of passage that occurs in every political regime (Rustow, 1964). As the passage of time is an inherent aspect of human existence, it is an event that cannot be escaped or avoided. Succession should not be overlooked as it deals with not only one, but two interesting questions: how rulers acquire power, and how the ruler is replaced or deprived of that same power. The rise of the leader often predicts the fall, as succession is irrevocably linked to legitimacy and regime stability (Herz, 1952; Huntington, 1965; Sudduth & Bell, 2018). Leaders and aspirants all wonder how one can obtain power and hold on to power for as long as possible and will adjust their behavior accordingly (Calvert, 1987, p. 1). To further understand succession, this thesis will look closer at the following question: *What is the nature of political succession*?

Succession is a natural process as old as leadership itself. In some ancient tribes and kingdoms, succession was often decided by struggle or force (Humphries, 2014, p. 162; Schaberg et. al., 2020, p.30). This type of succession has proven costly, as it brings death and destruction to society (Jones & Olken, 2009; Sudduth & Bell, 2018). In ancient Greece, elective transitions were born around 4th and 5th century BC (Finley, 2018, pp. 8; 24-26). Yet, they lost this type of governance after falling prey to demagogues. In the Middle Ages, the transfer of state power was mostly hereditary and established through royal bloodlines and the system of primogeniture (Frantz & Stein, 2012; Kokkonen & Sundell, 2014; Sharma, 2015). This system unified power and evolved rules for its orderly transition but created problems for rulers who only fathered daughters or who suffered from infertility or impotence (Sharma, 2015). As time has passed, power is still taken by force, passed down hereditary or given through means of electoral competition. Similarly, the successional issues that plagued ancient Greece, Tudor England and ancient civilizations are still present. Even the constitutional democracy, which has often been praised as the ideal form of government with the smoothest transition of power, has demonstrated an underlying weakness for election-deniers and demagogues in recent elections as in the United States (2020) and Brazil (2022) (Bueno de Mesquita, & Smith, 2017; Huntington, 1991; Rush, 1978; Schumpeter, 1942 [1976]).

Many regimes have suffered crisis of succession throughout the ages by either a lack of a leader, a leader who has outlived his tenure, a "lame duck", an ill-fitted ruler, or a leader with

no legitimate successor (Börm, 2014, p. 261; Rustow, 1964). In this thesis, there will be a case study of the latter with the well-known example of Henry VIII. He went to extraordinary lengths to secure a line of succession for England and his own dynasty (Scarisbrick, 2011). As a state leader, Henry VIII's actions were continuously shaped and limited by primogeniture. He sacrificed England's state religion, two prominent advisors: Cardinal Wolsey and Thomas Cromwell, and several of his queens for the ultimate prize: an heir who would secure the continuation of the reign of the House of Tudor (Scarisbrick, 2011; James, 2010, p.10). Similarly, so did the dynastic families which put forth their daughters to advance their societal ranks, knowing the risk to their daughters lives and reputation if they did not deliver Henry a boy. Hence, both ruler and dynastic families participated in power politics of the 16th century, driven by the prevailing dynasticism of the time, with the ultimate goal of advancing their patrimonial lineage (Sharma, 2015).

This is a thesis in two parts, where the first part creates a typology of succession, and the second part is a case study of Henry VIII. The aim in Part I is to identify the means of succession and the different successional types. Thereafter, the case study will try to understand both the constraints of succession and the stability and legitimacy it can offer by diving into the reign and life of Henry VIII. There are numerous case studies on different types of succession in the literature. Moreover, many have examined particular types of succession (see for instance: Brownlee, 2007; Bueno de Mesquita, & Smith, 2009; 2017; Helms, 2020; Rush, 1978). However, the literature lacks a cohesive understanding of the source of change, and the substance of succession. This thesis will attempt to rectify this by creating a typology of succession focusing on hereditary succession, succession through elections, and succession by force. In addition, it will suggest a residual category of succession where there is no set procedure. The aim is not to discuss what regime is best or how the process is, but rather to understand the nature of succession: how it functions and affects leaders and institutions alike. The belief is that once we see how leaders come to power and stay in power, then we can better understand the driving force behind politics: the self-interested calculations and actions of rulers (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2011, p. xxiii). The theoretical framework of Part I will be followed by a case study of Henry VIII, and his successional issues in Part II.

Method

This paper is divided into two main parts: Part I draws on existing literature for the purpose of creating a typology, and the second part is a case study of Henry VIII. The basis for the findings presented in this thesis is founded on literature created by other authors, and through relying on peer-reviewed articles and books written by scholars. This thesis aims to approach both parts with a historical sensitivity (Tjora, 2017, pp. 187; 190).

Earlier research highlights the ideal types of succession which illustrate how rulers may gain power. These types do not perfectly mirror reality but are created to help systemize succession. As such they are exaggerations that can show the essence of different successions, and with them the successional issues and solutions which characterize each means of succession. The rules of succession are ever changing, just as the political order of any state remains a dynamic, shifting hallmark or feature. Moreover, there will always exist exceptions and transitional regimes. So, even if a country may usually change leadership by hereditary means, that does not mean that the sitting leader may not be replaced by force. Nor do they capture changes where a nation moves from revolution to constitutional election or dissolution of state to hereditary appointment. Therefore, the Table of Successional Types (captured in *Table 1* on page 9), along with the examples covered in Part I, chapter 2, are not fully encompassing, but rather comprise key depictions of a broad spectrum of successional type approaches.

Previous research on the topic of succession provides an overview, which is necessary in order to create a typological framework (Doty & Glick, 1994). The typology is not only a way of classification but aims to theorize the current literature by specifying the relationship between the way rulers inherit power and their rule. As a typology, the table identifies interrelated ideal types of succession which represents a distinctive successional attribute. This attribute is believed to determine the eventual outcome for the leader as it is argued that the way you attain power could be a foreshadow of how it is lost (Sudduth & Bell, 2018). The literature that has been used to create this typology include works by political scientists, which have been reviewed in Part I of this thesis. Otherwise, trustworthy publications have been used, such as peer-reviewed articles and books by political scientists.

Ideally, this study would be comprised of three case studies, one for each of my main ideal types (succession by force, election or hereditary). It would have been interesting to conduct case studies for each of the main types and then conduct a comparative analysis of their respective successional issues. Considering current events, it could be fruitful to study the elective process of Vladimir Putin and how he transformed the successional practices in Russia to prolong his tenure (Zubok, 2022). It could also be relevant to assess how the assassination of President Juvenal Habyarimana escalated the Rwandan genocide, especially since Rwanda nowadays is often praised as a post-war success story (Ansoms, 2005; Hudson, 2009). However, because of limited space, this thesis will focus on one type only: hereditary succession through primogeniture. More specifically, it will focus on Henry VIII. The criteria for choosing Henry VIII in a case study is as follows: He is well-known and very important as he contributed to English nation building (Kohn, 1940; Kramer et. al., 2019, p. 210). Also, he can be used to illustrate most of, if not all, the challenges within a system that practices primogeniture. In fact, some of his actions can be explained by these faults. As such, he can be used as a critical case study where he has had a strategic importance to shed light on the nature of succession, primogenital problems and how he solved them (Flyvbjerg, 2010). He was powerful and a king, and if Henry VIII had issues within the system of primogeniture, surely others have as well. Thus, he can be used to shed light on the faults of primogeniture, which might be generalizable for other leaders.

The case study of Henry VIII is based on two historical works: the most well-known book about Henry VIII, written by J.J. Scarisbrick (2011), as well as the book *A History of Europe in the Modern World* by Kramer, Palmer and Colton (2019). Historical data provide a strong empirical basis for studies of past events as well as case studies (Moses & Knutsen, 2019, p. 118). Due to the nature of the study, which stretches far back in time, most of the sources are secondary or tertiary sources. Where it is possible one primary source has been used: one of Henry VIII's letters to Anne Boleyn (Henry VIII (1528 [2010], p. ii-iii). It would have been preferable to use more primary sources, but most of the primary sources have been lost over time. In particular, the material concerning Anne Boleyn, were mostly burned post-mortem (Bordo, 2013, p. x; 30; 111). Also, it is difficult to assess the wives of Henry VIII as their tales are tainted by the misogyny and predominantly male historians of that era who painted them as "witches" and "whores" (Hui, 2018, pp. 97-99).

PART I: ON SUCCESSION

How power is gained often mirrors how it is lost (Sudduth & Bell, 2018). Therefore, one must understand how power is gained to foreshadow how it can be lost in the future. For instance, if power is attained by force, it is very likely that it will be lost in the same manner. Also, if a leader gained power through an internal power struggle within the political party, it is likely that he or she will fall prey to that same competitiveness. Thus, to understand the nature of succession, these chapters wish to gain insight into the following question: *With what means do rulers gain power?*

Even though no democracy, nor any dictatorship are alike, all leaders have at least two commonalities: they all risk removal from office through force and other mass movements, and they almost always want to hold on to power for as long as possible (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2017). Factors which increase the likelihood of removal include economic issues, social crisis, political shocks, and a tradition of unregulated successions (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2017; Geddes, 1999). A rebellion or uprising requires that there is a will to dispose of the sitting leader, and a way of implementing change (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2017). These policy shocks, different crisis and issues, or a lack of legitimacy increase revolutionary pressure as they reduce the masses' satisfaction. Moreover, a budget issue may harm a leader's ability to pay henchmen, provide public goods or other projects that can buy popularity. A health shock can cause unease about the future and provide the opportunity for a vice president or a family member to step into power.

For the autocrat, a sudden change to their health can make them look weak and inspire disloyalty from their inner circle (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2017). There is no reason to be loyal to a leader who will perish and no longer provide you with benefits or access to the leader or the fruits of the office (Geddes, 1999, p. 121). Autocratic leaders in general risk removal by challengers within the political or military elite or by revolutionary threats (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2017; Geddes, 1999). Thus, a monarch, a dictator or someone within a hereditary regime should always fear their own family and inner circle. Meanwhile, democratic leaders should fear economic shocks, poor health, mistakes, or time itself.

For the people, the way a ruler takes power can lay the groundwork for what type of leader they will have. An autocrat who takes power by force needs to placate his inner circle of

followers and keep the political elite within his network placated (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2017; Frantz & Stein, 2017; Geddes, 1999). Meanwhile, a militarist leader is dependent on keeping his military fellowship, and often prioritizes military spending (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2017; Geddes, 1999). In a democracy, the tenure of the leader is decided by the Constitution and electoral support, and an eventual loss of power is inevitable (Calvert, 1987; pp. 1-2; Govea & Holm, 1998; Helms, 2020, p. 333). Hence, for an ambitious leader, democracy is the worst form of government (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2009). While more democratically elected leaders convert their countries into dictatorships, few dictators voluntarily transform their countries into democracies. Democracy is, however, the best type of government for almost everyone else, as people in democracies on average live longer and better lives. The longer a leader holds onto power, the poorer the average welfare provision for the incumbents' subjects.

As we will see later, there have been many case studies on distinctive types of succession: Calvert (1987) offers a series of case studies on succession for different types of regimes, and Helms (2020) compares successional practices in democratic and non-democratic regimes. Still, there lacks an exhaustive overview of how rulers attain power and by what means. In previous research the focus surrounding succession has been on succession as an institution (Huntington, 1991; 1965). Here, a neo-institutional approach is adapted to look at the norms and rules surrounding a succession into the highest office of the executive branch. The theoretical framework presented in Part I will be further used in Part II.

Chapter One: Political Succession as a Topic in Scientific Literature

The topic of succession has been granted surprisingly little attention in Political Science (Govea & Holm, 1998). Scholars have generally shown more concern for regime change, rather than changes in leadership. Studies of succession have frequently discussed singular (often violent) events or regime types (Jones & Olken, 2009; Rush, 1978; Sudduth & Bell, 2018). This has resulted in a field of research which is surprisingly scarce and limited. However, there are some authors who have covered the topic on succession, such as the political scientists Peter Calvert (1987), Dankwart Rustow (1964) and Ludger Helms (2020). In his book *The Process of Political Succession* (1987), Peter Calvert creates an overview of what succession is, and how it occurs within different states such as Argentina, the Soviet Union and Italy. Dankwart Rustow (1964, p.104) focuses on the nature of succession in the 20th century where rulers have left the stage either too young, too old or by force. While Calvert (1987) provides an overview of succession, Rustow (1964) creates an outline of a typology of successional crisis' by looking at successions that have occurred in the 20th century. Recently, Helms (2020) contributed to the fields by conducting a study of both democratic and non-democratic succession.

The most talked about type of succession in the 20th and 21st century is succession by force. Several influential political scientists have written about this violent type of succession (Govea & Holm, 1998). Among them are Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alistair Smith (2009; 2017). They have written several articles and books together, often about political leaders and their many strategies for political survival. Together they have created a model for political succession where they focus on succession by force and domestic threats to leaders in different types of regimes (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2017). Further, there is Barbara Geddes (1999), who creates an overview of how authoritarian regimes break down, and the way in which authoritarian regimes vary from one another. This includes looking at how different leaders handle their choice of leadership succession.

The least investigated type of political succession is hereditary monarchical succession (L. Anderson, 1991; Brownlee, 2007). There seems to exist a bias that monarchies are dated or no longer relevant. This sentiment is perhaps owed to a research field that is dominated by American scientists and publications, with little appreciation for what used to be the dominant political system of Europe (L. Anderson, 1991). However, there are some, like Vivek Sharma

(2015), Christine Corcos (2012), Andrej Kokkonen and Anders Sundell (2014), as well as Lisa Anderson (1991), who discuss primogeniture and different types of succession. Yet, they investigate specific historical periods. Sharma (2015) examines other hereditary systems, such as the competitive system which used to define the Ottoman Empire. Meanwhile, Jason Brownlee (2007) looks at cases of hereditary succession in modern autocracies where a family member is chosen by the ruling monarch or dictator, and how regimes operate when the sitting ruler departs.

Succession can also take place through electoral mechanisms. Vivek Sharma (2015) and Lisa Anderson (1999) again, but also Peter Haldén (2014) investigated electoral monarchy in central and northern Europe up until the Middle Ages. Joseph Schumpeter's (1942 [1976]) discussion of succession in electoral democracy is a classic contribution. He believes that all successional issues will be solved as leaders are disposed of naturally though institutionalized arrangements (Schumpeter, 1942 [1976], p.269).

Lastly, there are scholars who have written about succession in systems that do not have a defined procedure. Among them are Marx and Engels (1848 [1967]) who, in *Manifesto of the Communist Party,* created the outline for the early communist states. Here, the communist ideal is that the state withers away, and that there should be no leader, nor government, private property or currency. Western (2014) touches upon the ideal anarchist state, where there are "No Gods, No Masters", and only temporary autonomous leadership. Lastly, Hertz (1952) and Kokkonen and Sundell (2014) also talk about when a leader has the power to choose freely, and the consequences that has on a stable transition of power.

While the existing literature surrounding political succession provides some insight, the research in this field is relatively fragmented, lacks a unified approach or is rather brief, to fully grasp the complex chain reactions that a succession can initiate. Few researchers mention in their works more than one type of succession, and often succession is merely mentioned in passing to explain the strength of institutions, a type of leadership, or political development. Out of the existing literature it is still possible to create a typology of succession. Beneath you will find *Table 1,* a table that systematizes the existing literature, to provide a summary of ideal successional types. On the y-axis are three means of which rulers can attain power: force, inheritance, and election. There can also be an element of uncertainty, which is captured by absence of procedure. The x-axis shows the many variations of power

transitions which have been found in the literature. This table is not a cross table, nor is it ranked in any way, shape, or form. It is a typology which provides a simple overview of successional types mentioned in the literature.

Successional	types						
Means							
Force	Assassination	Foreign imposition	Insurgency	Revolution	Coup d'état		
Hereditary	Co-optive adoption	Hereditary fragmentation	Hereditary competition	Agnatic seniority	Primogeniture	Hereditary appointment	Cognatic succession
Electoral mechanisms	Elective monarchy	One-party election	Internal party changeover	Constitutional election			
Absence of procedure	Dissolution of state	Collective leadership	Appointment by choice				

Table 1: Successional types and means of succession.
Created by author drawing on works from Anderson (1991), Brownlee (2007), Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009; 2017), Corcos (2012), Fearon & Laitin, (2003); Haldén (2014), Jones & Olken (2009), Kokkonen & Sundell (2014), Lucas (2012), Marx & Engels (1848 [1967]), Rossler (2011), Sharma (2015), Western (2014).

This table will be utilized for the organization of Chapter 2 in this thesis. It is an apparent weakness that in Part II, hereditary succession is favored above electoral succession and succession by force. Ideally, the three types would be explored and compared with each other. Yet, given the formal limitations in this thesis, only primogeniture- which is so scantily treated in the Political Science literature, will be studied in Part II by looking at Henry VIII's reign.

Chapter Two: Theory

Terms: Succession, Power, and Authority

Political succession is the transfer of power from one individual, government, or regime to another (Calvert, 1987, p.1). Political succession can be viewed as a process where orderly arrangements are made for another to take an office, so that the transitory crisis of legitimacy which inevitably arises is reduced to manageable proportions. As such, the ability to have an orderly succession is an indicator of political stability created by legitimacy through steadfast and accepted leadership.

The process of leadership acceptance can go rather smoothly depending on the system, the legitimacy of the leader and the nature of the succession (Calvert, 1987, pp. 1-4; Huntington, 1965; Rush, 1978). Power is cyclical in nature, and how it is obtained often mirrors how it is lost (Sudduth & Bell, 2018). Democracies, autocracies, and monarchies each have their own system with their own rules of succession, and none of these are perfect (Geddes, 1999). However, the more stable the system, the less likely it is that there will be any type of successional issue (Clapham, 1988). This stability is in part dependent on the previous leader, but a succession itself can lead to regime stability or stronger institutions. There is also the risk of the regime falling apart in the wrong hands (Kennedy, 1988, p. 11). This was the case in the Ottoman Empire, which saw 13 incompetent sultans in straight succession.

Despite the certainty of looming succession, many power-holders are reluctant to transfer power and may identify the stability of the system with their own continuance in office (Calvert, 1987, p. 1; Rustow, 1964). This can create a successional crisis (Rustow, 1964). Successional crises occur when a leader departs office either too soon, too late, or by force. There are different types of successional crises depending on the nature of the succession. In autocracies there is the problem if an aging monarch or dictator refuses to give up power, or if he lays a plan for his succession and thus creates a crisis of anticipated succession. This may also be the case in democracies where leadership is filled by an old political figure who has steered the nation through past calamities before and is asked to fill a position again during a time of national distress, such as Churchill (who was 77 when he was reinstated as Prime Minister in 1951) and De Gaulle (who was 68 when he was reelected as President in 1958). For a revolutionary leader, the challenge is creating cohesion to avoid being overthrown by internal rebellion (Rustow, 1964). Sometimes, the leader might be correct in holding on to

power, as the personal charisma of a departing leader does not always transfer. This can cause a successional crisis in itself, and is a test to the system, the strength of institutions, processes and policies (LaPorte, 1969; Rustow, 1964). As such, succession implies not only the acceptance or act of choice of a successor, but a series of decisions to implement that choice of leader (Calvert, 1987, p. 1).

Identified in this thesis are three means by which rulers can take office: by force, electoral mechanisms, and hereditary claims. These are all ideal types, and they share similarities with Max Weber's three types of legitimacy, in the sense that they are pure types devoid of hybrids which are concerned with legitimizing power to turn it into authority (Weber, 1919 [2001], pp. 78-79). According to Weber, power is the ability to get someone to do what they otherwise would not do and power turns into authority through legitimization (Weber, 1925, p. 28 as cited in Wallimann, et. al., 1977, p. 231). Weber (1919 [2001], pp. 78-79) deals with how a leader gains authority through charisma, tradition, and legal-rational authority. This thesis, on the other hand, looks at formalized power through successional rites that leads to a change in leadership (Calvert, 1987, p. 1). We might say, from a Weberian perspective, that leaders suffer when charisma is lost, tradition is broken, or the legal authority is questioned (Weber, 1919 [2001], pp. 78-79). However, aspiring leaders might also benefit from the sitting leader's loss of authority. In cases where older leaders such as Churchill and De Gaulle are brought out of retirement in moments of crisis, it may be because of their charisma. Or, alternatively, because they represent tradition by being associated with 'a better and distant time period'. As such, they can offer a sense of security and stability.

Common principles of legitimacy are important for stability, since without it there can be no order, nor peace (Kissinger, 2015, p. 96). Thus, power must be balanced by legitimacy of the state leader who relies on said legitimacy to assert power.

Types of Succession

Succession by Force

Succession by force is a type of unregulated succession, where the explicit threat or use of force destroys any rules, agreements, or expectations for succession (Govea & Holm, 1998, p. 134). There are five ways in which a succession by force can occur: by coup, assassination, revolution, insurgency, and foreign imposition (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith 2009; 2017; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Iqbal & Zorn, 2008; Jones & Olken, 2009; Roessler, 2011).

As defined by Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2017, p. 714) a successful coup means that the previous elite who were a part of the incumbent's winning coalition have seized power and deposed of that same leader. Roessler (2011, p. 307) mentions that in a coup the removal is "sudden and illegal" by using force. A well-known example of a coup is when the Chilean President Salvador Allende was overthrown by General Augusto Pinochet (Devine, 2014). In the process of the coup, Allende was murdered. However, it is still classified as a coup and not an assassination in this thesis as it was a part of a larger operation where the incumbent's (Allende) coalition seized power for themselves (Jones & Olken, 2009). In general, coups are the most life-threatening uprising for dictators as 73% of the time, a successful coup ends with the authoritarian leader facing either death, imprisonment, or exile (Frantz & Stein, 2017, p. 941). This is in stark contrast to leaders who depart office via other means, where 29% of them end up facing the same threats.

Assassinations are murders of political leaders due to a political reason (Iqbal & Zorn, 2008; Jones & Olken, 2009). These can occur in situations of conflict, and in the end or the beginning of a coup, a revolution, war, or foreign imposition. An assassination can intensify a conflict such as the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand which released a large-scale war in 1914, or it can lead to more democratization as with the case with King Birendra of Nepal who was assassinated in 2001 and created an opening for political reform (Jones & Olken, 2009). Still, assassinations are often unsuccessful. More than 75% of assassination attempts end with failure, which can again delay the process of democratization as the autocrat will increase pressure and escalate the use of force on opposition groups (Iqbal & Zorn, 2008; Jones & Olken, 2009, p. 57).

A revolution can be defined as efforts by the masses to depose the incumbent leader and alter the governing institutions (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2017, p. 714). The most well-known being the French, and American revolutions. Insurgencies are of a lesser scale than a revolution. An insurgency is a type of armed rebellion where those outside the winning coalition desire a change (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). The insurgents are weak relative to the government, at least in the beginning, and in general the insurgents do not wish for or have the means to implement a total change of the governing system. For instance, like the Taliban's efforts in Afghanistan (Bacon & Byman, 2021).

Lastly, foreign impositions refer to foreign powers who seek to take control of national resources or policies (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2009, p. 171). The most known examples of this phenomenon are found in the time-period of imperialism when many European nations sought out foreign lands for their resources. However, newer examples can also be employed such as when the United States intervened in Guatemala in 1954, or the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 (Mearsheimer, 2014; Taylor, 1956). Although the intervention in Guatemala started out as a coup, it is still a foreign imposition as it was orchestrated by a foreign power who wanted to protect its interests. As such, it is viewed as a foreign imposition and not a coup. This illustrates the earlier point that when dealing with ideal types, examples are rarely perfect but exist on a spectrum of succession types.

Succession by Force in Authoritarian Regimes

Successions by force are most common in authoritarian regimes where the norms and practices for a successional change are weaker (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2017; Geddes, 1999). Authoritarian regimes can be divided into personalist, military and one-party (Geddes, 1999, p. 121). In many regimes, power is personal (Clapham, 1988, p. 283). The personalist leader is the system, and access to office and the advantage of the office depends on the individual leader's discretion, as for instance with Pinochet in Chile (Geddes, 1999). The personalist leader often gains power after being victorious in an internal power struggle amongst rival leaders. They also arise when the military and the political party are not sufficiently developed to prevent the leader from taking personal control over decision-making and regime personnel (Geddes, 1999, p. 132). Meanwhile in a military regime like that of the military junta in Brazil between the years of 1964-1985, a group of officers decides who will rule and exercise influence over policy (Geddes, 1999). In a one-party regime, the access to higher office and control over policy is dominated by one party, even as other parties might be allowed to legally exist and compete. This is the case in today's China where the Communist Party is in charge. However, with their current leadership, power might indeed be personal (Shirk, 2018).

Tyrannies, as Aristoteles once said, are "quite short lived" (Aristotle, 335 B.C.E. [2013], p. 167). As previously mentioned, the link between succession by force and regime instability is well established (Sudduth & Bell, 2018). The non-democratically elected leader has not gained legitimacy through regular institutionalized practices (Govea & Holm, 1998). Nor do

they tend to provide public goods (Sudduth & Bell, 2018). Rather they tend to choose to provide private goods to their coalition of supporters, so that their coalition remains strong enough to overcome any potential rival coalitions. The autocrat tends to possess few incentives to build strong institutions and a prosperous state (Olson, 1993). These choices and lack of legitimacy leads to the autocrat being vulnerable to internal threats, as well as external ones who might wish to overthrow the rule (Sudduth & Bell, 2018).

However, political survival is best assured by depending on few people to attain and retain office (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2011, p. xviii). Many dictators enjoy a long reign and a safe seat. The autocratic leaders who seize power by force are the most vulnerable during their first couple of years in office (Sudduth & Bell, 2018). During this time period they need to justify the self-selected leadership, suppress enemies, and show force (Govea & Holm, 1998). Autocrats do this by possession of superior force and perhaps through a set of policies set to 'save the nation' or through faux elections (Calvert, 1987, p. 17; Govea & Holm, 1998, p. 130). Therefore, if the autocrat outlives their first year in office, they will on average reign for more than twice the time period of an elected ruler (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2009).

Even if the long tenure of some autocrats can be attributed to their overwhelming monopoly of force, brutality may not be enough (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007). Many of the long surviving autocrats have headed some of the most repressive regimes on earth: Stalin remained in power for 31 years and Mao ruled over China for 33 years, despite both being responsible for millions of deaths (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007, p. 1280). Still, having killed more than 2 million Cambodians, Pol Pot was overthrown after only 3 years in power.

Hereditary Succession

The term 'succession' was first applied to monarchies, where one sovereign succeeds another on a principle of inheritance (Govea & Holm, 1998, p. 132). In hereditary systems this transfer of power is normally a smooth one, with only the occasional conflict over the legitimate heir. In all hereditary systems, a change in the sovereign usually signifies a change in government as well.

For dynastic families, there are currently three common ways of transferring power: primogeniture, cognatic succession, and agnatic seniority (Corcos, 2012; Lucas, 2012). Primogeniture originated from European dynasticism where it was applied to dictate

succession procedures and protect the dynastic families of Medieval Europe (Kokkonen & Sundell, 2014; Sharma, 2015). Within a system that practices primogeniture, the first-born son is destined to inherit the patrimony (Sharma, 2015, pp. 165-166). Primogeniture would eventually evolve into cognatic succession where the oldest child, regardless of gender, inherits the crown (Corcos, 2012, p. 1588). Another system which was tried around that same time period (year 1000 C.E.), was agnatic seniority (Kokkonen & Sundell, 2014, pp. 438-439). Here, the ruler's oldest brother inherited, until the last living brother died, at which point the oldest brother's oldest living son could inherit the seat of power. Today, hereditary power is mostly associated with the Middle East, or other authoritarian regimes where power is passed down through the family line (L. Anderson, 1991).

Before primogeniture was instated as the standard practice in Europe around year 1000, one of the hereditary practices was hereditary fragmentation (Sharma, 2015, pp. 164-165) Here, inheritance and power were often shared between noble families, and within royal families. This divided inheritance weakened the wealth and social standings of dynastic families and created miniature principalities which were vulnerable for pillaging and external invasions. Therefore, it became vital to introduce a successional type which could conserve power and legacy. Hence, the introduction of agnatic seniority and primogeniture.

In the Ottoman Empire agnatic seniority was practiced up until the 20th century (Lucas, 2012; Sharma, 2015). Before the Ottoman Empire adopted agnatic seniority, they practiced yet another system: hereditary competition (Sharma, 2015). Here, the sons competed for the right to become sultan. Within the polygamic families of the empire, fratricide was legalized, and even encouraged, for the "welfare of the state" (Sultan Mehmet II, as cited in Sharma, 2015, p.163).

Hereditary appointment is when a state leader appoints a successor before his death (Kokkonen & Sundell, 2014). This could be any family member and, as the leader is appointed and not elected, this is a case of hereditary authoritarianism (Brownlee, 2007). The practice of hereditary appointment dates to the Roman Empire where a successor could be adopted to avoid what Rousseau (1762 [1999], p.108) later penned as "children, monsters or imbeciles" who inherit power through fixed rules of succession like primogeniture (Brownlee, 2007). Also, in Russia, the Tsar could pick his own successor whether of his own family, or of that of a stranger (Montesquieu, 1748 [2001], p.77). Research has shown that on average, in

an authoritarian regime, the son of an autocrat will be appointed as a successor once every third year (Brownlee, 2007). Many autocrats wish to find a dynasty, yet the takeover by the son is contingent on the response from the broader elite. Brownlee (2007, p. 599) looks at hereditary succession and defines it in part as 'transfer of top governing authority from father to son'. In his article, Brownlee (2007), thought that most rulers would choose an eligible son if given the opportunity. Since then, Raúl Castro, the youngest brother of Fidel Castro, succeeded Fidel's reign in Cuba from 2008 until 2018, despite there being other sons' who could take over. Thus, hereditary authoritarianism is a rather encompassing concept in this thesis.

Co-optive adoption was first possible in the Roman Empire where imperial families could adopt a potential successor (Sharma, 2015). However, given the nature of the Roman succession where succession was mostly determined by the army through civil war, kinship was more of a tool to enhance rank and status than the deciding factor. Still, most famously Julius Caesar announced his adopted heir Octavian (later known as Caesar Augustus) in his will, who went on to become the first Roman Emperor (Börm, 2014, p.240; Kramer et. al., 2019, p.77). As such, adoption is included as a rare, yet possible, type of hereditary succession.

Hereditary Issues and Developments

In an authoritarian regime, a leader has three options when it comes to transfer of authority (Herz, 1952, p. 30). The leader may groom a successor during his lifetime, he can avoid the question of his successor entirely or he may rely on some institutional framework.

For the leader, it may be important to have an appointed successor so that the elites have incentives to remain loyal, knowing that their loyalty will be rewarded even after the autocrat's death (Kokkonen & Sundell, 2014). However, there is a risk that if the heir is appointed too early in the reign (Humphries, 2014, p.261). The regent might be rendered a "lame duck" if members of the elite may transfer allegiance to the successor and the leader's power may decline relative to that of his appointee. There is also a danger in putting too much weight on institutional framework, as pro-democratic movements might utilize that momentum and push for more democratic practices (Herz, 1952). Lastly, when monarchs or leaders can choose their own replacements freely, they can also change their minds making

the process questionable (Brownlee, 2007). This flip flopping among alternatives creates ambiguity, which in turn may lead to regime instability and open the door for others, as was the case when the Normans invaded England in 1066 (Kokkonen & Sundell, 2014).

By grooming a successor, the leader helps position a potential rival who may try to replace him (Herz, 1952). This is known as the crown-prince problem and is the security dilemma for hereditary power (Brownlee, 2007, p. 604). The crown-prince problem may intensify as the regent grows too old, and the heir grows restless (Brownlee, 2007). By centralizing the power in the family, and particularly through primogeniture or cognatic succession, the appointee might have personal incentive for keeping the regent alive. Thus, primogeniture or cognatic succession is preferable to agnatic seniority as sons and daughters are less likely to be usurpers relative to that of brothers and other relatives. Especially since brothers and other relatives might be closer to the regent in age, and thus have less incentive to wait for an orderly transfer of power if they want to enjoy the benefits of ruling (Kokkonen & Sundell, 2014, p.441). Hence, primogeniture and cognatic succession might reduce the crown-prince problem. When the son and heir ascended to the throne, he tended to be quite young (Brownlee, 2007). A young successor provides the elite with a longer time horizon, giving them more incentive to stay close and loyal to the ruling family who will go on to reward them with private goods. That the process is embedded in tradition provides a method for regime stability that will last beyond the ruler's lifetime and is a stable one given that the ruler is able to produce an heir (Kokkonen & Sundell, 2014). It also forestalls a power vacuum and reduces uncertainty of whom is to rule (Brownlee, 2007).

The dynamics of dynasticism appeared in Europe after the family structure was altered around 1000 C.E., when actors could accumulate power and authority through marriage and inheritance (Sharma, 2015, p. 173). By that time primogeniture was instated, and power was centralized in kinship through property and public authority. Dynasticism is 'system of succession based on fixed rules regulating kinship in a society in which political power was held and transmitted' (Sharma, 2015, p. 163). The most important feature within the dynastic system is to continue the lineage of the dynastic family, and to sustain the dynastic patrimony by having sons. Within the dynastic system, the children all have allocated roles, and marriage is a tool in which families can achieve a strategic goal[1] (Fichtner, 1976; Saco, 1997; Sharma,

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[1] The different roles of offspring within the dynastic system will be further illustrated in Chapter 3 and 4.

2015). The first-born son is intended to secure the continuation of the family line and reign as the successor (Sharma, 2015). The remaining sons and daughters also serve a strategic purpose (Fichtner, 1976; Saco, 1997; Sharma, 2015). They are intended for creating alliances through advantageous marriage, providing the family with honor through joining the army or clergy, or acting as diplomats in foreign courts. Meanwhile, daughters are a tool for a dynastic marriage union (Saco, 1997). A dynastic marriage union was the primary means by which actors could achieve strategic goals in medieval and early modern Europe (Sharma, 2015). It gained them allies, political influence in a foreign court, potential territory, riches and lessened the likelihood of war (Fichtner, 1976; Saco, 1997).

Dynasticism is thought of to be a fixture in the Middle East today, and all absolute monarchic autocracies that exists as of 2014 are Arab (apart from Brunei) (See *Figure 1* in *Appendices* for an overview of the Gulf States) (L. Anderson, 1991; Kokkonen & Sundell, 2014). The dynastic structure in the Middle East has been a fixture ever since the 16th and 17th century (L. Anderson, 1991). Within the order of a clan-based family structure, they practice primogeniture or agnatic seniority by norm to maintain familial resources and enhance wealth and social standings within the families (L. Anderson, 1991; Lucas, 2012; Sharma, 2015). Also here, marriage plays a complex role where it is used sparingly to create connections with another societal group (Herb, 1999, p. 37). The men of the ruling families often marry daughters of strategic importance. Meanwhile, women are forbidden to marry outside the extended family (apart from some exceptions).

Electoral Succession

The democratic system has long been hailed as the most stable system for the transition of power (Huntington, 1991; Rush, 1978; Schumpeter, 1942 [1976]). Nevertheless, there exists successional challenges within democracy as well. It may be weak to the wishes of the masses, and which risk ignoring minority voices (Schumpeter, 1942 [1976], pp. 242; 281). Moreover, it is a system which can fall prey to charismatic leaders and demagogues (Finley, 2018, p. 24-26). Elected leaders can change the electoral regime into an authoritarian one. They can also sway the will of the people in intolerable directions. During the era of Plato and Aristotle, the democratic system was under scrutiny for just that (Aristotle, 335 B.C.E. [2013], p. 106; Plato, 375 B.C.E. [1941], pp. 276-277). In the 21st century there have been several instances of demagogy and hate speech amongst elected democratic leaders. There are also

recent instances of election-denying rulers that have tried to undermine electoral succession. As such the electoral system's nature should also be explored.

There exist several electoral mechanisms to secure a regulated transfer of power to a higher office. The most common mechanism is probably the constitutional election that occurs within a democracy. In a democracy, a leader is replaced following open electoral procedures (Brownlee, 2007). As democracy is the most common electoral type of succession, this will be further explored in depth. Other mechanisms of electoral successional that will be explored includes the elective monarchy, the one-party election and internal party changeover.

This thesis utilizes the Schumpeterian standard for electoral democracy where democracy is first and foremost a system of government which guarantees a smooth succession of government since democracy controls the competition for power (Schumpeter, 1942 [1976], p.269). In political life, there will always be competition for the allegiance of the people. Yet, democracy offers a controlled competitive sphere where both the removal and the inauguration of the leader is organized. The primary function of the elector's vote is to produce government (Schumpeter, 1942 [1976], p. 273). On principle everyone is free to compete for political leadership, but once the leader is elected, he or she will be the leader of the party, the nation and parliament (Schumpeter, 1942 [1976], pp. 273; 276-277). As such, once the leader is elected, party members and members of the party are driven by the man (or woman) that they elected. Nevertheless, the leader can and will eventually be replaced, owed both to the institutionalized arrangement within a democracy and the nature of democracy itself: political leadership will not be absolute due to the competitive element which is the 'essence of democracy' (Schumpeter, 1942 [1976], pp. 280-281).

Within either a democracy or an authoritarian one-party regime, there is the possibility of replacement through an internal party changeover where the leader is replaced internally by a party colleague (Calvert, 1987, p. 4). Here, like in electoral monarchies, the party elites decide who will replace the retired leader, after death, resignation, or a lack of confidence in the leader. As was the case with Kevin Rudd who was replaced by his colleague Julia Gillard as Australia's Prime Minister in 2010 after Rudd became increasingly unpopular due to policy failures, a chaotic leadership style and his inability to deliver on his campaign promises (Wilson, 2014). Another example of this occurrence is when Vice President Nicolas Madura

replaced the former President of Venezuela, Hugo Chavez, in 2013 after he died of cancer (Frantz, 2014, p. 27)

Elections can also occur within a one-party regime or a monarchy (L. Anderson, 1991; Calvert, 1987; Haldén, 2014; Sharma, 2015). A monarch can be replaced electorally through selection by the nobles (L. Anderson, 1991; Haldén, 2014). This candidate has often come from a noble or royal lineage, which was typical in the Middle East from the 7th to the 16th century, and in central and northern Europe from the beginning of recorded history and up until the Middle Ages where succession was made hereditary. Also, in the Roman Empire after year 268 C.E., imperial succession was often decided by the Army, as was the case with Emperor Diocletian who rose through the military ranks before being appointed to higher office by the Roman army (Sharma, 2015; Börm, 2014, p. 242-245). This selection differed from hereditary adoption as the successors were chosen. However, this selection by army often resulted in civil war (Sharma, 2015).

Lastly, there can also be elections held in one-party regimes such as China or North Korea, where there are electoral mechanisms that mimic democracy, but no real competition (Magaloni & Kricheli, 2010). One-party authoritarian regimes spread amongst the third democratization wave at the end of the twentieth century (Huntington, 1991; Magaloni & Kricheli, 2010). When 85 authoritarian regimes fell, one-party regimes continued to expand even as the wave of democratization settled down (Geddes, 1999; Magaloni & Kricheli, 2010). One-party regimes include both single-party and dominant-party regimes (Magaloni & Kricheli, 2010, p. 124). In a single-party regime, no oppositional parties are allowed to compete against the dominant party in an election, as in China, North Korea, and Vietnam today. Whilst in a dominant-party regime, the opposition is allowed to compete in the election, but they are not allowed any alternation of political power, as in Tanzania, Kenya or in the Soviet Union.

Electoral Praise and Problematization

The more stable a political system is, the less likely it is that succession will be an issue (Clapham, 1988). Even if some of their views on democracy vary, both Schumpeter (1942 [1976]), and Huntington (1965; 1991) agree that democracy is the best type of regime, as it creates a seamless succession and stability. As previously mentioned, all leaders will

eventually have to be replaced. Huntington (1991, p.602) notes that such replacement process involves three distinct phases: the struggle to produce the fall, the fall, and the struggle after the fall. Schumpeter's (1942 [1976]) view of democracy has already been accounted for, but in Huntington's (1965) view; a democracy is the best form of government as it is best at adaptability. As such, democracy is the most able to adapt to the leadership change when a new social and political environment is introduced. In contrast, a dictatorship will not survive the fall, and the regime will likely die out when the leader dies or is replaced. This is also since dictatorship's lack the common institutional core that establishes their identity and lack institutionalization which stems from adaptability (Huntington, 1991). As such they are more vulnerable in the struggle to produce the fall. This is also because most authoritarian leaders were often unaware of how unpopular they were.

Alternatively, one-party regimes have also proven themselves to be quite stable (Magaloni & Kricheli, 2010). They last longer than any other dictatorship, they suffer fewer coups, have better counterinsurgency capacities and higher economic growth than any other authoritarian regime. One-party system often legitimizes its rule through ideology, and once the system is in place the party monopolizes power and creates an institutionalized framework (Huntington, 1991, p. 580; 585). Thus, the identity of the state is created by the party. Trouble occurs when state and ideology intertwine so that the separation becomes uncertain. For instance, when the question arose in Lenin's Russia of who owns the assets: the party or the state.

For Schumpeter (1942 [1976], p.269) democracy is a *competition for political leadership*. He emphasizes the orderly qualities of democracy, not its ideals and ideology. In fact, he appears critical of its ideals, pointing out that these are often connected to socialism (Schumpeter, 1942 [1976], pp. 242; 284). He believes that the ideals that follow democracy are false, and instead concludes that democracy does not need socialism and socialism does not need democracy. Socialists will embrace democracy if it serves their ideals and interests and not otherwise. In that way, socialist parties are no more opportunist than others, yet they are not inherently better either. As such, democracy and socialism are not intertwined, and one can have one without the other. Also, even the most loyal democrat will put certain interests and ideals first to guarantee good governance and moral, thus there are no ideals or moral that need to be within a democracy (Schumpeter, 1942 [1976], pp. 241-242). Atrocities such as witch-hunting and antisemitism, for instance, could just as easily occur within a democracy as any other regime.

Democratic issues often grow within the masses and are decided on according to the rules of democratic procedure that states "by the people" or following the people's will (Schumpeter, 1942 [1976], pp. 241-242). To put an end to such brutalities, one often must go against the will of the people and break the 'democratic ideals'. Moreover, Schumpeter (1942 [1976], pp. 250- 253) states that ruling "by the people" is not possible if societies are big and highly differentiated. Even so, in smaller societies there is no common will that is acceptable to all. No one can agree or disagree by the force of rational argument. If one must follow the will of the people, then everyone needs to know what they stand for. As such, democracy is not an end but rather a tool that once should be utilized to solve successional issues, as it has set procedures to avoid successional issues. Also, the electoral method is practically the only one available for communities of any size (Schumpeter, 1942 [1976], p. 271).

Within a democratic system everyone is, on principle, allowed to compete for political leadership (Schumpeter, 1942 [1976], p.272). However, few individuals have the opportunity to win an election for higher office (Calvert, 1987). Clinton Rossiter (n.d. as cited in Calvert, 1987, p.6) notices that besides the formal requirements of being over 35, a natural-born citizen of the U.S. and 14 years of residency within the States, there exists many other additional requirements. These appear to be such an established practice of American politics that they carry almost equal force. All American presidents have been male and professed Christians. All, but one, has been of North European ancestry, and all but one has been married. Additionally, none have been an only child, all almost had political experience (apart from Donald Trump), all have come from a state larger than Kentucky (again: apart from Donald Trump), and have had legal training, a military background or belonged to Rotary or similar organizations. Factoring in these requirements, it is estimated that no more than 200 people at any one time have had any chance of becoming president, and no more than five or six may be seriously considered (Rossiter, n.d., as cited in Calvert, 1987, p.7). As such, not everyone has the opportunity to succeed into higher office, and while many countries have fewer norm-based requirements for leadership, it is hard to argue that political office is available for everyone.

Absence of Procedure

Absence of procedure, the final ideal type from the typology, is a residual category for when there are no set rules and no legality in the way that power transfers. There are some systems

that do not have a procedure of succession (Herz, 1952). One example of this are early communist states, another is anarchist states (Rush, 1978; Western, 2014). States with no successional procedure often end up with a non-democratic electoral mechanism of exchange of power when the leader steps down or after he is dead (Herz, 1952; Rush, 1978; Western, 2014).

Within the anarchist state, the ideal for leadership is 'collective' (Western, 2014, p. 676) Anarchists seek a 'leaderless' ideal where individuals and groups take temporary autonomous leadership without possessing a position of power and authority over others. Yet, this has not proven successful. Being leaderless is viewed as a 'myth' where leadership might not always be transparent, but it is always present. Needless to say, there has never existed a successful anarchist state. Even within anarchist circles, they tend to revere certain role models such as Bakunin, Kropotkin, and Proudhon, who then tend to stand out as leaders (Western, 2014).

Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (1848 [1967], p. 22), in *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, were cautious in explaining what is to follow the struggle for emancipation from the bourgeoise, and how the new society will be organized apart from phrases such as 'abolition of private property'. Still, after listing nine measures of what should be done in different countries, Marx and Engels (1848 [1967], pp. 26-27) state that after class distinctions are gone and production is in the hands of the nation, there will be no need for a ruling class or the existence of class antagonisms. As such, there should be a classless society and the abolition of both state and private property would put an end to "exploitation of man by man" (Marx & Engels, 1848 [1967], p. 26-27; Marx, n.d., in Schumpeter, 1942 [1976], p. 57).

No communist state has ever succeeded in not having a leader or a state. Typically, power has been concentrated in the party or in the state (Huntington, 1991, p. 585). The failure to devise a reliable means of transferring power is not just peculiar to communist regimes, yet it creates several problems for the communist states (Rush, 1978). When there exists no plan for succession, but several candidates from higher ranks of leadership, a competition for higher office will break out. There are three types of contests. First, a limited contest where the transfer of power will occur in a relatively orderly fashion. Secondly, an extended contest where a dominant leader, after defeating challenges or overcoming social disorder, establishes stable personal rule. Lastly, there could be an indecisive contest, in which a dominant leader after gaining power, fails to consolidate his position. In that case there will be a successional

crisis. Either way, when there is a contest for succession, the great concentration of power at the center is reduced. This situation often creates a double crisis of succession as described by Rush (1978, p.170). The first crisis arises when the new leader assumes the position of leadership that has been weakened during the succession process, causing a loss of authority for that office. To secure their position, the leader must gather support from functional groups, thereby strengthening their bargaining power and reducing the influence wielded from the central authority. The second crisis occurs when the new general secretary encounters challenges in utilizing the powers inherited from their predecessor, finding their scope of power weakened and the task of governance difficult.

Succession in communist states has in general been decided by four agencies: external agencies, the national leadership, sub-elites and the nation-at-large (Rush, 1978, p. 172). In the East Bloc countries, where communism spread after the second World War, the Soviet Union often had the influence to decide who their leader should be. In his day, Stalin decided all the leaders for eastern European states. Since then, their influence has diminished. Yet it is still apparent that Russia cares deeply about who rules in its neighboring states, as Putin demonstrated by annexing Crimea in 2014, shortly after Western influences helped dispos of the Russian-friendly leader Viktor Yanukovych (Mearsheimer, 2014).

Sometimes when there is no set procedure, rulers can decide their own successors (Herz, 1952; Kokkonen & Sundell, 2014). This often becomes an issue when there are no set rules, and rulers are given too much power in deciding their own successor. They often avoid doing so, they pick someone harmless (and useless) or change their minds when trying to choose the successor who will not become a threat to them, and who is loyal. When rulers often change their mind and appoint new successors, it can become questionable who is the legitimate heir (as previously mentioned in *Hereditary Issues and Developments*). An example of this is Adolf Hitler who first appointed Goering, and later switched to Admiral Doenitz (Herz, 1952). Saparmurat Niyazov of Turkmenistan appointed his dentist, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov as his successor, probably out of personal reason rather than his credentials as a dentist (Jackson, 2012). Lastly, there are some who choose not to appoint a successor at all, this includes Vladimir Putin and Muammar al-Gaddafi of Libya (Abushouk, 2016; Leanos, 2011; Zubok, 2022).

In the absence of successional practices, the Soviet Union and then Russia became a peculiar hybrid, where different ways of succession have been tried and discarded. The early tsars had hereditary succession with the option of co-optive adoption (Montesquieu, 1748 [2001], p.77). Lenin gained power through revolution (Zubok, 2022). Stalin and Khrushchev gained leadership through competition. Khrushchev was removed by a palace coup. In the Soviet Union, the state became a single party regime (Geddes, 1999; Huntington, 1991; Zubok, 2022). Under Yeltsin democracy was tried (Zubok, 2022). It was then discarded by Putin, who is their new personalist authoritarian leader, and who has not yet announced how he will be replaced (Zubok, 2022; Geddes, 1999). As such, Russia remains the epitome of the 'absence of procedure' type where the failure to devise a reliable means of transferring power has caused successional crises, oligarchy and most recently: dictatorship (Rush 1978; Zubok, 2022).

Summary

As is apparent from the literature presented in this chapter, all types of succession have their respective challenges. Both power and succession share the commonality of being cyclical in nature (Sudduth & Bell, 2018). Moreover, it is apparent that all types of leadership must come to an end, and when they do the regime is often at its weakest (Calvert, 1987, p.1; Rush, 1978; Rustow, 1964). Thus, succession has an institutional value for upholding stability within state and community.

The finding from Part I points to three main ways that rulers can succeed into power: by force, hereditary succession, and electoral succession. In some cases, there are also no procedures which fail to dictate how, when and who should rule. Following these findings, more in-depth studies of all would be preferable, but a case study of hereditary succession will have to suffice.

PART II: A CASE STUDY OF MONARCHIC PRIMOGENITURE

"The king is dead! Long live the king" was supposed to be proclaimed in the street immediately after the death of a monarch in Medieval England (Horowitz, 2018, p. ix). This 15th century tradition stemmed from their rival nation, France. The words themselves signified a seamless succession ordained by God where a new king was proclaimed on the same day of the demise of the old. Yet, for England in the 15th and 16th century this seamless succession was often interrupted by warfare. Likewise, by the rivalry among sons, and more often by the lack of sons (Nexon, 2009, p. 127; Sharma, 2015). The successional principle of primogeniture proved to be an immense stress factor for rulers who were reproductively challenged. One of these was Henry VIII (Nexon, 2009, p.127; Shrimplin & Jayasena, 2021). The Tudor King infamously had six wives in the search for a legitimate heir. In his frustration he beheaded two of them, divorced one more, annulled a marriage and switched the state religion from Catholicism to the Anglican faith in search of legitimacy (Scarisbrick, 2011). To understand the nature of primogeniture this section will try to answer the following question: *How was Henry VIII affected by primogeniture and how did it shape his actions as ruler?*

By investigating the actions of Henry VIII, it is possible to identify several of the challenges that troubled the reproductively challenged monarch. One can view the political consequence of royal impotency and a royal who only produces daughters (Whitley & Kramer, 2010). Also, the power struggle between king and church if the Church decides which marriages are legitimate and not (Sharma, 2015). Furthermore, there was a societal and private devaluation of women which could lead to acts of desperation and unfair treatment (Hui, 2018; Sharma, 2015). Lastly, there were also difficulties for spare sons and daughters who had intended roles (Sharma, 2015). This thesis will conduct a case study of Henry VIII, to gain further insight to the curious structure primogeniture bestows upon monarchs and families within the dynastic system of late Medieval Europe who was just embarking on its transition into modern times.

Primogeniture is perhaps the most overlooked type of succession in the Political Science literature. This study will discuss Henry VIII who was troubled by almost all the problems of the primogeniture system, and who is also the most infamous for his handling of the issue of "an heir and a spare". Primogeniture obviously reduced monarchs' risk of being deposed by internal rivals and was thus an essential ingredient of state making in Europe (Kokkonen & Sundell, 2014). In his quest to produce a suitable heir to reap the benefits of the primogenital

system, Henry VIII also contributed to the state formation of England (de Carvalho, 2014; Kohn, 1940). However, had Henry VIII accepted his daughters who, as it turned out were capable of ruling England, he might have saved himself and his nation a lot of trouble (Scarisbrick, 2011, p.150). Nevertheless, he unintentionally laid the groundwork for cognatic succession by allowing his daughters to rule when he had no other options.

Throughout the subsequent chapters, this thesis will examine the impact primogeniture had on Henry VIII, while contextualizing his reign within its historical backdrop. The thesis subtly gravitates towards realism as his actions are scrutinized through the lens of the national interests that shaped his decision-making (Morgenthau, 2006 [1948], pp. 4-6). Chapter Three will look closer at the Henrician-era by examining the ongoings of Medieval Europe, the power of the Roman Catholic Church and the pope, the dynastic family structures of Medieval Europe and the many ongoing wars. Chapter Four will further explore his primogenital concerns, together with his creative solutions. Then, the primogenital actions of his six wives will shortly be accounted for, before an analysis of Henry VIII's legacy.

Chapter Three: Outside Influences in the Henrician-Era

Transitional Europe

The era of Henry VIII is known as a transitional period, where society started to move from a traditional society to a more modern form of society (Kramer et. al., 2019, p.143). This transitional period, from about 1300-1560, embraces both the Reformation and the Renaissance (Kramer et. al., 2019, pp. 143; 191; 201-202). It signifies a time where more people learnt to read, secular and humanistic feelings grew, and the spread of religion started moving outside the official clergy (Kramer et. al., 2019, pp. 129-130; 143; 158; 191).

During the late Middle Ages, we started to see the contours of institutions and traditions that are still influential even in the most recent eras of modern world history. By year 1300 the first universities arrived in Europe, and by the 16th century, there were almost 100 universities in Europe (Kramer et. al., 2019, p. 129). Moreover, it was a period of population growth which spurred separate institutions of church and state, economic institutions to promote trade and commerce, and judicial as well as parliamentary councils (Kramer et. al., 2019, pp. 120; 144-147; 155). It was in particular the growth of universities and the translation of pre-Christian philosophers (such as the works of Aristotle) which led to Christian beliefs being challenged, revised and extended (Kramer et. al., 2019, p. 131). This development was further encouraged by a population which was more educated and who could read.

The Black Death which plagued Europe from 1348-1350 killed approximately 20 million Europeans (Kramer et. al., 2019, pp. 144-146; 149). This had serious economic repercussions. Also, it led to a crisis of faith amongst many survivors. This particularly affected the poor, who also struggled with the following famine. This sparked many uprisings amongst peasants in France and England who questioned division of assets and the establishment of social classes.

Papal Reach

During the Middle Ages, religion saturated every sphere of political, social, and cultural life (Kramer et. al., 2019, p. 123). From his seat in Rome, the Pope ruled over both the Papal State and the Roman Catholic Church (Whelan, 2014, p.4). The ruling Pope could utilize all the resources within the Church, and in essence both The Church and the Pope acted as the same entity (Partner, 1980; Whelan, 2014, p.4). At their peak of power in the 13th century, the

Catholic Church was an institution of wealth which increased funds through papal taxes, loans, and other fees for services rendered (Kramer et al., 2019, pp. 125;128; Partner, 1980). The Church often invested this capital in their own military, which could wage holy wars in the name of the Catholic Church (Whelan, 2014, pp. 72; 65). Additionally, they could use funds to sanction coups.

In terms of power, the papacy was an institution of power that could challenge that of kings (Whelan, 2014, pp. 41-42). The belief was that God had appointed two powers to govern the world, that of kings and that of the clergy. The power balance between the two went back and forth depending on financial circumstances and necessity (Kramer et. al., 2019, p. 84; Partner, 1980). Yet, the papacy had the power to discipline rulers that threatened the Church's authority based on 'ecclesiastical discipline' (Whelan, 2014, pp. 35; 41-42). Moreover, the Pope had jurisdiction when it came to all matters of faith (Whelan, 2014, p.35).

The power of the Pope included granting legitimacy to marriage (Sharma, 2015). It decided which sons were eligible to inherit and further the family line. Additionally, the Church could grant special dispensations that would permit royals or lordships to overlook certain laws in some instances (Clarke, 2013). This power was wielded most commonly for the purpose of legitimizing incestuous marriages. Here, the Church could grant *'supplet Ecclesia',* which translates to 'the Church makes good the shortcoming' (Scarisbrick, 2011. p. x).

The papacy reached its peak in the 13th century under Pope Innocent III (Kramer et. al., 2019, p. 124; Whelan, 2014, p.3). Between the 14th and 16th century it declined due to internal and external factors. From within, the Church battled heterodoxy, corruption, secular ideas and the ideas of Martin Luther (Kramer et. al., 2019, p. 103; 153; 195-198; Nexon, 2009, p.100). External challenges included the costs of a time period troubled by famine, plague, war and economic decline which called into question the validity of God's protection (Whelan, 2014, p.3). Thus, by the 14th century, the pendulum of power had shifted, and the Pope was growing increasingly dependent on monarchs to oppose secular opponents and rival seats of power within the Church (Nexon, 2009, p.97). In return, the monarch capitalized on the weakness of the Church by slowly removing their jurisdiction. Still, the Church had funds and power as they gave indulgences to the rich and powerful (Kramer et. al., 2019, p.148; 197). This is something that Pope Leo X would refuse to correct when being confronted by Martin Luther, which spurred the Reformation of 1517.

The religious contention in Europe was only heightened by Martin Luther's Reformation (Nexon, 2009, p.12). The Papacy, which had already started to buckle financially from the funding of many Holy wars, kept increasing their debt through counter-Reformation measures (Partner, 1980). The Italian Wars (1494-1559), in particular, vastly increased the Church's debt and halted much of their tax income. It was also during the Italian wars in 1527 when unpaid Habsburg troops captured and held Pope Clement VII prisoner, meaning that for a period of time, the papacy was firmly under Habsburg control (Nexon, 2009, p.160; Scarisbrick, 2011, p.155). Meanwhile, Protestantism was spreading throughout northern Europe and the Christian religion was becoming increasingly fragmented (Kramer et. al., 2019, pp. 194; 210-211). A phenomenon which was only heightened by Henry VIII and the establishment of the Church of England in 1534.


Figure 2: Religious fragmentation in 16th century Europe
From Kramer, Palmer, and Colton (2019, p. 211).

Dynastic Motivations and Family Interest

The Henrician era was also the prime era of dynasticism where events such as birth, marriage and death decided the distribution of power in Europe (Sharma, 2015). The main interest of rulers was to secure the continuation of their dynastic lineage and to protect their patrimony.

This was accomplished through practicing primogeniture and intermarriage between powerful families. Coincidentally, dynasticism in combination with primogeniture encouraged inbreeding within the dynastic family empires, which caused reproductive challenges. Dynasties in the Middle Ages developed and grew extinct at a very quick pace and lasted on average for three to six generations in the male line (Sharma, 2015, p. 168). Moreover, in each successional line, there was only a 50% percent chance of an adult male succession in the direct line. Thus, the number of dynastic lines in Europe decreased as dynastic agglomerations grew and families were united through marriage (Nexon, 2009, p.85; Sharma, 2015). In the table below, the decrease of dynastic families from the time period 1300-1610 is displayed.

Year	1300	1350	1400	1450	1500	1610
Number of Dynasties	12	9	9	8	8	5

Figure 3: Number of Dynastic families in Medieval Europe
From "Kinship, Property, and Authority: European Territorial Consolidation Reconsidered", by V. S. Sharma, 2015. *Politics & Society*, *43*, p. 169.
(https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329215571279).

Within the dynastic system of the Middle Ages, the principle of primogeniture helped shape dynastic interest as well as actions of kings (Nexon, 2009, p. 6; Sharma, 2015). During this era of history, *raison d'état* was not yet established, nor was sovereignty (de Carvalho, 2014; Patton, 2019). Rather, royals ruled by the principle of *'raison de famille'* or *'raison de roi'* (de Carvalho, 2014, p.411). As such, the main imperative for Henry VIII was to secure his line of succession and produce an heir. This was typically accomplished through a dynastic marriage (Saco, 1997). Henry VIII needed a marriage with a powerful family who could secure him riches, possibly land, and an alliance. No one did this better than Henry VIII's cousin through his first marriage: the Habsburg king Charles V, who through dynastic marriages and political maneuvering acquired a vast realm (Nexon, 2009, p.7).

Henry VIII needed a marriage sanctioned by faith (Sharma, 2011). This could only be granted by the Pope. In the initial stages of his reign, Henry had agreeable relationships with Pope Clement VII and the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V., two of the most powerful individuals on the European continent (Scarisbrick, 2011, pp. 46; 81). However, when Henry sought a divorce from Catherine, Charles V.'s aunt and his first wife, their relationship soured (Scarisbrick, 2011, p. 157-158; 197). Charles V. quickly became a loathed rival who actively hindered Henry's divorce in the interest of the House of Habsburg. The initially good

relationship that Henry enjoyed with Clement VII would also dissolve as the Pope fell into Charles V. control after the Habsburg Sack of Rome (Scarisbrick, 2011, pp. 155; 197-199). Thus, Pope Clement VII would also become an opposing power, and Henry who had previously feared Clements' demise would come to despise the Pope for deterring his divorce.


Figure 4: Habsburg dominion through Charles V's dynastic inheritance acquired through marriages in the year of 1526, and the lands of the Church as controlled through Clement VII. From Kramer, Palmer and Colton (2019, p. 194).

Warfare and the Growth of Nationalism in England

Early signs of patriotism first started appearing in England during the Hundred Year War (Kramer et. al., 2019, p.147). This war was a dynastic struggle between the English and French over inherited land. It was a conflict which lasted from 1337 until 1453, when the English lost their last battle. During the war, Parliament extended its powers as the king needed funding for his campaigns. Additionally, Parliament switched to speaking English during their sessions in 1362 (Kohn, 1940). When the war was lost, England withdrew from the continent and focused their energy and resources inwards (Kohn, 1940; Kramer et. al., 2019, p.147). This was something that would not strengthen the nation in the long run but was necessary as the English barons and lordships had grown increasingly unruly.

The internal disorder created by English dukes and earls in-fighting from 1450 until 1485 would come to be known as the Wars of the Roses (Kramer et. al., 2019, p.147). It was a

dynastic war between the Lancasters and Yorks, two houses which were both branches from the ruling house of Plantagenet (Horowitz, 2018, p.4). Eventually, Henry Tudor from the house of Lancaster emerged victorious after he slayed King Richard III in battle. Hence, King Henry VII, the father of Henry VIII, started the reign of the Tudor dynasty. Henry VII's claim to the English throne was 'anemic' at best, and many others from the Lancaster branch had closer ties to the English throne (Horowitz, 2018, pp. ix-x). However, Henry VII claimed that he was 'chosen by God', and that this fact was proven through his victory on the battlefield (Horowitz, 2018, p.312). With his dubious claim to the throne, Henry VII had to seek papal approval for his claim, and he struggled with Yorkist conspiracies for most of his reign (Horowitz, 2018, p.312; 146; 271). These struggles continued even after his marriage to Elizabeth of York (Horowitz, 2018, p. 17).

The English aristocracy had dwindled in numbers during the internal Wars of the Roses (Kohn, 1940). Weakened and with the absence of foreign wars and with the economic growth of the third estate, the system of classes and castes started to break down. It was now common to discuss the welfare of England as an entity in Parliament. Also, during the Wars of the Roses, dukes and earls had formed private armies to fight each other and had used Parliament and government for their own purposes (Kramer et. al., 2019, p. 147). To prevent this from happening again, Henry VII Tudor passed a law which stated that no lords could maintain private armies wearing their own livery or insignia (Kohn, 1940; Kramer et. al., 2019, p. 147). Thus, there was a shift in power and loyalty from the feudal lords to a more royal centered national sentiment. Henry VII used his royal council as a new court to deal with property disputes and other infractions (Kramer et. al., 2019, p. 147). As such, under the reign of Henry VII, he centralized the state, and the English nation was further developed (Kramer et. al., 2019, p.186).

Henry VII died in 1509 and was succeeded by his young son Henry VIII (Scarisbrick, 2011, p.11). Henry VIII tried to revive the Hundred Year War with an invasion of France in 1513 (Scarisbrick, 2011, pp. 35-38). However, his allies abandoned him, and the new Pope Leo X wished to ally with France and put pressure on Henry to end the war (Scarisbrick, 2011, pp. 50-54). Thus, the Hundred Year War was put to rest. Instead of the second invasion, a short-lasting treaty between France and England was signed, and Henry's sister, Mary, was set to marry the king of France.

Chapter Four: Analysis. Henry VIII in light of Monarchic Primogeniture

Henry VIII and his six wives

'If a man shall take his brother's wife, it is an impurity: he hath

uncovered his brother's nakedness; they shall be childless'.

(Book of Leviticus, 20:21, King James Bible, 1611)

Thus echoes the biblical words that would come to shape the life of Henry VIII, as well as the life of his first wife. Henry was born as a second son to Henry VII and Elizabeth Tudor (born York) in the year of 1491 (Scarisbrick, 2011, pp. 3-4). He was never intended to rule and, as is the custom within a system that practices primogeniture, Henry started the process of joining the clergy. Historical accounts suggest that Henry VIII was overshadowed for most of his life by his older brother Arthur (Scarisbrick, 2011, pp. 3-7). He never had the same education as the heir apparent and was intended to occupy the primatial seat of Canterbury where he would eventually marry Eleanor of Castille. However, when his brother died in 1502 from consumption, Henry's vocation changed.

At only 11 years old, Henry VIII made the transition from second son to heir apparent (Scarisbrick, 2011, p. 7). Together with Arthur's titles and position, Henry also inherited his brother's wife. He jilted Eleanor and got engaged to Catherine of Aragón in 1503. Both the English king and Catherine's parents, the King and Queen of Aragón and Castile, agreed that Catherine should befall the younger Tudor prince (Scarisbrick, 2011, pp. 7-8). Hence, a new marriage treaty was signed, based on the promise that the Spanish royals would pay a handsome dowry.

Before Catherine could marry Henry VIII, a papal dispensation had to be granted due to the previous marriage between Catherine and Arthur (Scarisbrick, 2011, pp. 8; 152). In accordance with the book of Leviticus, Catherine and Henry were not only brothers- and sisters-in-laws, but family to be regarded as close as brother and sister by blood. The Church normally forbade such marriages and without the Church's special dispensation of '*supplet Ecclessia*', the marriage would be illegitimate. Hence, their potential offspring would be considered bastards. Following the book of Leviticus, their marriage would be cursed, and

they would remain 'childless' (Book of Leviticus, 20:21, King James Bible, 1611). To secure the dispensation, Catherine claimed that during the short five-month marriage her union with Arthur was never consummated (Scarisbrick, 2011, pp. 8; 152). Thus, the marriage was void. The papal dispensation was granted, and after the dowry was paid, Henry VIII married Catherine in 1509 (Scarisbrick, 2011, pp. x; 8-12). By then, the idea of other dynastic unions had been laid to rest. His father had just died, and Henry VIII had to marry someone connected with the House of Habsburg given that he had rejected their close kin, Eleanor of Castile.

In the beginning, the union of the House of Aragón and Tudor was a success (Scarisbrick, 2011, pp.17-18). They reveled in court pageantry, hunting trips and were both of similar mindsets. Shortly after they were wed in 1511, Catherine gave birth to a son. He was sickly and quickly passed away (Scarisbrick, 2011, p. 27). After several stillbirths and miscarriages, the two Tudors managed to produce one offspring: Mary Tudor. To have only a daughter was to Henry like having no children at all. Hence, in 1527, Henry pursued a divorce (Scarisbrick, 2011, p.152). He argued that Catherine had lied about the consummation of her first marriage, that the papal dispensation and his marriage was void, and that the lack of offspring was a divine punishment for marrying his brother's widow and living in sin. Furthermore, Henry VIII had fallen for another: Anne Boleyn. Now, Henry ran into difficulties. One set of difficulties were domestic and interpersonal, as he would seek a divorce driven by personal reasons and the desire to strengthen England's successional line and his dynastic House.

Whilst it is unclear when Henry VIII started courting Anne Boleyn seriously, it is apparent that between 1525-6 the romance had become more serious (Scarisbrick, 2011, pp. 148-149). Anne Boleyn was the second daughter of the earl, Thomas Boleyn. He had previously succeeded in positioning his eldest daughter Mary to become Henry's mistress, before she was discarded like the many others before her. Anne, however, did not want to be a mistress. Either out of virtue, ambition, or from seeing how Henry had treated her sister, Anne avoided Henry's pursuit. As is apparent in one of Henry's many love letters to Anne which states:

> It is absolutely necessary for me to obtain this answer, having been for above a whole year stricken with the dart of love, and not yet sure whether I shall fail of finding a place in your heart and affection, which last point has prevented me for some time past from calling you my mistress. (Henry VIII, 1528 [2010], p. ii-iii)

The more Anne resisted, the more Henry prized her (Scarisbrick, 2011, p.149). In 1527, Henry first tried to have his marriage tried and dissolved in a secret court in Westminster (Scarisbrick, 2011, pp.153-156). At this point, a second set of difficulties arose. These were religious and international. They were connected to the Italian Wars and primed the Pope to reject Henry VIII's pleas for a divorce (Mallett, 2006, p.4; Scarisbrick, 2011, pp. 196-197; Shaw, 2006, pp. 108; 116). The Pope was involved in the war. He needed an alliance with Spain and dragged his feet on granting Henry VIII his much-desired divorce. After the sacking of Rome in 1527, where Pope Clement VII landed under Charles V. Habsburg control, it was virtually impossible for Henry VII to get a divorce as he had lost his power over Clement relative to that of Charles V. (Scarisbrick, 2011, pp.155; 197). Thus, the events of the Italian Wars spurred Henry VIII, into creating his own church where he could formally rid himself of his first wife, Catherine of Aragón.

Three weeks before Henry's first divorce hearing in 1527, Rome was sacked by Habsburg troops and Henry VIII, as well as his Cardinal Wolsey, lost their nerve (Scarisbrick, 2011, p.155). Knowing that the Pope was under Charles V control and that Catherine (Charles's aunt) would surely appeal the decision, the trial was called off. Instead, Henry confronted Catherine and stated that their marriage was void, while his Cardinal travelled through France to try and persuade the clergy and Clement VII (Scarisbrick, 2011, pp.156; 158-160). Henry lost faith in Wolsey and dispatched bishop William Knight to go to Rome and plead his case directly to Clement VII. However, both efforts were wasted as the Pope could not grant Henry a divorce without admitting that his predecessor was wrong in granting him a dispensation (Scarisbrick, 2011, pp.203-204). By 1528, Catherine and Mary had been sent away from court, and Anne had moved into the adjoining chamber next to Henry (Scarisbrick, 2011, p.219). Meanwhile, Henry VIII and Pope Clement VII were stuck at an impasse.

In January of 1533, a third set of difficulties presented themselves, hastened by the forces of biological necessity: it was discovered that Anne Boleyn was pregnant (Scarisbrick, 2011, p.309). The matter of marriage became urgent as Henry sought a legitimate heir. Henry married Anne in secrecy, while Parliament quickly passed acts that supported the validity of the marriage to Anne and declared his marriage to Catherine as void (Scarisbrick, 2011, pp.309-313). Later that same year, Anne was crowned Queen. Then she gave birth to a daughter, Elizabeth Tudor (Scarisbrick, 2011, p.323).

In 1534, Henry severed English ties to Rome and Catholicism completely (Scarisbrick, 2011, p.350). He signed the Act of Supremacy, which instated him as the head of the Church of England. During their short marriage, Anne failed to provide Henry with a son and their romance soon dwindled (Scarisbrick, 2011, p.348-350). By 1534, Henry had started courting what would become his 3rd wife: Jane Seymour. Anne Boleyn kept miscarrying, while Henry started to engage less and less with her. By 1536, he wanted out of the marriage and told his advisors Cromwell and Norfolk to find him an excuse. Hence, In May of 1536, Anne was executed on charges of adultery and incest (Scarisbrick, 2011, p.348-350). Less than two weeks after the beheading of Anne Boleyn, Henry VIII married Jane Seymour (Scarisbrick, 2011, pp. 305; 405). Jane died in childbirth but gave him a son, Edward VI. He too was sickly and died before he could reach adulthood at age 15. Jane is often described as the love of Henry's life as he requested to be buried with her (Scarisbrick, 2011, pp. 497).

Henry's last three marriages have no recorded pregnancies (Shrimplin & Jayasena, 2021). The fourth marriage took place in 1540 and was a dynastic marriage with Anne of Cleves (Scarisbrick, 2011, pp. 368-370). She was the daughter of the Duke of Cleves with whom Henry sought an alliance. The Cleve family were rumored to be very fertile (Watkins, 2018, p.4). Anne's grandfather, John II, was rumored to have 63 illegitimate bastards, and was fittingly nicknamed "the babymaker". Henry did not see Anne of Cleves until after the signing of the marriage treaty (Scarisbrick, 2011, p. 370). At this point, Henry was 49 years old, and Anne of Cleves was 16 or 17. Yet, after their wedding, he claimed that she was too physically unattractive for him to perform, and that the marriage was not consummated (Scarisbrick, 2011, p.371). They divorced quickly and amicably by that same year (Scarisbrick, 2011, p. 375). 18 days after the divorce, Henry VIII married Anne Boleyn's cousin: Catherine Howard (Scarisbrick, 2011, pp. 429-431). Records show that Henry VIII at that time was sexually timid, physically repugnant and a moody lover, and that 19-year-old Catherine preferred the company of other men. By 1542, Catherine admitted to adultery, and like her late cousin, she was beheaded shortly thereafter (Scarisbrick, 2011, pp.432-433). A year later, Henry married his last wife, Catherine Parr (Scarisbrick, 2011, pp.456-457). They remained married until his death.

Figure 5: Family tree of Henry VIII
Created by author based on the works of Harper, 2013, pp. 106-107, Horowitz, 2018 and
Scarisbrick, 2011. Photographs collected from Tudorsociety.com.

Above is an illustration of Henry VIII's immediate family. As is apparent, he had many wives
in hopes of a legitimate heir, including the wives of his late brother. Here, one can also see the
lifespan of his legitimate children, in addition to the length of his marriages, which starts from
the right with Catherine of Aragón, and ends with Catherine Parr.

Henry VIII's Primogenital Concerns

Henry VIII was from the very beginning shaped by the successional principle of
primogeniture. From early childhood he lived a sheltered life (Scarisbrick, 2011, pp.6-7).
Since his parents had lost five children, Henry VIII was seen as the spare heir held under such
strict supervision that he might as well have been a girl. In fact, he could not even venture
outside by himself, and if he did, he could only leave through a private door and into a park.
He never spoke in public unless spoken to by his father. He spent most of his time in a room
which could only be accessed through the King's chamber. Meanwhile, his elder brother
Arthur had apprenticeships to gain political experience and frequently ventured to Wales, as
the Prince of Wales. Henry's function within the family was to join the clergy (Scarisbrick,
2011, p.4). Here, Henry would not pose a threat to his brother as he would remain celibate,
and not produce any offspring. Also, he would bring further prestige to the House of Tudor by
cementing closer bonds to the Catholic church (Scarisbrick, 2011, p.4; Sharma, 2015). This is
the typical route for second sons within a dynastic system that practices primogeniture and is
a function that can eliminate internal strife between brothers. However, it also meant that

when Henry VIII inherited his brother's post, he was unseasoned and unprepared to inherit the family's patrimony.

It is also very likely that Henry VIII was affected by the previous successional turmoil which had led to the Wars of the Roses and marked his father's own reign (Horowitz, 2018, pp. 3-5; Kramer et. al., 2019, p.147). The Wars of the Roses broke out when there was uncertainty about who was the rightful ruler of England (Horowitz, 2018, pp. 3-5). The winner of the war, Henry VII Tudor, had a claim to the throne which did not follow the rules of primogeniture and has been described as 'dubious, at best' (Nexon, 2009, p. 127). His connection to the House of Plantagenet was weak, and for the legitimacy of his reign he had to rely on papal approval (Horowitz, 2018, pp. 6; 312). Moreover, his reign was plagued by Yorkist supporters, even though he tried to strengthen his rule by marrying into the family of his enemy when he married Elizabeth of York (See *Figure 5* on page 38 for an overview). The dynastic system of Medieval Europe meant that there was a shortage of individuals who could lay claim to the throne, or who could create chaos like that of the Wars of the Roses (Nexon, 2009, p. 127). This was likely glaringly obvious to Henry VII who fought to establish his rule, but probably also to Henry VIII who as a second son never intended to rule (Scarisbrick, 2011, p.3).

High infant mortality and miscarriages plagued medieval Europe (Nexon, 2009, p.127). Elizabeth of York and Henry VII suffered like many others and lost over half of their offspring (Scarisbrick, 2011, p.3). It was a period when successional crises were inevitable, and each noble couple had a fifty percent chance of an adult male succession in the direct line (Nexon, 2009, p.127; Sharma, 2015, p.168). Hence, the noble family lasted on average for three to six generations in the male line and the number of dynasties were reduced at a rapid pace, as illustrated in *Figure 3* on page 31. The stress of his familial past and weak claim to the throne, coupled with the reproductive challenges of dynasties in the Middle Ages, may possibly explain Henry VIII's resoluteness in finding a wife who would bear him a son (Horowitz, 2018, p. 5; Nexon, 2009, p. 127; Scarisbrick, 2011, p.430; Sharma, 2015). His predecessor had borne witness and capitalized on the consequences owing to primogeniture deficiencies, and it was Henry's sole duty to further ensure Tudor supremacy via his own recognized patrilineality.

Towards the conclusion of his initial marriage, Henry VIII faced three distinct issues that centered around primogeniture. Primarily, he struggled with domestic and interpersonal challenges stemming from his failure to father legitimate male heirs. Furthermore, he contested the Church's authority in determining the legitimacy of marriages and offspring, a matter intertwined with both religious and international implications. Lastly, Henry confronted his own biological limitations, compelled by the imperative of producing a son given the prevailing expectations of the dynastic system.

No Sons

In the beginning stages of his rule, Henry VIII did produce an heir, albeit an illegitimate one with a lover. In 1519, Henry had a child named Henry Fitzroy with his mistress Bessie Blount (Scarisbrick, 2011, p. 147; Whitley & Kramer, 2010). Therefore, when his wife Catherine of Aragón only managed to produce a living daughter it was natural for him to blame her. By 1525, Catherine was 40 years old, and her childbearing days were almost over (Scarisbrick, 2011, pp.150-153). Thus, it was dynastically urgent for Henry VIII to find another wife if he had any hopes of producing an heir and securing a lasting Tudor-reign. As such, his affair with Anne Boleyn deepened. The upcoming divorce was more than just a man in love or a man in lust. His five-year older wife had become a burden. His only daughter was only good for making alliances and securing riches. He used Mary accordingly. He explored several fruitful marriage-alliances with other dynastic families like the Valois from France and the Habsburgs of central-Europe (Scarisbrick, 2011, pp.39-40). It is said that a treaty with France without a marriage alliance was nothing 'but a drye peace' in Henry's eyes (Nexon, 2009, p.94). In that sense, Mary could contribute and be of use. Still, Mary could not secure a succession by primogeniture, and thus not protect his main interest at that time: the continuation of his dynasty.

As a second son raised to join the clergy, Henry probably had good knowledge of the Levitical argument for divorce (Scarisbrick, 2011, p.154). Yet, he seemed to say that the legitimacy of his marriage was first questioned by a French ambassador in 1527 (Scarisbrick, 2011, p.153). His argument was that Leviticus is divine law, thus, no pope can dispense of it (Scarisbrick, 2011, p.152). Therefore, his first marriage was illegitimate, and he was being punished for having bedded his brother's wife by not having any sons. Technically, in line with the argument of Leviticus, both Anne Boleyn and Catherine of Aragón were to be considered his sisters since he had bedded the former's sister while the latter had been married

to his brother (Scarisbrick, 2011, pp. 4; 147-148). However, he quickly interpreted the Levitical argument in his favor to only count for siblings through marriage (Scarisbrick, 2011, p.161). This interpretation changed when Anne did not bear him a son either (Scarisbrick, 2011, p. 349). Two days before her beheading, a court decided that the marriage had been invalid from the start due to Henry's adulterous relationship with Anne's sister prior to their marriage. After Anne's death and his new marriage to Jane Seymour, it was now believed that he would have no further issue of conceiving an heir. It can be said that Henry VIII had both a horror and a desire for incest which shaped his marriages, and which he thought to disrupt his familiar line (Scarisbrick, 2011, p. 17). Although a religious man, he was fairly pragmatic in his interpretation of Leviticus and shaped it to his own interest (Scarisbrick, 2011, p.160-161). Later in life he did not shy away from familial connection even after he had been made aware of Leviticus, as Catherine Howard and Boleyn were cousins (See *Figure 5* on page 38 for an overview and timeline of Henry's marriages).

It is apparent that Henry valued his wives for their ability to provide him with heirs (Scarisbrick, 2011, pp. 14; 150). His most valued wife was Jane Seymour who provided him with the son, Edward VI (Scarisbrick, 2011, p.494). Despite being a sickly son who died at 15, he was the only legitimate son of Henry VIII. His bastard, Henry Fitzroy died in 1536 (Scarisbrick, 2011, p. 351). This was shortly after the death of Anne Boleyn and before Henry had the opportunity and power to legitimize him, which could have been an option (Scarisbrick, 2011, p. 351). Meanwhile, Henry VIII did not even attend his daughter Elizabeth's christening, or care much for his daughter Mary after the divorce (Scarisbrick, 2011, p.322-323, 351-352). Although Henry has sometimes been described as romantic, he also felt grueling disappointment and sometimes the need to punish his wives (Scarisbrick, 2011, p. xii). This can be said for all his divorces, and in particular Anne Boleyn and Catherine Howard who were beheaded and publicly shamed. If either of these had provided him with an heir, no one would likely have dared to propose their adultery to Henry VIII. Moreover, had Catherine of Aragón provided a male heir, she would have secured her position.

Henry followed the governing principle of *raison de famille* when he divorced Catherine of Aragón to marry Anne Boleyn (de Carvalho, 2014, p.411). Catherine could not fulfil the most important job of a queen, which was to bear children (Fichtner, 1976; Scarisbrick, 2011, pp. 14;150). Anne, on the other hand, was pregnant by early 1533 (Scarisbrick, 2011, p. 313).

She, as well as others, had sworn that she would bear him a son. To make that son legitimate, Henry would have to marry her. Thus, it was not by the 'popular sovereignty' or 'the national interest' that Henry divorced Catherine, but rather at the interests of his dynasty and the 'divine kingship' (Scarisbrick, 2011, p. 216; Teschke, 2006, p.555). This governing principle was what rulers governed by in the Henrician era. *Raison d'état* would not be introduced for well over another 100 years during the Peace of Westphalia (Kissinger, 2015). Until then, in the age of dynasticism and Henry VIII, rulers would act in their own interest and in the interest of their family (de Carvalho, 2014, p.411; Teschke, 2006).

The Church

Legitimacy in Medieval Europe was fixed in kinship, primogeniture, and the Catholic Church (Sharma, 2015). The power the Roman Catholic Church had over legitimizing marriages, and consequently heirs, made Henry VIII's break with Rome in 1534 inevitable. In the years leading up to the separation, the discussions that Henry VIII had with Pope Clement VII quickly evolved from a simple disagreement into a quarrel over jurisdiction (Bernard, 2016). Whilst the Church had to counteract secular tendencies and their declining power, Henry VIII had to secure himself an heir who could inherit in accordance with primogeniture (Kramer et. al., 2019, p.143; Sharma, 2015; Whelan, 2014, p.3). Hence, there was no agreement to be made that would protect both interests.

If not for his lack of an heir, Henry VIII would have never separated from the Roman Catholic Church (Kramer et. al., 2019, pp. 209-210; Scarisbrick, 2011, p.152). Henry VIII was a religious man who was awarded the title 'Defender of the faith' by Pope Leo X after he authored *Defence of the Seven Sacraments* after the Lutheran Reformation. Initially, Henry would also acknowledge Clement's power to absolve him from his sinful marriage and either validate or invalidate his union with Catherine (Scarisbrick, 2011, p. 160). However, as the need for a divorce deepened, Henry began altering his stance (Scarisbrick, 2011, pp. 152; 197). By 1528, Henry had first aired the idea of England separating from Rome, and by the following year, he had started to show support for the reformist ideas of Luther, stating that the Church needed change (Scarisbrick, 2011, p. 213; 246).

Early on the Church and Clement tried to appease Henry in many ways (Scarisbrick, 2011, p. 159). At one point it is said that Clement even considered allowing bigamy so that Henry

would get his legitimate heir. However, the nature of Henry's argument called into question the validity of the Church's authority, which the Church could not allow (Scarisbrick, 2011, p.197). Not only did Henry VIII want to divorce Catherine, the aunt of Charles V and a devoted catholic, he wanted to divorce her because he believed that the papal dispensation *was not valid* (Scarisbrick, 2011, p.163). Due to the fragile circumstances already surrounding the Church, Clement was in no position to acknowledge that the dispensation his predecessor had granted Henry VIII's and Catherine to surpass 'divine law' was beyond their jurisdiction. To try an appease Henry, Clement said that he would get a divorce *if* the marriage was made on false ground. Still, the Church would not say that they could not grant 'supplet Ecclessia', nor would they allow Henry to get rid of Catherine. Whenever they tried to negotiate, they would soon reach a standstill.

Catherine of Aragón was well protected by her dynasty, but also by her popularity (Scarisbrick, 2011, pp. 17; 157; 219). Many theologists came to her defense at Blackfriars in the divorce proceedings of 1529, and later the people of England would come to her defense and detest Anne Boleyn for the entirety of her rule (Scarisbrick, 2011, pp. 224-227). The legatine court in Blackfriars has been called a turning point in the divorce proceedings. Here, Catherine won the case in a British court presided over by Cardinal Wolsey and managed to recall the case to Rome. This caused an escalation of events when in 1530, Henry was summoned to Rome to settle the question of the validity of his marriage (Scarisbrick, 2011, p. 261). He refused, and from that point forward his stance was that an Englishman could not be summoned out of their homeland to suffer foreign jurisdiction, no church could hold power over a king, and he was answerable to no earthly tribunal (Scarisbrick, 2011, pp. 261; 289; 290; 310).

There were many times thereafter when Henry tried to break Pope Clement's will (Scarisbrick, 2011, p. xiv). After the failed court of Blackfriars, Henry cast out Cardinal Wolsey and threatened him with imprisonment, disgrace, and later death by bringing against him charges of treason for being a papal legate (also known as *legate a latere*, a position he had possessed for 11 years prior). Additionally, he raised charges against 15 members of the clergy for *praemunire,* so-called maintenance of papal jurisdiction against the supremacy of the monarch (Scarisbrick, pp. 273-274). He later backtracked on the charges against the clergy, whilst Wolsey died on his way to trial. He also tried to cut off payments to newly appointed bishops in 1532 (Scarisbrick, pp. 297-300). However, Clement largely ignored

Henry's antics by that point in time. Hence, it was also a struggle of power where one would try to wield their influence over one another. Power is, as stated earlier, the ability to get someone to do something they otherwise would not do (Weber, 1925, p.28 as cited in Wallimann, et. al., 1977, p.231). Henry tried to assert power over Clement by withholding funds and prosecuting the Pope's men while hinting at a reformation and promoting anti-papalism (Scarisbrick, 2011, pp. xiv; 273-274; 297-300). However, Clement held power over the future of the Tudor dynasty by being the only person who could grant legitimacy to both marriage and children (Sharma, 2015). Therefore, Henry could not influence or hold power over Clement, who acted as the same entity as the Catholic Church and held the power of the Church in the palm of his hand (Partner, 1980; Whelan, 2014, p.4).

The word 'dynasty' can mean 'sovereignty' or 'power' as it signifies a succession of rulers (Mackenny, 1993, p. 59, as cited in Nexon, 2009, p.95). As the joint daughter of the Castile's and Aragón's and the aunt of the Habsburg Charles V, Catherine of Aragón was almost impossible to get rid of within the structure of the Catholic Church (Scarisbrick, 2011, p. 197). In the beginning of Henry's marriage to Catherine, her connections served him well as Catherine's family aided him in his French invasion (Scarisbrick, 2011, p.81). This changed when Henry started pursuing the divorce and Charles V spoke on Catherine's behalf (Scarisbrick, 2011, p. 157). Henry also suffered from horrible timing and tried to have his first divorce proceeding merely three weeks after the Sack of Rome, where the Pope had befallen Habsburg control (Scarisbrick, 2011, p.155). It became apparent that if the divorce went through, then Catherine would appeal it. If Catherine appealed the divorce, Charles V by papal proxy would protect her interest. Therefore, during the first divorce proceeding in Westminster, Henry VIII and Cardinal Wolsey temporarily abandoned their mission. As time would pass, Pope Clement would increasingly rely on Charles' resources as the sacking as well as the Italian Wars had only depleted his resources (Partner, 1980; Scarisbrick, 2011, p. 201). This further complicated the divorce process and made a separation between Rome and England inevitable.

Biology and Incentives

Throughout history, the responsibility of producing children has typically been the responsibility of women (Shrimplin & Jayasena, 2021). This was also the case with Henry VIII and his wives. Even if 70% of his recorded pregnancies with six different wives ended in miscarriages or stillbirths, it was his wives who "failed" to produce offspring (Shrimplin &

Jayasena, 2021; Whitley & Kramer, 2010, p. 833). Henry himself also accused his wives of sinful behavior which contravened Leviticus 20:21, or he disposed of those who were not attractive enough to tempt him into the marital bed (Scarisbrick, 2011, p.371).

There has been much research on Henry's reproductive issues. Whilst the Henrician era placed the blame on the mothers, more contemporary science validates that when one man has the same issues with several women, the fault probably lies with him (Whitley & Kramer, 2010). Early on, the issue was not in conceiving an heir as his wives did get pregnant rather rapidly. Still, they often suffered miscarriages and stillbirth. Given the era they lived in with poor nutrition, contaminated water, minimal hygiene, and a regular and steady alcohol intake, some miscarriages were probably due to natural causes. However, knowing the rate of Catherine of Aragón's miscarriages, Anne Boleyn's lasting issues of delivery and Henry's rapidly declining health in his mid-age, he probably had underlying health issues. As we now know, it is also the father's sperm who decides on the sex of the child. Therefore, Henry's reproductive issues and consequently his primogenital issues are most likely his own.

In his youth, Henry VIII was described as 'extremely handsome' and as the finest monarch in all of Europe (Scarisbrick, 2011, pp. 13-14). However, a shift occurred in Henry VIII's behavior when he reached middle-age (Whitley & Kramer, 2010). From there on out, he was often described as 'volatile', 'bloodthirsty' and a 'tyrant' (Scarisbrick, 2011, pp. 354; 361; 482). There has been much speculation around his health, including conditions like syphilis, type II diabetes, head injury from a fall from a horse in 1536, or that the ulcer in his leg contributed to his foul moods (Scarisbrick, 2011; p. 426; 482; 485; Whitley & Kramer, 2010). It is impossible to trace back his medical history in its entirety. Nevertheless, diseases like syphilis would at that time have been treated. However, he did often complain and lock himself away due to the ulcer in his leg. Later in life, he was also very obese and in poor health, and most certainly affected by the head injury as well. His rapidly deteriorating state/health could possibly be a contributing factor for the urgency of him to reproduce.

Another biological deficiency which might have troubled Henry's dynastic ambitions in his mid-age are his rumored struggles with impotence (Whitley & Kramer, 2010). During his short marriage with Anne of Cleves, he stated that he was unable to consummate the marriage due to her unattractiveness, despite her being rather fair and young (Scarisbrick, 2011, p. 371). Thus, it is said that he might have suffered from anxiety-driven impotency (Whitley &

Kramer, 2010). There was certainly a lot of pressure put on him to produce an heir, and his sexuality was at least in part driven by the political need for progeny to prove himself and his dynasty in the era of monarchic primogeniture (Scarisbrick, 2011, p.429). Hence, his known biological deficiencies, coupled with the unknown, would taint all his marriage unions with a sense of urgency and anxiety to reproduce.

From the perspective of Henry VIII, women served a strictly biological purpose: childbearing. He wished desperately for an heir and punished his wives severely when they disappointed him, either by public humiliation or by death (Scarisbrick, 2011, pp. xii-xiii; 430). His incentives for divorce were reproduction, as were his marriages. He married Anne of Cleves, who had descended from 'the babymaker' (Watkins, 2018, p.4). However, she did not manage to tempt Henry to reproduce (Scarisbrick, 2011, p. 375). Nor was he enamored by her meek personality. Hence, he did not feel the need for her to suffer when he divorced her as he did with many of his other wives. After his failure with Anne of Cleves, Henry VIII went in the opposite direction with the choice of the very flirtatious Catherine Howard, perhaps hoping that her different nature would help him overcome his biological deficiencies. However, it seemed like when this did not work, he contended himself to marrying an older woman for companionship rather than childbearing during his last couple of years (as can be seen in *Figure 5*, page 38)*.* This period also saw him begin to publicly acknowledging his daughters, thus bestowing them a sense of legitimacy before his death (Scarisbrick, 2011, p.456).

The Actions and Incentives of Six Wives in light of Monarchic Primogeniture

By 1533 it was clear that Henry VIII would divorce a popular and well-connected Queen for the purpose of heirs (Scarisbrick, 2011, p. 313). Whereas 1536, illustrated that he would dispose of those he felt had wronged him (Scarisbrick, 2011, pp. 348-350). However, some of Henry VIII's wives, such as Catherine of Aragón and Anne of Cleves, were protected by their dynastic lineage. Nevertheless, the relationship between Anne Boleyn and Henry VIII flourished when Catherine failed in her dynastic duty, to secure the line of succession (Scarisbrick, 2011, pp. 150-152). As the years went by without an heir, not only was Henry personally disappointed, but other royals and ambassadors had started to remark on the fact that he had no heir. The blame was attached to Catherine who was discarded, and Henry continued to pursue others out of a political necessity. By looking at the fate of the favorite wife Jane Seymour, it is apparent that one must provide a male heir to secure the station within the House of Tudor (Scarisbrick, 2011, p. 497).

From the perspective of the wives, they needed to reproduce male heirs by any means necessary. This may have even motivated several of the wives into having extramarital affairs. By the time Anne Boleyn suffered her last miscarriage, she was said to be 'desperate' of conceiving an heir by Henry (Scarisbrick, 2011, p. 348-350). After her final miscarriage of what is said to be a baby boy in 1536, Henry started courting one of Anne's ladies in waiting: Jane Seymour. Given the risk of what would be considered treason, and therefore punishable by death, it might have driven Anne to pursue other relationships. This would perhaps include even her own brother, who would be the "safest" choice in a court filled with gossip and intrigue. With Anne, there is no proof of indiscretion. She had certainly been flirtatious, was part of a very "libidinous court" and was suspiciously familiar with some of the court members. Henry VIII would go on to say that she had been with as many as "a hundred men" (Scarisbrick, 2011, p. 350). Yet, without her reproductive failure, no subject would have dared to put forth accusations toward Anne of adultery and incest (Scarisbrick, 2011, p. xii). By 1536, Henry's attitude toward Anne had changed drastically from the smitten man who had written her love letters. The once devastating infatuation had turned into a "bloodthirsty loathing" when she failed to deliver on the promise of giving him a son (Scarisbrick, 2011, p. xii). Thus, if Anne Boleyn ever did stray, it is not unlikely that she would do so out of the same political necessity that led Henry VIII to pursue a divorce from Catherine of Aragón.

By the time Catherine Howard married Henry, he was suffering from depression and perhaps impotency (Scarisbrick, 2011, p. 375; Whitley & Kramer, 2010). Still, the pressure was applied to her to reproduce. She would go on to have several documented affairs (Scarisbrick, 2011, p. 431). This was in despite of her awareness, being wife number four, of the potential consequences of adultery. So, it could be said that also the wives acted in accordance with primogeniture, not only to protect their interest, but their own lives. The Tudor wives needed children to be safe. After seeing that they could not have children with Henry they acted to protect their dynastic interest, as well as their lives and reputations.

Anne of Cleves, who was quickly dismissed by Henry himself, was probably better for it. In the divorce proceedings she was amicable and did not contest Henry even if her brother wanted her to (Scarisbrick, 2011, p. 373). Seeing how Henry had treated his former wives, and with not being able to conceive a child together, this annulment was probably in Anne's

best interest. Later, Henry would speak of her fondly and as a 'beloved sister' (Scarisbrick, 2011, p.430).

His last wife, Catherine Parr, was 31-year-old and had no recorded pregnancies by Henry VIII (Shrimplin & Jayasena, 2021). Yet, she secured the English successional lineage by uniting Henry VIII with his daughters, Mary I and Elizabeth I (Scarisbrick, 2011, p.456). By popular opinion, Henry married based on her nursing abilities (James, 2010, p.11). She fought to reinstate the Tudor women into the line of succession based on a moral conviction that they should not be excluded, and thus both secured the Tudor line and the line of succession. Although Henry briefly conspired against her in 1546 for daring to discuss scripture, their union is considered an amicable one as Catherine cared for him during his final years (Scarisbrick, 2011, p.479-481).

The families who pushed forward daughters to bestow upon Henry VIII either as a mistress or a wife, engaged in a queen's gambit where they put their queen in a vulnerable position to gain a tactical advantage (James, 2010, pp.10-11). High societies at that point in time were identified by kinship groups, and if one family member were to rise to the highest social strata of Medieval England, the rest of the family would follow. Henry himself, sacrificed four queens to his own perceived advantage. It is perhaps this that would become his most well-known legacy in addition to the Act of Supremacy of 1534. It is the hunt for an heir which would become the catalyst for most of his legacy.

An Unexpected Legacy: The Fallout from Henry's Actions Toward Securing an Heir

When Henry VIII uttered that no pope could hold power over a king, he declared the sovereignty of England and accelerated unification and nation building in England (Morgenthau, 1948 [2006], p. 141; Scarisbrick, 2011, pp. 261; 360). When refusing to answer to a higher power, Henry VIII consolidated power within the state and gave the sovereign undivided power and jurisdiction. This accelerated the development of the state by centralizing power. Moreover, in the process of separating England and Rome, Henry would create his own aristocracy and strengthen the legal branch (Nexon, 2009, pp. 98; 499). Thus, ushering England into modernity and creating a new basis for what we now know as England. The ideas of Henry VIII would continue to spread and leave its mark upon Europe until 1648, where the Peace of Westphalia also weakened the Catholic Church by establishing

sovereignty within the state (Patton, 2019). Hence, the Henrician reformation irrevocably changed the power structures of Europe. For England, he contributed to the formation of a national identity by creating a national religion, which is vital for the formation of the nation state (Morgenthau, 1948 [2006], pp.113; 145).

In the medieval era, individuals within a nation-state also identified themselves with a collective entity based on kinship, religious affiliation, or allegiance to a feudal lord or prince (Morgenthau, 1948 [2006]; p.114). In 16th century England, this identification was primarily centered around the interests of the sovereign ruler (de Carvalho, 2014, p.411; Teschke, 2006, p. 555). During Henry VIII's conflict with the Pope and Catholic Church, Henry started to steer England in a pronounced anti-Catholic direction (Whelan, 2014, p.4). Clement VII was extraordinary for a pope as he ruled for an astonishing 11 years. (Scarisbrick, 2011, p.547). This was abnormally long. It also meant that from 1527, when Henry first tried to pursue a divorce, and until his death in 1534, the Pope could actively prevent Henry's plans for a divorce. The conflict subsequently concluded in 1534 when Henry passed the Act of Supremacy (Kramer et. al., 2019, p. 209; Scarisbrick, 2011, pp. 309; 547). Henceforth, England would be separate from Rome, and Henry would be the head of the Church of England. Set in times already plagued by change and turmoil from dynastic warfare, England was in a perfect position for the growth of nationalism to occur (Morgenthau, 1948 [2006], p.118). In times of crisis, people often rely on identity markers such as religion and nationhood (Clarke, 2013; Morgenthau, 1948 [2006], p.118). These were set by Henry VIII. After the Henrician reformation, Henry established a paradigm where allegiance to the Pope would eventually come to mean the same as loyalty to a foreign prince (de Carvalho, 2014, p. 415). In parallel to the historical events that unfolded when Henry VII Tudor seized power from Richard II during the Wars of the Roses, a similar shift in fortunes took place for the Tudors (Horowitz, 2018, pp. 4-6). The Popes of Rome, who had once bestowed legitimacy upon the Tudors, now found himself cast as the usurper of power.

In terms of changes to the religious lives of the people of England, not much changed (Kramer et. al., 2019, p.210). The Henrician reformation was very much rooted in the same religious principles as Catholicism and the early stages of the Anglican faith was in general just Catholicism without a Pope (Bernard, 2016). Still, the presence of religious differentiation coupled with a national religion created a collective identity within England (de Carvalho, 2014; Nexon, 2009, p. 98).

By separating from Rome, Henry gained ownership of Church property and their funds (Kramer et. al., 2019, p. 210). This he distributed to his friends and strengthened the English aristocracy. Without the expenses to Rome, the nation's financial burden eased (Kennedy, 1988, p. 77). The middle class was strengthened, and the last traces of feudal power in England were uprooted (Kohn, 1940). Funds were also increasingly spent on national projects such as strengthening the navy, and several other strong points (de Carvalho, 2014). By consolidating military power and strengthening the navy, the Tudor king established the building blocks of what would become Britain's overseas empire. The resulting strength would ultimately shape Britain's modern foreign policy landscape (de Carvalho, 2014).

Henry VIII consolidated his authority within the realm and assumed leadership of the English Church, thereby establishing a confessional state (de Carvalho, 2014). Within a confessional state, the Church integrates into the governing structure, leading to a power shift that favors the state. This transfer of power empowers the state to wield administrative authority and acquire new prerogatives that were previously under the command of the Catholic Church. Through confessionalization, a collective sense of identity is nurtured through the shaping of dogma, disseminating propaganda, influence on education, enforcement of discipline, conduct of rituals, and influencing language (de Carvalho, 2014, p. 413). Consequently, one can argue that the English Church played a pivotal role in forging a shared domestic identity. This identity would also come to influence England's alliance partners in years to come as maintenance of alliances hinged on mutual identification between nations (de Carvalho, 2014).

The influence of language that happened by creating a confessional state would be vital for the development of nationalism as language works as a unifier (de Carvalho, 2014). This sense of fellowship was first imagined through the sovereign, which established nationalism and shared cultural roots when religious pluralism and upheaval threatened their sense of legitimacy (B. Anderson, 2006, pp. 8-9). A nation is an imagined political community which occurs when a significant number of people considers themselves a part of that society (B. Anderson, 2006, p. 6). English started to be used in prestigious domains, such as the English Parliament, in the 14th century (Kohn, 1940). This sense of identity would only be furthered under Henry VIII who gave to the English a new sense of individualism and importance. The new pride led to a closer observation of what it would mean to be English by examining

institutions, language, traditions, and history. Thus, he strengthened national bonds and helped unify the English people as one. During the following Elizabethan period, there were fears that the English language only had a limited future. However, the English language would continue to make strides: the English King James Bible would be published in 1611, and within the Church of England, English would replace Latin as the language of the liturgy (Kramer et. al., 2019, p.213; Svartvik & Leech, 2016, p. 61). More noticeable works would be printed in English, such as the works of William Shakespeare where several new phrases were coined, and *the Dictionary of the English Language* which appeared in 1755 (Svartvik & Leech, 2016, pp. 58-59; 67). The more the English language would be standardized and codified, the more unity through the common tongue would evolve.

England would eventually turn fully protestant under the rule of Henry's youngest daughter: Elizabeth Tudor (Kramer et. al., 2019, p.211-212). Henry VIII and Anne Boleyn produced one of the most remarkable rulers in both Church and State compared to any predecessor, with qualities which equalled or out measured that of Henry's own (Scarisbrick, 2011, p.150). Thus, his patriarchal convictions and the structures of 15th century primogeniture proved illogical and unfounded. It was Elizabeth Tudor, and not his sickly son Edward IV, who ushered England into their first 'golden age' (King, 1990). By being fully competent rulers, she and her sister Mary I., unwittingly started tearing down social barriers which stated that women were not 'qualified by God's Word' to be Head of a Church, that war was a 'masculine preserve', and that patriarchy was a goal in itself (Richards, 1999, p.147-148). Hence, they laid the basis for following queens, and the implementation of cognatic succession in 2011 within the House of Windsor (Corcos, 2012). Perhaps made wiser by the fate of her mother and her father's actions, Elizabeth Tudor would never marry (King, 1990). Thus, she sealed the fate of the Tudor line of succession upon her death. Indirectly, she laid the foundation for the collective entity we know today as the "United Kingdom of Great Britain" as she was succeeded by her cousin James VI Stuart of Scotland as James I of England and Ireland. Hence, the House of Tudor consolidated and shaped the England that we know of today. Till this day, England retains a separate identity from the rest of Europe. This not only pioneered them as the first industrial and capitalist nation, but also affects them today through controversial actions such as Brexit.

PART III: CONCLUSION

The nature of succession is a multifaceted and dynamic phenomenon. This study has shed light on its various aspects, exploring its intricacies and implications in different contexts by looking at successional means and consequences of different successional types, with a particular focus on hereditary succession. Taking into account previous research, this thesis found that there are three types of political succession which mirror that of Max Weber's (1919 [2001]) ideal types: hereditary, electoral and by force. Additionally, there is a residual category which encompasses incidents of no set procedure.

The findings in this thesis support the existing literature that claim that succession by election is the most stable way of establishing leadership (Bueno de Mesquita, & Smith, 2017; Huntington, 1991; Rush, 1978; Schumpeter, 1942 [1976]). Secondary, is hereditary succession followed by succession by force (Andersen, 1991; Brownlee, 2007; Jones & Olken, 2009; Sudduth & Bell, 2018). The democratic system emerges as the most stable form of governance, not necessarily due to its capacity to promote virtuous values, but primarily because it provides a controlled and competitive environment for leaders to ascend to power and be replaced when their tenure concludes (Schumpeter, 1942 [1976]). This dynamic foster stability both in governance and for the people governed.

Succession, by its very nature, is cyclical, often resulting in leaders being deposed through methods similar to those they employed to ascend to power (Sudduth & Bell, 2018). Consequently, comprehending regimes necessitates an understanding of succession itself. This thesis addressed a previously neglected, brief or fragmented area of research, serving as an endeavor to rectify this gap. The developed typology (see *Table 1,* p.9) is an outcome of this effort, providing a comprehensive framework for categorizing and analyzing different succession patterns.

By looking at Henry VIII's actions given the circumstances of his era and primogeniture, it is apparent that he was a ruler who acted in his own interest and that of his dynastic lineage (Scarisbrick, 2011). As a ruler who acted in accordance with his self-interest, he rid himself of four wives to try and further his House. Furthermore, he did so as it was dynastically urgent and politically needed. His family's past had illustrated the importance of a clear line of succession (Horowitz, 2018, pp.4-6). Moreover, he wanted an heir to silence the doubters of

Continental Europe (Scarisbrick, 2011). In many ways, primogeniture came to shape the entirety of his rule. It is why he married, it is why he divorced, and it is why he separated from the Roman Catholic Church. Also, it shaped his alliances, which in turn shaped his potential for warfare. For instance, without Catherine of Aragón, he never would have had Charles VI's help in invading France. Given the importance of the structures of Medieval Europe, dynasticism and the different roles of sons and daughters within the family is also something which should be studied further. Especially given how the dynastic system is still in play in today's Middle East where states such as Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Oman regularly enforce primogeniture (Kéchichian, 2019; Lucas, 2012).

Primogeniture, with its inherent stressors and consequences, posed a significant challenge for Henry VIII and other rulers who faced biological complexities (Shrimplin & Jayasena, 2021; Whitley & Kramer, 2010). This system, while providing an unexpected path to power for Henry VIII following his brother's demise, failed to recognize the suitability of his daughters Mary and Elizabeth (Scarisbrick, 2018, p. 4-7; 150). Although primogeniture generally offered stability to European royalty, it, like any succession system, carried contingencies linked to biology and luck (Sharma, 2015). Inbreeding was an unintended outcome of this system, which underscored the need for additional considerations and fortuitous circumstances for it to effectively serve as an aid. This issue would ultimately lead to the decline of many European dynasties and royal lineages within a relatively brief period.

The deep dive into Henry VIII has highlighted the significant influence of cultural, religious, and historical factors on successional procedures. Whether it is the hereditary systems of monarchies, the democratic principles guiding electoral successions, or the challenges posed by violent successions, the nature of succession is deeply intertwined with the unique characteristics of each society and its historical trajectory. Furthermore, this study has highlighted the importance of succession in shaping the stability, continuity, and development of different political systems. Smooth successions can contribute to political stability and facilitate the implementation of long-term policies, while tumultuous successions can lead to power struggles, conflicts, and institutional disruptions (Bueno de Mesquita, & Smith, 2017; Börm, 2014; Huntington, 1991; Olson; 1993; Rush, 1978; Schumpeter, 1942 [1976]). In the case of Henry VIII, his lack of an heir contributed to his troubles which were interpersonal and domestic, international, religious, and biological.

In light of these findings, future research on succession should continue to explore its evolving nature in more contemporary contexts. Hopefully, future research will have room to also explore succession by election or force, which this thesis has not done. Yet, there are some suggestions embedded in this thesis about relevant areas of study, like the assassination of the Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana, or Vladimir Putin who came to power by electoral practices yet changed Russia's successional practice (Ansoms, 2005; Hudson, 2009; Zubok, 2022). By examining different case studies from diverse regions and regimes, scholars can gain a more complete understanding of the challenges and opportunities inherent in successional practices, contributing to the development of effective governance practices and frameworks.

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APPENDICES

Figure 1: Most Common Hereditary Succession Amongst the Gulf States

Figure created by author using mapchart.net, drawing on the works of Kéchichian (2019) and Lucas (2012).

Attachment 1: Lesson Plan- The Attainment of Power

The subject of how a ruler might gain or lose power is also relevant for lower secondary school learners, which the following lesson plan will reflect.

Theme: Power in different regimes.
Outline:
This lesson takes place in a 90-minute class, for Norwegian 10th graders. I have structured the planning of this lesson into the PWP-format which is a tool that structures the class into three parts: the Pre-activity, the While-activity, and the Post-activity (Pranata, 2019, pp. 45-46). By utilizing an Icebreaker-activity I hope to lower the bar for speaking and switch the students over to English (Yeganehpour & Takkac, 2016). After the Icebreaker, the students will work with a task. By working with a specific task, the idea is that the language grows out of the task, rather than the language growing out of explicit language learning (Harmer, 2015, p.60). The basic skills that this class hopes to develop includes digital, - and oral competence, while developing their societal understanding which is a part of the LK-20 interdisciplinary curricula: Democracy and Citizenship (The Norwegian Directorate of Education and Training, 2020a; 2020c).

Competence aims:

- Write formal and informal texts, including multimedia texts with structure and coherence that describe, narrate, reflect, and are adapted to the purpose, recipient, and situation (The Norwegian Directorate of Education and Training, 2020b).

- Understand how one can participate in politics and influence developments in the civil society (The Norwegian Directorate for Education and Training, 2017a).

Learning aims:

The competence aims can be broken down into smaller learning aims that can be presented to the students, so that they can understand what is expected of them after the end of a 90-minute class:

After this class the student should be able to:

- Define what power is, and how it is attained.

- Have an understanding of how different individuals gain power.

- Combine text and photographs on a digital platform.

Pre-activity, Icebreaker (ca. 15 minutes):

As a warming up-activity, the teacher will draw a person with a crown on the board with the headline 'Power'. The students are then instructed to talk with the person next to them for a couple of minutes about how people gain power. After a couple of minutes, the activity is paused, and the students are asked to share what they have discussed.

There are also several scaffolding questions one might ask to create progression in the discussion such as 'What about King Harald, why does he have power?", and "If Kanye West is a billionaire and has all that money, how come he did not win the Presidential election?" and so on. There are some natural follow-questions imbedded in this activity, such as at the end of the activity when you have several words on the board, one might ask 'what is power?'.

At the end of the activity, the topic of the class can be introduced together with the learning aims and plan for the class. Here, a correct definition of power should also be included.

While-activity (65 min):

Afterwards, the student's will be placed into groups of 3-4. Each group will draw a type of leader at random, from a bag. The options are a democratic leader, a military leader, or a monarch.

Before the draw, the teacher should read through the instructions (presented below). While the students work on their post, the teacher walks around scaffolding and helping where necessary.

Instructions for the students:

Create an Instagram account for a **fictional** leader where you present the leader and the country he or she leads, present a backstory, how he/she gained power and goals for the future. In total there should be **at least** 4 posts:

1. This is your victory post. You have just seized power. What is your name? How old are you? Where are you from? In which country did you gain power? Are you married or have a partner? Is there anyone you want to thank?
2. Backstory: Which family are you from? What did you do before this? Did you come from a rich or poor family? Did you have an education? Did you work before this? Do you have any interests?
3. How did you gain power? How will you keep it?
4. What are two goals you have for your reign?

Each post should be accompanied by a **suitable** photograph.

Time to spare: create more posts!
- Will you go to war on someone?
- How do you get money?
- Who is your rival? Is it a competing political party, a relative, a cooperation, another dictator, the people you rule over?
- What will you outlaw to secure your reign? Free press, a court of law, elections?

Notes to draw from:

| A democratic leader	A military leader	A monarch
Congratulations! You are elected by the people, through a democratic election to rule. You won the election by having more than 50% of all the votes. All the tiresome months of campaigning and debating the opposition is now behind you. What comes next? Examples of countries with democracy: Norway, England, France, Germany.	"This will be a day long remembered…" You and your military group gained power by force, and by organizing a coup. By rebelling against your leader and having the military back you. You now control a country. What comes next? Examples of leaders: Idi Amin, Napoleon, Muammar al-Gaddafi.	"The king is dead, long live the king." Finally, after years of sitting around, waiting, and doing nothing: Your father is dead, and you will take his place as a reigning monarch! Long live the king or queen! You will have to balance your own needs, the wishes of the church, the lord and ladies and the commoners. Will you let them eat cake, or will you be a selfless ruler? Examples of monarchs: Henry VIII, Louis XIV, Queen Elizabeth I.

Post-activity (10 mins):

Looking through the posts together from the teacher's computer, reading some of them out loud and commenting on them. Reflecting together on the different leaders, and what we have learned.

Assessment for learning: 'Learning to learn.'

There will be no formal assessment of the student's task this class. Instead, this 90-minute lesson will be focused on 'learning to learn', where they will utilize different strategies for learning and reflecting upon the knowledge they have and what they have acquired at the end of the lesson (The Norwegian Directorate for Education and Training, 2017b). This is to promote lifelong learning, and individual growth.

Continuation

A class should be a part of a bigger picture, and students should be given time to immerse themselves in different topics. This class functions as an introduction to power and leadership. An examples of a follow up class is reading pieces of/or the entire novel: *the Hunger Games,* which is suitable for Young Adult learners (Collins, 2014).