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Deliberative Mini-Publics: Effective Democratic Innovations, or Failed Concept?

A Comparative Study of the Citizen's Juries' Impact on Policymaking:

Masteroppgave i Statsvitenskap

Veileder: Jonathon Moses

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Abstract

The starting point of this master's thesis is the global recession of democracy since the early 2000s and the increased academic focus on ways to strengthen democratic governance and restore the public's trust in the system. The field of democratic innovation has emerged as a potential solution, offering various approaches to enhance democratic practices. However, there is a lack of empirical studies supporting the effectiveness of these democratic innovations in real-life policymaking. Furthermore, existing empirical research tends to cherry-pick positive cases, resulting in limited knowledge about ineffective practices. This thesis aims to fill this gap by conducting an empirical study comparing design practices to gain insights into how to improve the efficiency of future democratic innovations. The research question guiding this thesis is: *How can we design democratic innovations, such as deliberative citizen juries, to impact policymaking successfully?* The study formulates five hypotheses based on deliberative and participatory democratic theory, theoretical views of democratic ideals, and logical reasoning to identify explanatory conditions for successful and effective mini-public (MP) designs. Applying J.S. Mill's Indirect Method of Difference, I compare four successful citizen juries with four failed citizen juries to increase empirical reliability. The data analysis indicates causal relationships between the identified explanatory conditions and the successful impact of citizen juries on policymaking. Building on these findings, I formulate six design recommendations for future democratic innovation designers. The recommendations emphasize fulfilling five explanatory conditions: large (and representative) MPs, long time for deliberation, top-level design integrity, face-to-face interactions between MP members and public authority, and arranging DI events related to a local level of government. The study acknowledges limitations in terms of generalizability due to its small-n approach and recommends further comparative studies to explore the effectiveness of several types of MP s or other democratic innovations. Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) is suggested to gain deeper insights into the combinations of explanatory conditions relevant to explain each outcome. The findings and recommendations of this study hope to inspire and improve future design practices in democratic innovation.

Sammendrag

Denne masteroppgaven tar utgangspunkt i demokratiets globale tilbakegang og den økende oppmerksomheten innen academia om måter å styrke demokratisk styring og gjenopprette innbyggernes tillit til det demokratiske systemet. Demokratisk innovasjon har blitt fremhevet som en mulig løsning. Det demokratiske innovasjonsbegrepet omfatter flere ulike tilnærminger for å forbedre demokratisk praksis. Imidlertid mangler det bredde i empiriske studier som viser effektiviteten til disse demokratiske innovasjonene i faktisk politikkkutforming. Størstedelen av den eksisterende forskningen på området er basert på studier av positive tilfeller av demokratisk innovasjon, noe som begrenser kunnskapen om ineffektiv praksis. Målet med denne oppgaven er å fylle dette kunnskapsgapet ved å gjennomføre en empirisk studie som sammenligner designpraksisen mellom ulike borgerpaneler (både vellykkede og mislykkede) og vurderer den varierende effekten av denne praksisen på borgerpanelenes evne til å påvirke politikkkutforming. Hensikten er å forbedre effektiviteten til fremtidige demokratiske innovasjoner. Forskningsspørsmålet som denne oppgaven tar sikte på å besvare, er: *Hvordan kan vi designe demokratiske innovasjoner, som for eksempel deliberative borgerjuryer, for å oppnå vellykket påvirkning på politikkkutforming?* Oppgaven formulerer fem hypoteser basert på deliberativ og deltakende demokratisk teori, teoretiske syn på demokratiske idealer, samt logisk resonnement for å identifisere mulige forklaringsbetingelser for vellykket og effektiv design av borgerpaneler. Ved å bruke J. S. Mills Indirect Method of Difference, sammenligner jeg fire vellykkede borgerjuryer med fire mislykkede borgerjuryer for å øke den empiriske reliabiliteten og validiteten. Analysen av dataene gir indikasjoner på årsakssammenhenger mellom de identifiserte forklaringsbetingelsene og borgerjuryers vellykkede påvirkning på politikkkutforming. Basert på disse funnene presenterer oppgaven seks anbefalinger som er ment å hjelpe fremtidige demokratiske innovasjons designere med å sikre effektiv prosessdesign. Anbefalingene legger vekt på å oppfylle fem betingelser for vellykkede borgerpaneler: store (og representative) borgerpaneler, tilstrekkelig tid for overveielse, høy integritet i designet, ansikt-til-ansikt-interaksjoner mellom medlemmene i borgerpanelet og offentlige myndigheter, samt prioritering av demokratisk innovasjon knyttet til lokalt styringsnivå. Jeg ønsker å oppfordre til ytterligere komparative studier for å utforske demokratiske innovasjoners effektivitet videre. Jeg håper funnene og anbefalingene i denne studien kan inspirere og forbedre fremtidig designpraksis innen demokratisk innovasjon.

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Johan H. W. Grøgaard, Trondheim, Spring 2023

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Abbreviations:

CJ	Citizen Jury
DI	Democratic Innovations
EC	Explanatory Condition
EPG	Empowered Participatory Governance
IMD	Indirect Method of Difference
MP	Mini-public
O	Outcome
OECD	The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

1 Introduction

In 2015, one of the leading researchers on democracy studies, Larry Diamond, claimed that “Democracy has been in a global recession for most of the last decade” (Diamond, 2015, p. 153). Since then, there has not only been a recession in the number of democratic nations, but more importantly, the democracies have become less democratic (Economist Intelligence, 2022, p. 31). To avoid democratic depression, Diamond stressed the importance of not losing faith in our democratic institutions and principles but working for improvement and opportunities for democratic growth.

“It is vital that democrats in the established democracies do not lose faith. Democrats have the better set of ideas. Democracy may be receding somewhat in practice, but it is still globally ascendant in peoples’ values and aspirations. This creates significant new opportunities for democratic growth. If the current modest recession of democracy spirals into a depression, it will be because those of us in the established democracies were our own worst enemies.” (Diamond, 2015, p. 154)

The issues facing our democracies have increasingly interested me while studying at the university. Thus, I got interested when I first discovered the topic of Democratic Innovations (DI) while attending a guest lecture in a democratic theory class in the first year of my master’s degree. In the lecture, visiting lecturer Arild Ohren presented democratic innovations as a solution to many of the challenges facing contemporary democracy. These innovations are: “processes or institutions that are new to a policy issue, policy role, or level of governance, and developed to reimagine and deepen the role of citizens in governance processes by increasing opportunities for participation, deliberation and influence” (Elstub & Escobar, 2019, p. 11). Wanting to learn more about these democratic innovations, I investigated the literature. Here, I found reasons to be optimistic about a democratic future. For example, in John Gastil’s and Katherine R. Knoblock’s *Hope for Democracy*, democratic innovations prove they can restore ordinary citizens’ faith in democracy (Gastil & Knobloch, 2020, p. 143).

Further, a study by Robert E. Goodin and John Dryzek mapped multiple macro-political uptakes from deliberative mini-publics (MP)¹ (among the most popular democratic innovation types). This study identified various MPs showing diverse ways of positive impact on democracy. Examples of their findings include MP s: making policy, indirectly impacting policy through providing impactful recommendations, informing public debates, shaping policy by market testing, legitimizing policy, building citizen’s confidence in democratic institutions, providing popular oversight that forces public accountability, and resisting co-option (Goodin & Dryzek, 2006). However, I wondered: if we are sure that these innovative organizations and institutions can help redeem the faith in democracy, why are these innovative institutions not more common? As I continued reading about various MPs and distinct types of democratic innovations, I noticed that most field development is based on theoretical reasoning. De facto is that although there has been a growing interest in and expanded use of DIs, there is little empirical evidence to support the DIs’ impact on policymaking. According to scholars like Beetham, Smith, and Shapiro, this may result from an inconvenient gap between normative democratic theory and empirical studies of policy (Beetham, 1992; Shapiro, 2003; Smith, 2009). The findings of Thamy Pogrebinchi and Matt Ryan support these views. They state that:

“While in the normative world of democratic theory a well-designed procedure is sufficient to provide legitimacy to decisions, in the empirical world of real existing – and representative – democracies, an ideal institutional design would not bring much democratic quality if it were not to have an effect on legislation or legislative agendas” (Pogrebinschi & Ryan, 2018, p. 149).

Thus, it is necessary to improve the research regarding the empirical instances of DIs and how these democratic innovations may impact our policymakers. This is the only way we can gain actual knowledge on how these DIs affect democratic societies around us and if they genuinely improve democratic practice.

¹ A type of democratic institution and a product of democratic innovation that seek to involve citizens in decision-making processes and promote more inclusive and participatory forms of governance (Setälä & Smith, 2018, p. 300). They typically gather small and diverse groups of citizens who come together to deliberate on a specific issue or policy proposal, intending to arrive at a shared understanding and recommendation (Farell et al., 2019, p. 5; Setälä & Smith, 2018, p. 301).

1.1 Research Objective and Design:

Knowing what works and what does not, and the possible reasons for this, is essential to improve our democratic structures. Thus, it is important to compare and evaluate our practices to improve future democratic institutional designs. We may discover key factors or falsify theories and assumptions by structured comparison. In the case of democratic innovations, many initiatives may seem like successful democratic progress on paper. However, in the real world of politics, they necessarily are not, and sometimes they are successful, but not in the ways theorists expected them to be. With this as a starting point, this thesis will investigate examples of DI by examining eight MP cases (citizen juries). By performing a comparative case study of different instances of deliberative MPs, I map and identify design features that potentially impact the MP's impact on policy. Applying John Stuart Mill's Indirect Method of Difference (IMD) ensures that both positive and negative instances of MP s are mapped. Hence, if differences in design features and their application impacts the outcome (O) of the MP, it should be possible to identify these and thus learn from these practices so that future MP designs could improve and develop the best possible design. The research question is: *How can we design democratic innovations, such as deliberative citizen juries, to impact policymaking successfully?* Identifying how to design successful and impactful democratic innovations implies avoiding designs that lead to failure. Consequently, identifying and addressing features leading to weak system designs and failures will be equally important as addressing the features affecting the impact of DIs positively. Thus, this thesis will contribute to the DI field by mapping empirical evidence of and comparing MPs to understand how organizing features in deliberative MPs may impact policymaking.

1.2 Chapter Outline:

The following paragraphs present the structural build of this thesis. After the introduction, the thesis continues with a chapter regarding relevant theory. However, before this, I will end the introduction chapter with an overview of the research field, as the previous studies and their limitations have been the driver for this master's thesis.

The theory chapter presents the fundamental democratic ideas that have helped shape and develop today's DIs. I am first operationalizing the normative concept of the *ideal* democracy. In the following section, I present Elstub's and Escobar's operationalization of democratic innovation, regarded as the contemporary established

understanding of a DI. I also outline how I interpret what a successful DI means. Further, I present the two most significant theoretical approaches that have led the way for democratic innovation: the deliberative and the participatory approaches to democracy. These theories have different views on ensuring democratic legitimacy, and hence, they motivate several types of democratic innovation. Thus, by recognizing the theoretical DNA of distinct types of DI and comparing the DI's empirical impact on policymakers, we can identify which theoretical arguments should be emphasized in future DI design. I, therefore, see the theoretical perspectives of deliberative and participatory democracy as a valuable lens for the interpretation of this thesis's analysis. The chapter ends by presenting what I identify to be the five most significant design features that may affect the DI's impact on policymaking. These features will later be empirically tested by comparing eight cases of citizen juries, thus constituting the explanatory conditions (EC) of this analysis. For each of the five design features' theoretical effects, I propose a hypothesis that will be tested in the coming analysis.

In the method chapter, I present my reasoning for studying the specific type of DI known as citizen juries. I outline the reasons for my chosen design of this study and operationalize how the five features with a theoretical effect on the success of citizen juries are measured. For the coming analysis, this requires a binary coding of some explanatory conditions. Considerations regarding the case selection are outlined, and its effect on validity, reliability and eventual sources of selection bias is addressed.

The fourth chapter describes the variation of cases based on the outcome variable “**success.**” By mapping public authorities' implementation rate of MP recommendations, I sort eight cases into two camps: one includes successful MPs, while the other includes failures. I will systematically present the outcome of all the cases analyzed and their subsequent coding. The chapter ends with presenting all studied cases in a Table, sorted by the outcome variable “**success,**” providing an overview of the complete variation. Based on the coming operationalization of the concept of success, The Kingston citizens' assembly on air quality is evaluated as the most successful of the cases examined. The Local Environmental Plan Review Panel, the Capital Region Climate Change Forum, and the Citizen's Jury on Land Management and the Natural Environment all share the last rank, being regarded as failures, as none of their resulting recommendations is being implemented.

The fifth chapter presents the variation of the explanatory conditions. Here, I systematically identify the cases regarding the variation of the previously identified five significant design features (independent variables). Like the procedure in the outcome chapter, the variation of all individual variables will be presented and discussed for all eight cases. An overview of the total variation of each explanatory condition is presented at the end of each subsection. In the closing section of the chapter, I outline a Table including the total variation of all explanatory conditions to get a holistic overview of the cases studied and the observed variation of the differentiating design features.

In the analysis chapter, I take a step back to study all eight cases with an overview. An IMD matrix including the variation of the outcomes and the five explanatory conditions enables us to test the stated hypotheses and identify features contributing to the successful impact of the citizen jury's (CJ) recommendations on policy. Based on the findings, I present six recommendations that can guide MP designers in the future. The concluding sections of the chapter discuss the findings from both the deliberative and participatory perspective, before addressing limitations of the analysis.

In the conclusive chapter, I summarize the proceedings of this study before presenting my conclusion regarding the essential findings. The possible weaknesses of the study are addressed before I propose suggestions for future analysis.

1.3 Previous Studies and Their Limitations:

The literature on democratic innovations is comprehensive and can be challenging to navigate. For this reason, starting with an overview of that literature can be helpful before proceeding with my inquiry. Many significant contributions have been made, and it is sadly impossible for me to include them all here; however, I propose a selection of critical scientific contributions and aim to summarize their findings and limitations. The following section will provide an overview of the field as of spring 2023.

Looking at the long lines of democratic innovation literature, Graham Smith dates the beginning of democratic innovation as a field of study back to 1970 and the publication of Carol Pateman's *Participation and Democratic Theory* (Smith, 2019, p. 572). Here, Pateman argued that citizens should participate more and have a more significant say in governmental

decision-making as it increases the citizen's political efficacy (Pateman, 1970, p. 50). Another significant early contribution mentioned by Smith is Jane Mansbridge's *Beyond Adversary Democracy*: In Smith's eyes, this study "raised the bar for the integration of theoretical and empirical research" (Smith, 2019, p. 572). In her study, Mansbridge calls for polities to recognize the virtues of making decisions in adversary and consensus modes and use each where appropriately (Mansbridge, 1980, p. 302). She attributes numerous democratic failures of the 1960s to what she argues has been a too-rigid commitment to form a consensus as a decision-making principle (Mansbridge, 1980). At the beginning of the 2000s, Archon Fung contributed significantly to the field when he shifted the debate toward institutional design. In the significant, *Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance*, Fung and Erik Olin Wright introduced the concept of Empowered Participatory Governance (EPG). Their framework for an empirical study approach of EPGs opened new possibilities regarding structural analysis of democratic innovations' institutional design (Fung & Wright, 2003, pp. 5–6; Smith, 2019, p. 574). Graham Smith took the structural analysis to the next level in his *Democratic Innovations: Designing Institutions for Citizen Participation*. This book was the first to systematically categorize different participatory designs, discussing their impact on democratic theory and practice (Smith, 2009, pp. 3–4, 2019, p. 572). Stephen Elstub and Oliver Escobar built further on Smith's work to present a new definition of democratic innovations and build a typology² to prevent further concept overstretching (Elstub & Escobar, 2019).

Building on these great works, we have seen more studies on democratic innovations. However, as Spada and Ryan point out in their literature study, most studies within the field focus on best practices. "Only 18% of empirical articles explore the varying quality of implementation of democratic innovations, and just seven studies (4%) investigate deliberative initiatives that, according to the author(s) themselves, are failures" (Spada & Ryan, 2017, p. 772). This skewed distribution of studies within the DI field could potentially affect and mislead us by over-emphasizing the significance and strength of positive impact on democratic processes through innovations such as recommendatory deliberative MPs. Further, studies focusing on best practices fail to evolve our understanding of the shortcomings of democratic innovations. One does get improved backing for conceptual refinement. However,

² This typology will be presented in the theory chapter of this thesis as it enables us to understand a CJ's suitedness to promote a particular type of democratic good (Elstub & Escobar, 2019).

this is not what the democratic innovation field needs now. As Matt Ryan argues, we should instead aim for conceptual refinement to:

“(…) become a by-product of comparison rather than its main focus. This requires not just thinking about what relevant attributes of democratic innovations are or how they might be measured, but actually measuring their presence and sampling cases effectively to take advantage of expected variance” (Ryan, 2019, p. 560).

Not only have most studies been focusing on best practices, but most studies and discussions within the field driving DI have also been focused on micro-design aspects of MPs to secure a prominent level of internal legitimacy. This is related to the legitimacy of the “input and throughput” by considering who participates, how they should participate and contribute to the MP, and how the MP should develop recommendations (Harris, 2019, p. 52). Recently there have been signs of the discussion shifting, taking a new direction. Many scholars now focus on the output legitimacy of MPs, meaning DIs relate to the population they represent, decision-makers, and media. The output legitimacy is affected by “macro design choices” like who initiates the MP; who sets the agenda and organizes the process; levels of empowerment; responsiveness of the ‘empowered’ space; levels of dissemination to the broader citizenry; and monitoring and reiteration (Harris, 2019, pp. 52–53). Christoph Niessen studied how politicians and stakeholders envision the place of deliberative MPs in political decision-making. He found that most politicians and stakeholders welcome the deliberative processes if they remain consultative. He also found that the decision-makers and stakeholders’ views depended on their interest in the outcome on a micro-level and their general ideas about political decision-making on the macro level (Niessen, 2019, p. 481). Robert E. Goodin and John Dryzek (2006) have mapped successful examples of democratic innovation and have, based on their findings, sketched some possibilities for future application (Goodin & Dryzek, 2006, p. 219). However, they do not test systemic explanations for why sometimes the impact is achieved and sometimes not (Goodin & Dryzek, 2006, p. 239). One of the reasons why they chose to focus on MP successes was that “Exposing problems and failure is all too easy” (Goodin & Dryzek, 2006, p. 219). Paradoxically, by avoiding examples of failed MPs, Goodin and Dryzek miss the opportunity to learn about the causal reasons for MP success. Pogrebinschi’s and Ryan’s findings suggest that the effectiveness of deliberative MPs depends on multiple factors like high or low volumes of participation; high or low dispersion of deliberative fora; institutionalization; the policy area at stake and solid or weak civil

society influence affect the output and outcomes of MPs (Pogrebinschi & Ryan, 2018, p. 136). By performing a QCA analysis, the pair concluded among many findings that:

- ❖ Mass participation can yield laws at the macro-democracy level;
- ❖ a small number of instances within a deliberative process is a necessary institutional design feature for effectiveness; and
- ❖ the policy area that democratic innovations concern themselves with contributes to explaining their effectiveness (Pogrebinschi & Ryan, 2018, p. 136).

Pogrebinschi and Ryan call for complementing research studying factors impacting legislative effects from MPs (Pogrebinschi & Ryan, 2018, p. 150). Thus, supporting Graham Smith's argument that the democratic innovation field needs to perform studies on both successful and failed practices:

“If we have relatively little knowledge of the fate of the proposals and the broader social and economic outcomes that derive from participatory governance, we also are still very much in the speculative stage in understanding how to best couple participatory institutions with centers of power across the democratic system so that citizen's voices are heard and have a meaningful impact on the political process” (Smith, 2019, p. 577).

As this literature review has shown, there has been a great deal of work on democratic innovations, but most of this work has been theoretically oriented. When empirical studies have been conducted, they have tended to cherry-pick from positive cases, so we need to learn more about what does not work. As a result, we lack solid empirical grounds for assessing the effectiveness of various democratic innovations. It is this gap in the literature that my research aims to fill, and I begin that research project in the next chapter by outlining the theoretical foundation for my study.

2 Theory:

To have a theory is a necessary condition to interpret and understand the phenomena we observe. Hence, to answer the research question: *How can we design democratic innovations, such as deliberative citizen juries, to impact policymaking successfully?* We must recognize what a deliberative citizen's jury is, what we interpret as the success of such a democratic innovation and identify the differentiating features of design that may affect eventual success or failure. This chapter will provide this necessary theoretical foundation to analyze DIs (citizen juries) comparatively. The chapter could be split into two sections, serving two different goals.

The first section presents central democratic ideals and their importance for developing democratic innovations (including MPs). It then continues by describing the concept of democratic innovation and outlining Elstub's and Escobar's typology of democratic innovation. This typology is used to assess the success of DIs. By providing an overview of diverse types of DIs and their design features, MPs are identified as suitable for study and variations of subtypes' design features are presented. Further, the two theoretical democratic approaches, participatory and deliberative democracy, are outlined. Both theories have significantly influenced the development of DIs. They are, therefore, considered elementary for the coming analysis, providing a normative perspective of citizen's juries function and design to this empirical study.

The second section of the theory chapter presents the theoretical and logical reasoning for five design features that are identified to have potentially affected MPs' successful impact on policymaking. To later test these theoretical assumptions, five hypotheses are developed for testing. Potential explanatory conditions that will not be tested are also addressed in this section.

2.1 Democratic Ideals

The deliberative and participatory democratic theories, which have contributed the most to the development of DI, are based on strengthening democratic ideals to increase democratic legitimacy, hence improving the democratic practice by making the system more democratic.

The ideals they emphasize to increase this legitimacy are some of the foundational ideals that constitute the democratic system. These ideals stem from the democratic origins in ancient Greece. According to *Encyclopedia Britannica*, the *ideal* democracy is minimum able to fulfill the following ideals ³(Dahl, 2023):

- ❖ Effective participation;
- ❖ equality in voting;
- ❖ informed electorate;
- ❖ citizens' control of the agenda;
- ❖ inclusion; and
- ❖ fundamental rights.

If we can outline the features of an ideal democracy, why have we yet to develop this *ideal* democracy? The reason is simple. The fulfilment of some of the listed ideals could easily be seen as a limitation of others in the real world. The ideal of inclusion, for example, logically limits the ideal of effective participation and an informed electorate. Therefore, the starting point of democratic innovation is challenging. It seeks to increase institutional legitimacy and deepen the involvement of citizens, but by improving certain democratic features like effective participation or an informed electorate, one risks reducing other essential features. Hence, the normative idea of an *ideal* democracy is impossible to achieve. Neither is it likely that one theory or DI can improve all features simultaneously (Dahl, 2023; Elstub, 2014, p. 391). This does not mean that a vision for DI is naïve or hopeless. It emphasizes the importance of an effective system and design for DIs to work properly. We will also depend on multiple types of innovative systems and designs to improve our democracy, not only in theory but in practice, through practical democratic innovations. An effective democratic innovation must achieve its purpose with the minimum cost of other democratic ideals. If the design and practice of a DI affect its eventual outcome, then we should strive to adopt the designs and practices that are most effective, thus increasing the probability of successfully impacting democracy.

The following section will present Elstub's and Escobar's inclusive typology of democratic innovation. By recognizing a DI's foundational elements, I aim to identify some core design

³ For in-depth explanation of the listed ideals of democracy see (Dahl, 2023).

features that might affect the operation of DIs and, potentially, whether the outcome of these processes is successful or not.

2.2 Recognizing Democratic Innovation and its Success:

The concept of democratic innovation has developed and formalized over time. Graham Smith presented a much-used understanding of the term in his already-mentioned *Democratic Innovations* (2009). However, this thesis will use another operationalization of the term. Elstub's and Escobar's proposed definition and typology are selected as it is more inclusive than Smith's⁴ (Elstub & Escobar, 2019). I see it as preferable due to the development of the field in later years. With the term democratic innovation being briefly outlined in the introduction chapter, I intend to quickly sum up Escobar's and Elstub's reasoning for their definition to put it into a context before presenting my interpretation of a democratic innovation's success.

Repeating the definition, Elstub and Escobar understand the concept of democratic innovations as: “(...) *processes or institutions that are new to a policy issue, policy role, or level of governance and developed to reimagine and deepen the role of citizens in governance processes by increasing opportunities for participation, deliberation and influence*” (Elstub & Escobar, 2019, p. 11). They include *processes or institutions* as they see Smith's (2009) proposed definition as too restrictive. They argue that institutions have a particular time of stability and continuity that many democratic innovations lack in many cases. The old definition also excluded innovative processes within established institutions (Elstub & Escobar, 2019; Smith, 2009).

The authors include *That are new to a policy issue, policy role, or level of governance*, as a democratic innovation only could be considered *innovative* concerning its context. Elstub and Escobar have an expansive interpretation of what this context is. They argue for the inclusion of policy area, level of governance, stage in the policy process, and function in the policy process as proper contexts, with this taking a more inclusive stance than that of Geissel (Geissel & Newton, 2012, p. 164). Elstub's and Escobar's premise is that a practice should be considered innovative if it is new to any of the mentioned contexts, even if it has been

⁴ I recommend reading (Elstub & Escobar, 2019) for a complete argument and elaboration of reasoning for creating this definition and typology, as well as Smith (2019) for his responding reflections on the matter.

implemented in the same state on a previous occasion. They are with this referring to the argument of Eva Sørensen (Sørensen, 2017).

Developed to reimagine and deepen the role of citizens in governance processes is the ineliminable core of the concept of democratic innovations (Elstub & Escobar, 2019, p. 15). According to Elstub and Escobar, this should be seen as the “ability to promote this reimagining that renders a process a democratic innovation, it is what they all have in common (Elstub & Escobar, 2019, p. 15)”. The two theorists further argue that democratic innovations primarily seek to enhance democracy by reimagining the role that citizens can play in governance processes (Elstub & Escobar, 2019, p. 15). By doing so, “democratic innovations open space for reconstruction and influence of the deliberative citizen in the context of the ‘New Public Governance’ (Elstub & Escobar, 2019, pp. 15–16; Osborne, 2010)”. As a result, democratic innovations do not suppress organized interest’s influence, advocacy groups’ interest, or associational life’s interest. Instead, DI enables the ‘universal subject of participation’ – prioritizing deliberation over protest or representation – to enact politics (Elstub & Escobar, 2019, p. 16).

Thus, based on the definition, the success of a DI should be evaluated based on its ability to effectively “deepen the role of citizens in governance processes” (Elstub & Escobar, 2019, p. 11). If it can deepen the average citizen’s role in governance processes, the DI should be regarded as a success. The definition implies three ways DIs may achieve this goal: **by increasing opportunities for participation, deliberation, and influence**. Elstub and Escobar elaborate that this element of democratic innovations is shaped by the underlying theoretical assumptions, usually impacted by participatory and deliberative democracy theories. These two theories are related and often get intertwined⁵. However, as Elstub and Escobar specify: “The point is that different types of democratic innovations are likely to be required to promote participatory democracy to a deliberative version, and vice versa” (Elstub & Escobar, 2019, p. 17). Hence, the “democratic innovations represent a compromise between the aspirations of participatory democracy from the 1960s and a revived pragmatism regarding current challenges in public governance and the need for new models of collective action” (Elstub & Escobar, 2019, p. 18).

⁵ Their differences will be outlined later in this chapter.

I find interest in the element of influence. Not because the others are not interesting but because influence is the most difficult to achieve. As already addressed in the research review, we know the effects of democratic innovations regarding features of participation and deliberation (Curato et al., 2017, pp. 30–33). But less knowledge of its influence on policymaking and potential causes for eventual success or failure. This was the starting point of this project, and thus, the success of democratic innovations (in this thesis exemplified by citizen juries' cases) will be evaluated based on their ability to increase people's influence in policymaking⁶.

Today, there are many diverse types of democratic innovation. Examples are participatory budgeting, digital participation, MPs, collaborative governance, and referenda and citizen initiatives (Arnesen et al., 2022, p. 9; Elstub & Escobar, 2019, p. 25; Setälä & Smith, 2018, p. 301). Some of these types of DI have subtypes. All DIs have specific design features, which differentiate across the diverse types of DI and even within the different practices of the same subtype. MPs are an example of a subtype of democratic innovations. Table 2-1 below outlines the different subtypes of MPs and how they vary in certain aspects. Notice how different they are, for example, regarding the feature of size. Some DIs might only gather around 12 people, while others gather up to a thousand. Is this variation of design features related to the MP variation in impactful outcomes on policymaking? Can the theories that inspired these DIs and empirical observations of various applications of design hint about which democratic ideals might be prioritized, thus causing some DIs to be more effective in affecting actual policymaking?

The following section will present the ideas of participatory and deliberative democratic theory, providing an understanding of how these theories have formed the development of DIs, like MPs, and how they see how we can improve our democracies. These theories are the main drivers for the evolution of DIs and are inevitable for understanding the concepts and ideas that form MP designs.

⁶ I will present the specific details on how success is measured in this study in the methods chapter.

Table 2-1 Types of Deliberative MPs:

Types of Deliberative Mini-Publics

	Citizens’ juries	Planning Cells	Consensus conferences	Deliberative polls	Citizens’ assemblies	G1000
No. of participants	12-50	100-500	10-25	100-500	100-160	1000
Time	2-5 days	4-5 days	7-8 days	2-3 days	20-30 days	1 day
Selection method	Random selection	Random selection	Random + self- selection	Random selection	Random + self- selection	Random selection
Activities	Information + deliberation	Information + deliberation	Information + deliberation	Information + deliberation	Information +consultation +deliberation	Information + deliberation
Result/intended output	Collective position report	Survey opinions + Collective position report	Collective position report	Survey opinions	Detailed recommendation	Series of votes on proposals
Destination of proposal	Sponsor and mass media	Sponsor and mass media	Parliament and mass media	Sponsor and mass media	Parliament, government and public referendum	Parliament, government and public referendum

Table 2-1. Types and characteristics of MPs. Adaptation of (Harris, 2019, p. 46; Setälä & Smith, 2018, p. 301).

2.3 Participatory and Deliberative Democracy:

The participatory and deliberative democratic theoretical traditions are fundamental to the development of democratic innovation. The two theories aim to reform and improve democracy by securing more substantial legitimacy for democratic institutions. They share the same overarching goal but have different views on reaching it. These differences are noted by Carson and Elstub in their research note, *Comparing participatory and deliberative democracy* (Carson & Elstub, 2019).

Participatory democracy is an older theoretic tradition than its deliberative sibling. In Western societies, it is often associated with theorist Carol Pateman and the activist movements in the 1960s (Carson & Elstub, 2019; Pateman, 1970). Participatory theorists stress the importance of participation in democracy and argue for a “politically active citizenry,” increasing the opportunity for people to impact governmental decision-making (O’Flynn, 2019, p. 39). The more citizens participate in political life, the more democratically legitimate decision-making becomes. They hope to achieve this goal by reforming democratic institutions to make participation meaningful (OECD, 2020b, p. 12). Participatory democracy is about “democratizing democracy” (Pateman, 2012, p. 10). Thus, participatory democracy argues for a democratic transformation across all levels of our society. Up, down, and across (O’Flynn, 2019, p. 40). In doing so, people would be given the power to control the social arenas in which their lives occur. However, as O’Flynn points out, no single institution is capable, on its own, of securing the pervasive social and political transformation necessary (O’Flynn, 2019, p. 40). Hence, the objective of participatory democracy requires a broad range of democratic innovations to make democratic practices more democratic. The DIs present this arena where participatory democracy can more effectively democratize democracy.

The deliberative approach has grown from academic literature in the 1980s. Political thinkers like John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas were early influencers. For Rawls, applying reason was substantial in constructing a framework for a fair and just society for all its inhabitants:

“Thus we are to imagine that those who engage in social cooperation choose together, in one joint act, the principles which are to assign basic rights and duties and to determine the division of social benefits. Men are to decide in advance how they are to regulate their claims against one another and what is to be the foundation charter of their society. Just as each person must decide by rational reflection what constitutes his good, that is, the system of ends which it is rational for him to pursue, so a group of persons must decide once and for all what is to count among them as just and unjust” (Rawls, 1971, pp. 10–11)

This constitutes the fundament for an equal rights society, securing the possibility for fair citizen participation in the future (Eagan, 2023). On the other hand, Habermas emphasized that just procedures and clear communication can produce legitimate and consensual decisions by citizens (Eagan, 2023). The fairness of procedures that govern the deliberative processes legitimizes the outcomes (Habermas, 1984, pp. 25–26).

Thus, deliberative democracy strives for more substantial legitimacy in democratic processes, but it differs from participatory democracy by emphasizing the importance of fair and reasonable discussion and deliberation to reach a democratic decision (Carson & Elstub, 2019, p. 2). Deliberative democratic theory assumes that ordinary people that have access to balanced information and the opportunity to reason about that information with people from different occupations can reach judgements that can be both well thought out and considerate of the views of others (O’Flynn, 2019, p. 38). The theory argues that a decision should be seen as legitimate “not when people have the power to throw the rascals who make the decisions out, but when the decisions are determined solely by ‘the force of the better argument’” (Habermas, 1984, p. 25; O’Flynn, 2019, p. 38). To reach a good and democratic process, deliberative democrats require participants to be (Carson & Elstub, 2019, p. 2):

- ❖ Well-informed about the topic;
- ❖ consider different perspectives; and
- ❖ arrive at a public judgement about “what we can strongly agree on.”

DIs are equally valuable to the deliberative democratic theorists and the participatory theorists. They also present an arena from which deliberative democratic ideas can effectively be implemented. The deliberative MPs are an example of such a democratic innovation. They facilitate better deliberation and discussion in decision-making processes, giving the decisions higher legitimacy.

In summary, the participatory approach to democracy emphasizes the importance of broad participation in society and focuses less on the depth of this participation. While deliberative democrats, on the other hand, are more focused on the quality of the participation by those who participate. One could say that the deliberative democratic theorists are process-driven, and the participatory democrats are issue-driven (Carson & Elstub, 2019, p. 4).

Key differences between the two approaches are highlighted in Table 2-2 on the following page (OECD, 2020b, p. 20) We notice that DIs like the CJ (presented in Table 2-1) fall under

the category of deliberative democracy. Citizen juries operate very similarly to the deliberative visioned practice regarding the processes' number of participants, the participants' type of participation, and the participant selection method. The participatory valuation of numerous participants might effectively increase MP legitimacy and hence, prove to be a compelling principle for future MP designers. Graham Smith has advocated this perspective, as he has presented the somewhat controversial claim that deliberative democracy has become too hegemonic in studies of democratic innovation. He argues that most researchers studying participatory processes focus predominantly on the meditative qualities of participatory institutions (Smith, 2019, p. 579). "We need to be more specific about what deliberative forms of citizen engagement contribute to the democratic system and recognize that democratic innovations make contributions beyond these deliberative concerns" (Smith, 2019, p. 579). O'Flynn also supports this argument when he argues:

"My own sense is that most people who write on democratic innovations have something like deliberative democracy in mind, even if this commitment is never made explicit (or, in some cases, explicitly denied). This is a real shame since it hinders discussion about the larger goals and purposes democratic innovations are meant to serve" (O'Flynn, 2019, p. 41).

By also emphasizing the theoretical views and contributions of participatory democracy to DIs like the MP, we may get increased insight into their function and impact.

Table 2-2 Essential Differences Between Deliberative and Participatory Democracy:

Participatory and Deliberative Democracy

	Number of participants	Type of Participation	Participant selection method
Deliberative Democracy	Relatively small (but representative) groups of people, as it is difficult to have deep deliberation among large numbers	Deliberation , which requires that participants are well-informed about a topic and consider different perspectives in order to arrive at a public judgement (not opinion) about "what can we strongly agree on?"	Typically, a civic lottery , which combines random selection with stratification , to assemble a public body that is: representative of the public; able to consider perspectives, and not vulnerable to being stacked by representatives of powerful interest groups.
Participatory Democracy	Large number of people, ideally everyone affected by a particular decision. The aim is to achieve breadth.	More participation , in all aspects of politics, from all citizens who choose to be involved; an embrace and encouragement of a diversity of opportunities for political engagement.	Self selected participation in order to enable as many people as possible to share the experience.

Table 2-2. A presentation of crucial differences between deliberative and participatory democracy. Source (Carson & Elstub, 2019; OECD, 2020b, p. 12).

2.4 Explanatory Conditions and Expected Effect on Results of MPs:

If there are causal relations between the design features of a MP and its eventual impact on policy, this should be possible to identify by comparison, but this must be tested. Having outlined my understanding of a successful DI, presented some foundational democratic ideals, and the leading DI-developing theories' understanding and use of these ideals, I now want to present the theoretical reasoning for five design features that could be expected to affect the MP impact on policymaking-processes. These features will be included in the forthcoming analysis and systematically compared to illuminate the potential systemic causes affecting MP success.

2.4.1 Size:

The first of these potentially impactful design features is the size of the MP. The size feature is essential as it balances the MP's representativeness and the potential for quality deliberation. Both the deliberative and participatory approaches to democracy emphasize the importance of representativity. However, the participatory theorists are especially interested in this feature and the total number of participants as they argue that legitimacy in democratic processes is related to citizens' opportunity to participate and engage with the substance of law and policy (Cohen, 2009, p. 248; Elstub, 2018, p. 189). Paradoxically, increased representativity seems to reduce the chances for quality deliberation. Dryzek and Goodin recognized these two unavoidable requirements. They argue that the MPs: i) must be small enough to allow the exchange of views and motivate deliberation and ii) big enough to maintain a certain level of representativity, which means they should be genuinely democratic⁷ (Goodin & Dryzek, 2006, p. 220). A larger MP arguably has a higher level of legitimacy regarding increased representativity. A smaller MP will theoretically be more suited for quality deliberation, potentially increasing the quality of recommendations for the public authorities. Thus, the size feature is appealing for analysis for two reasons. First, if the larger instances of MPs are found to be more successful, one could deduce the theoretical argument that a prominent level of representativity is essential for a MP's success. Second, if the smaller MPs are more successful than large-sized ones, we could deduce that high

⁷ These requirements do not necessarily coexist in harmony. It might be easy to gain internal trust in small MP s, necessary for quality deliberation. However, to ensure representativity, a certain number of people must be included in the assembly. Hence, providing a natural problem for MP designers.

representativity is less critical. Thus, we could design smaller MPs that, in theory, are more likely to produce high-quality recommendations. Emphasizing representative legitimacy over theoretical capacity for deliberation, I form the hypothesis, **H1**: larger MPs are more likely to be successful than small MPs.

2.4.2 Duration:

The second feature that is believed to impact the success of a MP is the MP s' duration (Setälä & Smith, 2018, p. 302). Educating and facilitating the participants on the given topic of interest, nonetheless, deliberating and producing policy recommendations is time-consuming. However, MP organizers often have time and capital limitations to fund multiple deliberation sessions. It seems reasonable to assume that insufficient time in MP design would lower the probability of achieving quality deliberation. With low-quality deliberation, the resulting recommendations are also, in theory, lower quality. Thus, one could deduce that abbreviated time for deliberation could produce recommendations that are more likely to fail to impact policy. This feature is crucial for deliberative theorists as they argue that the legitimacy of a political decision should be reached through deliberation and the force of the better argument (Habermas, 1984, p. 25). Sufficient time is a natural condition for participants to learn about the situational political arguments, reflecting on these, discuss, and arrive at a political decision. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) recommends a minimum of four days to produce informed citizen recommendations (OECD, 2021a, p. 32). If the analysis shows that the longer-lasting MPs are more successful, we can deduce that enough time for quality education, deliberation, facilitation, and policy formulation is essential for the quality of the resulting citizen recommendations.

Moreover, a potentially increased quality in recommendations increases the probability for recommendations to impact policy successfully. If not found impactful, the duration of future MPs could arguably be limited to reduce the total cost and administrative tasks of a longer-lasting event. Following the recommendations from OECD, I present hypothesis **H2**: MPs lasting four days or longer are more likely to be successful than shorter-lasting MPs.

2.4.3 Design Integrity:

The third feature I suspect affects the policy impact of MPs is the design integrity of the MP. It seems logical that a well-designed MP would perform better than a less well-designed MP. For example, one could expect a solid design process to have an elevated level of quality

facilitation. Thus, helping the participants to improve their deliberation, which we have already argued, can affect the quality of the resulting recommendations. In the case of a weaker design, the facilitation may not be of the same quality, and the resulting deliberation may consequently be of lower quality, further failing to produce solid recommendations and failing to convince policymakers. The quality of design integrity is a complex concept with many different elements. It is subjectively evaluated based on the evidence in the provided reports. A MP with a prominent level of design integrity should meet the following criteria (OECD, 2021a, pp. 18–19):

- ❖ Clear and suitable process;
- ❖ clear and unbiased framing;
- ❖ suitable design;
- ❖ procedural design involvement;
- ❖ transparency and governance; and
- ❖ representativeness and inclusiveness.

What should be considered a suitable design is also up for evaluation. OECD appoints eleven good practice principles that guide MP designers towards a suitable design. These principles are: Purpose, Accountability, Transparency, Representativeness, Inclusiveness, Information, Group deliberation, Time, Integrity, Privacy and Evaluation⁸ (OECD, 2021a, pp. 31–32). If the analysis proves a positive correlation between juries evaluated to have a prominent level of design integrity and the impact of its recommendations on policy, we can deduce that solid design integrity increases the probability of impactful recommendations. Hypothesis, **H3**, states that: MPs with a top level of design integrity are more likely to be successful than MPs with lower design integrity.

2.4.4 Connection with Public Authority

The fourth potentially impactful design feature of MPs I intend to test is the MPs' connection to public authority. Generally, the political impact of MPs has been “contingent on the willingness of decision-makers to take their recommendations into account” (Setälä, 2017, p. 854). I assume it would be harder for politicians not to consider recommendations if they had met with the participants of the MP, either during the process or when delivering the

⁸ For an operationalization of these good practice principles, see Supplement B in appendix.

recommendations to public authority. This suspicion finds support as Pogrebinschi and Ryan find that institutionalized NPPCs can substantially impact political decision-making when strongly institutionalized (Pogrebinschi & Ryan, 2018, pp. 148–149). Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that MPs that have met with public authority should have a higher chance of delivering recommendations that prove impactful on policy. If a correlation exists between MPs that have met with public authority and recommendations' impact on policy, we could deduce that the inclusion of public authority in the MP process increases the possibility of impactful recommendations. Based on this logic, I present hypothesis **H4**: face-to-face meetings with public authority during the process or when delivering recommendations increase the probability for MP recommendations to be successful.

2.4.5 Level of Governance

The last feature I want to control for in the coming analysis is whether the level of governance correlates with accepting and implementing recommendations. The reason I expect this feature to have an impact is related to the concept of representativity. For example, a MP held to handle an issue at the international level would arguably have more difficulties in forming a representative group of participants, thus being less legitimate than if the MP were to handle an issue at the local or regional level. With legitimate representation being more challenging to achieve at the higher level of government the MP operates at, I would expect MPs found at the local level to more often be successful than those held at the regional level. The regional level MPs to more often be successful than those at the national level and so on. Based on this reasoning, I form hypothesis **H5**: MPs held to handle issues at Local level of government are more likely to be successful than instances related to a higher level of government. Table 2-3 on the following page presents the independent variables' expected impact on the dependent variable.

Table 2-3 Causal Conditions' Expected Effect on the Outcome:

Causal conditions' expected effect on outcome

Feature (EC)	Expected impact on outcome	Theoretical reasonement for expectation
Size	Bigger MPs (more representative) are possitively correlated with success	Bigger MPs are more likely to be more representative of the population they aim to represent, thus increasing the legitimacy of the DI
Time	Longer lasting MPs are possitively correlated with success	A certain amount of time is necessarry to produce high quality deliberation. High quality deliberation icreases the legitimacy of recommendations, thus making them more likely to be accepted by public authority
Design Integrity	MPs with high quality design process is possitivley correlated with success.	A high quality design process increases both internal and external legitimacy
Face to face	MPs with meetings with public authority are expected to have positive correlation with success	Harder for politicians to reject the DI's contribution after meeting with participants. Forming a relation to participants and the project increases the possibility for accepting recommendations
Level of government	MPs at a lower level of government are expected to have a positive correaltion with success	MPs held at a high level of government will struggle more to achive a representative group of particiapants. Thus the have less legitimacy

Table 2-3 shows the explanatory condition' expected effect on success of citizen juries.

2.4.6 Potential Impactful Features That are not Tested in This Study:

Certain features could potentially impact MPs' success that will not get tested in this analysis. For example, contextual features like the policy area/issue the MP is to discuss may affect the elected representatives' openness towards a CJ's recommendations (Elstub & Escobar, 2019, p. 22; Hendriks, 2005, pp. 15–16). Hypothetically, imagine a MP held to handle an issue regarding public transport. If the MP recommends reducing the price of public transport by subsidizing the local bus contractor, one could expect politicians to resist if they are restrictive to increasing public taxation. Thus, although CJ's recommendation may be representative of the population and their wishes for cheaper bus transport, their recommendations are being rejected. The outcome might have been different if the CJ were to handle an issue from a policy area the elected representatives are more likely to support.

However, the policy area feature will not be tested as it has been intentionally limited in the case selection process to increase comparability between cases. Hence, a potential analysis of explanatory conditions could lead to biased or false conclusions. There could also be possible to identify more detailed specific features that might impact on the MPs' level of success. For example, it could be possible that MPs arranged at the weekend are more successful than MPs arranged on the working days of the week. However, I have decided to operate with only five explanatory conditions to increase the generalizability. Further, a more detailed focus on MP design is conditioned by more detailed data. As the quality of documentation of cases is of notable variation, this naturally limits the potential for a detailed analysis.

3 Method:

In this chapter, I outline the method, cases, and data used for analyzing citizen juries as an example of democratic innovation, and I elaborate on the reason for my subsequent case selection. I begin the chapter with a justification of my choice of case and the comparative analysis' specific focus on deliberative citizen juries. Further, the chapter elaborates on my chosen method for analysis before presenting considered sources of data, my reasoning for filtration of cases, and operationalization of possible explanatory conditions affecting the outcome of CJs and how these will be measured in the comparative analysis. Lastly, thoughts on validity, reliability and potential selection bias are outlined.

3.1 Specifying Focus of Study:

There are, as implied above, many diverse types of DIs. Comparing them all is a complex and comprehensive challenge, too comprehensive for this master's thesis. Thus, I found it necessary to limit the focus of the study to one specific type. Deliberative MPs have been described as "the most advocated method to institutionalize deliberative democracy (Harris, 2019, p. 48). Hence, this type of DI is particularly appealing for testing. However, within the MP family, there are many different subtypes. They are based on the same principles but are made for use in different scenarios. Thus, contextual variation among the MP subtypes also proved to be a challenge to provide a solid comparison.

To simplify the comparison, I limited this study to focus on one type of MP, the CJ model. Citizen juries are a type of deliberative MP that gather small groups of people to deliberate on political issues. They are usually constituted ad hoc. However, there are examples of institutionalized versions as well. The CJ model was developed by Ned Crosby in the 1970s (Arnesen et al., 2022, p. 19). There are different opinions in the literature regarding their size, but in this thesis, we will operate with juries with 12-50 participants (Arnesen et al., 2022, p. 19). The participants are selected by sortition to achieve a satisfactory level of representativity. As 50 people are often too small to attain statistical representativity, stratification methods like a random population selection are used to make a jury as representative as possible (Arnesen et al., 2022, p. 19). The purpose of the jury is to produce a report that is to work as a recommendation to the elected representatives in government.

Consensus is not necessary to author the report. However, participants must be able to stand behind the given recommendation comfortably. Hence there would at least need to be a certain level of agreement or freedom to argue for one's position if there are disagreements among the participants (Arnesen et al., 2022, p. 19). The report should inspire future readers to reflect and deliberate on the issued topic. Hence, the most significant thing about the recommendatory report is to elaborate on the CJ's proceedings and how they arrived at their final recommendation (Arnesen et al., 2022, p. 19).

I ended up choosing this model specifically for two reasons. The first is the fact that they are widespread across various countries. The OECD registers CJs as the most practiced type of deliberative MPs today (OECD, 2020b, p. 35). Further, the deliberative MP is also the DI that has been used the most by public authorities for public decision-making (OECD, 2020b, p. 71). Thus, focusing on CJs in the comparative analysis ensures the most extensive population for study. Second, the model has been used to handle several topics and issues in multiple sectors, making eventual findings useful for people in various contexts (OECD, 2020b, p. 71). It should be noted that choosing only to compare instances of one type of MP weakens the leverage of this study. As other MPs are designed for a different context, choosing a different MP for examination could result in different findings. The only way to know for sure is to either perform more comparative studies or more comprehensive comparative studies that include a wider variety of cases than I do here.

3.2 A Small-n Comparative Study:

This study will be a small-n comparative study with all the pros and cons that come with it. Unfortunately, no scientific method comes without limitations. The small-n study provides detailed insight into the phenomena, but the small number of observations often limits the quantifiability drawn from the explanatory variable(s). Sometimes, eventual causal connections proven in small-n studies are limited to the same cases studied. Quantitative methods, with the potential of producing results of high generalizability, are by some researchers regarded superior to the qualitative methodology. However:

“if quantification produces precision, it does not necessarily encourage accuracy since inventing quantitative indices that do not relate closely to the concepts or events that we purport to measure can lead to serious measurement error and problems of causal inference. Similarly, there are more and less precise ways to describe events that

cannot be quantified. (...) It is pointless to seek to explain what we have not described with a reasonable degree of precision” (King et al., 2021, pp. 43–44).

Thus, the qualitative comparative approach to study remains essential to scientific research. It emphasizes precision and detailed understanding and information over generalizability. Comparativists that use case-oriented strategies are more interested in understanding and interpreting specific cases due to their intrinsic value. The goal is to “produce limited generalization concerning the causes of theoretically defined categories of empirical phenomena common to a set of cases” (Ragin, 1987, p. 35). Regarding DI research, comparative studies on democratic institutions, devices, and processes have provided “a unique quality of knowledge that helps us learn how to improve governance and democracies” (Ryan, 2019, p. 558).

3.2.1 The Indirect Method of Difference:

The method applied for comparison is John Stuart Mill’s Indirect method of difference (IMD). The method uses patterns of invariance to identify eventual causal explanations of phenomena (Moses & Knutsen, 2019, p. 104). By including both positive and negative instances of a phenomenon, the IMD controls potential variance (Moses & Knutsen, 2019, p. 104). Table 3-1 below presents the logic of the method. By inspection, we notice that condition **C2** correlates with positive and negative outcomes. Thus, the variation of this condition implies a causal connection to the outcome

Table 3-1 The Indirect Method of Difference:

		The Indirect Method of Difference							
Case		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Outcome	O	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
	C1	Yes	No	-	-	No	Yes	No	Yes
Conditions	C2	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
	C3	Yes	No	-	-	No	Yes	-	Yes
	C4	Yes	Yes	No	-	No	No	-	Yes

Table 3-1. The indirect method of difference. Inspired by (Moses & Knutsen, 2019, p. 105).

Overall, the IMD is regarded to be a reliable method for comparison, using cross-tabulation of causes and effects to approximate experimental design with non-experimental data (Moses & Knutsen, 2019, p. 104). However, the method has its liabilities. The IMD can include cases involving multiple causations (Ragin, 1987, p. 41). Another aspect that opens for criticism is that the paired comparison is seriously incapacitated by conjunctural causation (Ragin, 1987, p. 41).

Ragin addresses these potential faults. He states that in some situations:

The paired comparison of a positive instance (where land hunger and rapid commercialization combined to produce a revolt) with a negative instance (where rapid commercialization without land hunger failed to produce a revolt) leads to the rejection of rapid commercialization as a cause of revolts, when in fact it is the coincidence of land hunger and rapid commercialization that causes revolts (Ragin, 1987, p. 41).

This is a significant weakness, and it can be hard to observe as the researcher would easily believe that land hunger alone is sufficient for citizens to revolt. To avoid this issue presupposes a theory that would allow the investigator to identify the set of observations that includes the *possible* instances of the studied phenomena. Ragin states that ideally, “the definition of this set should be influenced by previous knowledge of instances of hypothesized causes or instances of the effect” (Ragin, 1987, p. 41). Hence, the theoretical outline in the previous chapter is not only necessary to provide insightful conceptions about the empirical world but a condition for the validity and reliability of our analysis.

3.3 Sources of Data:

Where should I look for pertinent data? This was the first issue presented at the beginning of the data-collection process. Multiple potential sources were considered; among these direct contact with MP organizers, several types of databases and open sources like *Participedia* (OECD, 2021b; Participedia, 2023; Paulis et al., 2022; van der Does & Jacquet, 2020). An established database was considered the best available data source for administrative reasons. Three distinct types of databases were considered. The OECD database was selected ahead of the *MINICON* and *Politicize* databases based on internal information. *Participedia* has been particularly useful as a crosschecking tool for gathering information. However, it is not seen as reliable as the OECD database⁹.

The OECD database includes 170 records of citizen juries collected from seventeen countries¹⁰ (OECD, 2021b). Of these 170 instances, 165 were arranged ad hoc, while only five citizen juries are reported to be institutionalized (OECD, 2021b). They are most often

⁹ It should also be noted that I have been advised to use data from all mentioned databases with a critical view. The different operators of these databases use different techniques for gathering data. To ensure reliability, the data presented in this study has been crosschecked through various sources before implementation.

¹⁰ Including the EU

arranged at the local level of government (94 instances). The regional level is the second most common to arrange citizen juries (53), with the national (21) and international (2) levels having fewer reported events (OECD, 2021b). Of the citizen juries included in the OECD database, most cover the topics of environment (34), health (29), infrastructure (19), urban planning (16), and public services (14) (OECD, 2021b).

3.4 Filtration, Case Selection, and Issues:

With an established pool from which cases could be selected, we are ready to select cases for comparison. This process introduced multiple challenges. Democratic innovations are complex structures, and citizen's juries are no exception, with many variations regarding numerous factors. Good research is naturally dependent on the quality of data-material. The analysis results are not generalizable if the data has too much internal variation or limitations regarding its validity or reliability. Kaarbo and Beasley identify critical tasks in case selection that involves control to make analysis possible (Kaarbo & Beasley, 1999, p. 380). The first is to ensure that the cases involved in the analysis are comparable. The second is to include cases with variations in outcome values (Kaarbo & Beasley, 1999, p. 381; King et al., 2021). Hence, a researcher studying DI processes and institutions must consider his/her data selection wisely. The following paragraphs will elaborate on the data sources used for data collection, challenges faced through the case-selection process, considerations, and the reasoning behind the final data selection¹¹. I begin addressing the issue of ensuring comparability.

3.4.1 Ensuring Comparability:

We must ensure two sets of comparable cases to perform the IMD analysis. Without comparability, we cannot know if the case variation is caused by the explanatory conditions studied or other differences between the cases (Kaarbo & Beasley, 1999, p. 380). Following the advice of King, Keohane, and Verba, a small-n comparative study should aim to compare data on the same variable/condition to reach solid inferences:

“Controlled comparison of a small “n” should follow a procedure of systemic data compilation. Such structured-focused comparison requires collecting data on the same variable across units. Thus, it is not a different method from the one that we emphasize here so much as it is a way of systemizing the information in descriptive

¹¹ These case-selection challenges have forced me to adjust my intended focus of study. I believe I have learned a lot about challenges and dilemmas in scientific work through this process.

case studies in such a way that it could conceivably be used for descriptive or causal inference” (King et al., 2021, p. 45).

Three issues were critical to consider ensuring a satisfactory level of comparability:

- ❖ Consider the cultural variation;
- ❖ reducing the contextual variation; and
- ❖ consider the time of the study.

3.4.1.1 The Problem of Political Culture Variation

The issue of political-cultural variation has the potential to impact the cases studied significantly. Varying understanding of democratic principles and differentiating national political climate and history inevitably affect MP development and their intended function. They further impact MP designs, participants, and the rest of the population’s conception of democratic innovation. Not only are some types of MPs almost limited to specific political cultures (consensus conferences and Denmark is one example) (OECD, 2020b, p. 43). The varying understanding of democratic principles across nations means that similar MP designs are interpreted differently depending on which political environment they are used in (Andreasen, 1988, p. 308; Nielsen et al., 2007, pp. 33–34). Hence, comparing cases from two notably different democratic cultures would be no different from comparing apples and oranges. To reduce this potential source of internal data variation, similar political cultures should be compared. The UK and Australia seemed reasonable for this selection as these countries share enough similar traits to validate the comparability in the coming analysis. The countries are reasonably similar regarding political culture, concerning governmental election and electoral rules. Thus the cultural variance factor is reduced to negligible (The Museum of Australian Democracy, 2023). Thus, the total pool of cases from the OECD database was limited to instances of citizen juries from Australia and the UK.

3.4.1.2 Reducing Other Contextual Variations:

The second issue potentially affecting the comparability of cases was the contextual variation. Elstub and Escobar rightfully note that contextual features impact the outcome of democratic innovations (Elstub & Escobar, 2019, pp. 22–24). The contextual features introduce complexity to a level that is hard to control. If not limited, these contextual features would reduce the analysis’s comparability, reliability and validity and further reduce the generalizability of the results. By eliminating the contextual variation, more eventual

variation could be claimed to the other explanatory factors. A downside is that it further limits the potential of cases that could be included. The first contextual feature noticed by Elstub and Escobar is the policy area. Out of all the citizen juries recorded in the OECD database, processes handling issues related to the policy area of the environment were the most frequent. Thus, citizen juries handling environmental-related issues are a good starting point for case selection to maintain the highest possible population of comparable cases. Elstub's and Escobar's second contextual feature is the level of governance. As the level of government has been identified as a potential impactful feature regarding the CJ design, this contextual feature should not be reduced by intention. Neither is their third contextual feature, the policy stage, as all cases available were similar at this point in the filtration process.

3.4.1.3 Timeframe, How MPs Have Changed Over Time:

The last factor that had to be considered to ensure satisfactory comparability was the case study's timeframe. The previously presented literature review illuminates how democratic researchers' views on democratic innovations have changed since the introduction of DI-related theory in the 1970s. Hence, it would be reasonable to assume that DI participants' and the population's conception of DIs might have evolved as well. The OECD database shows that arranged citizen juries increased rapidly after 2014 (OECD, 2021b). Thus, applying a divide between what could be labelled as "early DIs" and "contemporary DIs" seemed preferable. Ideally, one should compare cases from somewhat of the same period. However, the limited sample pool did not realize this ideal divide. Instead, the time condition is something that deserves notice in the analysis.

3.4.2 Filtration on the Outcome of Cases:

The second step in the case-selection process is to collect a fair number of cases differing on the outcome variable. To perform this filtration and selection conditions, knowing what a successful or failed impact on policy means. Thus, I start this section by operationalizing the interpretative concept of a *successful* CJ, this thesis' outcome variable.

In the literature, when researchers seek to evaluate citizen's juries, they usually want to focus on either the internal practices of the CJ to measure the effects of the internal deliberation or to evaluate the external effects of the CJ by studying the impact left of the policy process.

Hence forming a “formative” and a “summative” branch of evaluation (Gastil et al., 2012)¹². This study has a summative focus seeking to test for potential causes and effects. “Outcome evaluations focus on the end results and long-term consequences” (Gastil et al., 2012). For these evaluations, one must define “success” and determine whether the studied outcomes met that threshold (Gastil et al., 2012). This thesis’s main goal is to identify design features affecting the DIs (CJ’s) impact on policymaking. Explicitly put, it seeks out design features that make citizens’ juries *impact policymaking successfully*. The OECD database measures this by the outcome variable “**response and follow-up.**” This variable track policymakers’ response to the CJ’s recommendations, and to what extent these recommendations are implemented. One of the goals of this thesis is to identify patterns separating the best DI designs from the rest. Therefore, the reference point of a successful impact on the policy should be high. Thus, in this study, CJs will be considered to have a successful impact on policy if they prove that around 50%, or more, of their recommendations are implemented. This was the highest possible bar set when considering the features of comparability while at the same time having enough cases available for comparison. The outcome condition is binary coded so that all citizen juries that meet the criteria are coded “**Yes**” (successful). The citizen juries that do not meet the criteria are coded “**No**” (failed). A positive response means that the policymakers will implement most, or all the recommendations produced in the CJ, thus giving the jury an indirect impact on actual policy. A negative response means that the recommendations have been neglected or rejected. In this scenario, the CJ will have failed to impact the policy-making process and, by doing so, failed its purpose as a DI, not deepening the role of citizens within the current democratic system.

Selecting cases based on the outcome is open to criticism as the researcher becomes vulnerable to potential selection bias. Through transparency in my case selection and including a wide variety of the outcome by studying an equal number of both successful and unsuccessful cases of citizen juries, I hope to convince you that this thesis results from a logical and reasonable approach to studying CJ designs rather than a fabricated biased approach.

¹² This source was accessible as an open source on Oxford academic but was not available for pdf-print. Thus, page numbers are not included in the citation. See section on “Process and Outcome Orientations to Evaluation”.

3.4.2.1 Filtering of Cases

Ready to filter cases based on the outcome variable, a new issue emerged. The quality of reports on the cases available for study was limited. Only ten of the originally 170 available cases meet the selection criteria in the case-selection process. Australia and the UK have five each (OECD, 2021b). Thus, the eight cases differing in the outcome were selected based on the quality and quantity of available data reported in the OECD dataset. Table 3-2 below presents the selected cases in alphabetical order:

Table 3-2 Cases Selected for Study in Alphabetical Order:

Cases selected for study in alphabetical order

Case name:	Year(s) of project
Capital Region Climate Change Forum	2006
Citizen’s Jury on Land Management and the Natural Environment	2019
Container deposit legislation in New South Wales, Australia	2001
Green Wedge Management Plan Community Panel	2018
Kingston citizens' assembly on air quality	2019
Leeds Climate Change citizens' jury	2019
Local Environmental Plan Review Panel	2005
Noosa Community Jury	2015

Table 3-2 presents the cases selected for study in alphabetical order.

3.5 Operationalization of Explanatory Conditions:

Having filtered and selected a comparable pool of cases, it is time to operationalize the criteria for evaluating and coding the theoretically reasoned explanatory conditions. From the theory chapter, we recall five theoretical explanations for MP design features that might impact the success or failure of a MP. We can operationalize these features more clearly after having specified to focus on citizen juries¹³.

The first explanatory condition is related to **H1** regarding the size of the CJ. This condition is labelled “**Size of jury.**” It measures the total number of registered participants in the arranged CJ. We perform a binary recoding of the condition for future analysis to ease the logical interpretation of the IMD analysis. This condition (**Large***) ¹⁴ tests hypothesis **H1**. As this

¹³ A complete codebook can be found in Supplement A in the appendix.
¹⁴ The * in the label implies that the explanatory condition has been binary recoded for logical interpretation when analyzed in the IMD matrix.

thesis operates with a suitable CJ size of twelve to fifty participants, a CJ considered large should be above the average CJ size. The average number of participants in the cases included in this study is 24 participants. Hence, the CJ is considered large when exceeding the 24-participant mark. Thus, coding **Yes** means that the number of participants is 25 or more. **No** means that the registered number of participants was lower than 25.

The second explanatory condition is linked to **H2** and is labelled “**Total duration (in days)**”. This condition measures the number of days the CJ was operative (meaning participants were involved in a deliberative process). We perform a binary recoding of the condition to ease the logical interpretation of the future IMD analysis. This condition (**Long***) tests the second hypothesis, **H2**. **Yes**, means that the CJ lasted for four days or more. **No** means that the CJ lasted for less than four days.

The third explanatory condition is linked to **H3** and is labelled “**Design integrity**”. The coding of this condition is due to the evaluation of the CJ 's ability to follow design ideals and provide solid facilitation during the process. The evaluation examines the CJ’s fulfillment of the six procedural criteria that constitute a deliberative process’s design integrity (identified by OECD): clear and suitable purpose, transparent and unbiased framing, suitable design, procedural design involvement, transparency and governance, and representativeness and inclusiveness (OECD, 2021a, pp. 18–19). The third criterion (suitable design) is based on eleven good practice principles: purpose, accountability, transparency, representativeness, inclusiveness, information, group deliberation, time, integrity, privacy, and evaluation (OECD, 2021a, pp. 31–32)¹⁵. To avoid overdetermination, the practice principle of time is not counted as this is already measured in the condition “**Total duration (in days)**.” Each good practice principle and procedural criterion are systematically evaluated. The **Design integrity** is then ranked based on the number of principles and criteria fulfilled. If ranked as “**Top**,” all criteria are fulfilled. The ranking “**High**” includes citizen juries that fulfill all but one criterion (5). The rank of “**Medium**” is given to citizen juries fulfilling from two to four criteria. The “**Low**” rank is given if the CJ fulfills less than two criteria. We perform a binary recoding of the condition to ease logical interpretation for future analysis. This condition (**Top design integrity***) tests the third hypothesis **H3**. **Yes**, means that the CJ is rated to have top-level

¹⁵ Tables used for schematic evaluation of the design integrity feature and good practice principles can be found in the appendix, see Supplement C and B respectively.

design integrity. **No** means that the CJ got rated a high, medium, or low design integrity. Supplement C in the appendix presents the schematic framework for evaluating the explanatory condition of design integrity. Supplement B in the appendix presents the schematic framework for evaluating good practice principles listed by OECD (OECD, 2020a, pp. 31–32).

The fourth explanatory condition is linked to **H4** and is labelled “**Face-to-face**”. It measures whether participants in the CJ discussed final recommendations with public authority. If coded **Yes**, they met face-to-face with public officials at least once. If coded **No**, they did not.

The fifth explanatory condition is linked to **H5** and is labeled “**Local government**”. The condition refers to the level of government where the CJ was conducted. It can be either of the following: local, regional, national, or transnational. We perform a binary recoding of the condition to ease the logical interpretation for future analysis. This condition (**Local government***) tests the fifth hypothesis **H5**. **Yes**, means that the CJ was arranged at the local level of government. **No** means that the CJ was arranged at a different level of government (Regional, National or Transnational).

3.6 Validity, Reliability, and Selection Bias

Maintaining the highest possible validity and reliability are principles in all scientific studies. The following section will reflect on these issues, how they are concerned in this thesis, and reflect issues regarding potential selection bias.

3.6.1 Validity

Conceptual validity refers to the degree to which a concept, as defined, matches a set of empirical indicators (Gerring, 2012, p. 442). Or, as King, Keohane, and Verba put it, measuring what we think we are measuring (King et al., 2021, p. 24). The concept of validity has two dimensions: the internal and the external. Internal validity is the degree of truth of a proposition concerning a chosen sample. External validity is the degree of truth of a proposition concerning the population of inference, namely its level of generalizability (Gerring, 2012, p. 424).

As for internal validity, the chosen conceptual variables coded in the dataset must match the empirical element they are supposed to represent. This study includes variables based on

concepts that may have different interpretations. An example is the categorical condition variable of design integrity, which includes various concepts and principles. The design integrity term has been operationalized differently in the literature (Gastil et al., 2012; OECD, 2021a). I have chosen to operate with the OECD operationalization of the design integrity condition (OECD, 2021a, pp. 18–20). This seemed sufficient as the OECD dataset is the base dataset for the coding in this study. Hence, operating with their operationalization of the concept makes sense as it rationally should match the data in the provided dataset.

As for the external validity, concerns are more complex. As in all small-n studies, the level of generalizability is limited. However, it is constrained when studying cases of complex phenomena like democracy and DIs. Considerations regarding validity have been taken. For example, the contextual variation was reduced intentionally to increase the possibility of proving solid inferences and achieving high generalizability. However, if the moderation in the case selection proves considerate enough to provide good external validity is up for discussion. An evaluation of the external validity conditions a holistic overview of the literature and theory within the field of research, as well as a well-reasoned and executed methodological approach to the study. These elements will be addressed in the forthcoming analysis chapter.

3.6.2 Reliability

Reliability refers to how reliable the data-collection methods are. Ideally, the same data-collection procedure will always produce the same measure (King et al., 2021, p. 24). It is closely related to the *precision* of the study. As this is a qualitative study, it is impossible to specify, beyond theory, the variance of results. Thus, it is not possible to address the level of precision (Gerring, 2012, p. 432) Hence, evaluating the reliability of a study is subjective, or the least not entirely objective. However, I hope to show that the performed case selection is reasonable and reliable by building on previously established theories and practicing transparency in my methods. This will also be up for discussion in chapter six.

3.6.3 Selection Bias and the Potential for Inference:

A natural concern when comparing a small number of cases is the issue of selection bias. King, Keohane, and Verba stress that “in qualitative research, selection bias will mean that the true causal effect is larger than the qualitative researcher is led to believe (unless, of course, the researcher is aware of our argument and adjusts his or her estimates accordingly)” (King et al., 2021, p. 128). Further, “The extent to which we underestimate the causal effects

depends on the severity of the selection bias (...), about which we should have at least some idea if not detailed evidence” (King et al., 2021, p. 128). Avoiding selection bias entirely is not easy in research where the number of cases for observation is limited. However, it is still possible to learn from “biased” inferences if they are predicted to be biased. If bias is expected, we can compensate and adjust our claims of causal inference.

In this study, the cases/observations have been selected based on the outcome variable **success**. Thus, the cases do not represent the natural variation of successful and failed instances of democratic innovation we could expect to find in the real world. Further, the explanatory variables are selected based on suspicion of potential causal effects. Hence, the analysis is limited, as it cannot make *descriptive* inferences (King et al., 2021, p. 139). However, the analysis could still provide information about the empirical plausibility of causal inference. For example, if we find in this study that successful citizen’s juries are highly correlated with CJs with high numbers of participants, we can claim that more extensive CJs are more plausible to be successful. However, this is conditioned that the observations are not selected concerning the explanatory variables (King et al., 2021, p. 139).

By transparently describing my reasoning for case selection, I hope to have proven that the inclusion of cases in this study has been reasonable. Further ensuring that the cases are comparable. Furthermore, the reasoning behind the filtration of cases seems sound and logical. The following chapters will describe the variation in the outcome of cases and the explanatory conditions across the cases studied. The first of these two chapters is dedicated to the outcome of cases.

4 The Outcome of Cases

Repeating my view of a successful DI: a successful DI should be able to reimagine and deepen the role of citizens in governance processes (Elstub & Escobar, 2019, p. 11). Thus, a successful MP has been operationalized as an MP with 50% or more of its recommendations implemented by public authority. The MPs that get less than 50% of their recommendations implemented are registered as failures. This chapter will present the variation of the outcome (their success or failures) across all eight cases studied, starting with the four cases identified as successes, before presenting the four citizen juries recognized as failures.

4.1 Successes:

4.1.1 Kingston Citizens' Assembly on Air Quality

The Kingston citizens' assembly on air quality is coded as a success. The CJ was arranged in 2019 and brought together 38 randomly selected citizens (two-stage selection) to deliberate and develop recommendations on how the Royal Borough of Kingston upon Thames could improve its air quality (The Royal Borough of Kingston Upon Thames & Involve, 2020, p. 5). Five recommendations were developed and presented after two weekends of learning and deliberation. All the recommendations gained over 85% of support (or dedicated support) from the assembly (CJ) (The Royal Borough of Kingston Upon Thames & Involve, 2020, p. 5). In addition to the five recommendations, 26 actions across recommendations were outlined. These actions also had high support from assembly members (over 75%). A preliminary report was presented to the full council by assembly members after the deliberative process. The final report of the CJ was presented and discussed by the Environment and Sustainable Transport Committee of the Royal Borough of Kingston upon Thames in February 2020 (The Royal Borough of Kingston Upon Thames & Involve, 2020, p. 5). All recommendations are reported to have been implemented (OECD, 2021b).

4.1.2 Noosa Community Jury

The second CJ recognized as successful was the Noosa Community Jury arranged in 2015. The CJ consisted of 24 randomly selected participants from three thousand residents (two-stage selection)(OECD, 2021b). Meeting once a month for six months, the CJ deliberated on the task: "What is the best option for minimizing organic waste sent to landfill? (Noosa

Community Jury, 2015, p. 2; Wilkie et al., 2015, p. 4). The CJ agreed on a set of criteria and urged the Noosa Council to adopt eight guidelines to minimize organic going to landfills (Noosa Community Jury, 2015, p. 2). Nine recommendations were unanimously supported by CJ participants (Noosa Community Jury, 2015, p. 2). It has been reported that the Noosa Council provided a public response to these recommendations and that all recommendations were implemented (OECD, 2021b).

4.1.3 Green Wedge Management Plan Community Panel

The third CJ to be coded as a success was the Green Wedge Management Plan Community Panel, held in 2018. Nillumbik Shire Council brought this panel together to consider the question: “What is the best way to manage Nillumbik’s Green Wedge now and into the future?” (Green Wedge Management Plan Community Panel, 2018, p. 1). The CJ consisted of 42 members, randomly selected from addresses across the shire (two-stage selection)(Mosaic Lab, 2018, pp. 11–12; OECD, 2021b). After six panel days, a report was presented to the full Council at a Council meeting (Mosaic Lab, 2018, p. 16). The CJ’s report included a vision statement, 14 principles, and 32 recommendations (Mosaic Lab, 2018, p. 17). All recommendations had gained the support of 80% or more of the CJ in attendance on the sixth meeting day (Mosaic Lab, 2018, p. 17). The Shire Council publicly responded to the CJ’s recommendations (Green Wedge Management Plan & Shire of Nillumbik, 2018). Most of the recommendations were implemented (over 50%), with the rest of the recommendations and principles being partially supported or supported in principle by the Shire Council (all but recommendation 18 and the minority report) (Green Wedge Management Plan & Shire of Nillumbik, 2018; OECD, 2021b).

4.1.4 Leeds Climate Change Citizens’ Jury

The last CJ to be recognized as successful in this study was The Leeds Climate Change Citizens’ Jury held in 2019. The jury consisted of 25 randomly selected participants (two-stage selection) over nine deliberation sessions aimed to answer the question: “What should Leeds do about the emergency of climate change?” (average attendance at meetings was 21)(Shared Future et al., 2019, p. 3). The CJ produced twelve recommendations that were later presented to a public authority (OECD, 2021b). The Leeds Climate Commission agreed that its activities would be guided by these recommendations in the coming years, and Leeds City Council agreed to formally respond to the recommendations (Shared Future et al., 2019,

p. 4). In the aftermath of the CJ, around 50% of the recommendations have been reported to be implemented (OECD, 2021b).

4.2 Failures:

4.2.1 Container Deposit Legislation in New South Wales, Australia

The first CJ recognized as a failure in this study was the citizen's panel (jury) on Container Deposit Legislation in New South Wales, initiated by the Institute for Sustainable Futures in 2001. The CJ consisted of 12 randomly selected participants (two-stage selection) and was gathered in two and a half days to deliberate on the issue (Carson, 2010, p. 3). The CJ unanimously agreed on eight recommendations¹⁶ (White, 2001, pp. 147–151). The CJ's final report was incorporated into the more extensive CDL Review report delivered to Minister Hon Bob Debus (Carson, 2010, p. 3; White, 2001). The public authority initially rejected these recommendations, as none were implemented (OECD, 2021b). However, over 50% of the recommendations were implemented sixteen years later, after a new government was elected (OECD, 2021b).¹⁷

4.2.2 Local Environmental Plan Review Panel

The Local Environmental Plan Review Panel is also recognized as a failed CJ. The CJ was held in 2005 and initiated as part of the Council's 10-year review of the Local Environmental Plan for the local government area (OECD, 2021b). The CJ comprised 16 participants selected by a single-stage random selection process (OECD, 2021b). After five deliberative sessions, the CJ authored a report to the Council on four key planning questions. None of the recommendations is reported to have been implemented¹⁸(OECD, 2021b).

4.2.3 Capital Region Climate Change Forum

The Capitol Region Climate Change Forum was the third CJ coded as a failure. The CJ was initiated to understand better how the community in Australia's Capital Region would like to respond to climate change (Riedy et al., 2006, p. 4). The CJ gathered twenty randomly selected participants (two-stage selection) (OECD, 2021b). After three days of deliberation,

¹⁶ Unfortunately, the specific recommendations from this CJ were for long time not identifiable. This was supposedly no accident, as the Citizen's Report was hidden in the third volume of the larger CDL Review report. According to Carolyn M Hendriks, this volume was for a long time, unavailable to the public in hard copy form (Hendriks, 2005, p. 8).

¹⁷ Despite this, the CJ is still considered a failure.

¹⁸ Unfortunately, I have not been able to identify an official report of this CJ process. Thus, all data used are collected from the OECD database.

the CJ produced a report included in the process evaluation report. This report includes a series of recommendations (Riedy et al., 2006, pp. 23–27). The final recommendations in the report were discussed face-to-face with the authority (OECD, 2021b). However, none of the recommendations has been reported implemented (OECD, 2021b).

4.2.4 Citizens' Jury on Land Management and the Natural Environment

The last of the eight citizen juries examined in this thesis is the Scottish Parliament Citizens' Jury on Land Management and the Natural Environment (The Scottish Parliament, 2019). At the request of the Environment, Climate Change and Land Reform Committee, the CJ was aimed at answering the following question: "How should funding and advice for land management be designed to help improve Scotland's natural environment?" (The Scottish Parliament, 2019, p. 3; Valluri-Nitsch et al., 2020, p. 1). 21 randomly selected participants constituted the CJ. The participants were selected from three thousand Scottish households (two-stage selection)(Elstub et al., 2019, p. 11; OECD, 2021b). After finishing the deliberative process, the CJ reached seven recommendations by consensus (The Scottish Parliament, 2019, pp. 19–20; Valluri-Nitsch et al., 2020, pp. 1–5). In addition, there was also laid out a list of nine issues that the CJ felt deserved further consideration (Valluri-Nitsch et al., 2020, p. 1). The OECD database reports that none of the recommendations has been implemented (OECD, 2021b).

A summary of all the abovementioned citizen juries and the respective coding of whether they are seen as "**Successful**" (this thesis's outcome variable) can be inspected in Table 4-1 on the following page. The citizen juries are ranked based on their level of success

Table 4-1 Overview of Cases and the Coding of the Outcome

Overview of cases and the coding of the outcome

Case number	Case name	Nation	Year(s) of project	Percentage of recommendations implemented	Successful (O)	Case rank (based on success)
1	Kingston citizens' assembly on air quality	UK	2019	100 %	Yes	1
2	Noosa Community Jury	Australia	2015	100 %	Yes	1
3	Green Wedge Management Plan Community Panel	Australia	2018	>50%	Yes	3
4	Leeds Climate Change citizens' jury	UK	2019	50 %	Yes	4
5	Container deposit legislation in New South Wales, Australia	Australia	2001	0% *	No*	5
6	Local Environmental Plan Review Panel	Australia	2005	0 %	No	6
7	Capital Region Climate Change Forum	Australia	2006	0 %	No	6
8	Citizen's Jury on Land Management and the Natural Environment	UK	2019	0 %	No	6

Notes:* After 16 years, a new government implemented many (>50%) recommendations.

Table 4-1 presents background information about the cases studied, the coding of the outcome «successful», and the rank of the cases based on this criterion.

5 Explanatory Conditions:

This chapter will present the variation of the explanatory conditions across all eight cases studied. I have chosen to present each explanatory condition, in turn, to identify how the citizen juries differ systematically. Hence, we can identify how each design feature may impact the success or failure of the citizen’s juries. After the ECs have been presented, I include them in a table presenting the total variation across all variables. However, before presenting the first EC (size), I would like to clarify the coding due to some issues regarding missing information and evaluation.

5.1 Size:

Table 5-1 presents the variation across the cases studied based on size. We can read from the table that cases 1 and 3 have more than 24 participants. Thus, they are considered large CJs. CJs with case numbers 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 are all considered small citizen juries as they all have 24 participants or fewer. The last row of the table ranks the citizen juries based on their size. We can read that case numbers 1, 2, 3, and 4 are ranked as the second, third, first, and fifth largest citizen juries, respectively. Cases from case number 5-8 are ranked eighth, seventh, sixth, and fourth, respectively.

Table 5-1 Variation of Cases Based on Size:

Variation of cases based on size								
Case number	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Size of jury	38	24	39	21	12	16	20	22
Large*	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Ranking of cases based on size	2	3	1	5	8	7	6	4

Note: Citizen jury is considered small when including less than 32 participants

Table 5-1 shows the ranking of the studied cases based on the design feature of size.

5.2 Total Duration:

Table 5-2 presents the variation of cases based on the explanatory condition of total duration. We notice that cases 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 are considered long-lasting citizen juries, totaling four days or more. Case numbers 5, 7, and 8 last less than four days. Regarding their ranking based on size, case number 2 is ranked first, with cases 4 & 6 and 1 & 3 sharing spots with second

and fourth place, respectively. Case number 7 is ranked sixth and cases 5 & 8 share the last spot ranked eighth.

Table 5-2 Variation of Cases Based on Total Duration:

Variation of cases based on total duration								
Case number	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Total duration (in days)	4	6	4	5	2	5	3	2
Long*	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
Ranking of cases based on total duration (in days)	4	1	4	2	8	2	6	8

Note: Citizen jury is considered short when deliberating for less than 4 days.

Table 5-2 shows the ranking of the studied cases based on the design feature of time.

5.3 Design Integrity:

Table 5-3 presents the variation of design integrity across the cases examined. Two cases are coded as top (numbers 1 & 4). Two cases are evaluated to have high design integrity (case numbers 3 & 8). Two are evaluated to have a medium level of design integrity (numbers 5 & 7), while the two remaining cases are without evaluation due to missing data (case numbers 2 & 6). Thus, only case numbers 1 & 4 are coded as “Yes” on the **Top design integrity*** row among the eight cases. These two are ranked first among the eight cases based on the design integrity feature. The subsequent cases on the ranked list are case numbers 3 & 8, sharing the third spot. Case numbers 5 & 7 share fifth while case numbers 2 & 6 are without rank due to missing values.

Table 5-3 Variation of Cases Based on Design Integrity:

Variation of cases based on design integrity								
Case number	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Design integrity	Top	Missing	High	Top	Medium	Missing	Medium	High
Top design integrity*	Yes	Missing	No	Yes	No	Missing	No	No
Ranking of cases based on design integrity	1	Missing	3	1	5	Missing	5	3

Note: Cases without official process evaluation reports are automatically coded as missing

Table 5-3 shows the variation of the design integrity variable across all cases studied.

5.3.1 Notions on Missing Evaluation:

For case number 3 and 6, I could not find any official report/evaluation of the design and proceedings of the respective CJs. There were multiple sources, with limited information

about these processes¹⁹, but no official document that would provide the holistic overview of the process to complete a full evaluation of the design integrity of the CJ. I was for a long time committed to including the limited sources of information in the evaluation table, making a patchwork of information for analysis. This would at least make it possible to get some insight into the different process's levels of design integrity. However, as the coding proceeded, I noticed that there were so many dissimilar sources of information that the possibility of coding wrong was overbearing. Thus, I aborted the patchwork mission. I decided not to evaluate the design integrity feature, where the sources of information were spread out across multiple web pages, documents, and other types of sources. I would rather lose some of the analysis's explanatory power than risk presenting false causal claims.

5.4 Face-to-Face:

Table 5-4 presents the variation of cases based on the explanatory condition **Face-to-face**. We can read from the table that case numbers 1, 2, 4, and 7 have registered meetings face-to-face with public authority when discussing resulting recommendations. Case numbers 3, 5, 6 and 8 have not. Thus, case numbers 1, 2, 4, and 7 share the first rank, while 3, 5, 6, and 8 share the fifth rank.

Table 5-4 Face-to-face:

Face-to-face									
Case number	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
Face-to-face	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	
Ranking cases based on face-to-face	1	1	5	1	5	5	1	5	

Table 5-4 shows the variation of the face-to-face condition across cases studied.

5.5 Level of Government:

The last explanatory condition examined for variation is the **Level of Government**. Except for cases 5 and 8, all cases are coded to be found at the local level of government. Case number 5 is registered at the regional level of government, while case number 8 is located at

¹⁹ See Supplement D for evaluation links and sources of information in the appendix

the National level. Thus, cases 1-4 and 6 & 7 are coded as **Yes** on the **Level of Government*** row. Case numbers 5 and 8 are coded as **No** in the same row. All cases that are coded **Yes** also share the first rank. Case numbers 5 and 8 share the sixth rank.

Table 5-5 Level of Government:

Variation of cases bases on the level of government

Case number	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Level of government	Local	Local	Local	Local	Regional	Local	Local	National
Local level of government*	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
Ranking of cases based on level of government	1	1	1	1	7	1	1	7

Note: Citizen juries found lower than the regional level are considered low, others high

Table 5-5 variation of the level of government condition across cases studied.

Having presented the variation of all five explanatory conditions, we can move on to the analysis, where the empirical recordings will be compared and analyzed considering the earlier presented theoretical assumptions. However, it could be helpful with a holistic overview presenting a variation of all the explanatory conditions. This is provided in Table 5-6 on the following page.

Table 5-6 Variation of Explanatory Conditions:

Variation of independent variables

Case number	Size of jury (*)	Total duration (*)	Design integrity (*)	Face to face	Level of government (*)
1	38 (Yes)	4 (Yes)	Top (Yes)	Yes	Local Government (Yes)
2	24 (No)	4 (Yes)	**	Yes	Local Government (Yes)
3	39 (Yes)	6 (Yes)	High (No)	No	Local Government (Yes)
4	21 (No)	5 (Yes)	Top (Yes)	Yes	Local Government (Yes)
5	12 (No)	2 (No)	Medium (No)	No	Regional/State (No)
6	16 (No)	5 (Yes)	**	No	Local Government (Yes)
7	20 (No)	3 (No)	Medium (No)	Yes	Local Government (Yes)
8	22 (No)	2 (No)	High (No)	No	National/Federal (No)

Notes:* Binary coded variable value in parentheses

** Missing documentation - complete evaluation/score not attainable

Table 5-6 presents the variation of the explanatory conditions across the studied cases.

6 Analysis:

This chapter presents the analysis of the correlation between the outcomes of cases and the theoretical explanatory conditions related to MP design. I test the five hypotheses previously introduced in the theory chapter and discuss the results from the analysis through the lens of deliberative and participatory democracy theory. I will present the resulting IMD-analysis matrix where the correlations between outcomes and explanatory conditions are displayed. Further, I will repeat all hypotheses and schematically test these based on the explanatory condition's correlations shown in Table 6-1. The findings are then discussed concerning theoretical perspectives before I finish the chapter by addressing weaknesses and options for future studies. Table 6-1, the IMD-analysis matrix, is presented below.

After a quick interpretation of the IMD-analysis matrix, we can conclude that there is no direct correlation between the success of the CJ and the presence of one of the explanatory conditions alone. This statement is supported by the fact that all cases that substantially impact the success of the studied CJs are also present in at least one failed case, and vice versa. However, we can identify several tendencies by studying the matrix more thoroughly. The following sections present a thorough analysis of the cases concerning the five hypotheses.

Table 6-1 IMD-analysis Matrix

IMD-analysis matrix:

Case number		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Outcome	Success*	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
	Large*	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
	Long*	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
	Top design integrity*	Yes	**	No	Yes	No	**	No	No
	Face to face	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
	Local level of government*	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
	Explanatory conditions								

Notes:* Explanatory condition is binary coded to simplify analysis

** Missing documentation - complete evaluation/score not attainable

Table 6-1 presents the data used for testing the five theoretically reasoned hypotheses. It is presented in a classic IMD-analysis format.

6.1 Testing Hypothesis H1:

Hypothesis **H1** states that: bigger MPs are more likely to be successful than small MPs. The IMD-analysis matrix supports this hypothesis, as all failed cases are considered minor. Two of the cases regarded as successful are considered large; thus, one could logically argue that the larger CJs perform better in producing successful recommendations than small CJs. Not all the cases registered as successful were considered large. Thus, larger MPs are not destined to be more successful than small MPs. The two cases coded as successful while not being identified as large (case numbers 2 & 4) share three present conditions (**Long***, **Face-to-face**, and **Level of Government***)²⁰. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that a CJ 2 & 4 depends on the presence of these three explanatory conditions to succeed.

To conclude, we can deduce that being a small MP negatively affects the probability of producing recommendations with a successful impact on decision-makers. However, a small MP could be successful if other essential conditions are present. By examining Table 6-1, it seems reasonable to state that a larger MP will have increased the probability of success (if

²⁰ Top design integrity* is not included due to the missing value for case number 2.

success is interpreted as I have in this thesis). Thus, we can recommend future MP designs to emphasize this design feature.

6.2 Testing Hypothesis H2:

The second hypothesis, **H2**, stated: that MPs lasting four days or longer are more likely to be successful than shorter-lasting MPs. The IMD-analysis matrix shows a clear tendency supporting this hypothesis as all the successful cases were correlated with a duration of a minimum of four days. One of the failed cases is also registered to be long-lasting. However, this is neither considered **Large*** nor did **Face-to-face** meetings with public authorities. Thus, the failure of this long-lasting CJ logically depends on either one of these two explanatory conditions or their combined absence. The IMD-analysis matrix also implies a clear tendency that CJs lasting less than four days often fail to prove an impact on decision-making. Three of the four failed cases are registered as short lasting.

Thus, we can deduce that MP designers should emphasize the time for deliberation if they aim to impact decision-makers. It seems reasonable to argue that Table 6-1 implies that longer-lasting MPs are more likely to be successful than shorter-lasting MPs.

6.3 Testing Hypothesis H3:

The third hypothesis, **H3**, states that: MPs with top-level design integrity are more likely to be successful than MPs with lower design integrity. The IMD-analysis matrix does not directly confirm that MPs with top-level design integrity are successful, and neither can it be stated that having weaker design integrity is unanimous with failure to impact policymaking. As two cases have missing data, the generalizability of the impact of this explanatory condition is limited. However, there is a tendency to imply an indirect explanatory connection between the MP's level of design integrity and its eventual success. By reading the IMD matrix, we notice that three failed cases are registered with low design integrity. The last case (case number 6) was coded as missing due to missing data and cannot be emphasized. However, the three negative cases indicate that not having top-level design integrity has a negative impact on the MP if it aims to impact the decision-making process. However, having top design integrity does not directly influence MPs' success. As case number 3 shows, the absence of top-level design integrity can still result in a successful CJ, conditioned by the presence of the three explanatory conditions **Large***, **Long*** and **Local level of government***.

Regardless, based on the IMD-analysis matrix findings, it seems reasonable to recommend that MP designers strive for CJs with top design integrity (or avoid impaired design integrity) to increase their hope of impacting policymaking.

6.4 Testing Hypothesis H4:

The fourth hypothesis, **H4**, states that face-to-face meetings with public authority during the process, or when delivering recommendations, increase the probability for MP recommendations to be successful. IMD-analysis matrix shows a tendency to support this hypothesis. Overall, 75% of the successful cases studied had meetings with public authority, while an equal 75% of failed cases did not prove meetings with public authority. Thus, there is a clear indication that establishing a little personal relationship with the authorities increases the probability for MPs to succeed. However, the matrix also shows that a CJ could have the absence of face-to-face meetings and be successful, and vice versa. In case number 3, the success is logically conditioned by the explanatory conditions: **Large***, **Long***, and **Level of Government***. The failed instance of case number 7 logically depends on the absence of the explanatory conditions: **Large***, **Long*** and **Top design integrity***.

However, the matrix proves it reasonable to recommend that future MP organizers prioritize time for meeting relevant elected representatives and authorities, which also increases the probability of success.

6.5 Testing Hypothesis H5:

The fifth and last hypothesis, **H5**, stated that: MPs held to handle issues at a local level of government are more likely to be successful than instances related to a higher level of government. The IMD-analysis matrix shows that 100% of the successfully registered cases were held at the local level of government. In addition, all the cases not registered at the local level of government (case numbers 5 & 8) were also registered as failed. Thus, it seems reasonable to deduce that MPs (at least in the instance of CJs) are more likely to be successful if arranged at the local level of government. Both instances of CJs organized at a local level of government, while also being registered as failures, were registered as small. Thus, their failure logically depends on the absence of the explanatory condition **Large***.

To conclude, the matrix shows a clear tendency that CJs organized at a local level of government are more likely to be successful than CJs organized at a higher level of

government. Hence, it seems reasonable to recommend that MP designers consider this when planning for future MPs and CJs.

6.6 Recommendations for Future MP Design:

Based on the analysis and the explanatory conditions correlations with theoretical expectation, I provide six general recommendations for future MP designers:

1. MP designers should strive to fulfill all five explanatory conditions: **Large***, **Long***, **Top design integrity***, **Face-to-face**, and **Local level of government***.
2. MP designers should emphasize the **time for deliberation**, providing participants with a suitable timeframe to produce high-quality recommendations.
3. MP designers should emphasize events being arranged at a **local level of government**, preferably local.
4. MP designers should emphasize having face-to-face meetings with public authority at least once during the process or while delivering recommendations.
5. MP designers should emphasize having a **large (and representative) CJ**.
6. MP designers should emphasize events being of **top-level design integrity**.

These recommendations are especially true if planning to arrange a CJ. However, based on shared theoretical foundations for MP development, they could also be generalizable to other MP types. The logical reasoning for including each recommendation, specific notions, and their subsequent rank is shown in Table 6-2 below.

Table 6-2 General Design Recommendations for MP Designers:

General recommendations for MP designers				
General recommendation:	If absent:	Notions:	Reason for recommendation and ranking:	Rank
MP designers should strive to fulfil all of the five explanatory conditions: Large*, Long*, Top design integrity*, Face to face, and Low level of government*.	Logically very low probability for success (ref. case number 5 & 8).		All explanatory conditions proved/indicated a logical impact on CJ success. Fulfilling all explanatory conditions proved to cause the case ranked as most successful (case number 1).	1
MP designers should emphasize the time for deliberation , providing participants with a suitable timeframe to produce high quality recommendations.	Logically very low probability for success (ref. case number 5, 7 & 8).	Can still become a failure if not fulfilling either one or both of the following explanatory conditions: Large*, Face to face.	The explanatory condition that showed a tendency of being very impactful. Only one failed instance non-correlating with theoretical expectation; this having a relatively low number of conditional features absent (ref. Case number 6: Large* & Face to face).	2
MP designers should emphasize event being arranged at a low level of government .	Logically a low probability for success (ref case 5 & 8).	Can still become a failure if not fulfilling the explanatory condition of Large*.	The explanatory condition showed a tendency of being impactful. Two failed instances non-correlating with theoretical expectation; having a low number of conditional features absent (ref. 6 & 7, Large*).	3
MP designers should emphasize having face to face meetings with public authority at least once during the process, or while delivering recommendations..	Can still be successful if explanatory conditions: Large*, Long*, and Low level of government* are present (ref case number 3).	Can still become a failure if not fulfilling the explanatory conditions of: Large*, Long*, & Top design integrity* (ref. Case number 7).	The explanatory condition showed a tendency of being impactful. Two instances non-correlating with theoretical expectation (case number 3 & 7); being logically dependent on a relatively high number of conditional features (Large*, Long*, Level of government* & Large*, Long*, Top design integrity*) respectively..	4
MP designers should emphasize having a large (and representative) citizen jury.	Can still be successful if explanatory conditions: Long*, Face to face, and Low level of government* are present. (ref. case number 2 & 4).	No failures recorded to be large in size.	The explanatory condition indicates a tendency of being impactful. Two instances non-correlating with theoretical expectation (case number 2 & 4); being logically dependent on a relatively high number of conditional features (Long*, (potentially Top design integrity*), Face to face, Level of government*) respectively.	5
MP designers should emphasize event being of top design integrity .	Can still be successful if both explanatory conditions: Long* & Low level of government* are present (ref. Case number 2 & 4).	No failures recorded to have low design integrity, but uncertainties due to missing data.	Ranked last due to missing data. Thus, some uncertainty of validity of recommendations	6

Table 6-2 presents the reason for six recommendations concerning MP design. The recommendations are based on the results from the IMD-analysis matrix. The recommendations are ranked.

6.7 A Theoretical Perspective on the Analysis:

As noted in the research review, Graham Smith has stressed his worries about DI research becoming too hegemonic (Smith, 2019, p. 579). He encourages researchers to base the research frontier on deliberative theory and see the relevance of participatory democratic theory when relevant (Smith, 2019, p. 579). I wish to follow up with this encouragement in the following section by discussing the results of my IMD analysis from both the deliberative and participatory perspectives.

The deliberative democratic approach emphasizes the aspirational ideal of deliberation (Bächtiger et al., 2018, p. 2). This means that people, on the basis of equal status and mutual respect, can discuss the political issues they face and, further, based on these discussions, form well-reasoned policies (Bächtiger et al., 2018, p. 2). In theory, both time and competence are necessary to facilitate solid deliberation. The IMD analysis supports this as both explanatory conditions indicate an effect on the MPs' success in the performed IMD analysis (if competence is interpreted to design integrity). The condition of time seemed particularly impactful for producing successful recommendations. Thus, empirical evidence supports the aspirational ideal advocated by deliberative democracy.

The participatory theoretical democratic tradition has, as already addressed, a different focus. It emphasizes the importance of citizens participating in democratic societies. "The underlying participatory idea is that citizens in a democracy are to engage with the substance of law and policy, and not simply delegate responsibility for such substantive engagement to representatives" (Cohen, 2009, p. 248). We can relate the aspect of a prominent level of participation to the explanatory condition regarding an MP's size. The bigger the MP, the more inclusive and, thus, the more authentic representation of the total population is. The IMD analysis also identified the tendentious impact of the explanatory condition of size. This tendency was not as prolific as many other explanatory conditions (for example, time for deliberation). However, it should be noted that by setting the bar defining a "Large" CJ lower, the more impactful this feature would have indicated to be (all successes had more than 21 participants or more, while only one of the failed cases had more than 21). Thus, the IMD analysis would logically have indicated a more substantial impact of size if this was the case. Another explanatory feature linkable to participatory theory is the "Level of government." The IMD analysis indicated that CJs related to the local level of government were more

successful than CJs related to the higher levels of government. Theoretical reasoning for this may be that citizen juries found on the local level of government are more closely related to where the citizens are — making it easier for citizens to participate. Hence, participatory perspectives and ideals deserve to be emphasized by MP designers too. We should not undermine the importance of numerous participations or stop striving for inclusive systems of government that invite citizens to make their say in policymaking. In fact, by emphasizing participation, deliberative democracy might become more effective as one ensures that all citizens are included, thus increasing the institution's legitimacy. The potential gain is two-dimensional, increasing the demographic representativity and the probability for all political perspectives to be included, forming a fruitful deliberative climate (Elstub, 2018, p. 198).

Thus, we may conclude with the argument that the successful impact on policy by deliberative MPs, like the CJ, primarily seem to be affected by design features related to the quality of deliberation. Nevertheless, there also exists room for improving the effectiveness of these types of DIs by emphasizing participatory ideals (Elstub, 2018, p. 198).

6.8 Limitations of Analysis:

There are some notable shortcomings in this analysis. Firstly, there are potentially spurious correlations due to the limited availability of quality data. The cases examined had to be collected from a longer timespan than ideally preferable. Thus, it is difficult to control if the results in this analysis are directly caused by the design-related explanatory conditions outlined here or if the variation in success is due to more contextual conditions like the change in politicians' views on DIs and the usefulness of MP-generated recommendations. This naturally weakens the reliability of this study and the validity of its findings and recommendations. However, I would argue that this thesis' holistic view of the DI literature and the comparative IMD approach are a solid fundament for external validity. To further improve the reliability, more and higher-quality data would need to be available for analysis. This is fundamental if we are to improve the validity of future studies examining the causes of DI successes and conditions our understanding of their nature.

Another shortcoming of this study is that the analysis does not show how much each explanatory condition amplifies the success of CJs. This knowledge will be valuable to improve our institutional designs further. It further supports many more comprehensive empirical comparisons of DIs. An attractive option would be to follow Pogrebinschi's and

Ryan's (2018) example and conduct more QCA studies that will help us gain more detailed insight into the strengths and weaknesses of distinct types of DI design features. These future studies would naturally be easier to conduct if more cases and data were available. Hence, there should be plenty of motivation for future work, both for DI designers and DI researchers.

7 Conclusion:

Democracy has, since the early 2000s, been in a global recession (Diamond, 2015). To find ways to strengthen democracy and make citizens regain their belief in the democratic governmental system, the field of democratic innovation has blossomed, and multiple types of various democratic innovations have been developed. However, although these DIs have been well reasoned in theory, few empirical studies have supported their effect in real-life policymaking. In addition, previous empirical research has tended to cherry-pick positive cases, resulting in little knowledge of practices that do not work. Hence, there are weak empirical grounds for assessing various DI's effectiveness. Thus, there has been a need for empirically focused studies and comparisons of design practices to gain knowledge on how we can make future DIs more effective and sufficient. With this as the starting point, this thesis has aimed to answer the research question: *How can we design democratic innovations, such as deliberative citizen juries, to impact policymaking successfully?*

Based on deliberative and participatory democratic theory and theoretical views of democratic ideals, as well as logical reasoning, I formulated five hypotheses developed for testing. Hence, seeking to identify explanatory conditions for successful and effective MP designs. By carefully selecting two comparable sets of cases, including four successful CJs, and four failed CJs, I increase the reliability compared to previously conducted studies that have tended to cherry-pick positive cases.

The thesis has contributed to democratic theory and democratic innovations research by comparing deliberative citizen juries to identify MP design features that affect CJ recommendations impact policymaking processes. By applying J.S. Mill's analytical framework, known as the indirect method of difference, I compare instances of citizen juries that have both failed and succeeded in impacting policy. The analysis indicates tendencies of causal relationships between the identified explanatory conditions and the citizen juries' successful policymaking impact. Based on the findings in the analysis, I then formulate six recommendations for future DI designers. I hope that the knowledge gathered here can inspire and improve future democratic innovation design practices. The recommendations are summed up and presented in hierarchical order below:

1. MP designers should strive to fulfill all five explanatory conditions: **Large***, **Long***, **Top design integrity***, **Face-to-face**, and **Local level of government***.
2. MP designers should emphasize the **time for deliberation**, providing participants with a suitable timeframe to produce high-quality recommendations.
3. MP designers should emphasize events being arranged at a **local level of government**, preferably local.
4. MP designers should emphasize having face-to-face meetings with public authority at least once during the process or while delivering recommendations.
5. MP designers should emphasize having a **large (and representative) CJ**.
6. MP designers should emphasize events being of **top-level design integrity**.

Being a small-n study, the generalizability of this study experiences some natural limitations. Despite this unavoidable fact, I argue that due to theoretical familiarity, the findings from this CJ -focused study could be generalizable to other types of MPs, although the strength of tendencies might differ. However, more knowledge on the causal relations between MP design features and their impact on their successes as DIs is needed. This should motivate more comparative studies focusing on the effectiveness of DI design. An option could be to compare several types of MPs or other types of DI. Further, an exciting option for the study would be to perform a QCA to understand the relevant combinations of explanatory conditions to explain each outcome. This would ensure more detailed insight into each explanatory condition and its effect on MP success.

To conclude, it is not possible to state that DI will provide a definite solution to the many issues facing democratic societies today. We do know that they can make a positive impact, deepening the role of citizens in political society, as this study has identified, there are tendencies showing that design features are of significance and can affect the DI's impact on policymaking. Thus, the findings here presented serve as a reminder that the way we construct our institutions and societies is significant.

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Supplement Appendix

The supplement appendix features additional information for this thesis. It includes a codebook, Tables outlining framework for evaluation and coding of design integrity related features, and information about the process of this thesis' construction. The supplements can be found in the following order:

❖ **Supplement A) Codebook:**

Codebook for names used in the analysis.

❖ **Supplement B) Good Practice Principles:**

Supplement B includes two Tables used for evaluating whether the cases studied have been able to fulfill the “Good practice principles” outlined by the OECD. The first **Table B-1** presents the framework used for evaluation, operationalizing the good practice principles. The second **Table B-2** presents the coding after all cases had been evaluated.

❖ **Supplement C) Design Integrity:**

Supplement C) includes two Tables used for evaluating the case's level of design integrity. **Table C-1** presents the framework for evaluation. **Table C-2** presents the coding of all cases regarding the evaluation of design integrity.

❖ **Supplement D) Evaluation Links and Sources of Information About Cases:**

Supplement D lists the links to sources of the information used for evaluation and the resulting coding of cases.

Supplement A, Codebook

Codebook	
Variable Name	Operationalization
Case number	The numerical identity of the case studied.
Case name	The formal name of the case studied.
Nation	The nationality of the case studied.
Year(s) of project	Refers to the year(s) the CJ was conducted.
Success	Binary recoding of OECD's response and follow-up variable. Measuring the policymaker's response and follow-up to the CJ's final recommendations. Coded Yes means that around 50% or more of the recommendations resulting from the CJ have been accepted and implemented. Coded No means that less than 50% of the recommendations have been accepted and implemented.
Percentage of recommendations implemented	A recoding of OECD's response and follow-up variable. Shows the total percentage of recommendations implemented by public authority after the CJ has provided their recommendations.
Size of jury	The number of participants in the given CJ.
Large*	Binary recoding of the size of jury variable. Yes , means that the CJ has 25 participants or more. No means that the CJ has less than xx participants.
Total duration (in days)	The duration of the CJ in the given total number of days.
Long*	Binary recoding of the total duration (in days) variable. Yes , means that the CJ lasted for four days or more. No means that the CJ lasted for less than four days.
Design integrity	The procedural criteria which ensure that a process is perceived as fair by the public and in line with principles of good practice. The coding of this variable is due to a subjective evaluation of the CJ 's ability to follow design ideals and provide solid facilitation during the process.
Top design integrity*	Binary recoding of the design integrity variable. Yes , means that the CJ fulfills all criteria defined by the OECD. No means that the CJ failed to meet one or more of the criteria listed by OECD.
Face-to-face	Measures if the final recommendations were discussed face-to-face with the public authority. Yes , means they were discussed, no means they were not.
Level of government	Refers to the level of government where the CJ was conducted. Can be either of the following: Local, Regional, National, Transnational.

Local level of government*	Binary recoding of the level of government variable. Yes , means that the CJ was arranged at the local level of government. No means that the CJ was arranged at a different level of government (Regional, National or Transnational).
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Supplement B, Good Practice Principles

Table B-1: Good practice principles framework

Good practice principles for deliberative processes for public decision making

Purpose: The objective should be outlined as a clear task and is linked to a defined public problem. It is phrased neutrally as a question in plain language.

Accountability: There should be influence on public decisions. The commissioning public authority should publicly commit to responding to or acting on participants' recommendations in a timely manner. It should monitor the implementation of all accepted recommendations with regular public progress reports.

Transparency: The deliberative process should be announced publicly before it begins. The process design and all materials – including agendas, briefing documents, evidence submissions, audio and video recordings of those presenting evidence, the participants' report, their recommendations (the wording of which participants should have a final say over), and the random selection methodology – should be available to the public in a timely manner. The funding source should be disclosed. The commissioning public authority's response to the recommendations and the evaluation after the process should be publicized and have a public communication strategy.

Representativeness: The participants should be a microcosm of the public. This is achieved through random sampling from which a representative selection is made, based on stratification by demographics (to ensure the group broadly matches the demographic profile of the community against census or other similar data), and sometimes by attitudinal context (depending on the context). Everyone should have an equal opportunity to be selected as a participant. In some instances, it may be desirable to over-sample certain demographics during the random sampling stage of recruitment to help achieve representativeness.

Inclusiveness: Inclusion should be achieved by considering how to involve under- represented groups. Participation should also be encouraged and supported through remuneration, expenses, and/or providing or paying for childcare and eldercare.

Information: Participants should have access to a wide range of accurate, relevant, and accessible evidence and expertise. They should have the opportunity to hear from and question speakers that present to them, including experts and advocates chosen by the citizens themselves.

Group deliberation: Participants should be able to find common ground to underpin their collective recommendations to the public authority. This entails careful and active listening, weighing, and considering multiple perspectives, every participant having an opportunity to speak, a mix of formats that alternate between small group and plenary discussions and activities, and skilled facilitation.

Integrity: The process should be run by an arms' length coordinating team different from the commissioning public authority. The final call regarding process decisions should be with the arms' length coordinators rather than the commissioning authorities. Dependent on context, there should be oversight by an advisory or monitoring board with representatives of different viewpoints.

Privacy: There should be respect for participants' privacy to protect them from undesired media attention and harassment, as well as to preserve participants' independence, ensuring they are not bribed or lobbied by interest groups or activists. Small group discussions should be private. The identity of participants may be publicized when the process has ended, at the participants' consent. All personal data of participants should be treated in compliance with international good practices, such as the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).

Evaluation: There should be an anonymous evaluation by the participants to assess the process based on objective criteria (e.g., on quantity and diversity of information provided, amount of time devoted to learning, independence of facilitation). An internal evaluation by the co-ordination team should be conducted against the good practice principles in this report to assess what has been achieved and how to improve future practice. An independent evaluation is recommended for some deliberative processes, particularly those that last a considerable time. The deliberative process should also be evaluated on final outcomes and impact of implemented recommendations.

Table B-1 presents the good practice principles as identified by the OECD. Source (OECD, 2020a, pp. 31–32).

Table B-2: Evaluation of good practice principles

Good practice principles for deliberative processes for public decision making

Case number	1	3	2	4	5	6	7	8
Purpose	Yes	Missing	Yes	Yes	Yes	Missing	Yes	Yes
Accountability	Yes	Missing	Yes	Yes	No	Missing	Partly	Partly
Transparency	Yes	Missing	Yes	Yes	Yes	Missing	Partly	Yes
Representativeness	Yes	Missing	Yes	Yes	Yes	Missing	Yes	Yes
Inclusiveness	Yes	Missing	Yes	Yes	Yes	Missing	Yes	Yes
Information	Yes	Missing	Yes	Yes	No	Missing	Partly	Yes
Group deliberation	Yes	Missing	Yes	Yes	Yes	Missing	Yes	Yes
Integrity	Yes	Missing	Yes	Yes	Yes	Missing	Yes	Yes
Privacy	Yes	Missing	Yes	Yes	Yes	Missing	Yes	Yes
Evaluation	Yes	Missing	Yes	Yes	Yes	Missing	Yes	Yes
Total	10/10	*Not evaluated	10/10	10/10	8/10	*Not evaluated	8,5/10	9,5/10

Note: Yes=1, Partly=0.5, No=0, Missing=not counted

* Due to missing documentation regarding the practice of principles, this principle has not been evaluated.

Table B-2 presents the evaluation the eight cases regarding their ability to fulfill OECD's good practice principles for deliberative processes.

Supplement C, Evaluation of Design Integrity

Table C-1: Framework for evaluation of design integrity

Framework for evaluation of design integrity	
<i>A) Clear and suitable process</i>	<p>a1) The deliberative process was commissioned for a suitable purpose, addressing a policy issue.</p> <p>a2) The mandate was clear, and it was clear how the recommendations will be used.</p> <p>a3) The deliberative process was connected to the broader political system or policy-making cycle.</p>
<i>B) Clear and unbiased framing</i>	<p>b1) The question addressed by the deliberative process was framed in a non-leading, unbiased, straightforward way, easily understandable to the wider public.</p>
<i>C) Suitable design</i>	<p>c1) The design choices of a deliberative process were aligned with its objectives.</p> <p>c2) The resulting process was in line with <i>OECD Good Practice Principles</i>, see Annex B For example.</p>
<i>D) Procedural design involvement</i>	<p>d1) Organizers had an established process to call for, respond to, and recognize comments from stakeholders regarding the deliberative process design.</p> <p>d2) A wide range of stakeholders representing diverse views had an opportunity to review the deliberative process design.</p>

d3) Experts in the policy area were consulted over the questions and the choice of evidence provided.

d4) Deliberative democracy experts (in-house or external) were consulted on process design.

e1) There were clear terms of reference, rules of engagement, codes of conduct, or ethical frameworks that govern the process. They were followed throughout the process.

e2) Information about the goals, design, governance of the process, funding source, civic lottery, and any other materials were published publicly.

e3) The design of the process was free of external interference.

f1) Everyone had an equal opportunity, via civic lottery, to be selected as a member of a deliberative process. (For example, all residents or eligible voters.)

f2) The final group of members was a broadly representative sample of the public (reflecting the demographic composition of a community, city, region, or country). (Anyone looking at the members could see ‘someone like me’ within the process.)

f3) Efforts were made to involve under-represented groups. (In some instances, it is desirable to over- sample certain demographics during the random sampling stage of recruitment to help achieve representativeness.)

E) Transparency and governance

F) Representativeness and inclusiveness

f4) Efforts were made to remove barriers to participation. The *OECD Good Practice Principles* identify remuneration of the members, covering their expenses, and/or providing or paying for childcare and eldercare as helpful ways to encourage and support participation.

Table C-1 presents the framework for evaluation of a MP's design integrity. Source (OECD, 2020a, pp. 18–19)

Table C-2: Evaluation of design integrity

Evaluation of design integrity

Case number		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
A)	a1)	Yes	*	Yes	Yes	Yes	*	Yes	Yes
	a2)	Yes	*	Yes	Yes	Yes	*	Yes	Yes
	a3)	Yes	*	Yes	Yes	Yes	*	Yes	Yes
B)	b1)	Yes	*	Yes	Yes	Yes	*	Yes	Yes
C)	c1)	Yes	*	Yes	Yes	Yes	*	Yes	Yes
	c2)	10/10	*	10/10	10/10	8/10	*	8,5/11	9,5/10
D)	d1)	Yes	*	Yes	Yes	Yes	*	No	Yes
	d2)	Yes	*	Yes	Yes	No	*	No	Yes
	d3)	Yes	*	Yes	Yes	Yes	*	No	Yes
	d4)	Yes	*	Yes	Yes	Yes	*	Yes	Yes
E)	e1)	Yes	*	Yes	Yes	Yes	*	No	Yes
	e2)	Yes	*	Yes	Yes	Yes	*	Yes	Yes
	e3)	Yes	*	Yes	Yes	Yes	*	Yes	Yes
F)	f1)	Yes	*	Yes	Yes	Yes	*	Yes	Yes
	f2)	Yes	*	Yes	Yes	Yes	*	Yes	Yes
	f3)	Yes	*	Yes	Yes	No	*	Yes	Yes
	f4)	Yes	*	No	Yes	No	*	No	Yes
Evaluation of total design integrity		Top	*	High	Top	Medium	*	Medium	High

Note: * Due to missing information regarding the citizen's juries practice, a complete evaluation/score regarding its design integrity is not attainable.

Table C-2 presents the evaluation of cases concerning their level of design integrity.

Supplement D, Evaluation Links and Sources of Information About Cases:

Hyperlinks to evaluation documents and other sources of information concerning the cases of CJs studied are listed below.

1. Kingston citizens' assembly on air quality

Evaluation Link:

<https://www.kingston.gov.uk/downloads/file/419/rbk-citizens-assembly-on-air-quality-full-report>

2. Noosa Community Jury

No official evaluation document available

Other Sources of Information:

<https://participedia.net/case/4391>

https://ehq-production-australia.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/c88d343903988699f5a42e688f9f97a8a0f74/documents/attachments/000/027/543/original/Noosa_Community_Jury_Final_Report_August_2015.pdf?X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Credential=AKIA4KKNQAKIOR7VAOP4%2F20230530%2Fap-southeast-2%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Date=20230530T094225Z&X-Amz-Expires=300&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Signature=4814b007fa802af3a26dacf64e7111bd2a82a8586f9f74b1392737171296cb20

3. Green Wedge Management Plan Community Panel

Evaluation Link:

<https://hdp-au-prod-app-nil-participate-files.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/6915/4941/1901/Nillumbik-GWMP-ProcessReport-Dec2018-FINAL-web.pdf>

Other Sources of Information:

https://hdp-au-prod-app-nil-participate-files.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/2215/4941/2235/GWMP_Community_Panel_Report_FINAL.pdf

<https://participate.nillumbik.vic.gov.au/gwmp/community-panel>

https://hdp-au-prod-app-nil-participate-files.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/7815/4923/7794/Response_to_Panel_recommendations_-_Endorsed_18_Dec_2018.pdf

4. Leeds Climate Change citizens' jury

Evaluation Link:

<https://www.leedsclimate.org.uk/sites/default/files/REPORT%20V1.2%20FINAL.pdf>

5. Container deposit legislation in New South Wales, Australia

No official evaluation document available

Other Sources of Information

https://www.jstor.org/stable/4532648?seq=5#metadata_info_tab_contents

6. Local Environmental Plan Review Panel

No official evaluation document available

7. Capital Region Climate Change Forum

Evaluation Link:

<https://www.dropbox.com/s/31whkvfvw6kzrdj/CRCC%20Forum%20Report%20Final3.doc?dl=0>

8. Citizen's Jury on Land Management and the Natural Environment

Evaluation Link:

<https://external.parliament.scot/Communityresources/CEUS052019R01.pdf>

Other Sources of Information:

[http://whatworksscotland.ac.uk/wp-](http://whatworksscotland.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/SPCJComparingMiniPublicsScottishParliament.pdf)

[content/uploads/2021/02/SPCJComparingMiniPublicsScottishParliament.pdf](http://whatworksscotland.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/SPCJComparingMiniPublicsScottishParliament.pdf)

[https://www.agora-parl.org/sites/default/files/agora-documents/Follow-up analysis - Citizens' Jury on Land Management and the Natural Environment.pdf](https://www.agora-parl.org/sites/default/files/agora-documents/Follow-up%20analysis%20-%20Citizens'%20Jury%20on%20Land%20Management%20and%20the%20Natural%20Environment.pdf)

<http://whatworksscotland.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/SPCJLandManagement.pdf>

