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Marius Swane Wishman

Janus-Faced

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Doctoral thesis

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Norwegian University of Science and Technology
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1.1 Introduction

In North West Indonesia, 1976, GAM (Gerkan Aceh Merdeka: Free Aceh Movement) declared the independence of the province of Aceh under the leadership of Hasan di Tiro, a descendent of the last Sultan of the Aceh region. Initially the movement consisted of the remnants of an old religious network, with its roots in the old Sultanate and armed struggle against the Dutch. The resulting conflict lasted until 2005 and caused in an estimated 3,402 combat related fatalities after 1989 (Aspinall, 2009; Pettersson and Eck, 2018; Sundberg and Melander, 2013).

In Ethiopia in 1975, the Dirge regime tried to arrest the Sultan of Aussa. However, anticipating the move, the Sultan's son had already sent men to neighboring Somalia to train in guerilla warfare (Shehim, 1985). The Sultan evaded arrest and launched the Afar Liberation Front (ALF) organized around the men trained in Somalia. The heavy handed response of the Ethiopian military left over a thousand civilian casualties (UCDP/PRIO, 2021).

In 1960, in the newly formed Republic of the Congo (Léopoldville) (current Democratic Republic of the Congo), South Kasai declared unilaterally to have seceded from the nascent Republic under the leadership of traditional chief Albert Kalonji (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002). He then preceded to have his father declared the new Mulopwe, thus resurrecting the royal title of the Luba kingdom (1585-1889). His father promptly abdicated, handing the title to Kalonji (now styling himself Albert Ditunga, 'homeland'). South Kasai fought for independence for just over two years, provoking a campaign by the Congolese armed forces that at the time was characterized by UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld as an act of genocide (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002).

There is no shortage of examples where previously independent states are involved in outbreaks of organized violence. Yet, both in the media and in the academic literature, these examples are referred to as ethnic conflicts, and surprisingly little attention has been given to their connections to past statehood. On the other hand, there are also examples of old state institutions working for peace, mediation and reconciliation. For example, in Burkina Faso, the Mogho Naba of the Mossi kingdom of Ouagadougou served as a mediator following a coup in 2015 and apparently was instrumental in preserving the peace and return to civilian rule. (BBC). While his office does not hold any formal authority, it is traditional that anyone who seeks power

in Ouagadougou needs his symbolic approval, especially so during times of crisis. Like most monarchs in Europe, his role is politically neutral. This combination between considerable influence in lending legitimacy, and neutrality makes for an ideal mediator.

The nascent academic literature on organized violence and the legacies of past statehood reflects these diverging sets of examples. While some, in line with the examples given above, find a conflict inducing effect of past states (Englebert, Tarango and Carter, 2002; Paine, 2019), others argue that past experiences of statehood provides institutions that are peace inducing (Wig, 2016; Wig and Kromrey, 2018; Depetris-Chauvin, 2016). Yet, all but one of these articles conceptualize states in terms of currently (politically relevant) ethnic groups and the degree to which these groups have connections to past states. This risks excluding states that are not readily tied to a current politically relevant ethnic group. It further risks discounting experiences of statehood of groups who have lived as a part of states for hundreds of years, without being the dominant ethnic group. Additionally, this literature has been almost exclusively limited to Africa. The diverging conclusions in the literature could in part be a result of the paucity of quantitative data on past statehood. Studies have primarily made use of either the Murdoch map, which codes 'jurisdictional hierarchy' of ethnic groups, or the State Antiquities Index, which measures country level experiences of statehood (including from foreign rule). In summary, there is a need for more and better data, in order to answer the puzzle of whether there is a positive or negative association between state histories and organized violence. Potentially, both statements are true, but vary according to circumstances. In which case, what determines when and where past statehood is conflict inducing or peace inducing? How is organized violence shaped by the underlying topography of historical statehood?

This thesis seeks to answer that overarching research question, adding to our general understanding of organized violence. Increasing the general understanding of concepts that matter to society, and attaining knowledge in general, is an intrinsic goal of social science as a whole. The hope that better understanding the causes of organized violence will contribute to conflict prevention and de-escalation, is a further motivating factor for this thesis, however small or insignificant the real world impact on these processes may be.

The main argument of the thesis is that historical states can have both conflict inducing and conflict reducing effects depending on the type of con-

flict in question,[1] the number of historical state entities contained within the boundaries of modern countries, and the distance between where the pre-colonial state was present and the post-independence capital.[1] Specifically, when historical states are located far from the capital, they provide *symbols of sovereignty* that can be used to mobilize for violence and *local elite networks* that have the ability to violently protect their interests against the central government. When located near the capital, historical state legacies provide a foundation on which modern states can be built. By providing legitimacy and institutions such as an experienced security apparatus, pre-colonial states can significantly limit violence when it breaks out in the capital.

The number of historical state entities within a country matters because the more of these there are, the more likely that one or more of them will be located in a remote part of the country (and thus be conflict inducing). Furthermore, increasing the number of potential claims-making actors incentivises the government to punish (engage in conflict) groups that it would otherwise accommodate in order to prevent other groups from making similar demands, thus increasing the risk of conflict for all groups.

While historical state legacies may, in some circumstances, increase the risk of conflict, between non-state groups and the state, I argue they have a general peace inducing effect between non-state groups. Just like the modern state has incentives to prevent its citizens from killing each other and destroying each other's property (such activities represent a dead loss to tax income), historical states had the same incentives. As a consequence, historical state legacies provide local institutions and traditions of conflict resolution, as well as building trust between communities, which prevent outbreaks and escalation of communal violence. Where little or no historical state legacies exist, and the modern state is weak or absent, groups are limited to less effective mechanisms (such as intra group policing) to keep the peace. In other words, when it comes to *communal violence* there is an inverse relationship between historical state legacies and organized violence.

The thesis addresses the research question across four individual articles and contributes to the literature through novel theory building, and substantial data collection, which breaks new ground on a so far 'under-researched' part of the larger peace- and conflict research agenda. The thesis has contributed to two data projects. The Anatomy of Resistance Campaigns (ARC) and the Geo-International Systems Data (Geo-ISD). The ARC project col-

[1] African sample.

lected yearly data on 1,426 organizations engaging in maximalist dissent (non-violent and violent) in Africa from 1990 to 2015. The Geo-ISD geocodes the borders of independent states in Africa from 1800 to 1900, which are used to generate a measure of their respective historical presence per 0.5 X 0.5 degree grid cells.

In summary, the thesis finds that the historical legacies of statehood's relation to organized violence depend on:

1) Distance to capital. In Paper IV I find that more pre-colonial state presence is conflict inducing far from modern capitals, but conflict reducing when close.

2) The number of historical states within modern states. In Paper II we find that having more distinct historical state legacies is conflict inducing on the state level.

3) Type of organized violence. While both Paper II and IV find conflict inducing effects of historical state legacies on civil conflict, Paper III finds that the relationship to communal violence is the other way around. Paper III finds that the stronger the presence of pre-colonial states, the less communal violence an area experienced in the post-cold war period.

1.2 Existing literature

1.2.1 Correlates of civil war and non-state conflicts

Studies of civil conflict have found a number of correlates,[2] some more robust than others. For example, while democratization itself may be a violent process, intermediate regimes are most prone to civil conflict of all regime types and stable democracies are the least prone to such violence (Hegre et al., 2001; Goldstone et al., 2010). Oil and natural resource wealth have been found to increase the likelihood of conflict onset and the duration of conflict (Lujala, 2010; Lujala, Gleditsch and Gilmore, 2005; Lujala, 2008; Ross, 2006). In contrast to various measures of ethnic diversity, such as fractionalization, excluding ethnic groups from power reliably predicts conflict (Cederman,

[2]As opposed to *causes*, which will be discussed in Section 1.4.1.

Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013). Others have found that rough and mountainous terrain also predict conflict (Buhaug, 2010; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). The negative association between economic development and civil conflict is the most consistent finding of all in civil conflict studies, although the causal mechanisms underlying the relationship remain hotly debated. Poverty itself (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006), slow growth (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006) and negative income shocks have all been linked to increased risk of conflict.

Relative to the civil conflict literature, the literature on non-state violence is still in its infancy. Nevertheless, works have examined subjects ranging from electoral violence (Fjelde, 2020; Salehyan and Linebarger, 2014; Burchard, 2015), to rebel on rebel violence (Fjelde and Nilsson, 2012; Lilja and Hultman, 2011; Cunningham, Bakke and Seymour, 2012; Nygård and Weintraub, 2014). More closely related to this thesis is the literature that has examined communal violence.

The quantitative literature on communal conflicts has focused on structural causes that makes conflict more likely to trigger. In particular, climate and environmental factors have been shown to increase rates of communal violence (Turner et al., 2011). Both negative (Detges, 2017; Fjelde and von Uexkull, 2012; van Weezel, 2019; Petrova, 2022) and positive (Theisen, 2012; Witsenburg and Zaal, 2012) shocks to precipitation have been shown to trigger communal violence. Others have pointed to socioeconomic inequality (Fjelde and Østby, 2014; Peters, 2004), mixed legal systems (Eck, 2014), marginalisation and corruption (Benjaminsen and Ba, 2009), or statebuilding on pastoral lands (Hagmann and Mulugeta, 2008).

State based and communal violence have been the topic of numerous studies – state based more so than communal – but an emerging area of debate is the influence of historical legacies, which I discuss in the next section.

1.2.2 Historical legacies

The literature on the long term effects of past statehood can broadly be separated into the economic, political, and conflict outcomes, which I will briefly summarise below.

Economic legacies

There is a growing literature demonstrating how historical states and institutions still have lasting legacies today. Most of this literature has examined the effects of past statehood (Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman, 2002; Borcan, Olsson and Putterman, 2018) and institutions related to statehood (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013, 2018; Englebert, 2000) and largely agree on a positive effect of statehood and institutions (Nunn, 2020; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2016) on long term economic development. However, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002) argue that European colonialism lead to a 'reversal of fortunes' for the areas it affected. Poorer areas with less population density (areas less likely to be at the center of states), were less likely to be colonised early, 'deeply', and with European settlers (in part because of states more effectively resisting colonization). This led to a larger transfer of European institutional innovations, and consequently a reversal of economic fortunes whereby historically poorer areas developed more rapidly and became wealthier in the modern period (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2002). In an explicit attempt to synthesize the 'reversal' and 'persistence' of fortunes, Foa (2017) argues that the reversal of fortunes is subject to a threshold condition. The most developed states were able to resist colonization (China, Japan and Turkey), and instead engage in defensive modernization (adopting western political innovations and technology). Those just below the threshold suffered most at the hands of the colonizers, but have also seen the greatest post-independence rebound, both in political and economic terms (Foa, 2017). In large parts of Africa the Tsetse fly carries parasites that kill humans, horses and cattle. This has caused lower population densities and difficulties with state building, and some have argued this in turn has translated to lower economic activity today (as measured by night light density) in affected areas (Alsan, 2015). Overall, the assumption is that state institutions are beneficial for economic development, but that pre-existing state institutions may have impacted the ability of areas to more readily adopt modern (democratic) institutions.

Political legacies

A different branch of research has examined political implications of state legacies. Building on Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002), Hariri (2012) tests parts of the proposed mechanism and finds that more pre-colonial ex-

perience of statehood decreased the likelihood of being colonised, while it increased the likelihood of only being *indirectly* colonised. Furthermore, not being colonised, or being so indirectly, depresses post-colonial democracy (Hariri, 2012). Chlouba, Smith and Wagner (2021) find that exposure to early state development (pre-colonial) is associated with support for autocratic rule in Africa. Stasavage (2020) finds that states developed bureaucracies as a way to avoid relying on democratic institutions. Essentially, if the state could not rely on a bureaucracy to inform it of how much it could tax its population, it had to make political compromises with that population. Thus, states, such as China, who developed effective bureaucracies early on have been resistant to democratization (Stasavage, 2020). At a more local level, Wilfahrt 2018; 2021 has documented how areas and groups with pre-colonial experiences of statehood are better at distributing public goods equitably and efficiently, and are generally more likely to adopt non-group based legislation and politics. The actors themselves ascribe this to their history of cooperation (under the umbrella of pre-colonial states). This was even true in Senegal, the 'poster child' of French direct rule and dismantling of pre-existing institutions (Wilfahrt, 2021). This supports earlier works of Gennaioli and Rainer (2007*a*,*b*) who argue that pre-colonial political centralization facilitates the implementation of modernization efforts in rural ares.

Legacies of violence and contention

Living up to the second part of the quote attributed to Charles Tilly, 'War made the state, and the state made war.', past states can leave legacies of conflict. Historical levels conflict in Africa have been found to positively affect modern levels of conflict (Besley and Reynal-Querol, 2014), although the direction of the relationship does not hold in a global sample and depends on colonial experiences and wars of colonial liberation (Fearon and Laitin, 2014).

Similar to Clapham (1996)'s notion of limited statehood, another branch of literature has emphasized how African boundaries reflected colonial competition between European powers, rather than the local ethnic, geographic or political situation. For example, Alesina, Easterly and Matuszeski (2011) use the 'squigglyness' of international boundaries as a measure/instrument for whether the boundaries were drawn with local knowledge (endogenously), or not (exogenously). They find that straightness of international boundaries,

what they term artificial borders, are linked with lower levels of economic development. The presumed mechanism (which is not tested) is that artificial borders, borders drawn by an exogenous process, group together multiple ethnic groups and split others. Similar to arguments presented by Wimmer (2018) that state building facilitates linguistic unity, which is peace building and thus beneficial to economic development. The ethnic constellations in 'artificial states', on the contrary, make it difficult for the state to create a sense of nationhood and get people to work toward common goals. Englebert, Tarango and Carter (2002) test this more explicitly and find that states whose borders split ethnic groups more are more often involved in international disputes. They also find that countries whose boundaries group together ethnic groups with more different forms pre-colonial political organization,[3] are more susceptible to civil wars, political instability and secession attempts. Following Englebert, Tarango and Carter (2002) the conflict-literature has also uncovered links between ethnic partitioning and civil conflict (Ito, 2020; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2016), as well as links between resulting trans-border ethnic kin relations and conflict (Cederman et al., 2013; Salehyan, 2009; Weidmann, 2015).

A handful of recent studies have examined how legacies of statehood can shape violence and contention even to this day. Wig (2016) finds that African ethnic groups with more centralized pre-colonial institutions are less likely to be involved in ethnic conflicts. He argues that many of these institutions are persistent and that institutions reduce commitment problems by reducing uncertainty and imposing constraints on leaders (Wig, 2016). Similarly, Depetris-Chauvin (2016) finds that areas with more long run exposure to statehood have experienced fewer years of post-cold war conflict (of any type coded by the GED). He attributes this to these areas being better equipped with mechanisms to establish and preserve order and supports this by showing that individuals in countries with more state history are more favorable to state institutions and traditional leaders, and that such areas are more resistant to the conflict inducing effect of negative economic shocks (Depetris-Chauvin, 2016).

On the other hand, Paine (2019) examined ethnic groups in Africa organized as pre-colonial states (PCS-groups) and how they relate to non-PCS-groups. He finds that PCS-groups are likely to hold executive power, and

[3]As measured by the standard deviation of Murdock (1967)'s jurisdictional hierarchy index.

that while in power they tend to exclude other ethnic groups, increasing the risk of internal coups and civil conflict from other groups (Paine, 2019). Overall, he finds that non-PCS groups in countries with a PCS-group participated in major civil wars 4.9 times more frequently than non-PSC-groups in countries without a PCS-group. Indeed, of the thirty-two ethnic group-level major civil war onsets after 1989, thirty occurred in countries with a PCS-group.

Studying communal conflicts, Wig and Kromrey (2018) employ bargaining theory from state based conflict studies to demonstrate that institutions (like those stemming form former statehood) can provide credible non-violent bargains between groups. They find that the more institutions an ethnic group has, the better it is able to avoid conflict. They also find a conflict reducing effect of more inclusive, democracy-like, institutions (Wig and Kromrey, 2018).

1.2.3 Moving beyond the literature

As is evident from the introduction and the previous paragraph, there is considerable ambiguity as to whether legacies of historical statehood have a positive or negative impacts. Whether the outcome variable is long term economic development, chances for democracy, public goods provision, or levels of conflict and violence, findings remain mixed. This thesis seeks to address part of this puzzle by examining the relationship between state legacies and organized violence. The thesis moves the literature forward by showing that the relationship between past statehood and conflict is conditional. In Paper II, we find that *multiple* distinct state legacies within the same country can be conflict inducing. While Paper III establishes that the conflict inducing/reducing effect of pre-colonial states in Africa further depends on the type of conflict in question. Namely, that for communal violence the overall effect of pre-colonial statehood is conflict reducing. Finally, Paper IV identifies novel ways through which pre-colonial states in Africa can be both conflict inducing as well as conflict reducing.

Additionally, the thesis addresses some shortcomings of the existing literature by providing innovative new data on pre-colonial states (see Section 1.5), and using existing data in new ways.

1.3 Concepts

1.3.1 States

At the core of the thesis lies the concept of 'the state'. However, the term is ambiguous. Three of the four individual articles in the thesis use a specific operationalisation, derived from Butcher and Griffiths (2019) and Butcher and Griffiths (2017), but the concept merits further discussion than what the article format allows. The subject of the thesis requires a definition that is broad enough to include African and Asian states in the nineteenth century and modern European states. It needs to be flexible to changes in how we think of the state across time (even in Europe, states were very different from today), as well as across space. At the same time it needs to draw the line at some point to say what is not a state. To this end the thesis employs Clapham (1996)'s three dimensions of the state as a guiding principle, which allows assessing degrees of statehood along three axes.

The first dimension of the state is the *administrative*. The ideal of this dimension is an organization (government) which exercises sovereign jurisdiction (the final legal arbiter) over a given population and territory. To exercise this sovereignty, the government controls a coercive apparatus (military and police forces), which is usually financed by taxing the population. In return, modern states are usually expected to ensure the welfare of their population (externalities, health, security, education etc.). A state in this sense may be more or less able to control its population, and more or less able to provide welfare.

The second dimension of the state is the 'idea of the state' as constructed in the minds of at least those who run it, but usually also a portion of the population living within a state. This construction provides legitimacy for its institutions and its use of coercive force (governmental legitimacy), and for who, or where it should rule (territorial legitimacy). Today most states draw their governmental legitimacy, their right to rule, from claiming (more or less truthfully) to rule on behalf their citizens through democratic principles.[4] Historically, various forms of religious justification have been the norm (divine right of kings in Europe, the mandate of Heaven in China, or rulers claiming to be gods or dependents of gods themselves). Claims to territorial legitimacy (or lack thereof) usually rest on a mix of historical

[4]Even the most blatant autocracies make this claim (Fukuyama, 2014).

precedence and the principle of national self determination. Past claims include rights to inheritance, religiously based rights to world conquest, or the infamous 'white mans burden'. The 'idea of the state' and legitimacy is key to ensuring compliance with minimal use (or threat) of coercion (Buzan, 2007).

The third dimension of the state is the system of international recognition, wherein states recognise each other and respect (or even protect) each other's sovereign territories. In the current globalized world, international recognition has become essential to participate in international transactions. States that are lacking in the first and second dimensions of statehood can lean more on the international system through aid (both from other states but also non-state actors) and ideology. Prior to the twentieth century, multiple international state systems existed. Even as late as the nineteenth century, what mattered to most Muslim rulers was recognition by the Caliph in Istanbul, not what the kings or queens of Europe had to say on the matter. Similarly in East Asia, China (the Middle Kingdom) was at the center of its tributary-based international system, while South East Asia was organized in the Mandala state system (bor Hui, 2005; Kang, 2010; Spruyt, 2020,?).

States can conform to each of these three dimensions to a greater or lesser extent. In other words, states have an overall degree of statehood, but also variation in terms of the individual dimensions. Poor performance in one dimension can be compensated, but only partially, and by strong performance in another. Taiwan for example, has a robust and well functioning state apparatus, and is de facto in undisputed control of its territory, enjoys a high degree of legitimacy and compliance among its citizens, but struggles with a lack of full international recognition. Israel has a high degree of administrative statehood, and enjoys recognition from the most relevant actors (the exception being several Muslim majority countries), but is viewed as largely illegitimate among many Palestinians, who represent roughly 20% of its population. Somalia (and other so-called 'failed states') fare poorly across all three dimensions of statehood. The Somali government barely functions in and around the capital, let alone the rest of its sovereign territory. Its government is viewed as corrupt and illegitimate. Its borders do not reflect the settlement of the Somali ethnic group, lacks any historic president, and are the product of exogenous factors (external diplomatic negotiations). What little claim to statehood Somalia has rests almost exclusively on the international system.

Clapham (1996)'s argument is that post-independence Africa represents

a new model of statehood, where statehood rested almost exclusively on the international system. They were in large part created by (large and important wars of de-colonization notwithstanding) and eventually sustained by the international system. At the very least their *extent* was. This amounted to a novel form of limited, or artificial statehood. I argue that this process is not unique to Africa. In Asia too, Europeans created colonial states, and left countries with limited degrees of administrative statehood and vague 'ideas of state'. The thesis build on this notion of partial statehood in two ways. First, it addresses one of the reasons modern states might struggle to create 'ideas of state', namely, multiple, competing state traditions. Second, it examines and attempts to provide a measure of the extent of past administrative statehood (see section 1.5.2).

Historical state entities and pre-colonial states

At this point a further clarification of the terms 'past states', 'pre-colonial states', and 'historical state entities' (the term used in the second article of the thesis) is needed, as I have used these terms more or less interchangeably in this Introduction chapter. The reason they are used interchangeably is that they do refer to the same *concept*. However, they apply to different *contexts*. Specifically, I use 'pre-colonial states' in the context of Africa, where the majority of states were at some point colonized (with the exception of Ethiopia and Liberia). The other two terms are used in the global context and refer to states that now form parts of sovereign states. The term 'Historical state entities' refers to the operationalisation used in the second article of the thesis, which is further restricted to the time period of (1816-1939).

1.3.2 Maximalist dissent and organized violence

Another key concept of the thesis is collective action; people cooperating in a more or less organised fashion to a achieve more or less common goals. Organizing in such a way is harder than it might seem. Olson (1965) and Tullock (1971) emphasise the difficulty of overcoming the barriers to collective violent action and the free rider problem. For example, organizing to overthrow a despised dictator involves substantial risks, while the benefit for successfully overthrowing him befalls equally to everyone, regardless of participation. In particular, this thesis is concerned with two partially overlapping forms of collective action, namely *maximalist dissent* and *organized violence*. Figure

1.1 illustrates how these forms of collective action relate to each other, and the following discussion will provide more details.



Figure 1.1: Categories of violence and dissent

Maximalist dissent

A central concept in the first article of the thesis is maximalist dissent. The concept builds on Tilly (1978)'s definition of collective dissent as observable action involving multiple people, beyond normal institutional procedures for realizing political goals. This could include anything from strikes, sit-ins, shirking, large scale demonstrations and other non-violent tactics, to riots, terrorism or armed rebellion. It does not include acts of dissent executed in an individual capacity, acts that lack clear political goals and acts within institutional political bounds (regular functioning of political parties, lobbying, electoral participation etc.). The second part of the concept, maximalist, refers to the political goals of the act (event). The definition builds on the criteria used by the NAVCO 1 data set, which only includes resistance campaigns where the objective was maximalist (i.e. regime change, secession, or self-determination) as opposed to limited (i.e. greater civil liberties or economic rights) (Chenoweth and Shay, 2019). The ARC data (presented in

Paper I) clarifies this further as demands that call for changes in the political structure that would significantly alter the executive's access to state power, the rules with which executives are selected, or the policy or geographic areas for which the executive has the right to make laws (Butcher et al., 2022).

While the remaining articles of the thesis are concerned with organized violence, most of which represent the violent part of the spectrum of maximalist dissent (more on this below), the literature on the non-violent forms of dissent has informed the thesis in a number of ways as well. Understanding how, and when, nonviolent forms of dissent work and when they do not can help us understand when and why people choose to pick up arms and use violence. Several studies find that nonviolent dissent (or resistance) has a higher success rate than violent dissent in achieving maximalist political goals (Chenoweth, Stephan and Stephan, 2011; Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008) such as regime change and democratization (Celestino and Gleditsch, 2013; Bethke and Pinckney, 2019). Why then do some actors still chose violence? Part of the answer could be the size of the target audience (Gleditsch et al., 2021). Mass mobilization is necessary for nonviolence to be successful. Goals that benefit a large part of the population, such as overthrowing an unpopular autocratic regime, facilitate mass mobilization. In comparison, groups who appeal to more narrow bases such, as self determination for an ethnic minority, find mass mobilization difficult. For such groups then, non-violence may not be effective, and so they pursue their goals by violent means instead (Gleditsch et al., 2021). Economic structures could matter as well (Butcher and Svensson, 2014). A substantial literature is also arguing that repression of nonviolent campaigns or protests, can cause escalations to violence, although there is conflicting evidence (Chenoweth, Perkoski and Kang, 2017; Lichbach, 1987).

Furthermore, a key reason for employing the term maximalist dissent is that there is no sharp dividing line between violent and nonviolent forms of dissent. In her study of the civil war in El Salvador, Wood (2003) highlights how rebel groups cooperated and worked closely with civil society, and how individual rebels shifted between violent and nonviolent forms of dissent. Many predominantly nonviolent movements have violent wings, who increase the likelihood of violent escalation – especially if the nonviolent campaign fails to make progress (Ryckman, 2019). In Paper I we found that rebel groups tend to organize in less developed, oil rich countries, while trade unions, student organizations and other civil society organizations tend to dissent in more developed countries. This suggest that perhaps some thresh-

old of development needs to be met in order for countries to have sufficiently well organized civil society and trade unions to organize for non-violent campaigns. Perhaps cross national (geographically) and cross societal networks across civil society must be present similar to what Wimmer (2018) argues. Conversely, rebel organizations can form relatively locally, especially where opportunity costs of rebellion are low (low development) and potential gains are considerable (oil rich country).

Organized violence



Figure 1.2: Yearly number of civil conflicts per region

There are many forms of organized violence, most of which are captured by maximalist dissent. I follow the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (hereafter UCDP) and Melander, Pettersson and Themnér (2016) in treating organized violence as the aggregation of the mutually exclusive typologies of one-sided, non-state and state-based violence. One-sided violence is violence committed by formally organised non-state groups or governments against unarmed civilians. State based violence is what one usually thinks of as armed conflict, or simply war. More accurately, it is armed conflict where at least one side is a government (and the other is not unarmed civilians). This includes inter

state conflicts (conflict between states), extrastate conflict (decolonization-conflicts), intrastate conflicts (conflicts within states, i.e. civil conflicts) and internationalised internal conflicts (intrastate conflicts in which at least one party receives troops from another state). Non-state violence is violence perpetrated by named organizations (criminal organizations, political parties, rebel groups etc.) or identity groups (ethnic or religious groups), against one another (without the involvement of government). Non-state violence therefore is seldom maximalist dissent, although clashes between political parties or politicised ethnic groups could be potential borderline cases.

This thesis focuses on two forms of organized violence: civil conflict (which includes intrastate and internationalised internal conflicts) and communal violence.[5]



Figure 1.3: Civil conflict combat related deaths (log-transformed) after 1989.

[5]Historical state entities could matter for interstate conflict. For instance in cases where the borders of historical state entities cross international boundaries, old borders could form the basis of claims making and disputes, such as with the borders of the former empire of Bornu (Hariri, 2012). However, as in the case of Bornu, such disputes can be solved peacefully in international courts. Additionally, three of the four papers rely on an African sample and the continent have seen only one interstate conflict and no extrastate conflicts in the time period covered in the papers.

Communal violence is organized lethal violence between identity groups. These groups can identify along tribal, national, clan, religious, ethnic lines, or any other source of identity but are not permanently organized for combat, in other words not rebel groups, formally organized militias, or state coercive apparatus. A key difference between communal conflicts and civil conflicts is that both parties are, at least nominally,[6] subject to the higher authority of the government. For further discussion of the concept of communal conflict see Brosché and Elfversson (2012). While events that trigger such conflicts can be often be relatively minor (theft, trespassing, illegal grazing etc.) this type of violence tends to quickly spiral through reprisals and counter reprisals and can generate large death tolls and often far larger displacement (Horowitz, 2001).

1.4 Theoretical framework

1.4.1 Theoretical traditions

There is a substantial body of literature explaining the occurrence (and reoccurrence) of civil conflict. I broadly divide this literature into three overarching traditions that continue to inform not only the works presented in this thesis, but in most of the academic literature on civil conflict. This literature can be traced back to a handful of classic studies in the 1960s and 1970s. Gurr (1970)'s theory of relative deprivation and the related 'revolution of rising expectations' (Davies, 1962) focused on how widespread individual discontent laid the ground for revolution (Section 1.4.1). This *grievance* tradition of civil conflict was met with critique from the likes of Charles Tilly and others, who instead argued that rebellion happened when there were opportunities for it (Section 1.4.1). A more recent branch of the literature builds on models from microeconomics via international relations theory. Starting from the assumption that both parties are (usually) best served with a non-violent bargained solution, this tradition focus on the situations in which bargaining none the less breaks down, or the exception when conflict becomes a rational choice (Section 1.4.1). It should be mentioned that these traditions are by no means mutually exclusive, and throughout the thesis I draw on each of them where one might be more illuminating than another. Overall

[6]Gray areas include areas outside de facto state control, or cases where one side acts with government impunity or backing.

Paper II mostly draws on opportunity arguments, but also bargaining and grievances (low development). Paper III primarily draws on bargaining and opportunity models, and Paper IV relies partly on grievance models, but also opportunities and bargaining.

Grievance

The grievance model of civil conflict originated with Gurr (1970) and Davies (1962) who emphasized the discrepancy between expectations of rising living standards and the reality of stagnation or even worsening conditions. They argued that this *relative deprivation* among large contingents of society is what drives civil conflict. This was later expanded on to include structural inequalities as well (Muller, 1985; Muller and Seligson, 1987; Scott, 1977). For example, the labor class may experience relative deprivation when they see the wealth they are generating for the capitalist class, and as a result take up arms.

Responding to the criticism of the opportunities tradition (covered below in Section 1.4.1), another branch of the grievance literature shifted the focus to group level mechanisms, moving away from strict Marxist or materialist explanations at class or country level. For example, Hechter (1978) argued there was a cultural division of labor, and that civil conflict occurred when cultural and economic groups coincide. Others emphasized competition between ethnic groups for scarce resources (Barth, 1969). Horowitz (1985)'s case studies demonstrated how ethnic groups can garner intense feelings of belonging, collective self-esteem, and group worth, and that ethnic conflict was not just competition for scarce resources, but *also* for political influence. He anticipated the literature on horizontal inequality by stressing the role of cognitive comparisons between groups as a mechanism for ethnic conflict. Despite the scale of Horowitz's study, there was still a lack systematic empirical support for the idea that grievances (group level or not) could lead to civil conflict. The drive to address this gap was lead by Gurr and the minorities at risk (MAR) project (Gurr, 1993*a*). In response to Tilly's earlier critique he also added some opportunity to the general argument of grievance in the resulting work (Gurr, 1993*b*).

In response to the lack of explanatory power of commonly used measures in the quantitative literature on ethnicity and civil conflict like ethnic fractionalization (Alesina et al., 2003; Posner, 2004) and polarisation (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005), a more recent branch of the grievance literature

has turned to disaggregation in an effort to tighten the logic of causal inference. This literature has examined the role of interpersonal grudges and local score settling in civil violence (Kalyvas, 2006, 2008), as well as the role of moral outrage at government injustice and a sense of doing the right thing (Wood, 2003). Reflecting earlier work by Barth (1969), others who expressed scepticism of how ethnic identities were used as analytical units in civil conflict research, they argued that ethnic defection is more common than previously assumed (Kalyvas, 2008; Staniland, 2012), and that ethnic identities are essentially undetectable or too fluid be of analytical use (Gilley, 2004; Chandra, 2006). What is more, the state is not ethnically neutral (Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013). Using data from the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR hereafter) project, Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug (2013), building on previous quantitative efforts (Gurr, 1993*b*; Goldstone et al., 2010) were finally able to put grievances on a solid empirical footing by finding that horizontal ethnic grievances do increase the likelihood of conflict (Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013).

Opportunities

The main criticism of the grievance literature was the lack for empirical support for grievance based arguments (Oberschall, 1978; Brush, 1996). Specifically, there seemed to be a discrepancy between the proliferation of grievances and relatively rare events of civil conflict (Snyder and Tilly, 1972; Tilly, 1978; Skocpol, 1979). Instead, this branch of the literature argues that civil conflict occurs when groups are able to overcome collective action problems (Larson and Lewis, 2018). Thus, research should (according to this branch of the literature) be focused on finding and examining the contexts in which this happens.

Seemingly unaware of the critiques that came before them, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) explicitly framed their paper around the 'Greed versus grievance' debate and forcefully reiterated the previous argument that if grievances caused civil war, then civil conflict would be equally widespread. Instead, they painted a picture of civil conflict being driven by cynical and greedy conflict entrepreneurs, arguing that conflict occurs when the potential economic gains from rebelling outweigh the associated risks. By the time they revisited their initial article, their framing had become more nuanced, using the term *opportunities* in the place of greed (Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner, 2009). Yet, the fundamental argument and criticism of the grievance motivated literature

remained largely unchanged. Also writing from the perspective of opportunities, Fearon and Laitin (2003) emphasized how fighting in peripheries, rough terrain, state weakness, and corruption due to oil evened the odds in favor of rebel groups, making them able to challenge the state. Like Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner (2009), Fearon (2004) nuanced their initial stance in their follow up work on civil conflict duration, echoing Weiner (1978)'s 'Sons of the soil', they argued that concentrated peripheral ethnic groups react violently to perceived incursions. This highlights that these sets of traditions (grievance, opportunities and bargaining), are not closed categories. Demonstrating a similar duality, Weinstein (2005) argued that natural resources provide opportunities for short term rewards. While in resource poor surroundings, rebel leaders must make credible promises of future rewards based on political reform, which is similar arguing that rebel leaders must address economic grievances (while still employing the theoretical lens and language of opportunities models).

Bargaining

Fearon (1995) and Powell (2006) introduced bargaining theory to international relations. This set of theories starts with the assumption that war is costly and unpredictable for all parities. Further assuming that actors are rational, the parties to a disagreement should be able to come to a bargained solution short of war, to be determined by their relative military capabilities. Fearon (1995) outlined three basic reasons conflict might nonetheless occur, aside from breaking or loosening the rationality assumption. Pillar (1983) and Walter (2002, 1997) and others, introduced bargaining theory to the civil conflict research,[7] and highlighted how characteristics of civil conflict can exacerbate the three sources of bargaining breakdown.

First, (asymmetric) information problems. Parties have incentives to misrepresent information about their (military) capabilities, as the outcome of the bargain depends on the relative capabilities (more relatively capable then your opponent equals a better deal). The asymmetry between the information about ones own capabilities and that of the opponent could lead rational actors to miscalculate and cause bargaining breakdown by demanding too much or rejecting offers that would be otherwise acceptable.

Second, commitment problems. In the absence of a third party arbiter

[7]See Walter (2009) for a review of bargaining literature.

and enforcer, parties have incentives to renege on any bargain that is struck. This is because if one party demobilizes and the other does not (reneging on the deal), the other gains a clear advantage. Thus striking a bargain can be difficult without mechanisms to ensure that parties make credible commitments (such as a third party enforcer, or institutional mechanisms). This is (usually) true both in the anarchy of international relations, but also of civil conflicts. What makes matters worse in internal conflict is that, unlike interstate conflicts, only one side usually disarms (rebels) as part of a negotiated settlement. This makes commitment difficult because once a rebel group lays down its arms, it is essentially at the mercy of the governments. Additionally, the government is often fighting multiple rebel groups, which means that accepting the demands of one group sends a signal of weakness to the others (Cunningham, 2006). This incentivises the government to avoid such settlements and instead push for military victory, and to generally signal willingness to resort to violence as a means to deter the other actors from making claims (Walter, 2006, 2009). Furthermore, rebel groups can easily fracture if some commanders are not satisfied with the result of the settlement, thus discrediting the credibility of rebel group commitments (Cunningham, 2013). I got to see this 'first hand' when coding the origin variable of numerous rebel groups for the ARC project where it felt like the vast majority of the rebel groups I coded were the result of some splinter, usually following peace talks. Indeed, Paper I finds that rebel groups are more likely to splinter relative to other types of organizations engaging in maximalist dissent.

Third, issue indivisibility. If the issue of the disagreement does not lend itself to compromise, for example the issue of slavery in the American civil war (you cannot have just a little slavery), finding a bargain that reflects the relative capabilities is difficult. Interstate conflicts over territory can (at least in theory) be resolved by territorial concessions matching the relative capabilities of two warring states. On the other hand when rebel groups fight for secession or regime change, finding some level of concessions that match the relative capabilities becomes much more difficult because of the winner-takes-all nature of the issues common to civil conflicts (Toft, 2005, 2002).

1.4.2 The Janus face

Drawing from these theoretical traditions, I build a new theory of how historical states shape conflict and peace in the modern world. The main argument

of the thesis, and its main theoretical contribution, is that the relationship between historical statehood and organized violence is conditional. On the one hand, it can be a force for peace, but on the other it can be a source of conflict. This conditionality helps make sense of the seemingly contradictory findings in the existing literature. The conditions determine which of mechanism become relevant, as outlined in Figure 1.1.

Condition	**Mechanism**	**Outcome**
Number and far from capital	Symbols	Conflict
	Claims making groups	
	Colonialism, democracy and weak statehood	
	Elite networks	
Near to capital	Security apparatus	Peace
Type of violence	Enforcement of contracts (in the past)	
	Resolution of disputes (in the past)	
	Forceful reduction of internal conflict (in the past)	

Table 1.1: Mechanisms and modifiers

Despite having lost their sovereignty, old states do not disappear without a trace. This thesis rests on the argument that historical states can leave behind symbols, elite networks, institutions and a legacy of reduced intercommunal violence.

I use the term 'symbols' as a deliberately vague term to describe the practical application of the collective memory of historical states. In other words, when the collective memory of some past state is invoked by someone to serve some purpose, it is used as a symbol. The purpose of using such a vague term is that different states can produce different collective memories, which can be used by different actors in different ways. 'Symbols' is thus

meant as a catch all term for something that is too complex to disaggregate (at least in the context of this thesis). Primarily, such symbols are useful for generating group cohesion (potentially by delineating a clear in group as opposed to the out group) and for conferring legitimacy.

The cultural-, economic-, political- or religious elites that states produce, rarely disappear along with the sovereignty of the state. Instead, they are either incorporated into the new state, or are transformed to regional or local elites. As evidenced by a number of case examples throughout the thesis, the social networks of these elites can be remarkably stable over time, and can span multiple generations.

Institutions often survive into new states as well, either as formal or informal institutions. 'Institutions' is once more a purposefully vague term which can describe leaders, courts, councils, laws et cetera. I generally follow North (1991, 97)'s definition of institutions as '..the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditionsm and condes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights).' The reason for using such a vague term is, as with symbols, to capture a general, yet distinct, phenomenon that is too complex to disaggregate.

None of these legacies are inherently conflict inducing. While symbols can be used for mobilization, they can just as well lend legitimacy to the central state, or facilitate public goods provision through shared identities. The organizational capacity of elite networks and institutions can be used for both violent mobilization or better governance. However the effects of historical state legacies are conditional, and these legacies only become conflict inducing, or peace promoting, in combination with other factors, which I discuss below.

Distance to capital

The distance between the capital and a pre-colonial state matters because it proxies the relationship between the pre-colonial state and the central, or post-independence state, and the relative military capabilities between them. If a pre-colonial state is close to the capital there is a good chance that its institutions, elites and main ethnic group are well represented in government, if not its main component.[8] In other words, it is unlikely that the potential

[8]For example, most of the North African states Merina in Madagascar or Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso.

conflict inducing capabilities of the pre-colonial state will be used against the central government (Wucherpfennig, Hunziker and Cederman, 2016). Instead it is a potential source of peace promoting mechanisms such as legitimacy, institutions such as an experienced security apparatus, and institutions useful for bargaining.

On the other hand, far from the capital, the relationship between pre-colonial state elites, institutions and ethnic groups more likely takes the form of a center-periphery cleavage (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). In this scenario, institutions, elite networks and unifying symbols of a past statehood can translate into potential to mobilize against a central government. For example, rebel groups use the symbolism and collective memory of past states as focal points for mobilization. This is often displayed prominently in the names of various rebel organizations,[9] or is a common feature of their manifestos or ideological writings. What is more, states create hierarchical, or vertical, social networks that often persist for generations, long past the death of the state. In a new state, former national elites become new regional elites. Given the increased likelihood of indirect rule, regional elites created by past states are often more autonomous. Recent work by Ying (2020) suggests that one source of conflict outbreak is when the state expands its influence into areas which previously enjoyed regional autonomy. The vertical nature of these social networks also makes them better able to mobilize (Goist and Kern, 2018; Staniland, 2014).

Crucially, being far away from the capital evens the relative capabilities between prospective challengers and the state, which increases the danger of miscalculation (Boulding, 1963). This danger is exacerbated by the fact that information deteriorates over distance as well, further increasing information asymmetries.

Past statehood gives peripheral groups opposing the central government another key advantage over other groups. Given the importance of the sovereignty principle in the international system,[10] wherever there are historical states, their past sovereignty can form the basis of claims making for ethnic groups tied to past states. What is more, states can both create and spread ethnic groups over large geographical ares, and thus potentially be the source of politically relevant ethnic groups in multiple countries.

[9]Examples include The Macina Liberation Front, Al Mourabitoun, Cyranecia Liberation Army and the Free Ache Movement.

[10]Article 2.1 of the United Nations Charter reads: 'The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.'

Number of HSEs

The number of historical state entities within the boundaries of a modern state matters for two reasons. First, more historical state entities increases the likelihood that one or more of them are far from the capital and thus might trigger the above mentioned mechanisms. Second, it adds two conflict inducing mechanisms of its own. Having more areas with such qualities within the boundaries of a country, in and of itself raises the likelihood that one or more of them will eventually challenge the state. However, in addition it creates an incentive for the government to signal toughness and resolve (as explained in Section 1.4.1). The second mechanism is that, where strong states existed they more often resisted colonization, and when they were colonized were more likely to be ruled indirectly (Englebert, 2000; Gerring et al., 2011; Hariri, 2012). This meant that such ares were more likely to preserve existing autocratic ways of rule, and to a greater extent resisted the influence of western ideas of democracy and modern bureaucracy (Foa, 2017; Hariri, 2012). Thus they circumvented the peace inducing effect of democracy, and were left with less effective institutions.

Conflict type

Finally, the effect of pre-colonial statehood does not have the same effect across categories of organised violence. As elaborated in Section 4.3.1, communal conflicts are distinctly different from civil conflicts. For one they are horizontal rather than vertical in nature. So while pre-colonial states affect the relationship between groups with ties to that state and their central government in one way, it might change the ways the people within that pre-colonial state interact with other groups in quite different ways. Specifically, in Paper III, we argue that in their domain, states leave a legacy of reduced intergroup violence, through enforcing contracts, resolving disputes, and forcefully reducing internal conflict when necessary. In other words, the pre-colonial state facilitated bargaining between groups by acting as an arbiter. The initial reduction sets in motion a positive feedback loop of increased interaction and trade between groups, which makes punishing spoilers[11] individually, rather than collectively, possible. The stronger the

[11]Someone whose individual gains of spoiling the bargain (peace) exceeds that of continued cooperation. In the absence of intergroup interaction, a member of one group can commit crimes, such as a cattle raid, against the other group, and hide in anonymity

presence of the pre-colonial state, the more effective the initial reduction of the security dilemma and commitment problem between groups, and thus the larger the degree of intergroup interaction and trade, further reducing the information problem. In the paper we even show that pre-colonial state presence positively correlates with ethnic fractionalization. This is consistent with our hypothesis that pre-colonial states have reduced communal violence in the past, and that this has indeed facilitated increased intergroup interaction to the point that groups feel safe enough to settle amongst each other.

1.5 Analytical approach

The analytical approach of this thesis is quantitative in nature, and seeks to uncover generalizable (across the relevant sample), probabilistic relationships. Doing so requires statistical data, and much of the novelty of this work lies the data assembly that was done as part of this thesis. Both as part of the ARC project, released as Paper I of this thesis, but primarily the Geo-ISD which forms the basis of papers III and IV. The following sections will focus on the latter.

1.5.1 Data on historical statehood

As mentioned previously, the literature on the legacies of historical statehood has been limited by the availability of data on historical statehood. Most previous studies use a combination of two sources (with some efforts to build on these), namely the Murdock map (Murdock, 1967) and the State Antiquity Index (Bockstette and Putterman, 2012). While both have unique shortcomings, a common weakness is that they miss a substantial number of historical state entities, particularly in Africa. Second, neither contain accurate data on where the included states were present. The Murdock map (Murdock, 1967) only provides a measure of the 'stateness' of ethnic groups.[12] Tying this measure to the geographical settlement of ethnic groups (past or present) builds on the assumption that the degree of centralised institutions

amongst his own group. Any punishment by the aggrieved party will, in the lack of means to identify the thief, be carried out collectively against his group, and so communal conflicts ensue.

[12]Measured as jurisdictional hierarchy ranging from none to kingdom and Empire.

(jurisdictional hierarchy) affected the whole ethnic group (and equally so). The State Antiquity Index for its part aggregates state histories to current country level. This is problematic because it is not clear that the all of the pre-colonial states of Ethiopia, both minor Galla states, the Afar emirate of Aussa and the central Amhara state, all contributed to the modern state of Ethiopia's experience of statehood. This is addressed by applying weights based on rough estimates of the proportion of the modern country controlled by each pre-colonial state. The differences between native and colonial state experience, and variations across time (duration of the state) are also addressed using a weighting scheme. The country level of the data furthermore does not allow for testing subnational dynamics.

Paper II rectifies three of the common shortcoming in the literature on historical statehood and civil conflict (Griffiths and Butcher, 2013). First, the ISD is a global sample, and thus avoids the African bias in this literature. Second, and partially related, we move beyond ethnic groups as the unit of analysis. Third, the ISD identifies far more states than comparable data efforts,[13] and does so starting from a definition of state that does not require Eurocentric conditions such as recognition by one or more European power (Griffiths and Butcher, 2013).

Building on the State Antiquity Index, Depetris-Chauvin (2016) (to my knowledge) represents the only previous attempt to create a measure of historical state presence disentangled from ethnic groups and current countries. However, as with the State Antiquity Index and Murdock map, his data only contains the most well known African states. While avoiding aggregating to current country boundaries, the data is nevertheless highly aggregated at a 2°by 2°grid cell level.[14] Finally, the data do assume that states have uniform control, or degree of presence, across a constant set of 'hard' boundaries for half century periods (Depetris-Chauvin, 2016).

The Geo-ISD seeks to build on the advance made by Depetris-Chauvin (2016) in creating a measure of historical statehood that is untangled from ethnic groups and modern boundaries, by making use of a grid cell representation of state presence. In addition, the Geo-ISD seeks to address the three shortcomings of the existing data, namely: number of included African states, high level of aggregation, and assumption of uniform state presence across territory.

[13] 439 unique states.

[14] Approximately 222 by 222 kilometers at the equator.



Figure 1.4: The number of independent states per year.

1.5.2 Geo-ISD: moving beyond two dimensions

Prior to the globalisation of the Wesphalian model, drawing a discrete line on a map is not an accurate way to depict what is, and is not, part of a state. The extent of states would vary according to their ability to project military power outside an alluvial core, surrounded by a large, permeable frontier. State penetration into the frontier was in the form of relations with groups, ranging from tributary, through allied or hostile to extracting 'protection' payments from the state (Scott, 2009). In fact, by some accounts the vast majority of people lived outside states until at least 1600 (Scott, 2017, 2009). In many parts of the world, this was still the reality in the nineteenth century (Scott, 2009). Boundaries between states, where they occurred, were usually in the frontiers of each state, where neither would have full control. Any attempt to depict the geographic extent of states in such a pre-Westphalian state system should take this gray-area of the frontier into account. A more accurate representation would be a gradient of statehood that fades into the frontier, for most of Africa and Asia in the nineteenth century, roughly conforming to concentric circles extending from a core area. The Geo-ISD creates such a measure of statehood, which captures geographic extent, in

addition to depth, termed 'state presence'.



Figure 1.5: Pre-colonial state presence (normalized per pre-colonial state)

As the name implies, the Geo-ISD builds on the identification work of the ISD, and follows its definition of state. To this, the Geo-ISD adds geocoding of state presence for Africa. To construct this measure, the Geo-ISD primarily relies on historical maps from the David Rumsey project, covering the 1800-1914 period, complimented by historical atlases compiled by later historians. The maps from the David Rumsey project typically depict the 'current' political state of affairs to the best of European map makers knowledge. We would then use QGIS to trace the borders of any states that were included in the ISD V2 for the year that the map depicted. We then summed the resulting polygons per PRIO-GRID cell. In this way the Geo-ISD leverages the variations in the knowledge and the differences in the conceptualisations of statehood that led the map makers to draw the political lines on the map exactly where they did. For example, one might include vassal states as part of a kingdom, while another would not, and yet others would include some vassals, but not others depending on the relationship to their liege. The pre-Westphalian international system had ample grey areas for such variation to manifest. Indeed, there is an almost continuous range

of possible degrees of sub state autonomy, from core areas of states, to being subjugated in name only. Nevertheless, all maps should agree on where the core areas of states were, and moving away from the core, gradually fewer maps would consider these peripheries as part of the state. Similarly, the cases where mapmakers disagree on whether or not some realm qualified as a state, reflects that it lacked the institutions or political centralization to have much presence as a state. By aggregating, we leverage both these variations in conceptualizations of statehood as well as variations in *actual state presence* over time, as kingdoms' and empires' influence waxed and waned.

The end result is a three dimensional,[15] continuous measure that I argue more accurately depicts the pre-Westphalian international system in Africa from 1800 to 1914. Figure 5.3 in Paper IV displays the resulting data.

Additionally, the Geo-ISD also provides information on borders that I do not analyze in this thesis. For example, a measure of 'frontierness', the degree to which an area has had one or more borders crossing it (Figure 1.6), or a measure of 'borderlandness', the degree of overlapping sovereignty (how often *more than one* state's borders cross an area)(Figure 1.7). Both of these measures represents potential avenues for future research, together with other potential uses of the raw polygon (state-shape) data, all of which I plan to publish along with Paper IV.

Of course, there are a number of potential issues surrounding the accuracy of the historical maps. For example, the potential biases of mapmakers, technical ability to produce reliable maps, as well as alternative methods for aggregating to grid cell level are covered in Paper IV. Additionally, as noted by Brecke (1999) data on historical conflict and historical statehood are inexorably linked because states are more likely to leave historical records, including records of conflicts.[16] This relationship could still be true, that areas of pre-colonial statehood are still more likely to record conflict events. Especially small scale events are likely to be missed by data collection efforts (Pinker, 2012), but perhaps less so in areas of past statehood. At least that means that it should affect the measure of number of events more so than the number of fatalities.

[15]Latitude, longitude and 'depth'.

[16]The Appendix of Paper I deals with this at length.



Figure 1.6: 'Frontierness', the number of borders (square root transformed).



Figure 1.7: 'Borderlandness', the number of border overlaps (square root transformed).

1.6 Article summaries



Figure 1.8: Overview of the papers

1.6.1 Paper I: Introducing the Anatomy of Resistance Campaigns (ARC) Dataset

Published in: **Journal of Peace Research**
Co-authored with: **Charles Butcher, Jessica Maves Braithwaite, Johnathan Pinckney, Eirin Hauseth and Ingrid Vik Bakken.**

While the literature on resistance campaigns has long emphasized the role of organizations in overcoming collective action problems, mobilizing for campaigns, and effecting the outcome of campaigns (Braithwaite and Cunningham, 2020; Brancati, 2016; Butcher and Svensson, 2014; Celestino and Gleditsch, 2013; Chenoweth, Stephan and Stephan, 2011; Haggard, 2016; Tarrow, 2011), until recently there has been little data on organization types,

goals and the connections between them. Paper I is a data release paper for the Anatomy of Resistance Campaigns project (ARC-project), which seeks to address this lack of organization level data. In it we present detailed data on 1,426 organizations that engaged in maximalist dissent in Africa during the 1990-2015 period. The data covers 17 organization features including type, goals, leadership, origin and social base, in addition to ties to other groups (see Table 2.6 for full list of features). This allows the mapping of inter organizational networks of alliances (horizontal) and fronts (vertical).

The paper also tests correlates of organizational participation, and finds that rebel groups tend to mobilize in poor countries while trade unions, student organizations and other civil society groups are more common in developed countries. These results are in line with both opportunity costs and poverty as grievance explanations of civil conflict (Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner, 2009; Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1970). They also support modernization theories of democratization (Butcher and Svensson, 2014; Dahlum, Knutsen and Wig, 2019). In terms of interconnectedness the article finds that rebel groups (perhaps unsurprisingly) tend to cooperate amongst each other, rather than with other types of groups.[17] Political parties, trade unions, and civil society organizations tend to form fronts and cooperate with one another, while religious organization cooperate more narrowly with other civil society organisations.

1.6.2 Paper II: Beyond Ethnicity: Historical States and Modern Conflict

Published in: **European Journal of International Relations**
Co-authored with: **Charles Butcher**

In Paper II we argue that the more historical states that are confined within the boundaries of a country, the more likely civil conflict onsets become. This is because each historical state entity has four potential mechanisms leading to civil conflict, and the more there are, the more likely it is that one or more mechanism triggers. First, historical states created elite networks useful for insurrection. Second, they provide symbols of past sovereignty that are likewise useful for overcoming collective action problems. Third, states

[17] To the degree that other groups cooperate with rebel groups they tend to do so clandestinely rather than overtly. Thus, it is difficult to capture and perhaps underrepresented in the data.

generated and spread modern ethnic groups that, once part of a larger state, activated dynamics of ethnic inclusion and exclusion. Fourth, states were typically more able to resist colonization than non-state areas. The stronger the state, the more autonomy they were able to hold on to. However, resisting colonization also meant resisting the forced introduction of western institutions, which in the long run, have had peace inducing effects. We also find that conflict onsets are more likely when historical state capitals are located far from the current capital, and the effects are stronger in less developed countries. We argue that the latter is due to more developed states being better able to incorporate other states.

For the analysis we used the ISD version 2 which records independent states between 1816 and 1939, where 'independent state' is defined as a polity with more than 10,000 people, autonomy over a specific territory and uncontested or recognized external sovereignty (Butcher and Griffiths, 2020). For determining which current country historical states are in, we use the approximate location of the historical state capital, also included in the ISD, supplemented with data from the World Statesmen database of traditional states. A key benefits of using the ISD is its global coverage and that it does not select on ethnicity, both of which are features that several studies in the field lack.

1.6.3 Paper III: Communal Violence and the Legacy of Pre-colonial States

Co-authored with: **Ole Magnus Theisen**

Paper III addresses how pre-colonial state presence affects communal conflicts. Unlike for civil conflict, we find that state legacies have a conflict reducing effect on communal violence. We argue that pre-colonial states initially reduced the security dilemma and commitment problems between groups by forcefully reducing intergroup violence and acting as a third party enforcer of contracts. This initial reduction of violence allowed for virtuous cycles of increased interaction and trade between groups, which reduced information problems and increased the long term pay off of cooperation relative to the short term pay off of defection. We find empirical evidence of this mechanism in the form of increased ethnic fractionalization in areas with more pre-colonial state presence. This indicates that pre-colonial states, de-

spite their shallow presence relative to modern states, did allow for a greater degree of interaction between groups. The finding that pre-colonial states reduce communal violence is also consistent with the argument in the literature that conflict reducing institutions have been persistent in many cases (Wig and Kromrey, 2018). This is the first paper to use the Geo-ISD data on pre-colonial state presence.

1.6.4 Paper IV: After Forever: Pre-colonial States and Civil Conflict

The last paper of the thesis is the one that most directly addresses the overarching research question of the thesis of how historical state legacies affect long term levels of organised violence. By using the pre-colonial state presence measure from the Geo-ISD, this paper compliments Paper II of the thesis in two ways. First, it re-examines the relation between pre-colonial states and civil conflict, but at a grid cell level, as opposed to country level, and by using a continuous measure of state presence (rather than a count). Second, like in Paper II, I emphasize the distance to the current state capital. However, Paper IV goes beyond that by examining how distance to the capital and pre-colonial state presence *interact* to affect civil conflict both to reduce and induce violence. I argue that pre-colonial state presence has a conflict reducing effect when close to the post-independence capital because the short distance means that traditions, elite networks and elite cohesion and institutions can more easily be integrated into the central state. The paper finds that the conflict reducing effect of pre-colonial state presence in and around capitals is particularly strong when it comes to minimizing violence when it breaks out. On the other hand, far from the capital, I argue along the lines of Paper II, that the networks, symbols, ethnic group dynamics, and institutions left by pre-colonial states are more likely to be used to oppose the central government. The typical example of this would be campaigns for increased autonomy or outright secession claiming the right to self determination based on past sovereignty. Distance to the post-independence capital also makes rebellion more feasible as the governments ability to project force deteriorates over distance. The more even relative capabilities also make miscalculations more likely, especially given that information asymmetries likewise increase with distance. I find that higher levels of pre-colonial state presence is indeed associated with higher levels of conflict (as measured by

number of combat related deaths or number of conflict events per cell), far from the capital and with lower levels close to the capital. Moreover, I find that higher levels of pre-colonial state presence drastically reduce the level of violence near the capital after an initial combat related fatality. In other words, when violence breaks out in capitals with no pre-colonial state presence, it can cause fatalities in the tens of thousands, perhaps indicating that pre-colonial provides states with some resilience to such events.

1.7 Concluding remarks

This thesis addresses the question of how organized violence is shaped by the underlying topographies of statehood. Under which circumstances are state legacies peace inducing and under which circumstances are they conflict inducing? I find that historical state legacies are civil conflict inducing when there are multiple legacies in one country and particularly in poor countries and when they are far from the central state capital. On the other hand, pre-colonial state presence reduces civil conflict in and around central capital areas. Especially when violence does break out in the capital, pre-colonial state presence acts as a substantial violence reducing factor. I argue that the relationship between the central state and the historical, or pre-colonial state, is what determines the outcome, and that the distance only proxies whether or not the central state is able to benefit from a state legacy or whether it represents a rival claim to sovereignty. In Paper III we find that when it comes to the horizontal conflicts of communal violence on the other hand, pre-colonial state presence is generally peace inducing when it comes to communal violence.

In addition to the contribution to the theoretical and empirical literature, the thesis also makes a considerable contribution in the form of data, in the from of data on organizations engaging in maximalist dissent (ARC Project), and on the presence of pre-colonial states in Africa from 1800 to 1914 (Geo-ISD).

In terms of practical implications, the findings presented in this thesis can help political actors understand the conditions under which historical statehood can be peace or conflict inducing. Areas of historical statehood cannot be re-located of course, but the way in which historical states are integrated into a modern state can be changed. Particularly, political actors should view historical statehood as a potential resource, rather than a hindrance to

central authority.

Papers II - IV all present plausible causal mechanisms for the observed correlations between historical state legacies and organized violence, supported by anecdotal examples that demonstrate plausibility. However, more qualitative research or more detailed statistical data is needed to further test the mechanisms, and potentially discover new mechanisms as well.

While Paper II uses a global sample, the literature on historical state legacies remains skewed toward examining the African case. This is perhaps not surprising, given Africa's history of colonialism, which provides a sharp, and highly visible, divide between the pre-colonial and post-colonial. For many, I suspect that it is self evident that areas with unique histories of independent statehood, sometimes stretching back over a thousand years could be hot spots of conflict. After all, some were ruled by a skeleton crew of colonial administrators (Englebert and Dunn, 2013) for less than a century, and upon independence found themselves ruled from distant capitals, at times by pre-colonial adversaries or ethnic groups with who they had little or no previous contact. However, the same narrative fits parts of Asia as well (India, Myanmar, Indonesia etc.). Even in Europe, areas of formerly independent states have fostered movements for autonomy and separatism,[18] although most of these have pursued their goals through constitutional means (as we allude to in Paper II). More research along the lines of Paper III and Paper IV is needed to determine if these results are generalizable, or of this is a uniquely African phenomenon.

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[18] In the United Kingdom: Scotland and Wales. In Spain: Aragon, Catalonia, Navarra (Basque), Asturia and Castille. France: Brittany and Corsica. Germany: Bavaria. Italy: Friuli, Trieste, Sardinia and Venetia. Russia: Tartaristan, Don Republic, Circassia, Tabasaranstan. Ukraine/Russia: Crimea (Tartan).

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Introducing the Anatomy of Resistance Campaigns (ARC) Dataset

Abstract

We introduce the Anatomy of Resistance Campaigns (ARC) dataset, which records information on 1,426 organizations that participated in events of maximalist violent and nonviolent contention in Africa from 1990-2015. The ARC data disaggregate episodes of contention into their organizational components and inter-organizational networks, containing 18 variables covering organization-level features such as type, age, leadership, goals, origins, social bases, and inter-organizational alliances. These data facilitate new measurements of key concepts in the study of contentious politics, such as the social and ideological diversity of resistance episodes, in addition to measures of network centralization and fragmentation. This paper outlines the core concepts underpinning the ARC data, the data collection method, and descriptive statistics that illustrate trends in organizational participation over time and how organization types vary in their main features. The paper also provides initial evidence that structural factors correlate with the participation of some organization types, but not others. Finally, we show how organization types cluster together or repel each other during periods of contention. The ARC dataset can resolve existing debates in the field and opens new avenues of inquiry in the study of contentious dissent. It should be useful to scholars of violent and nonviolent contention, repression and dissent, along with researchers aiming to understand the dynamics of revolution and democratization.

This paper was co-authored with Charles Butcher, Jessica Mavis Braithwaite, Jonathan Pinckney, Eirin Haugseth and Ingrid Vik Bakken, and published in Journal of Peace Research (2022) 59(3): 449-460.

Most resistance movements are comprised of organizations that mobilize people, make tactical decisions, issue demands, and accept or reject concessions (Haggard and Kaufman, 2016; Metternich et al., 2013; Braithwaite and Cunningham, 2020; Cunningham et al., 2017; McAdam, 2010; Tarrow, 2011). Organizations often head transitional regimes, assume power after post-conflict elections, and re-mobilize when democratic institutions are threatened (Haggard and Kaufman, 2016; Wood, 2000). However, we lack systematic cross-national data on dissident organizations spanning a variety of tactics, goals, and group identities.

This matters because organizational dynamics are often central to theories of the onset, dynamics, and outcomes of violent and nonviolent resistance campaigns (Bethke and Pinckney, 2019; Brancati, 2016; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Celestino and Gleditsch, 2013; Huang, 2016; Schaftenaar, 2017; Thurber, 2019; Sutton, Butcher and Svensson, 2014; Svensson and Lindgren, 2011; Belgioioso, 2018). Empirical analyses, however, usually depend on broad indicators of contention summarized over a campaign or campaign-year (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011), which leaves uncertainty around whether the theorized mechanisms drive observed effects (Schock, 2005). Case studies show that resistance campaigns involve complex networks of organizations and social groups (Metternich et al., 2013; Schock, 2005; Osa, 2003) and demonstrate – with detailed assessments of actors and their characteristics – that the features of these organizations and networks help explain tactical choices, campaign outcomes, and democratization (Pearlman, 2011; Thurber, 2019; Nepstad, 2011; Schock, 2005; Wood, 2000; Collier, 1999). Yet, it is difficult to generalize these findings to a larger sample of cases.

The Anatomy of Resistance Campaigns (ARC) dataset provides information on 1,426 distinct organizations across 3,407 organization-country-years associated with events of 'maximalist' collective dissent in Africa from 1990-2015. ARC includes information on organization types, origins, leadership, mobilization bases, goals, network ties, relationships with the state, and more. These data enable detailed observations of actor- and network-level characteristics across a large sample of cases, allowing scholars to unpack the organizational composition of resistance campaigns and their network structures. The ARC data can help answer lingering questions: how do ideological diversity and unity (through fronts and alliances) impact campaign outcomes and post-conflict institutional change (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Bayer, Bethke and Lambach, 2016; Celestino and Gleditsch, 2013)? Are some campaigns more resilient to repression than others because of their network

structures or the nature of participating organizations (Sutton, Butcher and Svensson, 2014; Siegel, 2009)? How do coalitions evolve through periods of institutional reform – especially democratic transitions (Pinckney, 2020)? To the extent that data availability shapes theoretical horizons (Gleditsch, Metternich and Ruggeri, 2014), ARC can stimulate additional research questions in myriad areas.

2.1 Core concepts in ARC

The ARC dataset focuses on *organizations* that participated in acts of *collective dissent* for goals of *maximalist* change. *Organizations* are structures designed to cohere people and resources - often through collective action - to pursue common goals (North, 1990; Daft, 1992, 2). The presence of a formal structure (however thin the hierarchy) intended to aggregate individual efforts towards a defined goal distinguishes organizations from broad social categories such as "students," "protesters," or the "working class." We discuss our operationalization of this concept in a subsequent section.

Collective dissent is observable action involving multiple people, beyond normal institutional procedures for realizing political goals (Tilly, 1978). This ranges from demonstrations and strikes to rebellion and terrorist attacks, while excluding actions lacking a clear political goal and everyday or institutional political activities such as lobbying politicians or electoral participation. Organizations engage in collective dissent when they deploy their mobilization infrastructure to encourage individual participation in these events.

We define *maximalist* demands as calls for changes in the political structure that would significantly alter the executive's access to state power, the rules with which executives are selected, or the policy or geographic areas for which the executive has the right to make laws. Examples of maximalism include demands that a head of state resign via a non-institutional method, for democratization in autocratic settings, to enfranchise an excluded social group, and for regional or ethnic autonomy or independence.[1]

Maximalist demands exclude calls that fall short of altering these fundamental aspects of executive power, such as improved human rights protections or changes in public spending. Demands by a disenfranchised group

[1] A series of borderline demands and their treatment can be found at the ARC project website.

for better protections can be addressed with legislation that typically does not change the process for deciding who holds executive power or who has lawmaking authority. Demands for enfranchisement of that excluded group are maximalist because – if implemented – they would include a new group in the process of deciding who holds executive power.

2.2 Relationship to existing datasets

ARC is distinct from existing resources because it provides information on the features of organizations that participated in nonviolent *and* violent dissent, while also going beyond self-determination or ethnonationalist movements (Wilkenfeld, Asal and Pate, 2011; Cunningham, Dahl and Frugé, 2020), or armed rebel groups (Pettersson and Öberg, 2020; Harbom, Melander and Wallensteen, 2008; Braithwaite and Cunningham, 2020; Stewart, 2018; Cunningham, 2013; Svensson and Nilsson, 2018; Cunningham, Skrede Gleditsch and Salehyan, 2009). Events datasets often identify participating actors, but lack information on their features (Chenoweth, Pinckney and Lewis, 2018; Chenoweth, Hendrix and Hunter, 2019; Salehyan et al., 2012; Clark and Regan, 2021; Raleigh et al., 2010; Chenoweth, Hendrix and Hunter, 2019). The Revolutionary and Militant Organizations Dataset does provide information about resistance organizations but seems to oversample on violent organizations (75% of REVMOD organization-years are rebel or terrorist groups) and does not account for relationships between organizations (Acosta, 2019). ARC is unique in capturing inter-organizational ties that help us understand network structures in resistance episodes.

2.3 Creating ARC

To construct the ARC dataset, we first identified organizations that participated in events of maximalist collective dissent and then recorded information on the features of those organizations. To maximize transparency and replicability, coding decisions at each step were recorded in RMarkdown files.[2]

[2]Markdown files available on request.

2.3.1 Identifying participants

Participating organizations were identified by drawing on five events datasets: the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (Sundberg and Melander, 2013), the Social Conflict Analysis Dataset (Salehyan et al., 2012), the Mass Mobilization Dataset (Clark and Regan, 2021), the Armed Conflict Location Event Dataset (Raleigh et al., 2010), and the NAVCO 3.0 data covering African countries (Chenoweth, Pinckney and Lewis, 2018). Together, these datasets provide a comprehensive catalogue of nonviolent and violent collective dissent across Africa. We began by creating a list of *candidate* maximalist events by sub-setting on variables related to dissident demands and a customized text-matching string.

We then determined whether event participants made maximalist demands and whether one or more named organizations participated by conducting newswire searches in FACTIVA and LexisNexis using a targeted search string. Event IDs from the events datasets are stored with the organization-year observations in ARC, allowing users to integrate variables from events data with ARC.

We added the constituent organizations of "fronts" according to a "three year" rule. Fronts are distinct, umbrella organizations coordinating the actions of member organizations. Some projects like the UCDP treat fronts as unitary actors, but this obscures variation in the preferences and features of member organizations. However, always treating fronts as decentralized organizational networks can be impractical - and empirically inaccurate. Fronts often become more unified over time (or they split apart) but systematically determining when a front ceases to consist of semi-autonomous groups and becomes a single organization is extremely difficult. We adopted an arbitrary but empirically informed rule to resolve this issue, whereby member organizations of a front were added as participants when those organizations had been members of the front for three or fewer years. Member organizations were identified in newswire databases, primary and secondary sources, and through an iterative process when information on their features was collected by coders. A more detailed description of the rules for coding fronts can be found in the codebook.

This three year rule means that some organizations may be included that were relatively new members of fronts but did not participate in protests, or played only a peripheral role. However, we argue that this risk is outweighed by the inclusion of organizations that often participate in protests

but are overlooked by news media, such as local human rights organizations, women's organizations and youth groups. Since front participants are identified through newswires *and* primary and secondary sources, our inclusion criteria is less subject to media biases and provides a new, more comprehensive picture of opposition networks.

2.3.2 Coding organization features

This process produced a list of organizations linked to events of dissent. Organization-years of maximalist dissent were then generated from the events data and a team of coders recorded information on the features of participating organizations. Some variables are constant across organization-years (e.g. "birth date"), while others are dynamic. Organization-years were only coded when organizations were identified as participating in collective dissent with maximalist demands in a given year. Organizations often continue to exist when they are not participating in dissent; however, their non-participation means these observations are omitted from ARC. Constructing a full panel for organizations between 1990-2015 is not possible for this reason and because we do not record if and when organizations cease to exist (versus entering into abeyance). Table 2.6 summarizes several organization-feature variables in ARC.[3]

ARC includes information on two types of ties between organizations: fronts and alliances. Front ties connect a constituent organization to a higher-level organization (a front) when the constituent organization is formally a member of the front, or its leaders participate in the front's leadership.[4] Organizations identified by the aforementioned "three year" rule have front ties to the main front.

Alliance ties connect two or more organizations that declared they were coordinating resistance activities, or sources indicated that organizations coordinated efforts, but they did not form a standalone organization (front) to manage coordination. Fronts and their constituent organizations can have alliance ties with non-front organizations. For example, in Malawi in 1993, the Public Affairs Committee (PAC, a front of CSOs and religious groups) allied with the Alliance for Democracy (a political party), which was not

[3]The full codesheet can be found in the supplementary materials.

[4]In some cases, fronts themselves become constituent organizations in higher-level fronts. In this case, we only include ties from constituent organizations to the closest-level front in the hierarchy.

Table 2.1: Organization-level variables

Variable	Description	Format
Type	Categorization of organization type	Categorical
Birthdate	Date organization was founded	Date: dd-mm-yyyy
Origins	How organization formed	Categorical: (Splinter, Merger, Other)
Goals	Primary organization goals	Open text
Size	Membership size in year	Numeric
Size Estimate	Approximate size	Ordinal
Leadership	Leader name/gender	Open text
Leadership Tenure	Date leader assumed position	Date: dd-mm-yyyy
Leadership Ties	Did leader serve at a high level in previous governments?	Categorical: (Yes/No)
Social Base	Main social group(s) in organization	Open text
Social Media	Extent of social media use	Categorical: (None, Some, Significant)
State Rel.	Relationship with state at t-1	Categorical
Formal Ties	Ties with other active organizations	String: Organization IDs
Structure I	Clear leadership/decision-making structure?	Categorical: (Yes/No)
Structure II	Characterised as 'decentralised'?	Categorical: (Yes/No)



Figure 2.1: ARC ties example

part of PAC. Users can assemble alliance-pairs with these front and alliance variables to explore factors driving inter-organizational ties.

Figure 2.1 illustrates these ties. The organization at the bottom-center has alliance ties to two other organizations and is a member of a front. That front is also a member of another front.

Our method for identifying organizations may create bias. Participation is coded when newswires identify named organizations engaged in maximalist dissent. Journalists may view some organizations – especially political parties and trade unions – as more deserving of a proper noun. Parties are skilled at attracting media attention and might be over-represented in reporting. Urban organizations may also be over-represented because events in cities receive more media coverage than events in rural locations (Kalyvas, 2004; Eck, 2012; Day, Pinckney and Chenoweth, 2015).[5] Media biases could affect

[5]Urban organizations may also be more frequent participants because organizations

inferences drawn from ARC, so robustness tests such as those from Weidmann (2016) are recommended.

Maximalist demand-making is strategic and may occur after prior campaign-building, after high levels of past participation in non-maximalist protest, or when repression offers 'no other way out' (Goodwin, 2001) – factors that independently generate regime concessions or democratization (Brancati, 2016; Klein and Regan, 2018). Researchers should control for omitted variables capturing these selection processes wherever possible and inferences from ARC should be informed by the limitations of selecting on maximalist demands.

ARC is limited to African countries from 1990-2015 for practical reasons driven by overlap in available events datasets. However, by building on existing datasets, we augment those resources while also maximizing compatibility. African countries' histories of contention, civil society, and statehood are unique and context-specific and we direct readers to studies that provide useful background (Boone, 2003; Branch and Mampilly, 2015; Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Herbst, 2014; Mueller, 2018).

While inferences drawn from ARC only apply with confidence to the African continent, our method of building upon existing event-based resources is transportable to other regions, time periods, and non-maximalist dissent – extensions we plan to offer in the future.

Table 2.2 shows continuous measurements of ideological diversity and opposition unity generated from ARC and compares them to similar (but categorical) measures in the NAVCO 2.1 dataset (Chenoweth and Shay, 2019) from Egypt between 2003-2015. ARC also encompasses years of democratic transition, identifies more organizations, and enables new measurements of features such as organization age. Figure 2.2 shows a network map for Egypt in 2011, generated using front and alliance variables in ARC.

and collective action are more common in cities (Weidmann and Rød, 2018; Nicholls, 2008; Miller and Nicholls, 2013).

Table 2.2: Comparison of ARC and NAVCO 2.1: Egypt 2003-2015

	NAVCO 2.1			ARC			
Year	Religious diversity	Unity[a]	New orgs	No. orgs	Unity[b]	Diversity[g]	Mean age[c]
2003	Yes	Seemingly united	3	10	0.750		17
2004	Yes	Moderate disunity	11	7	0.710		17
2005	Yes	Moderate disunity	6	9	0.765		23
2006	NA	NA	NA	9	0.793		24
2007	No	Seemingly united	1	9	0.793		25
2008	No	Moderate disunity	1	2	0		40
2009	No	Moderate disunity	1	3	1		29
2010	No	Moderate disunity	3	13	0.701		21
2011	Yes	Seemingly united	3	41	0.850		9
2012	NA	NA	NA	64	0.843		11
2013[d]	No[f]	Seemingly united[e]	6	74	0.874		9
2014	NA	NA	NA	30	0.901		9
2015	NA	NA	NA	15	0.846		12

[a] Measured with the 'camp_conf_intensity' variable. [b] Measured as the network centralization score, which captures the extent to which a network coheres around (or is united by) one focal point (often a single front in our case). [c] In years for valid observations. [d] NAVCO 2.1 features three campaigns in 2013. [e] All three campaigns were 'Seemingly United.' [f] No religious diversity was recorded across all three campaigns. [g] Legend is visualised in the network map below. Organizations that don't fit into these categories are grey. Embedded numbers are fractionalization index scores



Figure 2.2: Egypt 2011[g]

[g]Node sizes are proportional to degree centrality. Ideological positions were generated with text-matching on the organization-goals variable (see Appendix). Named organizations have a centrality score over > 0.6 or an estimated membership size of more than 100,000

2.4 Descriptive statistics

Political parties and rebel groups[6] are the most common types of organizations in ARC. Figure 2.3 shows the number of organizations in maximalist dissent by year and country. Stretches of little dissent are sometimes followed by bursts (Burkina Faso), while the number of organizations in dissent escalates over time in other cases (Sudan). Some countries exhibit consistently high numbers of organizations in dissent (Ethiopia) while others are stable and low (Namibia).



Figure 2.3: ARC organizations over time and space

Table 2.3 shows how ARC variables vary across organization types.

[6]We use the term rebel group to characterize armed groups explicitly organized to challenge the state using violence; this does not require involvement in conflicts with 25+ battle deaths as with UCDP coding rules, but rather follows the logic of Lewis (2020).

Table 2.3: Features of Organization-Years in Resistance by Type

Type	N	N Unique Orgs.	Splinter	Size Estimate	Age	Included in Regime	Legal	# Ties	Female Leader	Decentralized	Alliances
Pol. Party	1143	532	0.27	3	6.51	0.08	0.7	1.2	0.02	0.05	NA
Trade Union	214	96	0.16	4	24.06	0.06	0.83	1.87	0.05	0.63	NA
Religious	101	42	0	3	32.85	0.02	0.95	1.38	0	0.63	NA
Student/Youth	69	27	0.09	3	17.62	0.03	0.55	1.52	0	0.25	NA
Front	262	157	0.01	3	2.01	0.03	0.33	6.67	0.06	0.87	NA
Other CSO	558	297	0.08	2	10.13	0.01	0.72	1.51	0.19	0.21	NA
Rebel	1004	273	0.4	3	7.63	0.02	0.03	1.32	0	0.26	NA
Other	44	26	0.2	3	9.65	0.02	0.5	1	0.13	0.25	NA
Missingness (%)			0.12	0.17	0.08	0.03	0.03	NA	0.12	0.01	0.01

All summary statistics are means except for the Size Estimate which is a median. *Included* measures whether the organization was formally or informally included in the governing coalition at $t-1$

Rebel groups and parties commonly split from other organizations. Rebel groups dissent for longer (3.6 years on average) and more continuously (they have the lowest variance around the mean participation year) than other organizations. Participation by other types of organizations in ARC is "bursty," perhaps concentrated around elections or other focal points. Trade unions tend to be large, old, and more connected to the state and other opposition organizations than most other organizations. As one would expect, fronts are the most highly connected, with ties to 5.67 other organizations on average. Only CSOs have moderate levels of female leadership. Decentralization is most common in fronts, religious groups, and trade unions.

2.5 Correlates of organizational participation

Different types of organizations should have distinct correlates of participation in resistance given their varied constituencies and goals.[7] We explore associations between socioeconomic factors and the number of organizations of different types active in maximalist dissent using Negative Binomial models for over-dispersed count data. Specifically, we examine inequality, economic modernization, industrialization, economic growth, natural resource wealth, democratic institutions, the number of other participating dissident organizations of various types and a lagged dependent variable. Past research highlights these possible explanations for participation in maximalist dissent (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005; Ansell and Samuels, 2014; Ross, 2001; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010; Haggard and Kaufman, 2016; Maves and Braithwaite, 2013; Aksoy, Carter and Wright, 2012).

Income inequality (and its square) is captured using Gini coefficients.[8] Economic development is measured with GDP per capita in constant 2000 USD, along with the GDP growth rate to proxy economic downturns. Value-added manufacturing as a % of GDP represents the strength of the industrial sector (Haggard and Kaufman, 2016; Butcher and Svensson, 2016) and oil revenues as a % of GDP proxy for natural resource dependency. We measure prior political institutions with the V-DEM Polyarchy score (Coppedge et al., 2019), as well as its square (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). Repression is measured with the Physical Violence Index, also from VDEM. These variables are lagged one year. The number of organizations of other types engaged in

[7] Models were run in R 4.0.2

[8] Data come from the World Bank unless indicated otherwise.

maximalist dissent in year t is included to explore patterns of co-participation across organization-types.

Table 2.4 presents our findings. Visualizations can be found in the Appendix. The results for economic development are striking. More rebel groups mobilize in poorer countries, while more trade unions, student organizations, and other CSOs dissent in more developed countries. Broad, labor-based civil society coalitions may be an important link in the chain from modernization to democracy (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Celestino and Gleditsch, 2013; Bayer, Bethke and Lambach, 2016; Dahlum, Knutsen and Wig, 2019; Boix, 2003). Movements underpinned by thinner, technology-driven networks may be more brittle (Weidmann and Rød, 2018). Oil dependency is associated with fewer trade unions, student groups, "other" organizations, and religious organizations engaging in maximalist dissent, but more active rebel groups. These models are a first, descriptive look at patterns of participation that say little about the deeper mechanisms, however. For example, structural factors may alter the underlying organizational ecology, drive participation in maximalist dissent directly, or activate other processes, such as splintering.

Structural variables appear to be poor predictors of the number of fronts in dissent. Coalition formation may occur after shorter term shocks related to food prices (Abbs, 2020) or severe repression events (Chang, 2008). This is worth investigating in future work. Models addressing censorship and international media coverage (in the appendix) do not indicate strong media biases across most organization types.

Table 2.4 also reveals patterns of organizational cross-participation. Parties mobilize with fronts, but alongside fewer rebel groups. Trade unions and CSOs dissent alongside one another and with more parties, religious organizations, and fronts. Religious organizations have narrower co-participation profiles, mobilizing alongside other CSOs. Student groups dissent alongside rebel groups, in addition to trade unions, religious organizations, and other CSOs. Rebel groups tend to act without high numbers of other types of organizations. Finally, fronts assemble many group types including parties, rebels, trade unions, religious organizations, and other CSOs.

These findings highlight the usefulness of ARC for (re)examining mechanisms highlighted in theories of social change, as well as the ability to uncover novel, previously un(der)theorized relationships.

	Political Parties	Trade Unions	Rel. Orgs	Student/Youth	Fronts	Rebel Groups	Other CSOs	Others
Oil (% GDP)	−0.01	−0.09**	−0.27**	−0.08*	−0.01	0.03***	−0.02	−0.61**
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.23)
Manufacturing (% GDP)	0.02	0.00	0.09	0.13***	−0.01	0.02*	0.01	0.07
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.07)
Polyarchy	7.19**	−2.23	17.24	1.76	2.79	−1.65	6.12	12.46
	(2.52)	(5.19)	(9.88)	(6.40)	(2.86)	(1.68)	(3.84)	(11.00)
Polyarchy ^{2}	−10.26***	0.42	−29.11*	0.31	−3.96	1.16	−5.76	−16.34
	(2.95)	(5.79)	(12.07)	(7.68)	(3.30)	(2.05)	(4.20)	(12.70)
Income Inequality ^{2}	0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Income Inequality	−0.03	0.10	0.11	0.20	0.09	−0.04	0.24	−0.43
	(0.09)	(0.18)	(0.28)	(0.22)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.13)	(0.27)
Log GDP per Capita	0.03	0.79**	−0.33	0.85**	0.12	−0.51***	0.58**	0.94*
	(0.13)	(0.26)	(0.41)	(0.33)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.18)	(0.47)
GDP Growth	0.81	−4.24*	−1.07	−0.42	−0.29	0.09	−1.28	4.66
	(0.87)	(1.87)	(3.21)	(1.97)	(0.94)	(0.53)	(1.39)	(4.06)
Physical Integrity Rights	0.02	0.33	0.30	−4.96**	−0.96	−0.40	−1.40*	−3.90*
	(0.46)	(0.92)	(1.70)	(1.55)	(0.53)	(0.33)	(0.71)	(1.76)
Year	0.01	0.04	0.14**	0.03	−0.01	0.00	0.08***	0.07
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Population (Log)	0.08	−0.28*	0.47	0.13	0.04	0.26***	0.39***	0.78*
	(0.07)	(0.14)	(0.30)	(0.20)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.34)
No. Political Parties		0.11*	0.31***	−0.01	0.19***	−0.01	0.10**	0.02
		(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.06)
No. Trade Unions	0.06		−0.01	0.28**	0.29***	0.00	0.39***	0.25
	(0.09)		(0.23)	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.20)
No. Rel. Orgs	0.15	0.23*		0.24*	0.15*	−0.18	0.41***	0.21
	(0.09)	(0.12)		(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.14)	(0.09)	(0.14)
No. Student/Youth Orgs	−0.07	0.44	0.02		−0.24	−0.28	0.61**	−0.20
	(0.23)	(0.28)	(0.55)		(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.23)	(0.37)
No. Fronts	1.71***	0.88***	0.38	0.16		0.11	0.93***	0.18
	(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.36)	(0.18)		(0.09)	(0.17)	(0.41)
No. Rebel Groups	−0.17***	−0.19	−0.18	0.25***	0.25***		−0.27***	−0.01
	(0.04)	(0.11)	(0.23)	(0.05)	(0.03)		(0.07)	(0.24)
No. CSOs	0.01	0.16***	0.51***	0.10**	0.09***	0.00		0.15**
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)		(0.06)
No. Others	−0.40*	−0.52*	−2.53***	0.01	−0.55***	0.12	−0.53*	
	(0.20)	(0.25)	(0.52)	(0.20)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.21)	
No. Political Parties (t-1)	0.11***							
	(0.02)							
No. Trade Unions (t-1)		0.33***						
		(0.10)						
No. Rel. Orgs (t-1)			0.47**					
			(0.17)					
No. Student/Youth Orgs (t-1)				0.38*				
				(0.18)				
No. Fronts (t-1)					−0.08			
					(0.09)			
No. Rebel Groups (t-1)						0.29***		
						(0.02)		
No. CSOs (t-1)							0.07*	
							(0.03)	
No. Others (t-1)								0.37*
								(0.19)
AIC	1918.39	606.68	334.35	270.20	798.84	1743.83	1018.85	177.61
BIC	2020.66	708.95	436.62	372.47	901.11	1846.10	1121.12	279.88
Log Likelihood	−938.19	−282.34	−146.17	−114.10	−378.42	−850.91	−488.42	−67.81
Deviance	592.27	202.48	85.70	128.22	359.43	699.10	332.07	84.89
Num. obs.	963	963	963	963	963	963	963	963

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$

Table 2.4: Correlates of Organizational Participation

2.6 Conclusion

The ARC dataset advances our understanding of anti-government mobilization and has many potential applications. ARC provides details about organizations that engaged in violent and nonviolent dissent at various periods of their existence and could be used to identify correlates of tactical shifts. ARC should be useful to scholars of repression and dissent; connections to events datasets facilitate exploration of how organizational networks interact with repression to produce backlash and demobilization. ARC can also be collapsed into country-year format and merged with data on campaign outcomes (e.g. Chenoweth and Shay (2019), Kreutz (2010)), regime change, and democratization (Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza, 2009; Djuve, Knutsen and Wig, 2020; Coppedge et al., 2019). Information on inter-organizational ties can be used to generate network maps that span conventional violent-nonviolent dichotomies and even link campaigns cross-nationally. We look forward to seeing how others engage ARC to expand our knowledge of the causes, dynamics, and consequences of maximalist dissent.

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2.8 Appendix

2.8.1 Models with Indicators of Government Censorship and International Media coverage

The models below include two measures capturing aspects of the media environment at the country year level. The first is "Government Censorship Effort" from the VDEM dataset (Coppedge et al., 2019). Low values indicate that the media is highly censored while higher values indicate higher levels of media freedom. The second is a count of the number of Agence France Press and Associated Press newswire hits that are obtained with the country name in the headline or lead paragraph over a country-year. Chad is not included in these models because we were unable to create a search string that reliably separated the country 'Chad' from the personal name Chad. The results for other variables in the model are very similar to those in the main text, and we have excluded them from the table to focus on the media-related variables.

2.8.2 Coding the Religious Diversity Measure in the Main text

On pages 12 and 13 we show indicators of religious diversity over the years 2003-2015 in Egypt. These variables were generated from the ARC data with text-matching in R (version 4.0.2) on the organization goals variable according to the rules in the table below. The organization goals variable matches the text-matching pattern if any one of the listed strings matches with the words in the organization goals variable. For example, if any of the text in the organization goals variable matched the strings *secula* OR *antiislam* then this would return a positive match for the *Secularist* variable. White space and punctuation was removed from the words before the text-matching was used.

	Political Parties	Trade Unions	Rel. Orgs	Student/Youth	Fronts	Rebel Groups	Other CSOs	Others
								(0.19)
Count of FACTIVA newswire hits	0.00	−0.00**	0.00	−0.00	0.00	0.00	−0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Media Freedom from Censorship	−0.09	0.55	−0.50	−0.01	−0.02	0.44***	0.08	−0.94
	(0.14)	(0.29)	(0.44)	(0.43)	(0.16)	(0.09)	(0.21)	(0.58)
AIC	1790.60	576.89	333.12	261.24	709.52	1413.08	973.53	166.32
BIC	1901.20	687.50	443.73	371.85	820.13	1523.69	1084.13	276.93
Log Likelihood	−872.30	−265.45	−143.56	−107.62	−331.76	−683.54	−463.76	−60.16
Deviance	563.27	190.93	86.41	123.25	300.15	593.42	316.11	71.55
Num. obs.	906	906	906	906	906	906	906	906

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 2.5: Correlates of Organizational Participation, Media Variables

Table 2.6: Organization Size Estimate

Category	Coding Rule
Islamist	islam OR sharia OR jihad OR emirat OR salaf OR caliphat OR sunni OR muslim
Moderate Islamist	Islamist = TRUE and Liberal Moderate = TRUE
Moderate Liberal	liberal OR moderat OR centr OR center OR democra OR civilandlegalrights OR multiparty OR egalitarian OR electionintegrity OR civilsociety OR equality OR humanrights OR freedom OR plural OR freeelections OR fairelections OR libert OR suffrage OR freepress OR progressive OR humanist OR inclus AND Islamist = FALSE AND Moderate Islamist = FALSE AND Secular = FALSE AND Leftist=FALSE AND Christian = FALSE
Leftist	left OR anticapitalist OR socialis OR marx OR lenin OR trotsky OR communis OR class OR redistribution OR anticapital OR nationalization OR nationalizedeconomy
Secularist	secula OR antiislam AND Leftist = FALSE
Christian	christ OR evangel OR catholic OR gospel OR prosel OR biblic OR coptic
Other	Does not match any of the above patterns

2.8.3 Visualisations of the main results

Below are two figures that visualise the main results from Table 4 in the main text. Figure 2.4 plots the predicted number of organizations of a given type for different values of the structural variables in the model. These estimates were generated using the `ggeffects` package in `R`. Figure 2.5 visualises organization types that tend to participate together with a network graph, based on the results in Table 4 regarding how the participation of organization types is associated with the participation on other organization type. Organization-types have ties between them where we found a positive and statistically significant average marginal effect between the participation of organization type i and organization type j. The width of the ties is proportional to the size of the average marginal effects. Figure 2.5 shows that rebel groups and "other" organizations tend to act alone, while fronts are most strongly associated with political party, trade union and "Other CSO" participation. Trade Unions tend to participate with CSOs, which in turn have relatively strong associations with the participation of religious groups and student/youth organizations.



Figure 2.4: Visualizations: Main Results in the Text, Structural Variables



Figure 2.5: Visualizations: Clustering of Organization Types in Country-Years

Beyond Ethnicity: Historical States and Modern Conflict

Abstract

Historical states, be they sprawling empires or nominal vassal states, can make lasting impressions on the territories they once governed. We argue that more historical states located within the borders of modern states increase the chance of civil conflict because they: (1) created networks useful for insurgency, (2) were symbols of past sovereignty, (3) generated modern ethnic groups that activated dynamics of ethnic inclusion and exclusion, and (4) resisted western colonialism. Using new global data on historical statehood, we find a robust positive association between more historical states inside a modern state and the rate of civil conflict onset between 1946-2019. This relationship is not driven by common explanations of state-formation that also drive conflict such as the number of ethnic groups, population density, colonialism, levels of historical warfare, or other region-specific factors. We also find that historical states are more likely to be conflict inducing when they are located far from the capital and in poorer countries. Our study points to unexplored channels linking past statehood to modern day conflict that are independent of ethno-nationalist conflict and open possibilities for a new research agenda linking past statehood to modern-day conflict outcomes.

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3.1 Introduction

Hundreds of independent states existed in the 19th century that no longer appear on political maps, many extinguished by colonialism. Some countries encompass many of these historical states while others contain few. Studies reach differing conclusions on whether these historical states are a source of conflict or stability in the modern world. Some find that prior statehood (often labelled pre-colonial) facilitates peaceable solutions to latent ethnic conflict (Depetris-Chauvin, 2016; Wig, 2016), while others find that they can leave legacies of ethnic tension and war (Besley and Reynal-Querol, 2014; Paine, 2019; Englebert, 2000; Alesina et al., 2003).

We focus on the national-level effects of variations in the number of historical states that modern states encompass. We label these states 'Historical State Entities' (HSEs) throughout the paper. We argue that states with more HSEs within their modern borders experience more internal conflict onsets because HSEs left behind social networks and symbols of sovereignty that were useful for collective action, provided the raw material for ethnic claims making in the post WWII period and resisted colonialism before independence and state consolidation after. We test this theory with new measures of the number of HSEs that existed in modern-day states from 1816-1939, finding that more HSEs are positively correlated with civil conflict onsets between 1946-2019, an association that is not explained or mediated by more politically relevant ethnic groups or excluded ethnic groups in the modern period. This suggests that historical states are linked to conflict independently of their impact on or through modern ethnic power relations that are the focus of most research on the modern legacies of historical states (Paine, 2019; Wig, 2016). Moving 'beyond ethnicity' to understand how political topologies from the past shape conflict may lead to new insights (Herbst, 2014; Blaydes and Chaney, 2013; Mazzuca, 2021). We suggest further research on the symbolic legacies and mobilization infrastructures left behind by HSEs as a useful way forwards (Ahram, 2019).

3.2 Contribution

This study makes three contributions to the existing literature on the legacies of historical states and internal armed conflict. First, many studies assume that prior statehood impacts conflict through relations between modern eth-

nic groups and the state (Englebert, Tarango and Carter, 2002; Paine, 2019; Wig, 2016), or measure prior statehood with proxies of ethnic centralization. While incorporating these important insights, we advance the field by highlighting mechanisms through which historical states can influence conflict independent of ethnicity, and by drawing on a global dataset of independent *states* rather than ethnic groups. The pre-colonial political landscape was certainly populated by ethnic groups (Murdock, 1967), but it was also populated multi-ethnic empires. A focus on ethnic groups can't tell us about the legacies of the Sokoto Caliphate, for example, which was a multi-ethnic empire overlapping with dozens of ethnic groups in the oft utilised "Murdoch Map". Moreover, states often made modern ethnic groups. There is, for example, little evidence of an "Achenese" ethnic identity before the 20th century (Aspinall, 2009). This "ethnic group" is a product of the Achenese Sultanate, which survived up to the beginning of the 20th century as an independent state before it was colonized by the Dutch and incorporated into Indonesia (see also (Wimmer, 2018)).

Even if we grant the assumption that states and ethnic groups are coterminous, it breaks down outside of Africa and is, therefore, a poor conceptual foundation upon which to estimate the *global* impacts of historical statehood. States in South Asia and Southeast Asia were not strongly ethnic states. Studies of historical legacies outside of Africa focus on empires and states (Acemoglu et al., 2011; Grosjean, 2011), violent events (Grosfeld, Rodnyansky and Zhuravskaya, 2013), economic systems and change (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005; Nunn and Qian, 2011), or regional potentates (Mazzuca, 2021), not ethnic groups. The Mughal and Maratha empires ruled ethnic groups, but neither was an "ethnic" state, nor was the Ottoman empire (Richards, 1995; Ramusack, 2004; Gordon, 1993). Continuing from the assumption that we can study historical statehood by studying ethnic groups, therefore narrows the scope for comparative analysis.

Second, existing studies of historical *statehood* are based on incomplete datasets or regionally limited samples (Besley and Reynal-Querol, 2014; Depetris-Chauvin, 2016; Dincecco, Fenske and Onorato, 2019; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2016; Nunn, 2008). Most studies in international relations use registers of states with in-built European biases that exclude states in Africa, the Middle-East and Asia (Sarkees and Wayman, 2010; Gleditsch and Ward, 1999). There were hundreds of states in these regions in the 19th century, but they are elided because datasets often pin "statehood" to recognition by one or multiple European powers, usually England and France. For some non-

Western states, Europeans were simply not the most relevant international actors. The French were a small, distant, coastal trading enclave in the eyes of the massive Sokoto Caliphate in West Africa in 1816. The Oyo Empire and Borno Emirate were more important regional powers. Moreover, Europeans did not recognize some states for strategic reasons, especially if they intended to conquer them (Teorell, 2017). The political map of the globe, according to these datasets, is blank for swathes of Africa, Asia and the Pacific. We use a global dataset of prior-statehood that is more comprehensive than existing registers and does not select on matches with prior or modern ethnicity (Butcher and Griffiths, 2020), allowing us to test – rather than assume – links between historical states, ethnic groups and modern conflict in addition to mechanisms that do not strongly emphasise ethnicity.

Finally, we contribute to the literature on 'artificial states' (Alesina, Easterly and Matuszeski, 2011; Englebert, 2000; Herbst, 2014; Clapham, 1996), by developing a measure of state artifice that is more consistent with existing conceptualizations. 'Artificial states' are states that overlap poorly with the pre-existing topology of statehood (Alesina, Easterly and Matuszeski, 2011; Herbst, 2014). Our measure of the number of HSEs that existed on the territory of a modern state between 1816 and 1939 more directly captures the overlap between modern borders and past state structures than existing measures that rely upon the 'straightness' of modern borders (Alesina, Easterly and Matuszeski, 2011) or the variance in pre-colonial ethnic centralization (Englebert, Tarango and Carter, 2002).

3.3 Theory

3.3.1 Historical state entities

Our main argument is that countries with more historical state entities (HSEs) within its borders experience more internal armed conflict onsets than countries with fewer HSEs. HSEs are states that existed in the past that may or may not exist in the modern international system. For convenience and consistency with our measurement strategy below, 'modern' is the period after the Second World War and 'historical' is the period before 1939 and the Second World War, which was followed by the United Nations, decolonization and the modern-state system as we know it today.

Our definition of 'statehood' comes from the International Systems Dataset

(ISD) (Butcher and Griffiths, 2020), which adopts a 'thin' definition. States are political entities with a population of at least 10,000, autonomy over a specific territory and sovereignty that is either uncontested or acknowledged by the relevant international actors. ISD states have a baseline level of administrative structure, population and independence with the capacity to transmit institutions and symbols into modern states, or form the basis for ethnic groups. Thicker definitions of 'modern', 'territorial' or 'national' statehood that require standing armies, permanent bureaucracies or centralized decision making over the gamete of sovereign functions would exclude many historical states in places such as Africa and Southeast Asia (Spruyt, 1998) and a few current states. The ISD criteria permit a variety of independent states from decentralized, 'composite' states (Nexon, 2009) such as the Oyo empire in 19th Century West Africa (Law, 1977), to the more centralized Bugandan state. States can be, therefore, modern, historical, or both. France is a historical state and a modern state. Oyo is a historical state but not a modern state. Nigeria is a modern state but not a historical state. Figure 3.1 shows the location of former capitals/centres of historical states around modern Nigeria, which contains 19 historical states over the 1816-1939 period. For comparison, Ghana has one (Ashanti) and Benin has two (Dahomey and the Ketu kingdom).

Why would more HSEs in the territory of modern states lead to more internal armed conflict? We propose four mechanisms drawn from the existing literature on pre-colonial statehood and conflict: (1) HSEs left behind mobilization networks useful for insurgency, (2) they left behind symbols of independent statehood that conflict entrepreneurs can mobilize around, (3) they created the foundations for ethnic-claim making in the post WWII period, and (4) they altered colonial trajectories and created unfavourable conditions for democracy and state consolidation at independence. We discuss each of these mechanisms in turn.

3.3.2 Networks of rebellion

Many historical states leave behind formal and informal (Wig, 2016) social networks that lower the costs of insurgent collective action (Wood, 2000; Staniland, 2014, 17). For example, the Buganda Kingdom was a state entity for over 500 years before becoming a formal institution in modern Uganda through the British system of indirect rule (Tuck and Rowe, 2005). Buganda launched a brief and unsuccessful armed rebellion in 1966 after a power-



Figure 3.1: Historical states in Nigeria and Surrounds, 1816-1939

sharing agreement with the Obote regime broke down (Tuck and Rowe, 2005). In Ethiopia, the Derge regime tried to arrest the semi-independent Sultan of Aussa (Awsa) in June 1975 (Shehim, 1985). However, the Sultan was able to escape and launched an armed rebellion from Somalia (Afar Liberation Front - ALF, Shehim (1985)). While the Sultanate was unable to win independence, the institution continues to exist within the current Ethiopian state (Hanfare, 2011).

These are examples of HSEs surviving into the modern period as formal institutions. Informal networks can also survive and underpin insurgency. Aceh, for example, ruled parts of the northern tip of Sumatra in modern-day Indonesia from the 16th to the 19th centuries. Aceh sponsored Islamic learning and became a central node in a broad network of Islamic scholars *(ulama)* in Indonesia and Malaysia. These *ulama* fought against Dutch colonialism, even after the formal Achenese state had been destroyed. Tengku Cik di Tiro, for example, fought in these wars and later became a symbol for Achense mobilization against the Indonesian state. *Ulama* networks survived

defeat by the Dutch and colonisation into independent Indonesia – especially through organizations such as the Persatuan Ulamam Seluruh Aceh (PUSA) (the All-Aceh Assoication of Ulama) (Aspinall, 2009, 28) – and formed the core of the Darul Islam rebellion of the late 1940s and early 1950s. The leader of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM, formed in the 1970s), Hasan di Tiro, was the great-grandson of Tengku Cik di Tiro – the lauded hero of independent Achenese resistance to the Dutch. Tiro recruited directly from these old Darul Islam networks when launching the GAM rebellion – networks that have their roots in the pre-colonial Acehese state (Aspinall, 2009, 61-62).

Generalising from these specific examples, historical states can leave behind formal and informal networks that enable rebellion in the modern period. The more historical states, the more of these legacies are left behind and – *ceteris paribus* – the more potential foundations of rebellion there are in the often competitive and unstable environment of post-colonial politics.

3.3.3 Symbols of sovereignty

Historical states leave memories and collective symbols of sovereignty and independence. These narratives of lost nationhood or stolen 'homelands' can be powerful focal points for mobilization into armed conflict in an international system founded on the principal of national sovereignty (Ahram, 2019; Shelef, 2016). The more prevalent these narratives are, the more common armed conflict should be.

There are multiple examples of armed groups using former states and empires in this manner. The Macina Liberation Front in Mali refers to a short lived Islamic Empire in Northern Mali that lasted for only 44 years (between 1818 and 1862, (Brown, 1968)). The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) 'seeks to revive the "jihad" of Alhaji Umar Tell', leader of the 19th Century Tokolor empire, and the Vanguards for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa (Ansaru) claims to 'revive the "jihad" of Usman Dan Fodio', leader of the Sokoto Caliphate, also a 19th Century West African state (Zenn, 2015). Non-Islamist examples include the Cyranecia Liberation Army in Libya and the various Afrikaaner resistance groups that aimed for a re-establishment of the Boer Republics in South Africa.

In the literature there are multiple examples of interplay between the networks and symbols of sovereignty mechanisms. For example, The leader of the aforementioned Free Aceh Movement (GAM) justified rebellion with

recourse to Aceh's history as a sovereign state (Aspinall, 2009). While in Poland, the memory of an independent Polish state helped preserve elite networks of Polish noblemen, and provided a model for their proto-nationalist independence movement (Wimmer, 2018).

More historical states may therefore generate higher levels of conflict by creating symbolic resources that dissidents can rally around and mold into narratives of lost nationhood. These symbols – other things being equal – may make it easier to initiate armed conflict against the state.

3.3.4 Ethnic power relations

HSEs might also drive conflict by creating more 'politically relevant' ethnic groups in modern states. Existing studies tend to assume that ethnic groups pre-date and build states (Paine, 2019; Wig, 2016), but state-building often drives changes in ethnic identity (Anderson, 2006; Chandra, 2006; Wimmer, 2018). After the First and Second World War, the increasing legitimacy of appeals to self-determination by 'national' or 'people groups' rather than appeals to effective sovereignty (Clapham, 1996; Jackson, 1991), created incentives for collective groups to pitch political claims in ethnic or communal terms. These ethnic claims, however, were in some cases the product of prior-state building efforts that began before the existence of the ethnic group.

The 'Achenese', for example, are an ethnic group in the 'Ethnic Power Relations' data from 1950 (Vogt et al., 2015) and the war between the Indonesian state and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) is coded as an ethnic conflict (Vogt et al., 2015).[1] Aceh was a feudal-like state that portrayed itself as a pan-Islamic centre of learning before it was an ethnic group, however (Aspinall, 2009, 20). The elite were mostly Malay and Arab, not people with deep indigenous roots. Aspinall (2009, 46-47) states that: 'most surviving sources tell us there was no such [Acehense] consciousness before the twentieth century'. Rather, 'Achenese' as an ethnic identity was invented by local elites to manoeuvre within Indonesian laws that permitted 'cultural' expressions and of conflict entrepreneurs looking for foundations in international law to justify the independence of Aceh.

State-making also facilitated the *expansion* of ethnic groups, which influenced modern day ethnic demographics. The Lunda were a small ethnic

[1]The EPR data record GAM as having ethnic claims, recruitment and support, the highest level on all dimensions.

group in modern day Democratic Republic of Congo before the expansion of the Lunda empire, which saw Lunda settlers spread across the DRC (especially in Katanga), Angola and Zaire. Modern-day 'Lunda' settlement patterns are therefore a product of prior, successful, state-building. The Punjabi state of Khalistan in modern day India and Pakistan (1799-1846) is another example of how statehood and elite (religious) networks fused to generate ethnic tensions in the modern period, in this case between Sikhs and the Federal Indian Government during the 1970s and 1980s (Grewal, 1998). Even multi-ethnic empires in the pre-colonial period can 'create' politically relevant ethnic groups in the post-colonial period. The Sokoto caliphate was a large, Fulbe-based, but ethnically diverse Islamic empire that conquered much of Northern Nigeria and Niger in the 1800s (Law, 1977). The political 'relevance' of 'Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt' in the EPR is likely caused by the Sokoto cailphate, which (a) unified the Hausa and the Fulani (two different ethnic groups) under the same political administration and, (b) was the foundation for the North-South division in Nigeria because northern Nigeria was ruled indirectly through the Sokoto caliphate while the south was ruled more directly (Paine, 2019). The Sokoto caliphate was so influential in the early politics of independent Nigeria because it *transcended* the ethnic Hausa-Fulani divide and unified the fragmented Hausa polities under a single (albeit decentralized) Islamic administration. These religious divisions are relevant alongside ethnic divisions in Nigeria and the Islamic-North–Christian-South division was sharpened by the jihads of the 1800s and the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate (Reynolds, 1997).

The main upshot is that HSEs can shape post-colonial ethnic relations by creating, unifying and expanding ethnic groups into conglomerates that became 'politically relevant' in an international system that privileged 'national' claims (i.e people-group claims) over claims based purely in prior state rule. Countries with more historical states may be at a higher risk of conflict because those countries have a higher number of claims-making ethnic groups in the post-colonial period. To the extent that more ethnic groups or ethnic groups with a history of statehood create bargaining problems and highly competitive political environments characterised by ethnic exclusion and favoritism (Paine, 2019; Roessler, 2016; Cederman et al., 2013), this should also increase the number of armed conflicts. We do not attempt to untie the knot of ethnicity and statehood here, but existing research establishes a link from historical states to modern-day civil conflict that plausibly runs through a higher number of claims making ethnic groups that are themselves

the product of state-building efforts.

3.3.5 Colonialism, Democracy and Weak Statehood

Historical states often resisted European colonialism and where they were colonised, were ruled indirectly rather than directly (Gerring et al., 2011; Hariri, 2012; Englebert, 2000). Areas with stronger 'indigenous' statehood were also more successful at resisting European cultural and religious influences, especially Protestant missionaries (Woodberry, 2012). Although the connection is debated, direct colonial rule and the influence of Protestant missionaries may have created some foundations for democratic rule in the post-colonial period (Woodberry, 2012; Hariri, 2012) and democracies are less likely to experience civil conflicts than semi-democracies or autocracies (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006).

In addition, indirect rule preserved some of the power and influence of historical states through the colonial period, placing them in a stronger position to place demands on colonial regimes during the decolonization process and the leaders of newly independent states. Where there were many HSEs, this can create a 'strong society, weak state' dynamic where the central government struggled to rule parts of its territory where HSEs survived, creating areas of weak state control which, as Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Lewis (2017) argue, can facilitate insurgency by reducing the likelihood of state detection and defeat in the initial stages. Herbst (2014) argues, for example, that colonial regimes in Africa concentrated their rule in coastal capital cities, leaving existing institutions largely intact in the hinterland. At independence, African leaders inherited weak states with little 'infrastructure' of rule outside of the capital, faced strong challengers and high costs to expand the state. This dynamic was replicated in South Asia and South-east Asia (Migdal, 1988) and Mazzuca (2021) observes a similar dynamic whereby conditions at the moment of state formation – especially strong regional powers – help explain state weakness in South and Central America. Recent research suggests that *expanding* state presence can drive the onset of new internal armed conflicts (Ying, 2020), and as modern states move into areas previously ruled by HSEs, armed conflicts can become more likely. Higher numbers of HSEs may therefore generate more armed conflict in post-colonial period by altering the trajectory of colonial rule and creating conditions where weak, non-democratic states emerged after independence that faced strong internal challengers.

Figure 3.2 outlines the main mechanisms that link HSEs to conflict: (1) Networks of Rebellion, (2) Symbols of Sovereignty, (3) Ethnic Power Relations and, (4) Colonialism, Democracy and Weak Statehood. Additional cases exhibiting links between HSEs and modern conflicts can be found in the appendix.



Figure 3.2: Causal diagram

Hypothesis 1, outlines the bservable implications of our arguments.

H_1: More historical states in the territory of a modern state increase number of internal armed conflicts

3.3.6 Conditional effects

Our argument is general and probabilistic applying to the post WWII period. It should not be taken to mean that all HSEs are conflict inducing or that all conflicts involve HSEs. Studies show that in some instances, historical states can be advantageous to state-building by providing pre-fabricated governance structures that the centre can draw upon to deliver public goods and peace (Ziblatt, 2008). Historical states can be assets for state-building when the expanding centre and the historical states have high "infrastructural capacity", meaning a high capacity for taxation, providing public order and delivering public goods. In these circumstances, bargaining occurs between strong and credible actors capable of delivering on agreements (Ziblatt, 2008; Wig, 2016). These circumstances do not characterise the state-building challenges of most states in the post-WWII period, especially post-colonial states. First, the centres often inherited weak and geographically limited infrastructural capacity at independence (Herbst, 2014; Migdal, 1988). Second, most historical states in our sample were relatively weak and decentralized, especially in Africa, Southeast Asia and South Asia (Herbst, 2014; Scott, 2009). We

also suspect that some of the paradigmatic examples of peaceful state-HSE integration are also situations with few HSEs, as characterises modern day Ghana, or Benin. The typical conditions under which modern and historical states combine for effective state-building, therefore, do not characterise the situation of most states in the post-WWII and we, therefore, expect a general *negative* effect of more HSEs on peace as they provided the resources for collective action in a situation where effective bargaining is difficult.

We do, however, make two conditional arguments based on the discussion above. First, we expect that HSEs are less dangerous when they are located closer to the modern capital. The *process* of state consolidation often causes conflict between the centre and peripheral regions (Ying, 2020). As the costs of governance increase with distance from the centre in many modern, especially post-colonial, states (Herbst, 2014), HSEs located closer to the modern-day capital should be easier for the centre to incorporate peacefully. These may also be HSEs with pre-existing connections to the centre through trade and transport infrastructure. Historical states located close to the capital also sometimes inherit the state (such as in Egypt, Thailand, Sweden, or China), entailing a smooth transition between the historical and modern state. In contrast, HSEs located far from the capital are more likely to be disconnected from the centre and far more costly for the centre to incorporate, either through force or negotiation.

Second, modern states with more economic resources may be able to avoid conflict by providing economic transfers to regions with HSEs, or alternatively, modern states with higher levels of development may contain HSEs with a higher pre-existing level of development, or interconnectedness, making them easier to incorporate. Italy, for example, may have been able to avoid conflict in the post-WWII period, despite multiple HSEs, due it's higher capacity to incorporate former states. Sardinia and Sicily (both HSEs), for example, have had active secessionist movements, but these never escalated to high levels of armed conflict (Griffiths, 2016). Germany's federal institutions are (in general) the product of effective negotiation between a developed centre (Prussia) and numerous, relatively developed regional kingdoms (Ziblatt, 2008). More developed artificial states should therefore have a larger carrying capacity for historical states and be better able to solve bargaining problems peacefully.

These conditional arguments imply two hypotheses:

H_2: The number of historical states in the territory of a modern state has a stronger positive impact on internal armed conflicts when those

states are located further from the modern capital

H_3: *The number of historical states in the territory of a modern state has a stronger positive effect on the probability of civil war in less developed states*

3.4 Research design

3.4.1 Dependent variables

The unit of analysis is a country, observed over the 1946-2019 period. Our dependent variable is the conflict onset rate over the 1946-2019 period, sourced from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Pettersson and Öberg, 2020). A new onset is recorded when a state experiences a new internal or internationalized internal civil conflict after a period of two or more years of no conflict. The dependent variable is divided by the number of active state years to adjust for exposure time. Onsets represent attempts at armed rebellion successful enough to cross the UCDP death-threshold of 25 battle related deaths in a year (Tollefsen, avard Strand and Buhaug, 2012; Lewis, 2017). Our mechanisms describe conditions conducive to the launching of rebellion rather than the number of rebel groups (Fjelde and De Soysa, 2009), conflict duration (Cunningham, 2006) or termination (Walter, 2004) that are explained by additional processes such as splintering, bargaining failures with multiple rebel groups and peacekeeping.[2] The main results reported below are robust to several variations on the dependent variable, including using the logged number of onsets, the rate of logged onsets and the raw count of onsets using both negative binomial models for over-dispersed count data and OLS regressions.

3.4.2 Independent variables

The independent variable is a count of the number of HSEs that existed between 1816 and 1939 in the territory of a modern state (i.e a state that

[2]Using our main models, modern states with more HSEs also experience a higher rate of armed conflict incidence ($p < 0.05$) and incidence of years with more than 1000 deaths ($p < 0.10$).

existed between 1946 and 2019). These data are sourced from version two of the International Systems Dataset (ISD). Butcher and Griffiths (2020) require that polities have more than 10,000 people, autonomy over a specific territory and uncontested or recognized external sovereignty in order to qualify as a state. These criteria are more inclusive than the COW State System Membership List (Sarkees and Wayman, 2010) but more restrictive than the Murdoch map (1967) that also includes stateless ethnic groups.

To code the 'destination' state of HSEs we used the latitude and longitude coordinates in the ISD for approximate locations of HSE capital cities. We overlay these capitals on modern borders and count how many capitals fall into those borders. HSEs often ended up in multiple territories – parts of the Sokoto empire, for example, are in modern-day Nigeria, Niger, and Cameroon – and we coded up to ten additional destination states based on locations specified in the World Statesmen database of traditional states (`https://www.worldstatesmen.org`) and our own searches of secondary sources. Historical states in the ISD do not necessarily overlap in time. Some historical states can disappear, while others can come into being during the sample period, within a given territory. Because this measure does not vary across time, we use cross-sectional analyses to avoid artificially inflating the number of observations. Figure 3.3 shows how many historical states (i.e states that existed at some point between 1816 and 1939) are recorded within the boundaries of modern states. We also run models below counting only the number of historical state *capitals* falling within the borders of a modern state, with very similar results.

The ISD has a number of advantages. The first is global coverage. Existing studies have primarily analysed Africa, or Sub-Saharan Africa, while there were dense states systems in South Asia, Southeast and East Asia, and South America that are excluded by these analyses. Even within studies of pre-colonial Africa, many state entities are not included. For example, Besley and Reynal-Querol (2014) use data for 19 historical kingdoms in Africa over the 1400-1700 period to assess the impact of historical conflict, while our sample includes 109 states on the African continent that were independent at some point over the 1816-1939 period.

Second, the ISD includes states without selecting on ethnicity. States that were ethnically based are included (such as Buganda), along with multiethnic empires such as the Sokoto Caliphate and states that were not ethnic such the Rajput states of India, which were based more upon a shared warrior 'class' than ethnicity (Ramusack, 2004, 12). This provides a more accurate

picture of statehood in the 19th century, even within Africa. For example, Paine (2019)'s recent study of pre-colonial ethnic-states and post-colonial conflict identifies just one state in Ethiopia, while the ISD identifies eleven, some of which were highly centralized, such as the Shoa or Jimma kingdoms (Lewis, 2001). Thus, what Paine (2019) identifies as a country with one ethnic-state that is otherwise 'stateless', is, according to a different dataset, a country with multiple historical states. By avoiding the assumption that states are ethnic states we also avoid projecting modern ethnic identities back onto pre-colonial polities that were not ethnically based or only marginally so.



Figure 3.3: Number of historical state entities per country

The main drawbacks are that the ISD start in 1816, and only geocode capital cities or state centres. Eighteen-sixteen is an arbitrary starting point, marking the Congress of Vienna and the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars, that attributes some states with no HSEs because they were colonised before 1816 (e.g Bangladesh) and elides historical states that existed in the 1700s and earlier, some of which may have powerful legacies (especially in Europe, India and Myanmar). However, the 1816-1939 period is also a critical period, and arguably more important than earlier periods of historical statehood for

understanding modern conflict dynamics because these states existed on the eve of the international system freezing into its current territorial divisions through colonialism, followed by the explosive rise of norms emphasising self-determination and fixed territorial sovereignty (Branch, 2013; Ahram, 2019; Paine, 2019). Some states, such as France, Sweden, Thailand or China entered this international system having already incorporated historical states through processes of vassalage, warfare, territorial expansion and centralization by the end of the 19th century. Other states fared very differently. Nigeria, for example, did not exist as a state before 1960 and the territory of modern-day Nigeria is host to numerous historical states that existed between 1816 and colonialism, many of which survived through colonialism (and because of colonialism) and indirect forms of rule. These were all potential challengers to the post-colonial Nigerian state. Mazzuca (2021) shows that conditions at the moment of *state formation* can have lasting impacts on the trajectory of *state consolidation*. If we were to go further back in time, we would surely find more states,[3] but measuring independent states that existed between 1816 and 1939 captures the main historical states that presented the greatest potential conflict risk in the modern period.[4]

3.4.3 Controls

Our identification strategy rests upon conditioning on observable factors (Morgan and Winship, 2015), making the question of what causes higher or lower numbers of historical states in the territory of a modern state critical. Before discussing control variables, the number of historical states is likely exogenous to some factors that may cause armed conflict. State formation is not random (Tilly, 1990; Osafo-Kwaako and Robinson, 2013; Bates, 2008), but the *number* of states encompassed by modern boundaries depends upon the boundary-drawing process. Competition between European powers generated colonial boundaries that were quasi-random in relation to local conditions (Clapham, 1996; Branch, 2013; McCauley and Posner, 2015). Mc-

[3]Burma, for example, conquered many of the independent Burmese states in the late 1700s and has seen widespread armed conflict (41 onsets in our data).

[4]Some resources such as GeaCron map statehood globally back into the 1600s and 1700s, but underestimate the number of states and conflate non-state entities with states. For example, GeaCron identifies just 15 states in Africa in 1840 where the ISD identifies 92 and includes the "Hausa" in Nigeria, which was not a state but a collection of independent city-states

Cauley and Posner (2015, 3) suggest that up to 80% of the borders in Africa follow 'meridians, parallels or other rectilinear or curved lines'. The 'Scramble for Africa' is infamous for paying little to no attention to local conditions when demarcating colonial spheres which eventually became the foundations of modern state boundaries (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2018, 32-34). Moreover, some of the risks associated with assuming quasi-random border allocation highlighted by McCauley and Posner (2015) – especially cluster randomization and open treatments – do not apply in our case because we are not studying individuals and HSEs cannot move after 1939. Therefore our independent variable is partially assigned by a process that is likely to be independent of factors that cause modern conflict. At the very least, our results are not likely to be explained by reverse-causality concerns in some samples, especially the African sample.

Nonetheless, borders are not exogenous in an experimental sense. Even in Africa some borders were drawn in relation to historical states – the Sokoto caliphate and the northern Nigerian borders are an oft-cited example (McCauley and Posner, 2015) – and borders in Southeast Asia, South Asia, Europe, and Central Asia may have been drawn more in response to local conditions given the longer colonial experience in these areas or due to longer term processes of war and absorption. Moreover, the number of historical states will also be a function of how conducive the conditions within modern borders are to state-building, no matter how random the assignment of borders are. Our main models include a parsimonious set of controls and we show results with an extended set of controls.

Population density is closely related to state-building (Herbst, 2014) and the 'great reversal' entails that countries with favourable conditions for state-building had lower levels of economic growth in the modern period (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001), making them more vulnerable to armed conflict (Fearon, 2003). We control for estimated population density in 1500 from Dincecco, Fenske and Onorato (2019).[5] Larger countries have more space for previous state entities and may be more difficult for states to govern. A control for land area in 1000s km^2 was included. Countries that were colonized by Europeans may also contain more historical states compared to un-colonized countries because Europeans often drew borders without respect to historical states as opposed to more indigenous processes of state build-

[5]Unless otherwise states, our control variables come from replication data in Dincecco, Fenske and Onorato (2019)

ing, absorption and separation that may leave fewer historical states behind (Tilly, 1990). The link between European colonialism and civil conflicts is less clear, however (Hegre et al., 2001). A control for whether the state was a former European colony from the Correlates of War Colonial Contiguity data was included (Correlates of War Project, 2016). A control for historical conflict from Dincecco, Fenske and Onorato (2019) was included, as conflict can drive state-building (although this is contested (Osafo-Kwaako and Robinson, 2013)) and may be related to armed conflict through other channels such as lower trust (Besley and Reynal-Querol, 2014) or lower levels of development (Englebert, Tarango and Carter, 2002). Additional tests exploring historical conflict as an alternative explanation can be found in the appendix and suggest that historical conflict does not confound the main results. The timing of the neolithic revolution has been found to drive state-building and conflict (Paine, 2019) and we control for this with the log of years since the neolithic revolution. We also control for the log absolute latitude and for slave exports as slavery may have inhibited or promoted state-building while undermining trust that may have led to conflict (Nunn, 2008).

The average number of politically relevant ethnic groups in the Ethnic Power Relations data (EPR; Vogt et al. (2015)) over the 1945-2017 period was included. This is a post treatment control that biases against the main hypothesis. Some ethnic groups may have pre-dated states and caused conflict through other channels than state-building, while some ethnic groups were created by states and may be a modern phenomena. By controlling for both, we remove the causal effects of more EPR ethnic groups on conflict that are independent of historical statehood and the effects that run though prior statehood, biasing our estimates down. This is a conservative approach but reduces the risk that our results reflect a simple 'more ethnic groups = more states = more conflict' story, or whether our measure of historical statehood is simply picking up the measurement error in estimates of ethnic diversity, where it is also difficult to disentangle the relationship between ethnicity and statehood. We also include the ethnic fractionalization index, which measures the extent to which ethnic demographics are dispersed across many groups or concentrated in a single group. By including both of these popular measures of ethnic diversity, we can be more confident that our results do not reflect only pre-existing ethnic conditions. Finally all models include region fixed effects for Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Western Europe and North America and Asia and the Pacific. These controls

parse out any region-specific factors that drive state-building and conflict.

These controls are the baseline controls included in all the main models. We also ran models with additional controls for geographic factors, specifically the country's suitability for agriculture, the extent of rugged terrain and whether it was an island or landlocked. Again, these controls come from Dincecco, Fenske and Onorato (2019).

3.4.4 Modelling strategy

We follow Besley and Reynal-Querol (2014) and use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions. The first two models use the civil conflict onset rate over the 1946-2019 period as the dependent variable, with the main and geography controls. Models with the dependent variable disaggregated into conflicts over government, conflicts over territory and then the onset rate in the 1946-1988, 1989-2000 and 2001-2019 periods are then shown. Results in regional and theoretically relevant subsamples follow. We then re-test our hypothesis against four similar, but conceptually distinct, independent variables: (1) the number of ethnic groups with centralized states, from Wig (2016), (2) the number of ethnic groups with pre-colonial states (PCS) and 'stateless' ethnic groups in PCS states from Paine (2019), (3) state antiquity from Bockstette and Putterman (2012) and, (4) the fractal index from Alesina, Easterly and Matuszeski (2011). The last section unpacks the mechanisms using mediation analysis and explores conditional effects, discussed in more detail below.

3.4.5 Mediated and conditional effects

The main models aim to identify the general association between more historical state entities and the number of conflict onsets. We also use mediation analysis to explore the channels through which historical statehood might affect conflict (Imai et al., 2011). The mediation models use the baseline control variables. Testing the networks and symbolism argument is difficult because the legacies of past states take many forms – ethnic networks, religious networks, states in federal systems, symbolic cultural or political roles – and there are no cross national measures of these concepts (outside of ethnicity) that we are aware of. However, we can test the ethnicity and weak-statehood and colonialism mechanisms with cross-national data on ethnic groups, indicators of state development and patterns of colonial experience.

To test the colonialism argument we use colonial duration, similar to Hariri (2012) and the estimated percentage of people evangelised by Protestants in 1923 from Woodberry (2012). Colonial duration and 'conversionary protestants' have been shown to positively impact civil society and democracy in the post World War 2 period.

To test the ethnicity mechanism, we use the average number of politically relevant EPR groups across the 1945-2017 period and the average number of politically excluded EPR groups over the same period as mediators. Data come from the EPR project (Vogt et al., 2015). These mediators capture ethnic groups that pre-dated states and ethnic groups that were created by states (such as Aceh). We cannot separate these two channels but the mediation analyses provide an indicator of whether any HSE-conflict link is primarily explained by the creation or survival of modern-day ethnic groups.

Finally, to test the state-weakness argument we use log GDP per capita in 2000 from Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) and relative tax capacity (Hendrix, 2010) as mediators. A statistically significant mediated impact would suggest that HSEs resulted in weak state capacity and higher levels of armed conflict, but it could reflect the impact of earlier conflicts on GDP per capita. The estimate is therefore biased towards finding a mediated relationship. No significant association, however, would constitute stronger evidence against this as a causal channel.

Hypotheses two and three imply conditional effects. To test H_2 (HSEs have a stronger effect when located far from the capital), we create a variable capturing the average distance between the first modern capital and the capitals/centres of HSEs and interact this variable with the number of HSEs. To test H_3 (HSEs have a stronger effect in less developed states), we interact the number of HSEs with the first non-missing observation of GDP per capita after 1946 from The Madison Project to assess whether HSEs are primarily associated with conflict in states that lack the economic capabilities or preexisting state capacity to absorb them.

3.5 Results

3.5.1 General associations between HSEs and armed conflict

Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show bivariate associations between HSE prevalence and modern conflict onset rates. Countries with more HSEs are associated with higher armed conflict onset rates. From Figure 3.5, a state with no HSEs (e.g Malawi) experienced conflict onsets in 2.5% of state years, which doubles to 5.1% for one HSE, before dropping to 2.5% for states with two HSEs. [6] Onset rates then steadily climb until states with more than 10 HSEs expect onsets in 19% of country years. The increase is more pronounced for territorial conflicts.



Figure 3.4: HSEs and Armed Conflict, Bivariate Association

Figure 3.6 shows results using the main dependent variable (internal armed conflict onsets) and our main robustness tests. The regression tables can be found in the Appendix. There is a consistent positive impact of

[6] Myanmar, which unified in the late 1700s, largely accounts for the increase at one HSE. States with one HSE have an average onset rate of 4% if Myanmar is dropped



Figure 3.5: Onset rates across HSEs and conflict types

HSEs on the number of internal armed conflict onsets. The association is significant across both batteries of controls and is therefore likely to be independent of important alternative explanations: that HSEs are symptomatic of many ethnic groups in the modern period or that these are countries with an underlying propensity to state-building and conflict. We ran a sensitivity analysis using the `sensemakr` package in `R`, which can be found in the Appendix. A confounder that would render the main results insignificant would have to explain about 8% of the variance in the number of ISD states *and* the conflict onset rate. For comparison, not even confounders explaining three times the variance as the average number of EPR groups or the measure of historical conflict would render the results insignificant at the 0.05 level. Other things being equal, moving from the number of HSEs in Tunisia (1) to the number in Nigeria (19) is associated with an onset rate that is 0.08 points higher, or about one additional armed conflict onset every twelve years. Although the model is not specifically set up to estimate the impact of ethnic group identities on conflict, we would need to add more than 10 politically relevant ethnic groups to generate the same impact on conflict onset (on average there were 6 politically relevant EPR groups in Nigeria over

the 1946-2017 period and 0 in Tunisia). Thus, the main association is of a similar magnitude to the association with politically relevant ethnicity.

The positive association between HSEs and armed conflict applies to conflicts over territory and to a lesser (although still statistically significant) extent, armed conflicts over government. The results are also fairly stable over time periods. Using the baseline model, more HSEs increase the number of expected conflicts during the 1946-1988 period, the 1989-2000 period and the 2001-2019 period. In general these results indicate a resilient association across conflict issues and time periods.



Figure 3.6: HSEs and Armed Conflict, Main Results

Figure 3.7 shows the main models across regional and other relevant subsamples. HSEs are associated with more conflict onsets across important subsamples where our theory should apply: former colonies, outside the West (i.e states not in Western Europe or North America, also including Australia and New Zealand), when we drop countries that get a '0', and in Sub-Saharan Africa. The coefficients are positive but not significant at the 0.05 level in Latin America, MENA and Asia (the latter result may reflect the lower number of states identified in Myanmar and India). More HSEs have a generally negative impact across Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Wealth

and state capacity may have enabled these countries to offset any conflict inducing impacts of HSEs, which we explore in the conditional effects.



Figure 3.7: HSEs and Armed Conflict, Regional Sub-samples

The results for the sub-Saharan African sub-sample are striking (regression tables in the Appendix). We do not find a statistically significant relationship between the average number of politically relevant ethnic groups and the number of armed conflict onsets, while we do for the number of HSEs. This suggests that HSEs have important, unexplored, connections to armed conflict even in regions where ethnic politics and tensions are thought to play an influential role (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010). This is also not simply a function of using the average number of politically relevant EPR groups. The results are almost identical if we use the average number of excluded EPR groups.

3.5.2 Alternative arguments

Our mechanisms link the *number* of HSEs in the territory of a modern state to more armed conflict onsets. Similar arguments have been made in existing studies, but that emphasise conceptually different aspects of historical or pre-colonial statehood. In this section we adapt these arguments and test them

as alternative explanations for the HSE-conflict link. First, Paine (2019) argues that stateless ethnic groups in a state with an ethnic group that had a pre-colonial state (SLPCS groups) rebel more frequently because of bargaining problems and exclusionary practices by the dominant pre-colonial state ethnic group (PCS group). Adapting this argument to a cross-sectional framework, Paine (2019)'s work suggests that the more SLPCS groups that exist in a modern state, the more armed conflict onsets we should observe (states with no ethnic groups that had a pre-colonial state (i.e PCS groups) also have no SLPCS groups). As he notes, the PCS - SLPCS dynamic raises the likelihood of conflict for all groups in a state. To measure SLPCS groups we used a count of the number of ethnic groups in Paine's study that were at one point a SLPCS group. This gives an estimate of the total number of 'high risk' ethnic groups in the state over the 1946-2013 period (the period of his study). We also include the number of PCS groups. These tests are restricted to sub-Saharan Africa.

Second, Wig (2016) argues that ethnic groups with centralized pre-colonial states can make credible commitments with the state and avoid armed conflict. This argument is not easily adaptable to a cross-sectional framework as Wig (2016)'s study is dyadic while *many* centralized pre-colonial states might introduce additional bargaining problems that drive up the risk of conflict for all groups, even if dyadic bargaining is easier (Cunningham, 2006; Walter, 2009). We use the number of ethnic groups that were centralized (a jurisdictional hierarchy score over 2) as a proportion of all ethnic groups to re-test this argument. An ethnic demography dominated by centralized groups (i.e Ghana) should be more conducive to peace than one dominated by decentralized groups.

Third, Alesina, Easterly and Matuszeski (2011) emphasise that artificial borders grouped together hostile pre-colonial groups and split others apart, which has led to low growth and armed conflict. To test whether our results reflect Alesina, Easterly and Matuszeski (2011)'s fractal index – which measures how 'squiggly' borders are – we run a model including the variable from their study.

Finally, Putterman (2008); Hariri (2012), and Bockstette and Putterman (2012) point to 'early statehood' or state antiquity as an explanation for growth and internal peace. Countries with a longer history of continuous statehood developed more capable state structures that were able to generate economic growth and deter armed conflict. While there are overlaps between state antiquity and our measure of HSEs, our mechanisms highlight the dis-

tribution of states around or before colonization (similar to Paine (2019)), while the state antiquity data reach further back in time. We run a model including the mean state antiquity score from 1 A.D to 1800 in order to test whether the results for HSEs reflect a simpler underlying relationship between early state history and conflict. Figure 3.8 shows the results of models including these alternative explanations, retaining all of the baseline controls (regional FEs are dropped where the sample is Africa only).



Figure 3.8: HSEs and Armed Conflict, Alternative explanations

Figure 3.8 shows that our main results are not simply a reflection of the fractal index or the state-antiquity index. The coefficients on the fractal and state-antiquity indexes have the wrong sign or are insignificant. These models also suggest that the HSE-conflict link is not solely driven by strong, peaceful, modern states (such as Sweden) with a long history of continuous state presence that might, for other reasons, have survived into the modern world. There is a negative but statistically insignificant relationship between a more centralized distribution of ethnic groups and armed conflict levels (which is not necessarily inconsistent with Wig (2016)'s dyadic argument), while HSEs remain positive and significant at the 0.05 level. More SLPCS groups are associated with fewer armed conflict onsets, but these coefficients

are not significant at conventional levels while the HSE measure remains significant. Overall, these models suggest that the main results are not driven by previously identified and measured mechanisms linking pre-colonial statehood to conflict.

3.5.3 Mediation analysis

Figure 3.9 shows the results of mediation models exploring whether the HSE-conflict link can be explained by the ethnicity, weak-statehood, or colonialism channels, or whether it is more plausibly the result of a direct effect that we suspect is the product of mobilization networks and symbolism. Full regression tables can be found in the appendix.

There is little evidence that variations in colonial experiences or weak statehood transmits the relationship between HSEs and conflict. The Average Causal Mediated Effect (ACME) for log GDP per capita in 2000 and relative tax capacity are small and insignificant. The mean estimate is that close to 0% of the association can be attributed to lower GDP levels and only 2% for relative tax capacity. Both GDP and relative tax capacity have significant *direct* and negative associations with armed conflict. The results for colonial exposure are similar. While more HSEs are negatively associated with Conversionary Protestants (CPs), the mediated association is insignificant. There is no evidence that longer periods of colonialism mediate the association between HSEs and armed conflict.

There is also little evidence for the transmission of conflict through politically relevant ethnic groups, and in all specifications there is a large direct effect that is not explained by the ethnic channel. More HSEs are positively associated with a higher per-year average of politically relevant EPR groups, but this is not statistically significant in any models. Regardless of the way we operationalize the number of politically relevant ethnic groups across the 1946-2017 period there are no significant associations with more HSEs. The largest estimate is that about 10.6% of the association between HSEs and armed conflict runs through more EPR ethnic groups, but this mediated effect is not statistically significant.

We also tested for an effect mediated by the average number of excluded ethnic groups over the 1946-2017 period and the average size of the ethnically excluded population, but found little evidence a mediated effect. The number of EPR groups, the number of excluded EPR groups and the average size of ethnically excluded populations all have strong *direct* effects



Figure 3.9: Mediation Analysis, Main Results

on armed conflict levels in line with existing literature (Buhaug, Cederman and Gleditsch, 2014; Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010; Cederman et al., 2013), but there is little evidence that these effects are mediated though more HSEs. Our results suggest that HSEs and EPR groups are related to conflict through *distinct* paths, where far less is understood about the HSE-conflict link. This direct association may be evidence of the network and symbolism mechanisms at work. Finally, the mediation models act as additional robustness tests. In all of the second-stage equations that estimate the impact of our treatment (HSEs) and mediators on armed conflict onsets, the coefficient for HSEs remains positive and significant at the 0.01 level. The HSE-conflict link is probably not also explained away by excluded EPR ethnic groups, modern levels of development or differential exposure to European colonialism.

3.5.4 Conditional effects

Figure 3.11 and Figure 3.10 show the results of models testing whether the impact of more HSEs is mediated by the distance of those historical states from the capital, or the baseline level of development that was inherited by

the state in the modern period.



Figure 3.10: HSEs and Conflict by mean distance from modern capital

The results suggest that HSEs have stronger impacts on armed conflict onsets when HSEs are – on average – located further from the modern capital. When HSEs are located close to the capital (including situations where the modern state inherits a historical state, such as Thailand), they do not significantly increase conflict risk. As more HSEs are located further from the capital, however, the expected onset rate for the 1946-2019 period significantly increases.

On the other hand, HSEs are associated with more conflict onsets when the modern state is poorer in terms of GDP per capita. HSEs do not appear to have a statistically significant impact on conflict onsets at higher levels of GDP per capita, which helps explain why Italy and Germany have no recorded conflict onsets, but were home to a large number of independent states between 1816-1939.



Figure 3.11: HSEs and Conflict by GDP per capita

Overall, these results suggest that while more HSEs may not have led to conflict by *making* states poorer (as indicated by the mediation models), HSEs likely presented modern states with significant state building challenges where they were located in the periphery and governance is expensive, and where states had fewer economic resources or state capacity to effectively integrate older states. This is also consistent with the effect of HSEs being most pronounced in the 1946-1988 period, when many fledgling states were emerging from colonisation with limited capacities.

3.6 Conclusion

Studies of historical statehood and conflict have focused on ethnic groups' differing experiences of statehood. On the surface, our results may appear to contradict existing studies that link pre-colonial statehood to domestic

peace in the post-colonial era (Wig, 2016; Depetris-Chauvin, 2016). However, it may be the case that pre-colonial statehood facilitates governance by enabling newly formed states to make credible commitments with ethnic groups (Wig, 2016) or by leaving behind institutional structures that can lower the costs of governance and provide order (Depetris-Chauvin, 2016). However, capacity for mobilization and governance, independent of the state, can be a double edged sword. Our study suggests that pre-existing governance and mobilization structures that inhere in historical states can be turned against the state when the *number* of HSEs states that the regime has to bargain with increases. This could be because the likelihood of bargaining failures, miscalculation and war also increases (Fearon, 1995; Walter, 2009; Cunningham, 2006). For example, in a modern state such as Ghana or Benin, where the Ansante kingdom and the Dahomey kingdom broadly overlapped with modern borders, the state can leverage these pre-colonial structures to facilitate peaceful rule. Nigeria is also host to historical states, but the larger number of states may have compounded bargaining problems to such an extent that any advantages provided by pre-colonial statehood break down.

A more important contribution of our study, however, is to identify links between historical states and modern levels of armed conflict that are not easily attributable the mechanisms that run through ethnic power relations in the post-colonial world. We suspect that the independent effect of HSEs on civil conflict come from the mobilization infrastructures and symbols of independent statehood that historical states leave behind which can be used by conflict entrepreneurs to mobilize. Networks of rebellion need not be ethnic networks (Staniland, 2014) and HSEs can create networks of religious followers or elite networks that survive the colonial experience and exist in the modern state system. Rebel groups mobilise from a diverse array of social bases; only half of the rebel groups in the Foundations of Rebel Groups Emergence (FORGE) data have links to ethnic groups (Braithwaite and Cunningham, 2020), while another 20% have roots in religious groups and this is a growing proportion (Svensson, 2019). Others emerge from political parties, student groups, military defectors and political movements, among others. Alternatively, in situations of material deprivation or grievance, historical states can provide powerful touchstones of past sovereignty upon which to construct narratives that magnify unjust oppression and create a legal basis for demands for independence (Ahram, 2019; Shelef, 2016). We don't mean to imply that ethnicity is not important, it clearly was important to historical

state-building (Herbst, 2014) and modern conflict (Cederman et al., 2013), but our paper suggests that the historical states can impact conflict levels independent of their ability to make, or be made by, ethnic groups.

Of course, the direct association we observe here may still reflect omitted variable bias or another mechanism that we have not identified in this study. The conclusions that we draw are suggestive, but we argue push the research frontier forwards by identifying a puzzling direct effect, and specifying mechanisms that are likely to explain it, that can from the basis for a future research agenda.

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3.7 Appendix

3.7.1 Main Results: Armed conflict onset rate

	Baseline	Geography and climate
Log ISD states	0.03**	0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Log mean EPR groups	0.04**	0.04**
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Log population density in 1500	0.00	−0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Former colony	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Historical conflict	−0.03	−0.03
	(0.07)	(0.08)
Neolithic revolution	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Area	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.00	−0.02
	(0.03)	(0.04)
Perc. Rugged		0.01
		(0.01)
Log agricultural suitability		0.00
		(0.01)
Log exported slaves by land area	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Latin America and the Caribbean	0.02	−0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)
The Middle East and Nother Africa	0.03	0.04
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.02	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.04)
Western Europe and North America	−0.01	−0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Asia and Pacific	0.05*	0.05·
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Log absolute latitude	0.00	−0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Desert (middle latitude)		−0.05
		(0.05)
Landlocked		−0.00
		(0.02)
Island		−0.00
		(0.03)
R^2	0.32	0.33
Adj. R^2	0.24	0.22
Num. obs.	151	134

Reference region is Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

Table 3.1: Armed conflict onset rate

3.7.2 Main Results: Armed conflict onset rate, Government

	Baseline	Geography and climate
Log ISD states	0.01**	0.01*
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Log mean EPR groups	0.01·	0.01
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Log population density in 1500	0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Former colony	−0.01	−0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Historical conflict	−0.04	−0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Neolithic revolution	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Area	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.00	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.02)
Perc. Rugged		0.00
		(0.00)
Log agricultural suitability		0.00
		(0.00)
Log exported slaves by land area	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Latin America and the Caribbean	0.01	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)
The Middle East and Nother Africa	0.02·	0.02·
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Western Europe and North America	−0.01	−0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Asia and Pacific	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Log absolute latitude	−0.01·	−0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Desert (middle latitude)		−0.01
		(0.02)
Landlocked		0.01
		(0.01)
Island		−0.00
		(0.01)
R^2	0.29	0.34
Adj. R^2	0.22	0.22
Num. obs.	151	134

Reference region is Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

Table 3.2: Onset of conflicts over government

3.7.3 Main Results: Armed conflict onset rate, Territory

	Baseline	Geography and climate
Log ISD states	0.02*	0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Log mean EPR groups	0.03**	0.04**
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Log population density in 1500	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Former colony	0.00	−0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Historical conflict	0.01	−0.01
	(0.06)	(0.07)
Neolithic revolution	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Area	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Ethnic fractionalization	−0.00	−0.02
	(0.03)	(0.04)
Perc. Rugged		0.00
		(0.01)
Log agricultural suitability		0.00
		(0.01)
Log exported slaves by land area	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Latin America and the Caribbean	0.01	−0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)
The Middle East and Nother Africa	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.01	−0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Western Europe and North America	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Asia and Pacific	0.05*	0.05·
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Log absolute latitude	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Desert (middle latitude)		−0.05
		(0.04)
Landlocked		−0.01
		(0.02)
Island		−0.00
		(0.03)
R^2	0.27	0.31
Adj. R^2	0.19	0.18
Num. obs.	151	134

Reference region is Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

Table 3.3: Onset of conflicts over territory

3.7.4 Main Results: Armed conflict onset rate, 1946-1988

	Baseline	Geography and climate
Log ISD states	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Log mean EPR groups	0.02*	0.02·
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Log population density in 1500	−0.00	−0.01
	(0.00)	(0.01)
Former colony	−0.01	−0.02
	(0.01)	(0.02)
Historical conflict	0.04	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)
Neolithic revolution	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Area	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.00	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Perc. Rugged		−0.00
		(0.01)
Log agricultural suitability		0.01
		(0.01)
Log exported slaves by land area	0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Latin America and the Caribbean	0.04·	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)
The Middle East and Nother Africa	0.05*	0.06*
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.03	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Western Europe and North America	0.02	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Asia and Pacific	0.07**	0.07**
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Log absolute latitude	−0.00	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Desert (middle latitude)		0.03
		(0.04)
Landlocked		−0.02
		(0.01)
Island		−0.01
		(0.02)
R^2	0.40	0.44
Adj. R^2	0.32	0.32
Num. obs.	129	114

Reference region is Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

Table 3.4: Armed conflict onset rate, 1946-1988

3.7.5 Main Results: Armed conflict onset rate, 1989-2000

	Baseline	Geography and climate
Log ISD states	0.05*	0.05·
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Log mean EPR groups	0.07**	0.09**
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Log population density in 1500	0.02	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.02)
Former colony	−0.04	−0.05
	(0.05)	(0.06)
Historical conflict	−0.16	−0.18
	(0.16)	(0.18)
Neolithic revolution	−0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Area	0.01	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Ethnic fractionalization	−0.02	−0.07
	(0.08)	(0.10)
Perc. Rugged		0.02
		(0.02)
Log agricultural suitability		0.00
		(0.02)
Log exported slaves by land area	−0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Latin America and the Caribbean	0.04	0.02
	(0.06)	(0.07)
The Middle East and Nother Africa	0.05	0.04
	(0.06)	(0.08)
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.04	0.02
	(0.07)	(0.09)
Western Europe and North America	−0.05	−0.07
	(0.06)	(0.07)
Asia and Pacific	0.09	0.07
	(0.06)	(0.06)
Log absolute latitude	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Desert (middle latitude)		−0.16
		(0.12)
Landlocked		−0.01
		(0.04)
Island		0.01
		(0.07)
R^2	0.24	0.27
Adj. R^2	0.15	0.14
Num. obs.	151	134

Reference region is Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

Table 3.5: Armed conflict onset: 1989-2000

3.7.6 Main Results: Armed conflict onset rate, 2001-2019

	Baseline	Geography and climate
Log ISD states	0.03*	0.03·
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Log mean EPR groups	0.03*	0.04*
	(0.01)	(0.02)
Log population density in 1500	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Former colony	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Historical conflict	−0.05	−0.04
	(0.09)	(0.10)
Neolithic revolution	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Area	0.00	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.03	−0.01
	(0.04)	(0.05)
Perc. Rugged		−0.00
		(0.01)
Log agricultural suitability		−0.00
		(0.01)
Log exported slaves by land area	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.01)
Latin America and the Caribbean	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.04)
The Middle East and Nother Africa	0.09**	0.10*
	(0.03)	(0.04)
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.05	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.05)
Western Europe and North America	0.01	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.04)
Asia and Pacific	0.07*	0.08*
	(0.03)	(0.04)
Log absolute latitude	0.01	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Desert (middle latitude)		−0.08
		(0.06)
Landlocked		0.01
		(0.02)
Island		−0.02
		(0.04)
R^2	0.29	0.30
Adj. R^2	0.21	0.18
Num. obs.	151	134

Reference region is Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

Table 3.6: Armed conflict onset rate, 2001-2019

3.7.7 Alternative Measures of State History

	Wig 2016 JH	Paine 2019 SLPCS	State antiquity AD	Fractal index
Log ISD states	0.05**	0.04**	0.02*	0.03**
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Sum eth. groups with JH > 2	−0.02			
	(0.01)			
Log sum SLPCS groups		−0.02		
		(0.02)		
Log sum PCS groups		0.01		
		(0.03)		
Mean State Antiquity, 0 AD - 1800			0.00.	
			(0.00)	
Alesina et al fractal index				0.00
				(0.03)
Log mean EPR groups	0.02	−0.01	0.04**	0.03**
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Log population density in 1500	0.01	0.00	−0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Former colony			0.00	0.00
			(0.02)	(0.02)
Historical conflict	0.17	0.68**	−0.03	−0.02
	(0.18)	(0.22)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Neolithic revolution	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Area	0.04	0.03	0.00	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Ethnic fractionalization	−0.03	−0.07	−0.00	
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.04)	
Log exported slaves by land area	−0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Latin America and the Caribbean			0.01	0.02
			(0.03)	(0.03)
The Middle East and Nother Africa			0.02	0.03
			(0.03)	(0.02)
Sub-Saharan Africa			0.03	0.02
			(0.03)	(0.03)
Western Europe and North America			−0.02	−0.02
			(0.03)	(0.02)
Asia and Pacific			0.03	0.05*
			(0.03)	(0.02)
Log absolute latitude	−0.02	−0.02.	−0.00	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
R^2	0.63	0.77	0.34	0.31
Adj. R^2	0.48	0.66	0.25	0.23
Num. obs.	36	35	139	149

Reference region is Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

Table 3.7: Alternative explenations

3.7.8 Regional Subsets

Table 3.8: ISD states and civil war onsets by regional subsets

	SSA	Asia	Latin America	MENA	East. Europe and Central Asia	West	Former colonies	Non-West	Early Col.	Dropped
Log ISD states	0.03*	0.02	0.01	0.02	−0.08	−0.00	0.02*	0.03**	0.03**	
	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	
Log mean EPR groups	−0.00	0.22*	−0.01	0.01	0.05	0.00	0.04***	0.04**	0.04***	
	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	
Log population density in 1500	0.01	−0.00	0.00	0.02	−0.01	−0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	
	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	
Former colony	−0.05	0.23'		−0.13	0.05	−0.00		0.02	0.01	
	(0.03)	(0.10)		(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.01)		(0.03)	(0.02)	
Historical conflict	0.54**	0.82	−0.14	−0.28	0.17	0.03	0.20'	0.08	−0.02	
	(0.18)	(0.59)	(0.19)	(0.47)	(0.22)	(0.02)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.07)	
Neolithic revolution	−0.00	−0.00	0.00	−0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	
Area	0.04'	−0.09	−0.00	0.02	−0.00	−0.00	0.00	−0.00	0.00	
	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.00)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	
Ethnic fractionalization	−0.03	−0.01	0.04	0.07	−0.01	0.01	−0.00	0.01	0.01	
	(0.03)	(0.22)	(0.02)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	
Log exported slaves by land area								−0.00		
								(0.00)		
Latin America and the Caribbean								0.03		
								(0.03)		
The Middle East and Nother Africa								0.04		
								(0.03)		
Sub-Saharan Africa								0.04		
								(0.04)		
Asia and Pacific								0.05		
								(0.03)		
Log absolute latitude	−0.01	0.07	0.01	0.06	0.00	−0.00	−0.01	0.00		−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.26)	(0.37)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)
R^2	0.71	0.73	0.38	0.68	0.38	0.49	0.29	0.31		0.28
Adj. R^2	0.63	0.42	0.02	0.28	0.06	0.17	0.24	0.22		0.23
Num. obs.	42	18	23	17	27	24	127	127		146

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $'p < 0.1$

3.7.9 First Stage Mediation Equations

	DV: log mean EPR groups	Log mean EPR excl. groups	GDP per capita 2000	Relative tax capacity (2000)	Prot. missionaries	Years of colonialism
Log ISD states	0.09	0.10	−0.12	−0.00	−0.20˙	18.02
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.01)	(0.11)	(16.93)
Log population density in 1500	−0.02	−0.03	−0.09	−0.01	−0.17*	0.61
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.01)	(0.07)	(12.06)
Former colony	0.26	0.27˙	−0.52˙	−0.02	0.11	66.36
	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.26)	(0.02)	(0.33)	(47.07)
Historical conflict	1.39*	1.69**	0.55	0.01	0.91	397.32˙
	(0.55)	(0.52)	(0.86)	(0.08)	(1.12)	(201.42)
Neolithic revolution	0.00***	0.00***	0.00	0.00	−0.00	−0.01
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Area	0.10**	0.10***	−0.00	−0.00	−0.10	−24.80
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.08)	(18.35)
Ethnic fractionalization	1.02***	0.76**	−0.93*	0.02	0.13	37.72
	(0.27)	(0.25)	(0.42)	(0.04)	(0.40)	(72.82)
Log exported slaves by land area	−0.01	−0.04*	−0.14***	−0.00	−0.05	−3.25
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.00)	(0.03)	(5.21)
Log absolute latitude	−0.17**	−0.12*	0.22*	0.02*	−0.10	−10.06
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.01)	(0.09)	(14.27)
R^2	0.43	0.44	0.46	0.15	0.19	0.14
Adj. R^2	0.39	0.40	0.43	0.08	0.12	0.02
Num. obs.	151	151	150	120	109	74

Reference region is Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

Table 3.9: First stage mediation equations

3.7.10 Second Stage Mediation Equations

	Log mean EPR groups	Log mean EPR excl. groups	GDP per capita 2000	Relative tax capacity (2000)	Prot. missionaries	Years of colonialism
Log ISD states	0.03**	0.03**	0.03***	0.03**	0.04***	0.05**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Log mean EPR groups	0.04***					
	(0.01)					
Log Mean EPR excl. groups		0.05***				
		(0.01)				
Relative tax capacity (2000)				−0.05		
				(0.09)		
Log GDP per capita (2000)			−0.02***			
			(0.01)			
Years of colonialism						0.00
						(0.00)
Prot. missionaries per 10,000					−0.00	
					(0.01)	
Log population density in 1500	0.00	0.00	−0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Former colony	0.01	0.00	−0.01	0.03	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Historical conflict	−0.03	−0.05	0.00	0.03	0.19	0.17
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.18)
Neolithic revolution	0.00	0.00	0.00**	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Area	0.00	−0.00	0.00	0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.05	0.04	0.06
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Log exported slaves by land area	0.00	0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Log absolute latitude	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01·	−0.01	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
R^2	0.27	0.30	0.37	0.24	0.27	0.31
Adj. R^2	0.22	0.25	0.32	0.17	0.20	0.20
Num. obs.	151	151	150	120	109	74

Reference region is Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

Table 3.10: Second stage mediation equations

3.7.11 Models with alternative dependent variables

	Ln onsets	Ln onset rate	Negbin onsets	Raw onsets	Incidence rate	War incidence rate
Log ISD states	0.36***	0.00*	0.35**	2.03***	0.13*	0.03.
	(0.09)	(0.00)	(0.13)	(0.57)	(0.06)	(0.01)
Log mean EPR groups	0.37***	0.01**	0.83***	2.27**	0.19**	0.04*
	(0.10)	(0.00)	(0.19)	(0.68)	(0.07)	(0.02)
Log population density in 1500	0.07	0.00	0.05	0.44	0.03	−0.00
	(0.06)	(0.00)	(0.10)	(0.38)	(0.04)	(0.01)
Former colony	−0.12	0.00	0.08	−0.74	0.03	0.03
	(0.21)	(0.00)	(0.37)	(1.39)	(0.13)	(0.03)
Historical conflict	−0.23	−0.00	1.07	−2.38	−0.21	0.02
	(0.64)	(0.01)	(1.13)	(4.21)	(0.41)	(0.11)
Neolithic revolution	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	−0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Area	0.04	0.00	−0.04	0.17	0.00	−0.00
	(0.04)	(0.00)	(0.07)	(0.25)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.11	0.00	0.13	0.29	−0.01	0.04
	(0.32)	(0.01)	(0.53)	(2.09)	(0.20)	(0.05)
Log exported slaves by land area	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.00)	(0.05)	(0.20)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Latin America and the Caribbean	0.83***	0.00	1.22**	2.90.	0.20	0.06
	(0.24)	(0.01)	(0.40)	(1.60)	(0.16)	(0.04)
The Middle East and Nother Africa	0.96***	0.00	1.32***	4.30**	0.32*	0.05
	(0.23)	(0.01)	(0.36)	(1.49)	(0.14)	(0.04)
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.73*	0.00	1.09*	2.61	0.17	0.07
	(0.28)	(0.01)	(0.47)	(1.86)	(0.18)	(0.05)
Western Europe and North America	−0.09	−0.01.	−0.88.	0.24	0.08	0.03
	(0.22)	(0.01)	(0.50)	(1.46)	(0.14)	(0.04)
Asia and Pacific	0.81***	0.00	1.22***	5.12***	0.56***	0.15***
	(0.23)	(0.01)	(0.35)	(1.49)	(0.14)	(0.04)
Log absolute latitude	−0.00	−0.00	0.01	0.28	0.04	0.02
	(0.08)	(0.00)	(0.12)	(0.55)	(0.05)	(0.01)
R^2	0.51	0.31		0.38	0.30	0.28
Adj. R^2	0.45	0.23		0.31	0.22	0.20
Num. obs.	151	151	151	151	151	151
AIC			586.88			
BIC			638.18			
Log Likelihood			−276.44			
Deviance			158.58			

Reference region is Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

Table 3.11: Alternative dependent variables

3.7.12 Sensitivity test

Figure 3.12 shows how much of the variance in the conflict onset rate and the number of HSEs a potential omitted variable would have to explain in order to render the results insignificant at the $p < 0.05$ level. While similar to an Imbens test, Cinelli and Hazlett (2020) point to several important differences. This test was run on the model using the main control variables, including region fixed effects. Not even a confounder with three times the strength of the mean number of EPR ethnic groups would render the HSE results insignificant. Any omitted confounder would have to be several times stronger than the best predictors of conflict and HSEs in our models.

3.7.13 Additional tests of the state weakness mechanism

Table 3.12 shows associations between the number of ISD states and alternative measures of state weakness to further explore these mechanisms. We use the "State authority over territory" (Territorial capacity), "State fiscal source of revenue" (Fiscal capacity) and "Criteria for appointment decisions in the state administration" (Administrative capacity) variables from the VDEM dataset (Coppedge et al., 2021) as indicators of various dimensions of state capacity. The territorial capacity variable captures the extent to which states control their territories. Higher scores on the fiscal capacity variable indicate movements towards direct taxation of property or income. Lower scores indicate the inability to generate taxation revenue or dependence on natural resource extraction or international aid. Higher scores on the administrative capacity variable indicate movements towards an increasingly impartial recruitment to the bureaucracy based on merit rather than personal ties or patronage. We also test the average GDP level over the 1946-2018 period and the average Polyarchy score over the same period.

Although each of these variables represents a potential alternative mediator, we only show the first-stage equations here. None of these measures of state weakness are highly correlated with the number of ISD states between 1816-1920 and thus do not represent strong contenders for mediators. Overall, we see this as an indication that the links between ISD states and modern internal conflict rates are not well explained by the state weakness mechanism, at least on the country level.



Figure 3.12: Sensitivity test

	DV: Mean Territorial Capacity	Mean Fiscal Cap.	Mean Admin. Cap.	Mean GDP per capita	Mean polyarchy score
Log ISD states	−1.26	0.22$^{\cdot}$	0.11	−0.12	0.03
	(1.02)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.03)
Log population density in 1500	0.42	0.17*	0.15*	−0.11$^{\cdot}$	0.05**
	(0.64)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.02)
Former colony	−2.51	−0.81**	−0.70**	−0.54*	−0.16**
	(2.30)	(0.28)	(0.26)	(0.24)	(0.06)
Historical conflict	−0.29	−1.20	−0.73	0.29	−0.34$^{\cdot}$
	(7.44)	(0.89)	(0.85)	(0.78)	(0.19)
Neolithic revolution	−0.00	−0.00*	−0.00**	0.00*	−0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Area	0.23	0.09$^{\cdot}$	0.05	0.00	0.01
	(0.43)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.01)
Ethnic fractionalization	−2.57	−1.08*	−0.26	−0.46	−0.15
	(3.63)	(0.44)	(0.42)	(0.38)	(0.09)
Log exported slaves by land area	−0.63$^{\cdot}$	−0.04	−0.06	−0.12***	−0.01
	(0.32)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.01)
Log absolute latitude	1.72*	0.28**	0.20*	0.23*	0.10***
	(0.85)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.02)
R^2	0.19	0.34	0.21	0.45	0.37
Adj. R^2	0.13	0.29	0.16	0.41	0.33
Num. obs.	151	151	151	151	151

Averages are measured over the 1946-2020 period (1946-2018 for GDP per capita)

Table 3.12: First stage equations

3.7.14 Secessionism

Here we explore the extent to which the main results reflect an increase in the risk of secessionist movements. The UCDP data differentiates between conflicts with "governmental" and "territorial" incompatibilities, but does not specifically identify secessionist movements (although these are a subset of territorial conflicts). We use data from Griffiths (2016) on secessionist movements active in independent states after 1946 to unpack the relationship between HSEs and secessionism further.

Table 3.13: Descriptive Statistics: HSEs and secessionist movements

HSEs	Onset rate	Incidence rate	Ratio V/NV years	N
0	0.62	11.48	7.67	27
1	1.11	30.96	12.32	50
2	0.63	3.75	3.50	42
3-4	1.34	21.30	4.20	19
5-9	3.20	50.47	4.78	12
10+	4.68	108.44	14.17	7

Table 3.13 shows how the onset and incidence rate vary across levels of HSE presence. The patterns are similar to the main results and those for territorial conflicts in the main paper. The onset rate is low for 0 HSEs, rising for 1 HSE (again, largely because of Myanmar), before dropping and then rising to the highest onset (and incidence) rate for states with more than 10 HSEs. Although the number of observations is small in the category of 10+ HSEs, secessionist movements in these states tend also to be more violent.

Table 3.14 re-runs the main models, but using the onset rate of violent secessionist movements from Griffiths (2016) as the dependent variable. Increasing numbers of HSEs are still positively associated with the onset rate of secessionist movements, but the coefficient is smaller than in the main models (for territorial conflicts) and generally less precisely estimated. We think this supports the idea that the HSE-conflict link is not only a story of secession, but also challenges over government.

	Bivariate	Baseline	Geography and climate
Log ISD states	0.01***	0.00	0.01*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Log mean EPR groups		0.01**	0.01**
		(0.00)	(0.00)
Log population density in 1500		0.00·	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)
Former colony		0.00	−0.00
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Historical conflict		−0.01	−0.01
		(0.02)	(0.02)
Neolithic revolution		−0.00	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)
Area		0.00*	0.00*
		(0.00)	(0.00)
Ethnic fractionalization		−0.00	0.00
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Perc. Rugged			0.00
			(0.00)
Log agricultural suitability			−0.00
			(0.00)
Log exported slaves by land area		−0.00	−0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)
Latin America and the Caribbean		−0.00	−0.01
		(0.01)	(0.01)
The Middle East and Nothern Africa		0.00	−0.01
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Sub-Saharan Africa		−0.00	−0.00
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Western Europe and North America		−0.01	−0.01·
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Asia and Pacific		0.00	0.00
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Log absolute latitude		0.00	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)
Island			0.00
			(0.01)
R^2	0.07	0.30	0.34
Adj. R^2	0.06	0.22	0.23
Num. obs.	157	151	141

Table 3.14: Results: HSEs and secessionist movement onset rates

3.7.15 Historical Conflict

Historical conflict is an important alternative explanation for two reasons. First, historical conflict may lower trust between groups and increase the chances of modern conflict (Besley and Reynal-Querol, 2014). On the other hand, historical conflict may reflect successful state-building, where states with higher levels of historical conflict are more stable and peaceful today because they have already eliminated rivals and established themselves as the most capable state in that territory. This latter explanation is a form of survivorship bias, where modern states with few HSEs are the product of past competition and conflict that has selected out less capable states, leaving more capable states in their wake. To an extent this latter process is a part of our argument. States that emerged after the Second World War were not formed through a more "organic" process of conflict and competition, but through a combination of relatively arbitrary colonial border drawing and decolonization movements. Moreover, these states entered an international system where borders were hard to revise (Herbst, 2014). Unlike European states that had competed with rivals for centuries prior, new states such as Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo or Indonesia were established with many potential rivals, which we argue raises the probability of conflict.

Nonetheless, we wish to separate our study about the conflict inducing effects of HSEs from a story whereby modern conflict is simply reflective of past conflict, whether in the sense that past conflict created more peaceful states, or more conflict-prone states. The variable we use in the main models to control for historical conflict come from the data produced by Dincecco, Fenske and Onorato (2019) who link conflicts in Brecke's (1999) conflict catalogue to modern states. Dincecco, Fenske and Onorato (2019)'a work has several advantages. First, they record conflicts going back to 1400 meaning we can measure conflict levels before the number of HSEs (which we measure in the 1816-1939 period), although many HSEs do have deeper roots in time and post-treatment bias may still be an issue with this variable. Second, the intensity threshold for inclusion in Brecke's catalogue is lower than for other datasets (The Correlates of War, Project Mars) which we think means that these data capture more conflicts in Africa and South Asia, which tend to be under-reported in other sources.

Figure 3.13 shows the distribution of the historical conflict variable.

In the main models we use the percentage of years between 1400 and 1700 as the main control, but here we test additional specifications. First,



Figure 3.13: Historical Conflict (logged), 1400-1799

we use the raw number of conflicts in a country between 1400-1700. Second, we test the square root transformation of this variable to reduce the impact of outliers. Third, we test the square root transformed percentage of years between 1400-1700 and fourth we test the percentage of conflict years between 1400-**1799** to assess whether adding 18th century conflicts changes the results. Finally, we interact our main historical conflict control with the region fixed effects, to allow the impacts of war to vary across regions, as Dincecco, Fenske and Onorato (2019) find in relation to state capacity. Table 3.15 shows the results of these models. Our main results are largely unchanged. Similar to Dincecco, Fenske and Onorato (2019), we find that historical conflict in Africa has has a significantly different association with modern conflict than in other regions.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Log ISD states	0.03**	0.03**	0.02*	0.03**	0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Log mean EPR groups	0.04**	0.04**	0.03**	0.03**	0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Log population density in 1500	0.00	0.01	−0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Former colony	−0.00	−0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Historical conflict	−0.03				−0.05
	(0.07)				(0.12)
Neolithic revolution	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Area	0.00	0.00	−0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.00	−0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Log exported slaves by land area	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Latin America and the Caribbean	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
The Middle East and North Africa	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Western Europe and North America	−0.01	−0.02	−0.01	−0.01	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Asia and Pacific	0.05*	0.06*	0.05*	0.05*	0.05·
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Log absolute latitude	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Log historical conflict				−0.00	
				(0.09)	
No. historical conflicts		−0.00			
		(0.00)			
Log no. historical conflicts			0.01		
			(0.01)		
Historical conflict X Latin America and the Caribbean					−0.24
					(0.43)
Historical conflict X MENA					0.27
					(0.20)
Historical conflict X Sub-Saharan Africa					0.82**
					(0.29)
Historical conflict X Western Europe and North America					−0.04
					(0.14)
Historical conflict X Asia and Pacific					0.05
					(0.12)
R^2	0.32	0.33	0.33	0.32	0.37
Adj. R^2	0.24	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.27
Num. obs.	151	151	151	151	151

Reference region is Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

Table 3.15: Historical conflict controls

Using Project Mars

Systematically collected data on historical conflict with global coverage are rare, and Brecke's conflict catalogue and Dincecco, Fenske and Onorato (2019)'s adaptation are the only source that we are aware of with coverage before 1800. Coverage in the 19th century is better where there are several sources that record wars during this period. Here we draw upon Project Mars (v1.1, (Lyall, 2020)) to construct an alternative measure of historical conflict. The Project Mars data provide information on 826 different participants in conventional wars from 1800-2011. First, we subsetted the data, including only participants in wars from 1800-1900 and only participants within 1000km of the staring battle. Put differently, we are only including wars in the 19th century and only "local" participants in those wars.[7] This excludes cases that would attribute a historical conflict to the United Kingdom when it was fighting in sub-Saharan Africa, for example. We then matched these participating states in Project Mars with states in the ISD data using the Statename variable. Then, we have coded the modern "destination states" for each participant using the information in ISD on the modern locations of ISD states. For states in Lyall (2020) without a matching ISD state, we have coded the modern state in which the participant was located. For each modern state, we then calculated the total number of historical wars that involved a state on that territory. For example, if all participants in a historical war (as indicated by *warnum* in Lyall (2020)) were within the territory of a single modern state, that territory is attributed with one historical war. For example, the Tukolor-Bambara war of 1855 (*warnum* 75) involves the Tukolor empire and the kingdom of Kaarta, both primarily based in modern day-Mali. This conflict started 425km from the capital of Tukolor and 1km from Kaarta and therefore both are retained as "local" participants. Since both participants are located in modern Mali, Mali is attributed with the historical conflict. Some conflicts involve "local" participants located in different modern states. For example the Durrani Empire and the Sikh Kingdom fought several wars between 1813 and 1822. The Durrani Empire is in modern day Afghanistan and the Sikh empire in modern-day Pakistan. Both of these states were "local" participants, located less than 1000km from the starting battle, and in this case, both Afghanistan and Pakistan are attributed with a historical conflict.

[7] The results are very similar if we use smaller distance thresholds, specifically, 500km and 100km

This approach to measuring historical conflict has some advantages. Primarily, wars in Project Mars are linked to specific states in the ISD, meaning that if our results are best explained by historical states fighting wars then there is a closer conceptual link between states and wars using these data. Brecke, for example, includes wars that may not involve states and are less relevant to explaining the HSE-conflict link we outline in the paper.

The main downside is that this measure introduces post-treatment bias because the wars are measured contemporaneously to statehood (i.e between 1800-1900). More wars probably occur in territories with more states to fight them and to the extent that states cause wars we are controlling for part of the association between HSEs and modern conflict. Empirically this appears to be the case as both the historical conflict indicator from Dincecco, Fenske and Onorato (2019) and the measure based on Lyall (2020) are highly correlated with the number of HSEs. Table 3.16 shows some simple associations between the levels of historical conflict and the number of HSEs, controlling for population density in 1500, the timing of the neolithic revolution, land area, latitude and slave exports by land area.

	Brecke Conflicts 1400-1799	Project Mars 19th C. Wars
Log ISD states	0.02^{*}	0.28^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.08)
Log population density in 1500	0.04^{***}	0.04
	(0.01)	(0.04)
Neolithic revolution	−0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Area	0.03^{***}	0.07^{*}
	(0.00)	(0.03)
Log exported slaves by land area	−0.00	0.01
	(0.00)	(0.02)
Log absolute latitude	0.02^{**}	0.04
	(0.01)	(0.06)
R^2	0.49	0.16
Adj. R^2	0.47	0.12
Num. obs.	152	152

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\cdot}p < 0.1$

Table 3.16: Historical conflict and historical states

Symbols and institutions, for example, could be more potent or established when historical states have a history of fighting conventional wars. Nonetheless, the historical conflict- modern conflict link is an alternative mechanism to our proposed mechanism and this approach represents an al-

ternative method to account for the impacts of historical conflict that complements the analyses with the Brecke data.

Figure 3.14 shows the spatial distribution of wars in the 19th century, using the data from Lyall (2020).



Figure 3.14: Historical Conflict in Project Mars (logged), 1800-1900

Table 3.17 shows the main results replacing the historical conflict indicator used in the main analysis with the indicator of 19th century wars from Lyall (2020).

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Log ISD states	0.03**	0.03**	0.03**	0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Log mean EPR groups	0.03**	0.03**	0.03**	0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Log population density in 1500	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Former colony	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Neolithic revolution	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Area	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Log exported slaves by land area	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Latin America and the Caribbean	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
The Middle East and North Africa	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Western Europe and North America	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Asia and Pacific	0.05*	0.05*	0.05*	0.05*
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Log absolute latitude	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Log no. 19th C Wars	−0.00			
	(0.01)			
Log no. 19th C Wars (500km threshold)		0.00		
		(0.01)		
Log 19th C war-participant war-days			−0.00	
			(0.00)	
Log 19th C war KIA				0.00
				(0.00)
R^2	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.32
Adj. R^2	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24
Num. obs.	151	151	151	151

Reference region is Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

Table 3.17: Historical conflict controls (using Project Mars)

Conclusions

The preceding discussion leads us to conclude that historical conflict does not confound our main results, at least as far as we can empirically test that with the measures available. More historical states *are* correlated with more historical conflicts, but historical conflicts do not appear to be strongly correlated with modern armed conflicts. This is likely because wars in the past have conditional effects on state-building and future peace. Some wars, especially those in Europe, probably helped create cohesive, modern states that had overcome important state-building challenges prior to the 20th century. Here, past wars may be associated with future peace. But in other regions, primarily Africa, historical wars may have eroded trust between social groups that transmits into the modern world as weaker states and higher conflict risks (Besley and Reynal-Querol, 2014; Dincecco, Fenske and Onorato, 2019). Our results reflect this - only in Africa do we find that historical conflict is correlated with modern conflict. Historical states may be correlated with historical wars, but they don't appear to be strongly correlated with modern wars. Nonetheless, when we do allow the impacts of war to vary by region, our main results hold up, suggesting that even in Africa, historical warfare and historical statehood may have different impacts on the propensity to modern conflict.

3.7.16 Table of cases

Country	Actor	Onset year(s)	Mechanism	Narrative
Ethiopia	ALF	1975-1991	Networks	State tried to curtail traditional Sultanate (Shehim, 1985).
Uganda	Buganda	1966	Networks	Power sharing agreement broke down leading to a breif civil war (Tuck and Rowe, 2005).
DR Congo	State of Katanga	1961	Networks	Formal institution (king) led bid for secession of the Katanga region. (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, 99-100)
DR Congo	BDK	1989	Symbols	

DR Congo	Mining State of South Kasai	1960	Networks, symbols	Traditional chief led secession movement of South-Kasai region, and resurrected the royal title of the Luba Empire. (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, 105)
Indonesia	GAM	1976	Networks	Networks with deep roots to the HSE of Aceh used for rebel recruitment (Aspinall, 2009).
Mali	FLM	2015	Symbols	The name of the group refers to an HSE (Brown, 1968).
Mali	MUJWA	2011	Symbols	The groups seeks to revive the jihad of a HSE (Zenn, 2015).
Nigeria	Ansaru	2009	Symbols	The groups seeks to revive the jihad of a HSE (Zenn, 2015).
Libya	CLA	2012	Networks, symbols	The groups name refers to a short lived kingdom in Eastern Libya and the group elected a descendent of the former king as their leader (Ahram, 2019).
India	ULFA	1979	Symbols	The group frequently invokes the Ahom kingdom and the chairman claims to be a prince eligible for the long defunct royal title (Mahanta, 2013; Goswami, 2014)
India	UNLF, KCP, PREPAK	1979	Symbols	Manipuri insurgent groups used the name of the historical kingdom (Kangleipak) and fought against the "forced merger" of between India and the princely state of Manipur (Pettersson et al., 2021)
Pakistan	BLF, BLA	1948, 1974, 2004, 2019	Symbols, networks	Low scale insurgency following forced accession of the Khan of Kalat. Khan redeclared independence in 1958, and the new khan announced the creation of the Council of Independent Balochistan in 2009 (Ahmad and Najish, 2017)

China	ETIM	2008	Symbols	East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) seeks to revive the historical state of East Turkistan (Pettersson et al., 2021; Soloshcheva, 2017)
China	Tibet	1950, 1956, 1959	Symbols, networks	Tibetan insurgents aim to restore the independence of the historical state of Tibet (Pettersson et al., 2021)
India	Sikh insurgents	1983	Symbols	Sikhs seek to establish the independent state of Khalistan, referring to a long history of Sikh statehood, famously led by Rajit Singh in the 19th century (Pettersson et al., 2021)
Somalia	SSDF, Puntland	1982	Networks	Following the first civil war in Somalia, Puntland declares itself an autonomous region within federal Somalia. The elite has close ties to the old Majeerteen sultanate elite (Wimmer, 2018, 111-112)
Nigeria, CHA	Boko Haram	2009	Symbols	Founder of Boko Haram aims to restore Islamic rule with reference to the pre-colonial states of Kanem-Borno and the Sokoto Caliphate (Barkindo, 2016; Zenn, Barkindo and Heras, 2013)
Malaysia	Sultanate of Sulu	2013	Symbols, institutions, networks	Sultanate of Sulu claims historical territory in Sabah, leading to fighting with Malaysia (Pettersson et al., 2021)
Philippines	MILF	2013	Symbols	The Moro Islamic Liberation Front uses the examples of the Sultanate of Maguindanao and the Sultanate of Sulu to justify demands for independence (Tuminez, 2007, 81)

Sudan	Darfuri rebel groups	2003	State weakness	Darfuri rebel groups launch an insurgency against the central government in Khartoum. The Darfur region is comparatively weak and undeveloped in part because the historical Sultanate of Darfur was ruled indirectly during colonialism while Khartoum and it's surrounds were the site of colonial state and infrastructure investments (O'Fahey, 2008, 299)

Communal Violence and the Legacy of Pre-Colonial States

Abstract

Within the communal violence literature recent authors have stressed the potential conflict inducing effects of precolonial states, while others have emphasized the potential conflict reducing effects of local institutions associated with prior statehood. We address this apparent puzzle by arguing that an initial reduction of commitment issues and inter-group security dilemma introduced by pre-colonial states set in motion a positive feedback loop of increased trade, reduced information problems, increased relative gains from continued cooperation, and a legacy of mixed ethnic settlement patterns. In support of the proposed mechanism, we find that more precolonial state presence is associated with higher levels of ethnic fractionalization, and while precolonial states could cause more state based violence we find a general conflict reducing effect on communal violence. This effect is particularly strong in East Africa.

This paper is in review for publication and is therefore not included.

This paper was co-authored with Ole Magnus Theisen.

After Forever: Pre-Colonial States and Civil Conflict

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between the presence of pre-colonial states and post cold war civil conflict. I argue that pre-colonial state presence can be conflict inducing or reducing depending on the relationship between the pre-colonial and post-independence states. To test this argument the paper introduces the Geo-ISD data set, which maps the borders of 82 independent states in Africa in the 1800-1914 period. I use these data to create a topographic measure of state presence. Proxying the relationship between the pre-colonial and post-independence state using the distance from the post-independence capital, the article finds that higher levels of pre-colonial state presence are conflict reducing in areas surrounding modern capital cities, which is consistent with greater continuity of traditions and institutions associated with statehood that are inherently conflict reducing. In areas further away from the post-independence capital, higher levels of pre-colonial statehood are found to be conflict inducing, consistent with the view that state legacies can represent powerful symbols of past independence useful for mobilization and leave behind regional elite networks with the potential to violently resist centralisation efforts of national governments.

This paper is not yet published and is therefore not included.

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